Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 840South Africa
Raphaely and Another v Octagon Financial Services (Pty) Ltd (22/1508) [2022] ZAGPJHC 840 (24 October 2022)
Headnotes
“[141] In the instant case much depends in this regard on the question whether the particulars of claim must be read as basing the condition upon a finding in the Sun action (which can only be contemplated as a future contingency when the present claim is being advanced). If this is so, then the exception must be sound, based on the principle recognised in Nel,[4] that the cause of action, whether conditional or not, must be complete as at the date of institution of proceedings.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Raphaely and Another v Octagon Financial Services (Pty) Ltd (22/1508) [2022] ZAGPJHC 840 (24 October 2022)
Raphaely and Another v Octagon Financial Services (Pty) Ltd (22/1508) [2022] ZAGPJHC 840 (24 October 2022)
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sino date 24 October 2022
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NUMBER : 22/1508
REPORTABLE
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES NO
REVISED
In
the matter between:
LYNNE
ADRIENNE
RAPHAELY
First Plaintiff
LYNNE
ADRIENNE RAPHAELY
N.O.
Second Plaintiff
and
OCTAGON
FINANCIAL SERVICES (PTY)
LTD
Defendant
(Registration
No. 2003/032077/07)
J
U D G M E N T
VAN
DER BERG AJ
[1]
This is an exception by the defendant to the plaintiffs’
particulars
of claim. The parties are referred to as in the action.
# PLEADINGS AND EXCEPTION
PLEADINGS AND EXCEPTION
[2]
The relevant paragraphs of particulars of claim read as follows:
“
THE
FIRST ACTION
1.
The First Plaintiff is LYNNE ADRIENNE RAPHAELY…
2.
The Second Plaintiff is Lynne Adrienne Raphaely N.O.…cited in
her capacity as the executor of
the estate of the late JOHN MICHAEL
ABRO…
3.
…
4.
…
5.
During or about 2020, the Willem Trust (of which the First Plaintiff
is a trustee) brought
an action against Octagon relating to Octagon’s
breach of its agreement between it and the Willem Trust (the “
First
Action
”).
6.
On 1 February 2021, Octagon
[the
defendant]
delivered a plea in the
First Action in which, inter alia, it:
6.1
Denied contracting with Willem Trust
6.2
Alleged that, during or about January 2019, it contracted with the
First Plaintiff and John Michael
Abro (“
Abro
”) in
their personal capacities to ‘provide the First Plaintiff and
Abro with advice in connection the investment of
funds’.
6.3
Pleaded out the terms of this agreement.
7.
The Willem Trust denies that the First Plaintiff and Abro contracted
with Octagon in their
personal capacities, and contend that the
agreement was at all times between the Willem Trust and Octagon.
8.
However, and in the alternative to the First Action, the Plaintiffs
issue this action ex
abundante cautela,
in the event that this
Court finds that the agreement was indeed concluded with the First
Plaintiff and Abro in their personal capacities
.”
(The
underlining appears in the particulars of claim.)
[3]
The plaintiffs then allege in paragraph 9 that “
the First
Plaintiff, Abro and Octagon
” concluded an oral agreement.
The terms of the agreement are pleaded, and it is alleged that the
defendant breached the agreement
and that the plaintiffs suffered
damages.
[4]
The defendant served a notice in terms of rule 23 to remove causes of
complaint. Thereafter, there having been no reaction from the
plaintiffs, the defendant filed a notice of exception containing four
grounds of exception. However, the defendant only proceeds with the
third and fourth grounds of exception, set as follows in the
notice
of exception:
“
3.
THIRD GROUND
3.1
In paragraph 8 of the particulars, the plaintiff has alleged that in
the alternative to the first action (the
one lodged by the Trust
according to the plaintiff), the plaintiff has issued the current
action
ex
abundate cautela
in the event that
the above Honourable Court finds that the agreement was indeed
concluded with the plaintiff and Abro in their
personal capacities.
3.2 The
plaintiff should be aware of whether or not she entered into an
agreement with the defendant. It is improper,
prejudicial to the
defendant and abusive of the process of Court for this question to be
left for the Court to decide. Whether
or not an agreement was
concluded between the plaintiff and the defendant is fully within the
knowledge of the plaintiff.
3.3
In the circumstances, the particulars are vague and embarrassing,
alternatively
,
lack averments necessary to sustain a cause of action and the
defendant would be prejudiced were it required to plead thereto.
4.
FOURTH GROUND
4.1 In
paragraph 8 of the particulars, the plaintiff has alleged that the
current action has been instituted out
of the abundance of caution
(in the event that this Court finds for the defendant in the action
between the Trust and Octagon on
the question of the agreement).
4.2
However, nowhere has the plaintiff sought to explain the basis on
which the current action is an alternative
to the first action. This
is more so when regard is had to the fact that on the plaintiff’s
own version, there is an action
between the Trust and the defendant.
4.3
Consequently, the particulars are vague and embarrassing,
alternatively
,
lack averments necessary to sustain a valid cause of action and the
defendant would be prejudiced were it required to plead thereto.”
# TEST ON EXCEPTION
TEST ON EXCEPTION
[5]
The test for upholding an exception has been described as follows
(footnotes
omitted):
“
If
evidence can be led which can disclose a cause of action or defence
alleged in a pleading, that particular pleading is not excipiable.
A
pleading is only excipiable on the basis that no possible evidence
led on the pleadings can disclose a cause of action or defence…The
test on exception is whether on all possible readings of the facts no
cause of action is made out. It is for the excipient to satisfy
the
Court that the conclusion of law for which the plaintiff contends
cannot be supported upon every interpretation that can be
put upon
the facts.”
[1]
[6]
In
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hunkydory Investments 194
(Pty) Ltd
and another
(No 1)
2010 (1) SA 627
(C) the court
said:
“
It
is trite law that an overly technical approach by the court with
regard to exceptions and irregular procedure should be avoided.
The
court does not look too critically at a pleading.
Whether a pleading is
vague and embarrassing on the ground of lack of particularity depends
on whether it complies with the provisions
of the relevant rules of
the Uniform Rules of Court. Prejudice to a litigant faced with an
embarrassing pleading lies ultimately
in an inability to prepare
properly to meet an opponent's case.”
[7]
Certain
allegations expressly made may carry with them implied allegations
and the pleading must be so read.
[2]
DISCUSSION
Third
Ground
[8]
In its third ground it is stated that the plaintiffs should be aware
of
whether or not they entered into an agreement with the defendant,
and that it is improper and prejudicial to the defendant for this
question to be left for the court to decide as this is fully within
the knowledge of the plaintiffs. This may be a relevant factor
at the
trial in considering the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims but
has no bearing on whether the particulars of claim are
vague and
embarrassing or whether they sustain a cause of action. This ground
of exception cannot succeed.
Sun
International
[9]
The defendant’s attack is aimed at paragraph 8 of the
particulars
of claim. Mr Hoffman (for the plaintiffs) relied on
Vlok
N.O. v Sun International
2014 (1) SA 487
(GSJ) (“
Sun
International”),
whilst Ms Segeels-Ncube (for the
defendant) sought to distinguish the case.
[10]
In
Sun
International
the plaintiff instituted an action against Sun on the basis that Sun
made an offer in terms of section 124 of the Companies Act.
Sun
adopted the attitude that it was not the offeror. The plaintiff then
issued summons against SISA and pleaded:
[3]
“
If,
on a proper construction and interpretation of the Offer, it is in
fact found that SISA was the actual offeror and not Sun (via
SISA),
then the plaintiffs claim the relief sought herein from SISA in its
own capacity and this summons is therefore conditional
on that
finding.”
[11]
The particulars of claim in that matter proceeded to record an
intention to apply for the
consolidation of the action against Sun
and the action against SISA in terms of rule 11. The summons against
SISA was met with
an exception.
[12]
Snyckers AJ said:
“
[133]
No doubt the the formulation of the claims against SISA strikes
one
as anomalous…”
[134]
It is not only the conditionality of the claim that is
potentially problematic. It is the fact that the only allegations in
the
claim as to who the actual offeror is are destructive of the
claim itself.
”
[13]
The court however dismissed the exception and held:
“
[141]
In the instant
case much depends in this regard on the question whether
the
particulars of claim must be read as basing the condition upon a
finding in the Sun action (which can only be contemplated
as a future
contingency when the present claim is being advanced). If this is so,
then the exception must be sound, based on the
principle recognised
in
Nel
,
[4]
that
the cause of action, whether conditional or not, must be complete as
at the date of institution of proceedings.
[142]
I do not think the particulars need to be construed thus.
If the
instant claim is to be read in isolation, then it can reasonably be
taken as pleading an
implicit alternative allegation
that SISA
is the offeror. 'If it be held' that this is indeed so, would then,
in the absence of any consolidation of the actions,
be a finding in
this action, not in the Sun action.
[143]
The finding would relate to a state of
affairs existing as at the time action was instituted - who was, at
all material times, the
offeror?
There
would then be no problem entailed by advancing a claim conditional
upon a future contingency.”
(Own
emphasis)
[14]
Sun International
applies to this action: there is an
“implicit alternative allegation” in the particulars of
claim that Abro and the
first plaintiff in their personal capacities
were the contracting parties. If the court does make such a finding
in the first action,
it will be a finding that they were at all
material times the contracting parties.
Consolidation
[15]
In
Sun
International
the plaintiff pleaded that it had an
intention
to consolidate the actions, but the actions had not yet been
consolidated at the stage when the exception was argued.
[5]
This allegation does not appear in the particulars of claim in this
matter. The defendant argued that this omission renders the
particulars of claim excipiable, and relied on the following dictum
in
Sun
International
:
“
[146]…It
seems to me that Nel must be regarded as sufficient support
for allowing the plaintiffs to achieve joinder
by the clumsier route
of amendment and consolidation, at least in circumstances where one
is not viewing the SISA action in isolation.
Had I viewed the
SISA claim in isolation, I would have upheld the exception.
”
[16]
The present (i.e. second) action is not viewed in isolation. The
plaintiffs have sufficiently
pleaded the first action, the connection
between the first action and second action, and the reason for having
issued the second
action. An intention to consolidate does not form
part of the plaintiffs’ cause of action, and the omission of
such an allegation
also does not render the particulars of claim
vague or embarrassing.
[17]
It is so that the possibility exists that
consolidation may not be effected and that the second action may for
some reason be set
down before the first action (which may be
problematic for the plaintiff), but this is not a relevant
consideration in determining
whether the plaintiffs’
particulars of claim are excipiable at this stage.
Finding
in First Action
[18]
In
Sun International
the claim was dependent on a finding in
the other action that SISA was the actual offeror (i.e. a positive
finding)
and
that Sun was not the offeror (i.e. negative
finding), whereas the plaintiffs’ claim in this matter is
conditional only on
a positive finding in the first action. It was
submitted that for this reason
Sun International
is
distinguishable.
[19]
It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that this argument does
not fall within the
ambit of the notice of exception. For purposes of
this judgment I shall assume that it does.
[20]
In my view
Sun International
is not for this reason
distinguishable. The plaintiffs have made their claim conditional
that a specific finding should be made
in the first action (i.e. that
the agreement was indeed concluded with the First Plaintiff and Abro
in their personal capacities).
The plaintiffs have limited their
claim by
not
making it conditional on a finding that the
Willem Trust was
not
a contracting party. If anything, the
plaintiffs may have prejudiced themselves by defining the condition
so narrowly. This does
not render the particulars of claim
excipiable.
# CONCLUSION AND ORDER
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
[21]
Accordingly, this case is not distinguishable from
Sun
International
and the exception stands to be dismissed. Costs
should follow the result.
[22]
The following order is made:
The exception is
dismissed with costs.
VAN
DER BERG AJ
APPEARANCES
For
the plaintiffs
:
Adv
J M Hoffman
Instructed
by:
Tanners
& Associates
For
the defendant
:
Adv
L
Segeels-Ncube
Instructed
by:
Webber
Wentzel
Date
of hearing: 19 October 2022
Date
of judgment: 24 October 2022
[1]
Harms, Civil Procedure in the
Superior Courts, para B23.3
[2]
Jowell
v Bramwell-Jones and Others
1998 (1) SA 836
(W), at 902H-903E
[3]
Paragraph 14
[4]
Nel is a reference to
Nel
v Silicon Smelters (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander
1981
(4) SA 792
(A) to which extensive reference was made in
Sun
International
[5]
Paragraph 15
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