Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 863South Africa
Radebe v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (21713/2017) [2022] ZAGPJHC 863 (31 October 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
31 October 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Radebe v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (21713/2017) [2022] ZAGPJHC 863 (31 October 2022)
Radebe v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (21713/2017) [2022] ZAGPJHC 863 (31 October 2022)
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sino date 31 October 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
CASE
NUMBER:
21713/2017
REPORTABLE: NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
REVISED.
31 October 2022
In
the matter between:
VUKUYIBAMBE
STANLEY RADEBE
Plaintiff
and
PASSENGER
RAIL AGENCY OF SOUTH AFRICA
Defendant
#####
##### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
WILSON
AJ
:
1
On 11 December 2015, the Plaintiff, Mr. Radebe, was trying to
board a train running from Daveyton to Johannesburg. The train
started
to move while he was boarding. That caused Mr. Radebe to
fall. Mr. Radebe apparently fell with some force, because he
sustained
a midshaft fracture of his right radius and ulna. The
radius and the ulna are the two principal bones of the forearm. Such
was
the severity of the fracture that Mr. Radebe had to remain in
hospital for four days, after which implants had to be inserted into
his forearm to allow the bones to set properly.
2
The defendant, PRASA, which ran the train that Mr. Radebe was
trying to board, tendered to pay half of Mr. Radebe’s damages
arising from the injury. Mr. Radebe accepted that tender in
settlement of the merits of this claim.
3
The question before me is what those damages are. Mr. Radebe
claims compensation for general damages for pain and suffering, loss
of amenities of life and disability. He also seeks special damages
for loss of earning capacity, and medical expenses arising from
the
injury.
General
Damages
4
Mr. Radebe continues to suffer intermittent pain in his right
forearm and shoulder, a weak right-hand grip and some surgical
scarring.
He also suffers pain in his upper-front chest area and in
his right shoulder. Mr. Radebe has spent most of his working life as
a labourer, but he can no longer labour for as long or as hard as he
used to. He will continue to experience pain attributable to
his
injury for the foreseeable future.
5
It was conceded during trial that Mr. Radebe has pre-existing
arthritis in his right shoulder. It was suggested, in
cross-examination
of Themisile Mahlangu, an occupational therapist
called on Mr. Radebe’s behalf, that at least some of the pain
Mr. Radebe
experiences arises from the arthritis, and not from his
injury. Ms. Mahlangu very fairly accepted that it is not possible to
apportion
the pain Mr. Radebe experiences between his arthritis and
his forearm injury.
6
Ms. Mahlangu pointed out, however, that the arthritis did not
appear to prevent Mr. Radebe from performing fairly strenuous labour
before his forearm injury. After that injury, however, his capacity
to hold down labouring work has been markedly affected. He
is
undoubtedly weaker, slower and less able to tolerate sustained
physical exertion because of the pain following from the forearm
injury. In other words, it is the forearm injury that has made the
critical difference to Mr. Radebe’s quality of life. The
arthritis was painful but tolerated. Mr. Radebe’s pain after
the forearm injury is debilitating.
7
To the extent that his pre-existing arthritis is material at
all to the assessment of Mr. Radebe’s general damages, its
relevance
lies in the fact that it was a burden he was able to carry
before his forearm injury. Whether because of the direct physical
consequences
of the forearm injury, or because of its indirect effect
on his ability to cope with his arthritis, it is the forearm injury
rather
than the arthritis that has caused the damage for which Mr.
Radebe now seeks recompense. The full extent of the damage probably
lies in the interaction between the forearm injury and the arthritis,
but I need not consider that relationship in any detail.
The dominant
cause of Mr. Radebe’s pain, suffering, disability and loss of
amenity is the forearm injury, not the arthritis.
8
It follows that Mr. Radebe has suffered a fairly severe injury
that has had a significant impact on his quality of life. Both Mr.
Chabane, who appeared for Mr. Radebe, and Mr. Molojoa, who appeared
for PRASA, relied on awards of general damages following forearm
injuries like Mr. Radebe’s. Those awards established a range of
possible figures, starting at R150 000, and rising to
R540 000
(R746 000 having taken into account adjustments to the value of
money since that award was made). Mr. Molojoa’s
suggested an
award at the bottom end of this scale.
9
Mr. Chabane did not motivate for an award at the very top end,
probably because the case that marked it involved a much younger man,
who worked as a mechanic, and lost a great deal of fine motor skill
because of the injury. The injury prevented him from pursuing
a job
he clearly loved, and cast him into a significant depression (see
Mohlaba v Road Accident Fund
[2016] ZAGPPHC 12 (21 January
2016). Consequences of that nature have not been established in this
case.
10
I am nonetheless satisfied that, on the facts that have been
proved, the quantum of general damages to be awarded to Mr. Radebe
should be on the upper end of the range established in argument. I
can find no reason not to accede to Mr. Chabane’s submission
that an award of R600 000 would be fair and reasonable in the
circumstances.
Loss
of earning capacity
11
Because of the way the evidence developed at trial, the
computation of Mr. Radebe’s loss of earning capacity is
significantly
more difficult. Loss of earning capacity claims usually
follow a well-trodden evidentiary path. That path starts with a
medical
assessment of the nature and severity of the injury, before
an occupational therapist identifies the physical and mental deficits
the injury caused. Those deficits are then considered by an
industrial psychologist, who establishes the range in which the
plaintiff
was earning before the injury, the earnings the plaintiff
could reasonably have expected to attract had the injury not befallen
them, and the range of earnings, actual and expected, now possible
after the injury. The picture is completed with actuarial
calculations,
which take the earnings evidence and compute the
plaintiff’s likely loss. In the case of future earnings, a
“contingency”
value approximates the diminution of the
plaintiff’s earnings attributable to unforeseeable but likely
hazards we can all
expect the future to hold. That value is deducted
from the future earnings loss predicted purely as consequence of the
injury.
12
In this case, though, no actuarial evidence was placed before
me. Actuarial reports had been procured on Mr. Radebe’s behalf,
but PRASA did not admit them, and no joint minute of actuaries was
filed. For reasons that remain obscure, Mr. Chabane closed his
case
without leading an actuarial expert. PRASA closed its case without
leading evidence.
13
While an industrial psychologist did testify, his evidence
must be treated with a degree of circumspection. The witness in
question,
Clement Bell, was not the only author of the industrial
psychologists’ report that he sought to authenticate. The lead
author
of the report was Dr. Zurayda Shaik. The report was compiled
under her direction, and she signed the joint expert minute of
industrial
psychologists placed before me by agreement between the
parties. Dr. Shaik was not called to give evidence, however.
14
A further reason to treat Mr. Bell’s evidence with some
caution is that – as he readily accepted – he did not
actually examine Mr. Radebe. That was done by one of the report’s
other authors. Mr. Bell’s contact with Mr. Radebe
was limited
to a brief exchange when Mr. Radebe came to Mr. Bell’s offices
to be examined by someone else. It is not clear
whether Dr. Shaik
herself ever actually met with Mr. Radebe.
15
The available material on which to compute an award for loss
of earning capacity is accordingly limited to the evidence of Ms.
Mahlangu,
the joint minutes of the orthopaedic surgeons, occupational
therapists and industrial psychologists, and those portions of Mr.
Radebe’s industrial psychologists’ report on which I can
safely rely.
16
None of this means that I can decline to make an award. “[I]f
it is certain that pecuniary damage has been suffered, the Court
is
bound to award damages” (
Hersman v Shapiro & Co
1926
TPD 367
at 379).
Actuarial evidence, though
generally helpful, is not necessary before an award for loss of
earning capacity is made. When considering
a loss that will arise in
future a court “must do the best it can on the material
available, even if the result may not inappropriately
be described as
an informed guess” (
Anthony v Cape
Town Municipality
1967 (4) SA 445
(A)
at 451B). Where actuarial evidence is not available, a judge is not
precluded from making “a round estimate of an amount which
seems to him to be fair and reasonable” even if “[t]hat
is entirely a matter of guesswork, a blind plunge into the
unknown”
(
Southern Insurance Association v Bailey
NO
1984 (1) SA 98
(A), at 113H).
17
I have already summarised the nature of Mr.
Radebe’s injury, and much of what Ms. Mahlangu had to say about
it. The only additional
relevant observation that Ms. Mahlangu
contributed was that Mr. Radebe’s pre-injury working life was
characterised by regular
employment as a manual labourer. His
post-injury working life was much spottier, and was marked, in at
least one instance, by his
resignation from a job as a general worker
because he was simply not up to its physical demands.
18
The joint minute of industrial
psychologists records that Mr. Radebe’s pre-injury earnings
were likely above the median point
for unskilled manual labourers
(paragraph 1.12 of the joint minute). Although the joint minute is
not clear on this point, median
annual earnings for a manual labourer
in 2015 appear to have been R18 600. The top of the scale was
R53 500. The joint
minute also records that Mr. Radebe’s
reported pre-injury earnings were R1200 a fortnight, or R28 800
per year. Mr.
Radebe was working more or less full time –
putting in 189 hours per month (paragraph 1.7 of the joint minute).
19
Mr. Radebe was 44 years old at the time of
the injury. Although he was unemployed at that point, this was
because his most recent
contract had just ended. There is no
suggestion that he would not have found another within a reasonable
time. The joint minute
of industrial psychologists records that the
parties agree that Mr. Radebe had reached his “career ceiling”.
In other
words, he would have continued to earn at about the rate he
did just before the accident, allowing, of course, for inflationary
adjustments (paragraph 1.15).
Mr. Radebe would likely have
retired between 60 and 65 years of age. While the parties’
industrial psychologists were unable
to agree on an exact retirement
age, 63 seems consistent with what they did agree on.
20
It is difficult to say what Mr. Radebe’s post-injury
earning potential is. The job as a general worker paid him R500 per
week,
or R26 000 per year. Although there is some obscurity in
the evidence about exactly how that job came to an end, there is no
real dispute that Mr. Radebe was not up to it. Mr. Radebe reports
that he has also been able to attract R150 per day as a hawker,
selling offal from a market stall, which he does for two days a week.
That would give an annual income of R15 600. There is
no
suggestion that he was unable to cope with the physical demands of
work of that nature and frequency.
21
The evidence is accordingly that Mr. Radebe’s
post-accident earning capacity has dropped from R28 800 per year to
somewhere
in the region of R15 600 to R26 000 per year. The
evidence is that the R15 600 per year earnings arise from a job
that Mr. Radebe can actually do, whereas the R26 000 per year
earnings arising from a job with physical demands that apparently
forced his resignation. I am accordingly inclined to adopt the lower
figure – R15 600 – as representative of Mr.
Radebe’s
actual post-injury earning potential.
22
A reasonable estimate of Mr. Radebe’s post-injury loss
of earning capacity is accordingly the difference between R28 800
and R15 600 multiplied by the number of years between Mr.
Radebe’s injury and his probable retirement. That calculation
yields a figure of R250 800. Adjusted for inflation of around
5.7% over that period, Mr. Radebe’s likely post-injury
loss of
earning capacity is R350 130.
23
To this it is customary to apply a contingency. Contingencies
are far more value-laden and subjective than actuarial reports make
them sound. They are, effectively, a judicial estimate of the impact
that the vicissitudes of life will have on a plaintiff’s
future
earning potential. Those hardships, so it is assumed, would have been
encountered by the plaintiff whether or not they had
been injured,
and should accordingly not be compensated for by the defendant.
24
My calculation not being actuarial in nature, it does not seem
to me to be appropriate to apply a contingency to the figure I have
reached. I have some doubt about my ability, in the absence of any
evidence, to understand, much less quantify, the hardships likely
to
afflict a manual labourer in South Africa, nursing at least two
infirmities that I am aware of, over the course of the second
half of
his working life.
Future
medical expenses
25
The parties agree that Mr. Radebe will require R20 000 to
pay for the removal of the implants currently bonding the fracture
in
his forearm.
26
What remains in dispute is the cost of assistive devices,
therapy and domestic assistance Mr. Radebe will need to enable him to
function with the reduced physical capacity his injury has caused.
Both the need for the devices, therapy and assistance, and their
cost, has been placed in dispute. However, having regard to the
principle stated in
Hersman
,
to which I have already referred, if I am satisfied that a device,
therapy or assistance is needed as a result of Mr. Radebe’s
injury, I am required to award something reasonably approximating
their likely cost.
27
In her report, Ms. Mahlangu set out a range
of assistive devices she believes Mr. Radebe will need to continue to
perform basic
daily chores at home and beyond. Ms. Mahlangu also set
out the nature and cost of future therapy Mr. Radebe will need, and
the
cost of domestic assistance Mr. Radebe will have to rely on if
his current partner is unable or unavailable to provide it for any
reason. Finally, Ms. Mahlangu recommended that provision be made for
a handyman to be paid to assist Mr. Radebe with maintaining
his home.
28
This list of requirements was not in itself
seriously challenged in cross-examination, but it was suggested that
Ms. Mahlangu had
not done a home visit when she should have done, and
that there were people in Mr. Radebe’s household, other than
his current
partner, who could assist Mr. Radebe if need be.
29
Ms. Mahlangu said that she would only
ordinarily undertake a home visit if it was likely that some sort of
renovation to a patient’s
existing home might be necessary.
There was no indication of that possibility in this case.
30
I would have some difficulty in reducing
Mr. Radebe’s award solely to allow for the possibility that he
might be able to rely
on his family’s unpaid domestic labour to
assist him. That labour, while traditionally unpaid, is labour that
would not be
necessary but for Mr. Radebe’s injury. Wherever it
comes from, it is work of value, and ought to be reflected in the
damages
awarded. At the very least, the time Mr. Radebe’s
family spends caring for him is time that they could spend earning
their
own living, or resting after the necessity of going out to do
so.
31
In any event, the parties’ joint
minute of occupational therapists sets out an agreed list of
post-injury therapy, assistive
devices, and other assistance that Mr.
Radebe will require. It also provides a range of costs that attach to
some of the therapeutic
interventions required.
32
Based substantially on these joint minutes,
and on Ms. Mahlangu’s report, Mr. Chabane tabulated and
calculated a total amount
to be awarded for future medical and
related expenses of R228 242. Nothing has been done to cast any
serious doubt on this
calculation, which is reasonable having regard
to the nature and impact of Mr. Radebe’s injury.
Costs
33
The parties agreed that the question of costs should be
addressed in supplementary written submissions to be delivered once
the
value of the award is known.
The
award
34
For all these reasons, I find that Mr. Radebe’s proven
damages amount to R1 178 372 (one million, one hundred and
seventy-eight
thousand three hundred and seventy-two rand). PRASA is
liable for half of that amount.
35
Accordingly, I make the following order-
35.1 The
defendant will pay R589 186 (five hundred and eighty-nine thousand
one hundred and eighty-six rand) to the
plaintiff.
35.2 The
defendant will pay interest on that amount, at the prescribed rate,
to run from 14 November 2022 until the
day it is paid.
35.3 The
parties will make written submissions on the appropriate costs order
by no later than 7 November 2022. Those
submissions must be e-mailed
to the Registrar of Wilson AJ and uploaded to the entry for this case
on the Caselines system.
S
D J WILSON
Acting
Judge of the High Court
This
judgment was prepared and authored by Acting Judge Wilson. It is
handed down electronically by circulation to the parties or
their
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic
file of this matter on Caselines. The date for hand-down
is deemed to
be 31 October 2022.
HEARD
ON:
3, 4 and 6 October 2022
FURTHER
MATERIAL RECEIVED ON:
14 October 2022
DECIDED
ON:
31 October 2022
For
the Plaintiff:
VJ Chabane
Instructed by
Tsiestsi-Dlamini & Mahlathi
For
the Defendant:
B Molojoa
Instructed by Jerry Nkeli
and Associates
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