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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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[2022] ZAGPJHC 921
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## Phumzile v S (A118/2020)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 921 (15 November 2022)
Phumzile v S (A118/2020)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 921 (15 November 2022)
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sino date 15 November 2022
THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: A118/2020
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED
In
the matter of:
SHABANGU
PHUMZILE
APPELLANT
Versus
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Jordaan
AJ
[1]
The appellant was arraigned in the Regional Court Soweto on the
charge of murder read with the provisions of section 51(2) of
the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997(the CLAA). On 06 May 2016 the
appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to 15
years
imprisonment.
[2]
Aggrieved with his sentence, the appellant lodged an application for
leave to appeal, which leave was granted by the court
a quo
.
[3]
The appellant applied for condonation of the late filing of their
heads of argument, which were due to be filed on 14 September
2022,
but only filed on 28
th
of September 2022. This application
was not opposed by the State. The application for condonation was
granted.
[4]
The gravamen of the appellant’s heads of
argument was that the court
a quo
did not consider the particular circumstances of
the case in the light of the well-known triad of factors relevant to
sentence and
imposed a shockingly inappropriate sentence.
[5]
The jurisdiction of a court of appeal to interfere with the sentence
imposed by a trial court is limited. In S v Bogaards
[1]
Khampepe J stated:
‘
Ordinarily,
sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court. An appellate
court’s power to interfere with sentences
imposed by courts
below is circumscribed. It can only do so where there has been an
irregularity that results in a failure of justice;
the court below
misdirected itself to such an extent that its decision on sentence is
vitiated; or the sentence is so disproportionate
or shocking that no
reasonable court could have imposed it.’
[6]
It was submitted that the court
a
quo
erred
in that it did not consider the traditional factors relevant for
sentence and did not adequately take into account the appellant’s
personal circumstances when imposing the sentence.
[2]
[7] It was conceded by
the respondent that the court
a quo
failed to provide reasons
for the sentence.
[8]
In
Maake
v DPP
[3]
the court stated
:
“
It is not only
a salutary practice but obligatory for judicial officers to provide
reasons to substantiate conclusions.”
[9]
This court is
satisfied
that the court
a
quo
misdirected
itself in that it did not exercise its sentencing discretion
judiciously when imposing sentence, as a creature of statute
the
court
a
quo
failed
to apply the principles laid down in Malgas and the age old triad of
Zinn and gave no reasons for imposing sentence.
We
are thus at large to consider sentence afresh subject to the
sentencing jurisdiction applicable to the Regional Court in terms
of
section 51(2) read with subsection 3(a) of the CLAA
[4]
.
[10] The submissions on
sentence were:
The appellant is a 36
year old first offender, married, father of his two minor children
and a breadwinner to his family, as he
was employed prior to arrest.
[11] The following was
submitted as substantial and compelling circumstances:
There was a fist fight
between the deceased and the appellant, during which the appellant
was overpowered and then ran to the shack.
He was close to his
neighbour who was the deceased. He had the police called, he handed
himself over to the police and co-operated
with police.
[12] The State submitted
the sentence was totally inappropriate no reasons were submitted.
There is clear misdirection. However
the state wanted court to have
regard to the lack of defensive wounds.
[13] The most important
principle at the imposition of sentence is the so-called triad of
Zinn. In S v Zinn
1969 (2) SA 537
(A) AT 540G it was held that the
court should impose a sentence which in its view is appropriate:
“
What has to be considered is the triad consisting of the
crime, the offender and the interests of society”
. It
requires the court to consider the seriousness of the offence, the
personal circumstances of the accused and the public interests
and
exercise a balancing act between these competing interests wherein
equity in consideration should be given to each of these
interests.
[14]
In this particular case the offender is a father of two minor
children. In assessing the most appropriate sentence this court
is
guided by the guidelines proposed in the Zinn triad. However, the
process does not stop there. Section 28 of the Constitution
[5]
protects the rights of the child and the court has to approach this
sentence with that in mind. The fact that the best interests
of the
child are paramount does not mean that they are absolute. Like all
rights in the Bill of Rights their operation has to take
account of
their relationship to other rights, which might require that their
ambit be limited.
[15]
In a case where a primary caregiver sentence is being considered, the
sentencing officer must go beyond the Zinn triad requirements.
It
would be proper, in appropriate cases, to take into account the
impact of imprisonment on dependents. Every child needs the
care and
support and involvement of both parents in their lives. The two minor
children of the offender were in the care and custody of the
appellant and his wife. The appellant was the sole breadwinner for
his family earning R500 to R700 per week as a taxi driver.
[16]
The offender in the circumstances of this case can be said to be an
active present father and participant in his children’s
life.
Bearing
the case of S v M
[6]
in mind the
court finds:
·
That the offender is a primary care giver in conjunction with his
wife
·
That the children will be adequately cared for
should custodial sentence be considered as their mother as their
co-primary care
giver is their custodial parent and have been
providing for them since the appellant’s incarceration,
balancing their rights
with those of the deceased who lost his right
to life
·
The best interests of the children are protected
should a custodial sentence be considered
[17]
Holmes JA held in
S
v Rabie
[7]
punishment
should ‘fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to
society, and be blended with a measure of mercy according
to the
circumstances’. The court needs to exercise a value judgment in
order to determine if substantial and compelling circumstances
do
exist to justify deviation.
[8]
[18]
In considering the appropriateness or otherwise of
the sentence, I have regard to the nature and circumstances of this
case while
considering factors stated hereunder.
Seriousness of the
offence
Murder
is undeniably a heinous crime; it defiles the sanctity of life and
right to life as enshrined in the Constitution
[9]
.
In this particular case it robbed the deceased of his life and his
wife of her partner and protector. She will never see her beloved
husband nor have the comfort of his support again. The biggest threat
to our hard won democracy is serious and violent crimes of
which
murder is the pinnacle one of them.
The interests of
society
In
this case involve a broad interest in maintaining societal confidence
in the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system
exists to
serve the interest of the community; and punishment, as an integral
part of that system exists for that purpose. In R
v Karg
[10]
the court held: “It is not wrong that the natural indignation
of interested persons and of the community at large should
receive
some recognition in the sentence that courts impose, and it is not
irrelevant to bear in mind that if sentences for serious
crimes are
too lenient, the administration of justice may fall into disrepute
and injured parties may feel inclined to take the
law into their own
hands”.
Personal circumstance
of the offender
The appellant is a 36
year old first offender, married, father of his two minor children
and a breadwinner to his family, as he
was employed prior to arrest.
Substantial and
Compelling Circumstances
There
was a fist fight between the deceased and the appellant, during which
the appellant was overpowered and then ran into the
shack. The
deceased followed the appellant. The appellant relying on the case of
S v Peterson and Another
[11]
submitted that the fact that the court found that the murder was
committed with intent in the form of dolus eventualis, may be
a
factor to be taken into account in reaching the conclusion that there
are substantial and compelling circumstances.
Aggravating
circumstances
The deceased was stabbed
in the chest and neck. The appellant was extremely aggressive, he
stabbed the deceased in circumstances
where the deceased intervened
and prevented an assault. The appellant is not young at nearly
40years of age.
[19] Having regard to the
seriousness of the offence, the circumstances under which it was
committed, the court finds that there
are substantial and compelling
circumstances that exist that warrant this Court to deviate from
imposing the minimum sentence of
15years imprisonment as this court
finds that the deceased played a role in his ultimate demise in that
he followed the appellant
after the appellant removed himself from
the scene of their initial physical altercation by running away to
the shack.
[20]
After careful consideration of the totality of the facts, we find
that the imposition of 15years imprisonment on all the factors
cumulatively considered would be disproportionate. We however have
regard to what was stated in Malgas
[12]
that:
“
If
the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the
particular case is satisfied that they render the prescribed
sentence
unjust in that it would be disproportionate to the crime, the
criminal and the needs of society, so that an injustice
would be done
by imposing that sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser
sentence.
In
so doing, account must be taken of the fact that crime of that
particular kind has been singled out for severe punishment and
that
the sentence to be imposed in lieu of the prescribed sentence should
be assessed paying due regard to the bench mark which
the legislature
has provided.”
[21] In the result the
following order is made:
1.
The
appeal against the sentence of 15years imprisonment is upheld.
2.
The
sentence of 15years is set aside and substituted with the following:
‘
The
accused is sentenced to 12years imprisonment’
3.
The sentence set out in paragraph 2 above is
antedated to 06 May 2016.
M.T.
Jordaan
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Johannesburg
I
agree and so order
M.
Mdalana-Mayisela
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Johannesburg
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE STATE:
Advocate A. De Klerk
INSTRUCTED
BY:
National Prosecuting Authority, Johannesburg
FOR THE ACCUSED:
Advocate
L. Mosoang
INSTRUCTED BY:
Legal Aid South Africa, Johannesburg
Date
heard:
14 November 2022
Judgment:
15 November 2022
[1]
[2012]
ZACC 23
;
2013 (1) SACR 1
(CC) para 41
[2]
Appellant’s
HOA para 19
[3]
2011(1) SACR 263 SCA
[4]
Supra
[5]
Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa Act108 of 1996
[6]
2007
(2) SACR 539 (CC)
[7]
1975
(4) SA 855
(A) at 862G-H.
[8]
S
v Vilakazi
2012 (6) SA 353
(SCA)
[8]
paragraph
15
[9]
Ibid
[10]
1961(1)
SA 231 (A)
[11]
2017
ZAWCHC 32
[12]
[2001] para 25I-J ZASCA 30;
[2001] 3 All SA 220
(A)
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