Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 956South Africa
Lord's view Property Owners Association NPC v Member of the Executive Council for the Economic Development, Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development Gauteng Province and Others (43464/2020) [2022] ZAGPJHC 956 (29 November 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
29 November 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Lord's view Property Owners Association NPC v Member of the Executive Council for the Economic Development, Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development Gauteng Province and Others (43464/2020) [2022] ZAGPJHC 956 (29 November 2022)
Lord's view Property Owners Association NPC v Member of the Executive Council for the Economic Development, Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development Gauteng Province and Others (43464/2020) [2022] ZAGPJHC 956 (29 November 2022)
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sino date 29 November 2022
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
43464/2020
REPORTABLE: NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
REVISED: NO
29/11/2022
In
the matter between:
LORD’S
VIEW PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION NPC
Applicant
and
MEMBER
OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR THE
First Respondent
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURE,
ENVIRONMENT,
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT,
GAUTENG
PROVINCE
DEPUTY
DIRECTOR-GENERAL: NATURAL
Second Respondent
RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT GAUTENG
PROVINCE,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AND
RURAL DEVEPLOPMENT
ENVIROSERV
WASTE MANAGEMENT (PTY) LTD
Third Respondent
MINISTER
OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, WATER
Fourth Respondent
AND
SANITATION
JUDGMENT
MANOIM
J:
[1]
This
case concerns an ongoing dispute, now years in the making, between
two neighbours over the further establishment of a waste
pile on a
waste disposal site. The one neighbour is the applicant, the Lord’s
View Property Association NPC. The applicant
is a non-profit company
whose members are the owners of commercial properties on a site known
as the Lord’s View Industrial
Park (“LVIP”).
[1]
The applicant describes the LVIP as “…
a
prime 130-hectare industrial land development located on Allandale
Road providing easy access to both Pretoria and Johannesburg
as well
as O.R. Tambo International Airport.”
The
LVIP is partly tenanted but there is space for it to grow as a home
for future industrial development. The applicant says only
52% of the
land is developed at present.
[2]
[2]
Adjacent to the north and northeast boundaries of the LVIP is the
other neighbour,
the Chloorkop Landfill Site (“CLS”). It
is a large site of some 23 hectares which operates as a waste
disposal site
servicing the cities of Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni. It
has been in operation since 1997 operating under a licence issued
under
the then extant, but now repealed, Environment Conservation Act
73 of 1989. The third respondent EnviroServ is cited because it
owns
and operates the CLS.
[3]
[3]
EnviroServ loads waste it receives from the municipalities into
engineered cavities
in the ground, known as cells, located on the
site. Waste is continuously loaded into these cells until it reaches
a certain height
limit provided by regulation. This height cannot be
exceeded without further regulatory permission. Originally the height
restriction
was 10 meters but in 2016 an additional 15 metres was
approved by the MEC following an appeal.
[4]
Up until 2019 the CLS consisted of six cells known as Cells 1-6.
These cells have all now reached full capacity. So, in 2019
EnviroServ
sought and got permission from the second respondent, the
Deputy Director General of Natural Resource Management in the Gauteng
Province’s Department of Agriculture and Rural Development.
(the DDG) to establish a further cell. This cell is known as
Cell 7.
Whether it was established lawfully is the subject of this
application.
[5]
[4]
Part of the reason the applicant is aggrieved is that the DDG did not
hold a public
process to approve the construction of Cell 7. The DDG
followed an authorisation process set out in 1997 licence which did
not
require a public hearing. The applicant says this approach was
wrong – instead, the DDG should have followed the licensing
process set out in the requisite environmental legislation which does
require a public hearing. The applicant states it only came
know of
this once the construction of Cell 7 had commenced.
[6]
There followed a long series of interactions between the applicant,
EnviroServ and the DDG which I do not need to detail. After
this
process proved inconclusive, the applicant appealed the DDG’s
approval decision to the first respondent (“the
MEC”). On
the 23 September 2020 the MEC wrote to say that the appeal had been
dismissed and gave her reasons for doing so.
[5]
EnviroServ then commenced operations at Cell on 2 November 2020. With
the exception
of a cessation during the Covid period, EnviroServ has
continued to operate Cell 7 since then. Although it was only
authorised
to operate Cell 7 until August 2021, it was then given
permission to extend operations until August 2022. This means that as
of
the date of this decision Cell 7 is no longer in operation which
means it is not receiving any further waste.
The
application
.
[6]
This application was brought on 14 December 2020. It seeks to review
the decisions
of the DDG to grant the approval and the MEC to dismiss
the appeal. The application comprises two parts. Part A is an urgent
interdict
to prevent the further operation of Cell 7pending the
review. I did not hear the urgent application which curiously was
heard after
I had heard the present matter by another judge. Its
outcome is not in the record, but I assume that it was unsuccessful
or otherwise
this would have been brought to my attention.
[7]
What I am deciding then is Part B. Part B reviews the two decisions
(i.e. that of
the DDG and MEC) on several grounds. Five grounds of
review are set out in the founding affidavit, but some overlap and
they can
be summarised as follows;
a.
Errors of law; essentially that the decision was made in terms of the
terms of
the licence not the statutory requirements;
b.
Errors of process; there should have been a public participative
process based
on the legitimate expectations of the applicant;
c.
Errors of fact; relevant factual considerations were not considered
[8]
Only EnviroServ has opposed the application. The other three
government respondents
have filed a notice of intention to abide.
However, the MEC filed what he termed an explanatory affidavit. He
states that he filed
the affidavit on behalf of all the government
respondents.
[7]
What he seeks to do is to explain how the decision was made to
emphasise that it had been made carefully. Although not conceding
the
decisions were made unlawfully, the government respondents leave for
the court to decide the question of errors of law. In
particular,
whether the 1997 licence permitted EnviroServ to construct Cell 7 by
following the process set out therein.
Review
grounds.
(i)
Errors of Law
[9]
In 1997 EnviroServ was granted a licence to operate a landfill site
at CLS. This followed
a public process. The site had previously been
used as a quarry and for that reason was considered suitable to use
as a waste site
The licence was granted in terms of the Environment
Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (ECA) a statute that has since been
repealed. Since
that date several what I term ‘new order’
environmental statutes have passed that have a bearing on this
activity.
It is also common cause that despites it’s repeal, a
licence issued under the ECA is grandfathered under the new
legislation.
The primary dispute is whether the construction of Cell
7 involved an “expansion’” of activities that
required
EnviroServ to either get a new licence or an amendment to
its existing licence. This is the applicants’ argument. Both
involve
a public process. EnviroServ contends that it did not need to
do so as the 1997 the licence allowed it to develop the site as long
as it followed the provisions of the licence for doing so, which it
says it did.
[10]
The applicant starts its argument situating the dispute in the
context of the environmental right
set out in Section 24 of the
Constitution. Section 24(b)(i) states that:
“
Everyone has
the right to have the environment protected, for the benefit of
present and future generations, through reasonable
legislative and
other measures that prevent pollution and ecological degradation.”
[11]
There follows an observation that the relevant legislative measures
are those that have been
enacted after the date on which the licence
we are concerned with was issued. As the applicant put it in its
heads of argument:
“
It is of no
moment that the original permit was granted in terms of the ECA
because subsequent constitutional and statutory developments
have
strengthened the position.”
[12]
This is not to suggest that the licence is no longer valid. It is
common cause that it is. Rather
what the applicant argues is that
these legislative developments buttressed by the Constitutional
right, create the context for
a purposive approach to be followed in
interpreting the legislation. What this means for the applicant is
that the legislation
must be read expansively, to suggest a new
licence process was required, while at the same time it opts for a
narrow reading of
the licence to suggest that its variation provision
cannot be relied on to permit the type of expansion contemplated by
Cell 7.
[13]
In contrast to the environmental rights approach adopted by the
applicant, EnviroServ adopts
a property rights approach. It contends
it has a valid licence that albeit granted under now repealed
legislation has been extended
under the new legislation. This gives
it a vested right to conduct its activities in terms of its licence.
But this did not mean
it was unregulated. Rather the construction of
Cell 7 was an activity regulated by a provision of the licence which
required it
to get the permission after following the requisite
procedure. It had to submit engineering drawings of Cell 7 to the
satisfaction
of the DDG. This it did and the permission was granted.
Whilst this did not entail public participation as would a full blown
licence
amendment, it was nonetheless according to EnviroServ a
compliant process and one that still met the objectives of proper
pollution
control regulation.
[14]
It goes on to characterize the applicant’s approach - posing as
a public interest champion
of surrounding communities - as cynical, a
fig leaf for a purely commercial interest it has as an association of
commercial property
developers. Of course, EnviroServ has also sought
to champion itself as a promoter of public interest, albeit of
different stakeholders,
the city metros who need a place for their
waste storage and waste pickers who earn their livelihoods from their
work on site.
Again, this public interest is entirely consonant with
its own commercial interest as the owner of the site. Thus, since
both sides
are able to advance equally compelling public interest
claims, neither can rely on the public interest as an interpretive
factor
to tilt the balance in its favour.
[15]
Section 24 of the Constitution as I observed earlier contemplates
legislation being enacted to
prevent pollution and ecological
degradation. Two such statutes are the National Environmental
Management Act 107 of 1998 ("NEMA")
and the National
Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008 ("NEMWA")
[16]
The key statute the applicant relies on is NEMWA. The date of its
commencement was 1 July 2009.
The Act works this way. In terms of
section 19 the Minister responsible for environmental affairs may
list waste management activities
that have or are likely to have a
detrimental effect on the environment. If an activity meets this
definition, then in terms of
section 20 it must be undertaken in
terms of a licence if “a licence is required for that activity”
[17]
In the regulations the Minister has listed two activities that the
applicant seeks to rely on.
[8]
The first is the definition of ‘
construction’.
I have not quoted this definition because the second, which is the
definition of “
expansion”
is more pertinent to its argument. ‘
Expansion
‘is
defined to mean:
"(…) the
modification, extension, alteration or upgrading of a facility,
structure or infrastructure at which a waste
management activity
takes place in such a manner that the capacity of the facility or the
volume of waste recycled, used, treated,
processed or disposed of is
increased".
[18]
The applicant argues that the Cell 7 construction meets this wide
definition of what constitutes
expansion
. Since it does
EnviroServ was obliged to comply with the terms of the NEMWA
regulations. This to be succinct requires a public
process to be
followed. It does not matter, says the applicant, if Cell 7 is
regarded as requiring a new licence or an amendment
to the existing
licence because:
“
In either case,
either a basic assessment process or a scoping and environmental
impact reporting process was required to be carried
out in terms of
the NEMA EIA regulations of 4 December 2014, as amended. This was
plainly not done prior to the grant of the 2019
Cell 7 Approval.”
[19]
But EnviroServ argues that the DDG did not purport to approve a
licence or licence change in
respect of Cell 7. Rather the official
acted in terms of clause 3.3 of the 1997 licence which provides as
follows:
“
Construction
and
further developments
within the Site which
are not shown on figure 4 of the approved plan … dated
September 1997, can only be undertaken by the
Permit Holder after
specified engineering plans have been provided to and approved by the
Regional Director.”
(My emphasis)
[20]
A further provision in the licence required that the construction was
carried out under the supervision
of a suitably qualified person.
Other provisions in the licence make it clear that future development
on the site was contemplated
by the licence. Thus, since EnviroServ
got the necessary permission from the DDG and had its plans drawn up
by a firm of engineers
(the same firm who had the original plans
drawn in 1997 and referred to in the licence) it had complied with
the necessary regulatory
requirement.
[21]
In the debate between the parties the applicant characterises Cell 7
as an
expansion
because that is the language of the NEMWA
regulation whilst EnviroServ refers to it as a
development
so
that it fits the language of the licence condition as I underlined it
above.
[22]
It may appear from this that the debate is about which must be
complied with; the new requirements
of NEMWA read with the NEMA
regulations, versus the provisions of the pre-existing 1997 licence
provisions, issued under the now
repealed Environment Conservation
Act.
[23]
But the debate is not that stark. NEMWA contemplates this situation.
In terms of section 81(1)
there is a transitional arrangement which
states:
“
Despite the
repeal of section 20 of the Environment Conservation Act by this Act,
a permit issued in terms of that section remains
valid subject to
subsections (2) and (3).”
[24]
Then section 81(5) of NEMWA states:
“
During the
period for which a permit issued in terms of section 20 of the
Environment Conservation Act continues to be valid, the
provisions of
this Act apply in respect of the holder of such a permit, as if that
person were the holder of a waste management
licence issued in terms
of this Act.”
[25]
Moreover section 12(2)(c) of the Interpretation Act states:
“
Where a law
repeals any other law, then unless the contrary intention appears,
the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege,
obligation or
liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any law so repealed”
[26]
EnviroServ says these provisions prevail. If they prevail it argues
the issue is settled. The
DDG and by extension the MEC have not acted
unlawfully. If the legislature had regarded the old ECA licensing
regime as deficient
it would not have enacted these transitional
measures in section 81 of NEMWA. I agree with these contentions.
[27]
The applicant also alleges that because the operation of Cell 7 would
in its view lead to the
discharging of wastewater, a licence would be
required in terms of the
National Water Act 36 of 1998
. This was the
reason that the fourth respondent the Minster of Human Settlements
Water and Sanitation was cited as a respondent
although no relief was
sought against the Minister. It is common cause that EnviroServ does
not have such a licence. It contends
it did not require this licence
for its activities. Nevertheless, it contends that the DWS, the
Department of Water Affairs licensing
authority, was “
integrally
involved in Cell 7’s design, construction and operation”
.
(ii)
Errors of fact
[28]
The further ground of review is that the first and second respondent
did not properly apply their
minds to the facts.
[29]
The applicant contends that:
“
There was a
complete absence of any investigation of the environmental impacts of
the development of Cell 7 and the changes required
to associated
infrastructure. The NEMA principles, which require consideration of
cumulative impacts, socio-economic considerations
and the impact on
the health and well-being of surrounding communities of the decisions
was not considered or was inadequately
considered and incorporated in
the decision-making process.”
[30]
Two aspects are raised here. The absence of an environmental impact
investigation and second,
consideration of the socio economic impacts
for surrounding communities. The first issue is contested on the
facts. It appears
from both EnviroServ and the government
respondent’s affidavits that the environmental impact was fully
investigated. Details
are given on the work done by the consulting
engineers who prepared the drawings, and the second respondent.
Indeed, the government
respondent makes the important point that Cell
7 was based on improved technology than its predecessors, and thus
more environmentally
compliant than they were. Based on
Plascon
Evans
I must accept EnviroServ’ s version here.
[31]
The socio economic argument is based on the impact of the future
undeveloped 48% of the site.
The applicant puts up estimates of
future economic loss due to its impact on employment and future rate
revenues to Ekurhuleni
if this property development does not take
place. However, this assumption that none will take place requires
taking the most extreme
view of future events. Second, it ignores the
fact that CLS already exists with its six other cells. If some future
tenants or
developers are put off by the LVIP it is more likely that
it is the existence of a waste site that puts them off, not the
development
of Cell 7. Moreover, as EnviroServ notes, Cell 7 exists
on the far side of the CLS that is furthest away from the applicant.
(iii)
Legitimate expectations
[32]
An argument is also made that the applicant had a legitimate
expectation that due its past interactions
with EnviroServ and the
authorities about the site closing in August 2021. Whatever that
maybe that is now moot. The site I was
advised closed at the end of
August 2022.
(iv)
Process failures
[33]
The process failures relate to the lack of a hearing or public
process. But if the development
took place in terms of the licence
condition as I find that it did, no public process was required. In
any event even if I am wrong
on this point the appeal to the MEC
constituted a full appeal of all the issues
de
novo
and in this sense, there has been no process failure even if one was
required to be a public process.
[9]
Conclusion
[34]
The essence of this application is whether EnviroServ could construct
Cell 7 in terms of its
existing licence or whether notwithstanding,
it was still required to amend that licence and hence follow a public
process. That
requires reading the new legislation up and the licence
provisions down. EnviroServ rely on vested rights. The exercise of
interpreting
a licence issued under now repealed legislation against
the values set out in succeeding legislation is like trying to fit a
square
peg into a round whole. I accept that alternative readings are
arguable. However, at a textual level there is nothing in the text
of
the new statutes that suggests that mere reliance on the licence
variation provisions is insufficient compliance with later
legislation.
[35]
Even if one adopts a more purposive approach to the regulation of
pollution, the licence variation
still required a form of approval
which required compliance with pollution standards as they are now.
The affidavit from the MEC
makes clear that a high standard of
pollution control was required of Cell 7 and that technically it was
an advance on the previous
cells. What may be lacking in the process
was the public input. But that at its highest was about the
socio-economic effect of
the future development of the applicant’s
property. But whatever the answer may be to that speculative
question, Cell 7 is
on the portion furthest away from it. It is also
situated on an existing landfill site that has been duly licenced. It
is not a
new development. The LVIP commenced development only in
2013. Its developers would have been well aware that CLS was a waste
site.
[36]
But even if I am wrong on my legal conclusions there is a major
problem with the relief sought.
Cell 7 is no longer operative. It may
still be standing but even if it was found that its expansion was
unlawful it is by no means
clear what the remedy would be. The
applicant does not deal with this. The existing waste pile cannot be
wished away. If it is
to be removed where to? At this stage of the
history of the site once an interdict to its continued operation had
failed the most
that the applicant might still want to achieve is a
structural remedy of the
Allpay
variety i.e. for a court to supervise its decommissioning.
[10]
But that relief is not on the papers and would in any event be
premature since it would need to re-engage the regulator and other
interested parties such as the two Metros. Nor would there be any
value in a declaratory order as an expression of censure for
the
actions of EnviroServ. EnviroServ is not a polluter who should have
to face responsibility for its own actions. It has followed
the
conditions of its licence and the government respondents accept that
it has. Moreover, EnviroServ has not created the waste.
The residents
of the surrounding metros have. That waste has to go somewhere and
CLS is a licensed waste fill site and has been
since 1997.
[37]
It maybe that what was behind this litigation was, as EnviroServ
speculates, is not Cell 7, but
a proposed future development of the
CLS, known as the Northern Expansion. But that development is not
before me. As EnviroServ’
s counsel correctly points out, that
is a fight for another day.
Costs
[38]
The third respondent is entitled to its costs. The government
respondents did not seek costs
and abided.
ORDER: -
[39]
In the result the following order is made:
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The application is liable for the costs of
the third respondent.
N. MANOIM
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION
JOHNANNESBURG
Date of hearing: 30 May
2022
Date of final
submissions: 17 June 2022
Date of judgment: 29
November 2022
Appearances:
Counsel for the
Applicant:
A Gabriel SC
W Shapiro SC
Instructed by.
Moore & Associates
Counsel for the Third
Respondent
F Barrie SC
Instructed by:
Nicholas Smith Attorneys
Shepstone & Wylie
Attorneys
[1]
The owners are described as, inter alia, comprising “blue
chip” companies.
[2]
Of
the remaining 48%, 22% is owned by the Lord Trust Developers and 26%
to other developers to whom the land has been sold.
[3]
Given
that there are four respondents in this matter I will for
convenience refer to them by name.
[4]
The
department had refused permission for the height extension in 2015.
[5]
GDARD's
acting Deputy Director General: Natural Resource Management, Mr. L.
Mkwana ("the DDG"), signs and publishes
his "Approval
letter for the proposed development of Cell 7 at the existing [CLS]
in terms of
section 49
of [NEMWA]" ("the 2019 Cell 7
Approval”). This is the first of the two decisions that is the
sought to be impugned
in terms of Part B of the LVPOA's notice of
motion. SAA par 55; r. 53 record, pp 394
[6]
Construction
started on 4 November 2019 and the first sign of knowledge is the
attendance of the LVIP manager attending a meeting
on 22 November
2019. Thereafter the applicants’ attorney became involved.
[7]
The
first, second and fourth respondents.
[8]
GNR
921 in GG 37083 of 29 November 2013, as amended.
[9]
See
Wings
Park Port Elizabeth Pty Ltd v MEC, Environmental Affairs, Eastern
Cape and Others
2019(2) SA 606 (ECG) paragraphs 43-44 where the court discusses
whether a deficiency of natural justice can be cured on appeal,
holding that there is no hard and fast rule to say it cannot, rather
it depends on the circumstances of each case.
[10]
AllPay
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief
Executive Officer, South African Social security Agency and
Others
2014 (4) SA 179
(CC).
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