Case Law[2026] ZAGPPHC 11South Africa
Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy v Industrial Zone (Pty) Ltd and Others (52347/2020) [2026] ZAGPPHC 11 (5 January 2026)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
5 January 2026
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy v Industrial Zone (Pty) Ltd and Others (52347/2020) [2026] ZAGPPHC 11 (5 January 2026)
Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy v Industrial Zone (Pty) Ltd and Others (52347/2020) [2026] ZAGPPHC 11 (5 January 2026)
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sino date 5 January 2026
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case
No: 52347/2020
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED:
5
January 2026
In
the matter between:
THE
MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES
AND
ENERGY
Applicant
and
INDUSTRIAL
ZONE (PTY) LTD
First Respondent
CENTRAL
RAND GOLD SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Second Respondent
(in
liquidation)
WELCOME
NORMAN JACOBS NO
Third Respondent
JOHANES
HENDRIKUS DU PLESSIS NO
Fourth Respondent
MINISTER
OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND TOURISM
Fifth Respondent
and
RIVERLEA
MINING FORUM
Intervening Party
In re:
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (PTY)
LTD
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES
AND
ENERGY
First Respondent
CENTRAL
RAND GOLD SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Second Respondent
(in
liquidation)
WELCOME
NORMAN JACOBS NO
Third Respondent
JOHANES
HENDRIKUS DU PLESSIS NO
Fourth Respondent
MINISTER
OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND TOURISM
Fifth Respondent
NEUKIRCHER
J
:
1]
Three applications were set down for hearing:
a)
the first is a counter-application (the recission application) to the
main application
[1]
. It is
brought by the present applicant (the Minister)
[2]
and he seeks to rescind an order granted by Mnyovu AJ on 19 February
2024 (the contempt order). The recission application is brought
in
terms of Rule 42(1)(a);
b)
the second is an application for condonation for the late filling of
the Minister’s replying affidavit in the recission application.
This is opposed by the first respondent (Industrial Zone);
c)
the third is an application by the Riverlea Mining Forum (Riverlea)
for leave to intervene in the contempt application
[3]
and the recission application. Riverlea seeks a wide range of relief
including the imprisonment of the Minister and a structural
interdict
against the Minister.
The
application for condonation
2]
It is appropriate to first deal with the application for condonation
for the late filing of the Minister’s replying affidavit.
When
it was originally filed, the Minister’s two-page replying
affidavit was filed unsigned. Interestingly enough, attached
to that
two-page document were signed affidavits of deponents who set out
certain pertinent facts that were relevant to the issue
of the
recission. It cannot, and certainly no effort was made to argue
otherwise, be argued that the substance of the Minister’s
reasons for the recission application is not set out in those
confirmatory affidavits. In fact, all the Minister’s
short affidavit essentially does is to refer to those annexures and
affirm their content.
3]
The signed version of the Minister’s two-page affidavit was
indeed filed rather late – there was no attempt made by
the
Minister to argue otherwise.
4]
Industrial Zone put up an argument that it had been substantially
prejudiced by the late filing as the recission application had
been
delayed due to the Minister’s non-compliance with the rules.
But the opposition, in my view, is not genuine. Industrial
Zone was
in full possession of the Minister’s replying affidavit (albeit
unsigned) and the annexures thereto (which were
indeed in order). The
fact that the Minister’s signed affidavit was filed late is
simply of no moment and takes the matter
nowhere. It is certainly, in
this instance, of importance to have the Minister’s full
version before the court. The opposition
was, in my view, a waste of
time and money and was completely unnecessary – especially
because the Minister’s affidavit
is two pages long and it
relies on the very annexures that were properly deposed to from the
get-go.
5]
Thus, the application for condonation is granted. Because I am of the
view that the opposition was unreasonable, Industrial Zone
is ordered
to pay the costs of that application, to be taxed in accordance with
Scale C. The costs shall include the costs consequent
upon the
employment of one senior counsel and one junior counsel.
The
recission application
Background
6]
The genesis of the present dispute is to be found in the original
main application which was launched by Industrial Zone against,
inter
alia
, the Minister during October 2020. In that application,
Industrial Zone sought the following relief:
“
1.
That the First Respondent
[4]
be
ordered to initiate the procedures outlines in section 45 and/or 46
of the
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28 of 2002
,
within 30 days of this order, alternatively within such time as the
above Honourable Court may determine, in respect of the mining
operations conducted on the following properties:
1.1
Vogelstruisfontein
231 IQ;
1.2
Langlaagte 224 IQ;
1.3
Mooifontein
225 IQ;
1.4
Vierfontein
231 IQ;
1.5
Diepkloof
319 IQ;
1.6
Paardekraal
226 IQ;
1.7
Turffontein 96 IR.”
(the affected land)
7]
The background to this is the following: Industrial Zone is a
property developer who owns the affected land described above. In
2009 the second respondent in the main application (CRG)
[5]
became the holder of a mining right in respect of the affected
land.
[6]
8]
The Minster approved CRG’s mining right and CRG exercised a
decision to
mine
with the effective date being 27 February 2009.
9]
Amongst other obligations, CMG was obliged to undertake any
rehabilitation in respect of the affected property when it ceased its
mining activities. This obligation also falls to CMG,
inter alia
,
as a holder of the mining right over the affected area.
10]
Industrial Zone states that CMG ceased its mining activities on the
affected land on 2 May 2019 and has taken no steps to rehabilitate
the land. An Independent Financial Provisioning Assessment Report,
dated June 2016, was prepared on behalf of CMG for the purpose
of
providing a rehabilitation guarantee to the Department. According to
this report, R45 million would be required to rehabilitate
the land
mined by CMG.
[7]
11]
CMG was placed in final liquidation on 2 May 2019 and it is therefore
clearly unable to discharge its obligations.
12]
In the main application, Industrial Zone approached court to obtain
relief in terms of
s45
and s
46
of the MPRDA. It is not necessary to
quote
verbatim
the extensive provisions of
s45
and s
46
of the
MPRDA. In essence, these entitle the Minister to recover cost in
respect of,
inter alia
, any prospecting or mining activities
that result in ecological degradation, pollution or environmental
damage or those which are
harmful to the health, safety or well-being
of affected persons.
13]
In the event that the holder of the permit fails to comply with its
obligations under the permit issued, the Minister may then
take steps
to protect the health and well-being of any affected person, to
remedy any ecological degradation and to stop pollution
of the
environment. The Minister may use funds appropriated for that purpose
by Parliament and recover those funds from the permit
holder.
[8]
14]
Section 46
makes provision for the Minister to instruct the Regional
Manager to take the necessary steps if the permit holder, for example
and as in this case, has been liquidated.
15]
The main application was launched in October 2020. It was not opposed
by the Minister and on 29 September 2021 an order
was granted in the
terms set out in paragraph 6
supra
. It is common cause that
the Minister does not seek to appeal that order, nor to rescind it
nor to vary its terms and that the
court is therefore
functus
officio
in respect of that order.
16]
Despite the order being granted on 29 September 2021 it was only
served on the State Attorney by sheriff on 10 June 2022.
No
explanation has been provided by Industrial Zone for this inordinate
delay of almost eight months.
17]
It is common cause that the Minister not complied with the terms of
the 2021 order. The reason for this failure is, however,
in dispute.
18]
On 18 March 2023 Industrial Zone initiated contempt proceedings. The
relief sought by it is the following:
“
1.
That the [Minister] be found to be in contempt of the court order
issued out of this Honourable Court on 28 September 2021
by the
Honourable [Ms] Justice Bokako AJ (“
the
order”)
;
2.
That the [Minister] be committed to imprisonment for contempt of
court for a period of 30 (thirty) days;
3.
That prayer 2
supra
be suspended for a period of 30 (thirty)
days on condition that the [Minister] report to this Honourable Court
within 30 (thirty)
days from date of service of this order and inform
the court on the following:
3.1
what steps have been taken since 28 September 2021 to initiate
the procedures, as outlined in
Sections 45
and/or 46 of the Mineral
and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28 of 2002 (“
the
MPRDA”
);
3.2
what measures have been taken to remedy and/or rehabilitate
the affected land;
3.3
what measures have been taken to recover the rehabilitation
guarantee to rehabilitate the affected land; and
3.4
has the [Minister] and/or the Minister of Environmental
Affairs and/or the Director-General instructed the Regional Manager
(situated in the region of the affected land) to take the necessary
measures to rehabilitate the affected land;
4.
Should the [Minister] fail to comply with this court order, that the
applicant be allowed to approach this court for an
order for the
[Minister’s] committal to prison, on the same papers, duly
supplemented if necessary…”
19]
It is common cause that the contempt application was not served
personally on the Minister. Instead, it was served on
the State
Attorney on 11 April 2023 at 15h35 by the Sheriff. It is also common
cause that the Minster has not been cited in his
personal name, but
rather in his official capacity,
nomine officio
. This is
despite the fact that paragraph 2 of the notice of motion seeks the
direct imprisonment of the Minister for contempt.
20]
On 4 October 2023 the Minister as well as the Minister of
Environmental Affairs, filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose
the
application for contempt. Their instructing attorney is Mr Mathebule
of the office of the State Attorney, Pretoria.
21]
The application for contempt of court was set down for hearing on 19
October 2023. On that date, Lenyai J granted the
following order:
“
1.
The application for contempt of court is postponed to 19 February
2024.
2.
The first and fifth respondents are ordered to file their answering
affidavit(s) in the application for contempt on/before
2 November
2023.
3.
If the first and fifth respondents fail to file their answering
affidavit in the application for contempt of court on/before
2
November 2023, the applicant is entitled to enrol the application for
contempt of court on duly supplemented papers for hearing
on 19
February 2024 on the unopposed motion roll…”
22]
Thus, on the objective facts of this timeline, the contempt
application was served on 23 April 2023 on the Minister’s
representative; the State Attorney entered an appearance to defend on
4 October 2023; on 29 October 2023 the application was postponed
to
afford the Minister an opportunity to file an answering affidavit by
2 November 2023. The Lenyai J order was served on the State
Attorney
on 20 October 2023.
23]
Despite the terms of this order, no answering affidavit was filed and
on 19 February 2024 Mnyovu AJ granted the order
set out in paragraph
18
supra
(the contempt order).
24]
On 27 March 2024 the Minister filed an affidavit titled “
First
Respondent’s reporting affidavit as directed in the order by
Justice Mnyovu AJ dated 19 February 2024”
(the reporting
affidavit). The reporting affidavit states that its purpose is
twofold:
a)
it has firstly been filed to comply with paragraph 3 of the contempt
order; and
b)
it secondly supports the Minister’s recission application in
terms of Rule 42(1)(a).
25]
It is not for this court to decide whether the Minister’s
explanation for his failure to comply with the 2021
order is
adequate. It is however clear from the Minister’s reporting
affidavit that he has not complied with the 2021 order.
What is
common cause, is that this reporting affidavit was filed timeously
and thus the Minister has escaped the consequences of
paragraph 2 of
the contempt order ie the imprisonment provision.
26]
This aside, however, the finding of contempt stands and it is this
finding that the Minister now wishes to rescind.
[9]
27]
According to the Minister, he only became aware of Bokako AJ and
Mnyovu AJ’s orders on 27 March 2024 – this
is the same
date that he deposed to the reporting affidavit. He states that this
is when Mr Pieter Alberts – the head of
the Department’s
Legal Division – brought these proceedings to his attention. He
states:
“
5.
The first when I personally became aware of the main application, the
Order
made by Bokako AJ dated 28 September 2021…the
application for contempt of Court and the Order made by the
honourable Mnyovu
AJ dated 19 February 2024…was on the day
when I signed this affidavit when Mr Pieter Alberts the head of my
department’s
legal division brought these proceedings to my
attention. Mr Alberts’ confirming affidavit will accompany this
affidavit.
6.
At no stage before my signing this affidavit was I personally
advised
of or personally served with, any of the Court proceedings. As
appears from the papers, service was consistently effected
at the
Office of the State Attorney, Pretoria, never on me personally. The
State Attorney at no stage brought any of the Court
proceedings to my
personal attention.”
28]
And in paragraph 21 of his affidavit, the Minister repeats:
“
The
Court proceedings, as I have already stated, were not served on me
personally and also never brought to my attention until the
day when
I deposed to this affidavit.”
29]
In support of the Minister’s allegations, confirmatory
affidavits were filed: one by Mr Vezi and one by Mr Alberts.
Mr Vezi
is the Regional Manager designated by the Minister in terms of 27 of
the MDRPA. He states:
“
5.
The Regional Manager, Gauteng, was first advised of the Bokako Order
in
June 2023 when it was emailed to my Office by the legal department
of the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE”).”
30]
Mr Alberts’ affidavit is a generic confirmatory affidavit.
31]
It was only when the replying affidavit was filed that allegations of
substance emerged from the Minister and Mr Alberts.
The Minister’s
stance remained firm: he was not represented at court on 19 February
2024 when the order of contempt was granted;
he only became aware of
the proceedings on 27 March 2024 when he signed the reporting
affidavit; he never had any intent to act
in contempt of the 2021
order.
32]
Mr Alberts’ affidavit was also more comprehensive. According to
him, he received the 2021 order from Industrial
Zone’s
attorneys on 19 October 2021. His reason for ignoring the main
application is:
“
6.
Although I received prior correspondence from the Office of the State
Attorney
in
June 2021
[10]
in relation to
the main application which was launched in 2020, I have not had sight
of the application which appears not to have
reached my office.
7.
Had I been aware of its contents, I would in all probability have
advised the Department to oppose
the application…”
33]
Thus, according to Mr Alberts:
a)
he was made aware of the impending main application by the State
Attorney in June 2021,
but he made no effort to find out what that
application was or to obtain a copy of it;
b)
he may, or may not, have advised the Department to have opposed it.
34]
This unfortunate
laissez-faire
stance punctuates the State’s
affidavits throughout.
35]
Mr Alberts then states that he attempted to resolve the issues with
Industrial Zone’s attorneys when he was notified
of the court
order but “[u]fortunately due to my workload and other official
commitments and responsibilities, I failed to
attend to this matter
as diligently as I should have”. It is clear that for another
ten months Mr Alberts ignored the order
until on 30 August 2022 the
State Attorney emailed him “requesting the Department to attend
to the matter to avoid a possible
contempt of court application.”
No dates are given as to when any of these events occurred.
36]
But Mr Alberts did not focus on compliance with the 2021 order and
instead focused on an internal appeal filed in respect
of the mining
licenses regarding the affected property. Ten months later, on 13
June 2023, the State Attorney again urged the Department
to attend to
the order and on 15 February 2024 the State Attorney informed him
that the contempt application had been set down
for hearing on 19
February 2024. Mr Alberts states that, despite his request, the
regional office failed to provide him with urgent
instructions. On 19
April 2024 the State Attorney informed Mr Alberts that the order had
been granted.
37]
But interestingly, Mr Alberts does not detail his, or anyone in his
Department’s, efforts to obtain copies of either
the main
application or the contempt application. He also does not explain how
it came about that the State Attorney entered an
appearance to defend
on behalf of both Ministers without a specific instruction to do so –
this especially bearing in mind
that the main application was not
defended by the State Attorney. Given the Minister’s version
set out in his reporting affidavit,
this too seems to have been
overlooked.
38]
One must, at this stage, bear in mind that the contempt application
had been served on the State Attorney on 11 April
2023. Thus it is
difficult to conceive how, on 13 June 2023 when it had been in
possession of the contempt application since April
2023, the State
Attorney only asked the regional office to prioritize and process an
internal appeal - that had been filed in respect
of the mining
license on the affected land - to avoid any possible contempt of
court application, and failed to urge that the Department
furnish him
with instructions.
39]
Mr Alberts again emphasises:
“
17.
The Minister only became aware of the main application and the
contempt of court order when I brought it to
his attention on the day
he deposed to the reporting affidavit…”
40]
He also states:
“
33.1
I confirm having received the correspondence, emails and phone calls
referred to in these paragraphs. As
explained in the beginning of
this affidavit, I was hopeful that the matter would be resolved
internally. Also… operational
matters of this nature is
normally not brought to the Minister’s attention until such
time as the Department submits to him
a recommendation for his
consideration. As explained, my workload regrettably did not allow me
to attend to this matter as diligently
as I would have hoped…”
and
“
21.2
…[I] confirm that the Minister only became aware of the main
application and the contempt of court
application when I requested
him to depose to his reporting affidavit…”
41]
Mr Mathebula, the State Attorney who is the attorney of record in
this matter, also deposed to a confirmatory affidavit.
His affidavit
can only be described as containing the bare bones of an explanation.
There are no call notes, no emails, no letters
sent to either Mr
Alberts or anyone else in the Department or the Minister, attached.
He states:
“
35.
The court proceedings were bought to the attention of Mr Pieter
Alberts who explains what happened on his side. I understood
that Mr
Alberts was dealing with the matter.
36.
I knew that the application for contempt was enrolled for hearing on
19 February 2024 and I proceeded to court on that
day to oppose the
matter, but I was unfortunately delayed.
37.
By the time I arrived in the motion court of Mnyovu AJ, I was
informed that an order had already been taken against the
[Minister]
and that the court file had been uplifted by [Industrial Zone’s]
legal representatives presumably to have the
order issued by the
Registrar.
38.
I immediately approached that Office where I encountered Adv
Groenewald and his attorney who had taken the order in my
absence. I
tried to reason with them in an attempt to have the order reversed,
by consent, but they refused.”
42]
It is unfortunate that Mr Mathebula does not explain how he brought
either the main application or the contempt application
to the
attention of Mr Alberts, nor how he came to enter an appearance to
oppose the contempt application, nor how the order granted
by Lenyai
J came to be, nor how it was that he went to court on 19 February
2024, nor why he was delayed.
43]
The court is thus left with all these unanswered questions. But I am
also left with the positive and insistent assertions
by both the
Minister and Mr Alberts that at no stage prior to 27 March 2024 was
the Minister made personally aware of the court
orders or the
application for contempt of court.
44]
Industrial Zone argues that the objective of
s2(2)
of the
State
Liability Act 20 of 1957
is to ensure that the Executive Authority is
afforded effective legal representation by the State Attorney. It
argues that
Section 2(2)
provides:
“
(2)
The plaintiff or applicant, as the case may be, or his or her legal
representative must—
(a)
after any court process instituting
proceedings and in which the
executive
authority of a department is cited as nominal defendant or respondent
has been issued, serve a copy of that process on
the head of the
department concerned at the head office of the department; and
(b)
within five
days after the service of the process contemplated in
paragraph
(a), serve a copy of that process on the office of the State Attorney
operating within the area of jurisdiction of the
court from which the
process was issued.”
45]
It concedes that the application was not served personally on the
Minister but it argues that it was served on the State
Attorney who
represents the Minister and that this suffices.
46]
Whilst all of this is good and well, what Industrial Zone fails to
acknowledge is that the provisions of
s2(2)(a)
of the
State Liability
Act are
equally applicable.
47]
Leaving aside the issues of personal citation and service for a
moment, Industrial Zone clearly failed to comply with
the imperative
condition in
s2(2)(a)
of the
State Liability Act ie
, service on the
head of the department, and this in respect of both the main
application and the contempt of court application.
48]
But Industrial Zone further argues:
a)
that Bokako AJ’s order is attached to the founding affidavit of
the contempt application;
b)
that the Minister defended the proceedings on 4 October 2023;
c)
that the application was postponed because of the notice to oppose
and the Minister was afforded an opportunity to file
answering papers
by 2 November 2023;
[11]
d)
that this order was served by Sheriff and by hand on the State
Attorney and was also emailed to Mr Mathebula;
e)
that the State Attorney being on record for the Minister, meant that
the order was not granted in his absence;
f)
that there were no facts which would have precluded Mnyovu AJ from
granting the order – all the relevant facts were
before the
court at the time.
49]
According to Industrial Zone, the facts demonstrate that the Minister
had knowledge of the orders and the application:
a)
on 6 December 2021 its attorneys addressed a letter to Mr Alberts.
Attached to that letter is the order of Bokako AJ;
b)
follow-up emails were sent to Mr Alberts on 10 February 2022, 26 May
2022 and phone calls were made, but to no avail.
50]
On the Minister’s version:
a)
he was kept in the dark for a period of more than two years
[12]
;
b)
the State Attorney did not act on instructions from him when he filed
the notice to oppose
the contempt application;
c)
the State Attorney did not inform him of the order of Lenyai J;
d)
it appears that the State Attorney was not in possession of specific
instructions, and certainly
not his instructions, when he attended
court on 19 February 2024.
51]
Industrial Zone argues that, on the probabilities, the State Attorney
acted on the instructions of his client, the Minister.
If that is so,
then the Minister must have known of the court orders and failed to
comply with them.
52]
The argument is that once a party is represented, it is no longer
necessary to directly inform the party of the steps
being taken
against them – their legal representative is notified and that
is precisely what occurred here.
53]
Mr Badenhorst argues that although the 2021 order is not in dispute,
this fact alone does not absolve Industrial Zone
from complying with
the procedural requirements of personal citation and personal service
in order to obtain a contempt order.
54]
He argues that in
Matjhabeng
Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd and Others
[13]
the
Constitutional Court emphasized the principle that public officials
cannot be held in contempt of court and face personal consequences,
such as imprisonment, unless they are properly cited in their
personal capacities and served:
“
[92]
The law on joinder is well settled. No court can make findings
adverse to any person’s interests
without that person first
being a party to the proceedings before it. The purpose of this
requirement is to ensure that the person
in question knows of the
complaint to that they can enlist counsel, gather evidence in support
of their position, and prepare themselves
adequately in the knowledge
that there are personal consequences – including a penalty for
committal – for their non-compliance.
All of these entitlements
are fundamental to ensuring that potential contemnors’ rights
to freedom and security of the person
are, in the end, not
arbitrarily deprived.”
55]
Mr Badenhorst also argues that the exclusion of the Minister in his
personal capacity resulted in his exclusion as a party
in the
contempt application and he was therefore absent in every sense of
the word.
[14]
The fact that
the Minister was cited
nomine
officio
as Minister does not cure this defect and therefore the order was
erroneously sought and erroneously granted in his absence.
56]
It was also argued that the 2021 order was served on the Minister 177
days late – the order makes provision that
the Minister is to
comply within 30 days of the order
being
granted
[15]
.
Because it was served so late, the Minister was automatically in
contempt and compliance was made impossible within the stipulated
time period. In my view the argument is specious: it is quite obvious
that, it being served so late, the Minister could never be
held to be
in contempt for that reason alone. Any court would therefore
interpret the order purposively and would expect compliance
within 30
days of service of the order.
57]
But the issue is whether the contempt order is to be rescinded in
terms of
Rule 42(1)(a).
0cm; line-height: 150%">
58]
Mr Maritz argues that the entirety of the State’s affidavits
demonstrate that the Minister was aware of the 2021
order and the
contempt order notwithstanding the fact that he was cited
nomine
officio
and not served personally:
a)
the State Attorney received service of all the applications and court
orders and had sent
them to the Department;
b)
Mr Alberts admitted receiving correspondence from Industrial Zone’s
attorneys together
with the 2021 order;
c)
it is unlikely that Department officials would have kept the Minister
in the dark about all
of this;
d)
the notice to oppose must be construed as having been filed on
instructions of the Minister;
e)
because of this Notice, the status of the contempt application
changed from unopposed to
opposed;
f)
Lenyai J’s order ws served multiple times on the State
Attorney;
g)
it all begs the question: why would the State Attorney attend court
on 19 February 2024 unless
instructed to do so by the Minister?
59]
Mr Martiz argues that the Minister’s version is so untenable
and far-fetched that it should be rejected
[16]
.
He argues that, in any event, the requirement for personal service
and standard of proof as set out in
Fakie
NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
[17]
flow
from the constitutional right to be protected from deprivation of
freedom arbitrarily or without just cause. He argues that
where the
Minister has already complied with paragraph 3 of the contempt order,
the threat of incarceration has been removed and
there are therefore
no consequences that flow from the finding of contempt. There are
therefore no inroads made into the Minister’s
constitutional
right to freedom. All that remains is the finding that he is in
contempt and this order has no teeth.
60]
In any event, so the argument goes, even if I find that the
requirements of
Rule 42(1)(a)
have been met, that does end the
matter: the rule still confers upon the court a discretion –
this is derived from the word
“may” in the rule.
## 61]In
Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into
Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public
Sector Including Organs of State and Others)[18]the
majority court stated:
61]
In
Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into
Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public
Sector Including Organs of State and Others
)
[18]
the
majority court stated:
“
[53]
It
should be pointed out that once an applicant has met the requirements
for rescission, a court is merely endowed with a discretion
to
rescind its order. The precise wording of
rule 42
, after all,
postulates that a court “may”, not “must”,
rescind or vary its order – the rule is merely
an “empowering
section and does not compel the court” to set aside or rescind
anything. This discretion must be exercised
judicially
”
62]
The argument is that it is very clear from the Minister’s
reporting affidavit that he has no intention of complying
with the
2021 order and that he has taken the view that it was wrong on its
merits. Were this court to rescind the contempt order,
it will be a
theoretical exercise because it does not put to bed the 2021 order –
it still stands.
63]
In
Van
Der Merwe v Bonaero Park (Edms) Bpk
[19]
and
Nkosi
v ABSA Bank Ltd
[20]
the courts refused to grant a recission even though the applicants
had met the
Rule 42(1)(a)
requirements.
64]
In
Van Der Merwe
, the court refused to rescind the order
because an eventual re-hearing on the merits would have most likely
resulted in an order
being granted anyway. The court thus found that
the interests of justice would not be served by granting the
rescission.
65]
In
Nkosi
, Vivian AJ stated:
“
36.
Accordingly, it is a judicial exercise of the discretion to refuse to
rescind an order where the
recission will have no practical effect
and merely cause delay. The Court roll is notoriously busy. Litigants
who do not exercise
their right to be heard when properly notified
cannot expect as of right to be granted a recission based on a
dilatory defence
when all that the recission is likely to achieve is
delay…
45.
The conduct of the Applicant creates the impression that the
recission will cause delay,
but no more, the Applicant shows no real
intention to take advantage of the pause created by the notice. He
does not say what he
would have done had he received the notice. It
will simply be another matter clogging the Court’s roll. It
would not be in
the interests of justice to rescind the order.”
66]
And so the argument advanced is that it is not only highly likely
that the Minister knew of the 2021 order, and that he
was represented
when the contempt order was granted, but that this court should not
exercise its discretion in his favour because
it is clear from the
reporting affidavit that he has no intention of complying with the
2021 order and that he is, in every sense
of the word, therefore in
contempt of court.
The
application for intervention
67]
Riverlea is a non-profit company established in terms of the relevant
provisions of the
Companies Act, 2008
to represent the interests of
the Riverlea community in matters pertaining to the mining activities
in the area. It is a development
situated west of Johannesburg which
was constructed in the early 1960’s during the apartheid era as
part of the Group Areas
Act. It was designated primarily for Coloured
communities and is a historically disadvantaged area.
68]
The area is adjacent to Langlaagte, the site where George Harrison
discovered gold in 1886, leading to the Witwatersrand
Gold Rush. This
discovery marked the beginning of extensive mining activities in the
area.
69]
As a result of the disparities caused by the housing policies,
coupled with the environmental degradation and safety concerns
caused
by the mining in the area, the community is plagued with
environmental and safety issues associated with the mining
activities.
According to Riverlea, these have become all the
more difficult because of the mining activities of CRG and because of
the Minister’s
failure to rehabilitate the site since the
closure of the mine and CRG’s liquidation in 2019.
70]
Riverlea seeks leave to intervene (the intervention application) as
an applicant in both the contempt application as well
as a respondent
in the recission application. The notice of motion is extensive. It
not only seeks its and other respondents’
joinder, but it also
seeks
inter alia
the following relief:
“
4.
Prayer two of the order issued by Mnyovu AJ’s order on 19
February 2024 is implemented
within seven days of the grant of this
order and the [Minister] is committed to prison.
5.
Alternatively to prayer three
[21]
above, the following supervisory order is granted:
5.1
The DMRE and the Minister must report to this court within three
months of either the dismissal
or upholding of the
counter-application on:
5.1.1
The appointment of a new contractor to rehabilitate the site because
Amatshe as an applicant for a mining right
is conflicted and cannot
do so.
5.1.2
The integrated rehabilitation planning envisaged for the Langlaagte
site, including complete assessment of the
affected area to determine
the nature and extent of the rehabilitation required and an analyses
of the affected area, evaluation
of specialised rehabilitation option
and all other measures required to restore the open mining pit to a
useable site.
5.1.3
Financial provision for closure of the mine.
5.1.4
The proposed operational phases for progressive rehabilitation
including timeframes for their delivery.
5.1.5
Plans to engage with the community on the rehabilitation of the site.
5.1.6
Measures that will be taken to reverse the environmental degradation
at the site, including addressing water
contamination, soil toxicity,
increased levels of radiation and appropriate dust control measures.
5.1.7
The removal of waste and rubble.”
71]
The intervention application also seeks to join four further
respondents: the Minister of Police, the National Commissioner
of the
South African Police Service (SAPS) the Gauteng Commission of
SAPS
[22]
and Amatshe Mining
(Pty) Ltd. Amatshe is only sought to be joined insofar as it may have
an interest in Riverlea’s relief.
The first three respondents
are sought to be joined because Riverlea argues that they have a
material interest in executing the
order sought that the Minister be
committed to prison. For reasons not relevant to this judgment,
Amatshe has fallen out of the
picture and therefore has no interest
in the relief sought, nor can any relief be sought against it by
Riverlea in these proceedings.
72]
According to Riverlea, the site is plagued by the:
a)
illegal underground and surface mining;
b)
turf wars between the miners;
c)
increase in the crime rate;
d)
destruction of necessary infrastructure such as roads leading to a
local Primary School;
e)
illegal dumping of toxic, hazardous and other waste at the site of
the unrehabilitated pit;
f)
destruction of the historic heritage site, the George Harrison Park;
g)
environmental degradation through increased dust levels, toxic
residue in soil samples, water
contamination, exposure to
exceptionally high levels of radiation at the Primary School and in
the community as a whole resulting
in health issues;
h]
distinct possibility of sinkholes in certain sections of Riverlea
that endanger the welfare
of the community and cause damage to
property;
i]
real risk of the school’s closure because of reduced enrolment
as a result of illegal
mining and the fact that the mining pit has
not been rehabilitated. This threatens both the rights of learners in
the broader community
to access to education and the job security of
teachers.
73]
Riverlea’s direct and substantial interest is rooted in the
violations of the community’s fundamental rights
to
inter
alia
equality, dignity, freedom of security of the person, the
right to life, the right to a safe environment, the right to a health
and well-being, the violation of the best interests of the child
principle and the right to education.
74]
Riverlea argues that its intervention is essential as it is
abundantly clear from the Minister’s reporting affidavit
that
he has no intention of implementing the 2021 order. It argues that it
therefore approaches this court in its own capacity
and in terms of
s38
[23]
of the Constitution to
protect the broader interests of the community. No argument was
presented that Riverlea did not have the
requisite
locus
standi
.
75]
Riverlea argues that the 2021 order is final and binding and that the
Minister has neither sought to appeal it nor review
it nor rescind it
– as already stated, this is common cause before this court. It
also argued that, to date, the Minister
has not complied with the
provisions of that order – this too is common cause. It argues
that there is no reason to excuse
the Minister from complying with
the 2021 order and that the Minister therefore remains in contempt
and must be committed to imprisonment
for contempt of court.
76]
According to it, the two court orders of 2021 and 2024 give effect to
the rights of the Riverlea residents and uphold
the community’s
right to a safe and clean environment which the Minister’s
obdurate stance and refusal to comply with
the 2021 order, put in
danger. Thus, Riverlea’s intervention is aimed at the
enforcement of its rights which it seeks to
do in, for example, the
opposition to the recission application.
77]
Rule 12 provides:
“
Any
person entitled to join as a plaintiff or liable to be joined as a
defendant in any action may, on notice to all parties, at
any stage
of the proceedings apply for leave to intervene as a plaintiff or a
defendant. The court may upon such application make
such order,
including any order as to costs, and give such directions as to
further procedure in the action as to it may seem meet…”
78]
In
Pheko
and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2)
[24]
the Constitutional Court stated:
“
The
test for joinder requires that a litigant has a direct and
substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation, that
is, a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation which
may be affected by the decision of the Court. This view of what
constitutes a direct and substantial interest has been explained and
endorsed in a number of decisions by our courts.”
79]
The Minister argues that Riverlea has failed to make out a case of a
direct and substantial interest in the outcome of
the recission and
contempt applications as:
a)
it was not a party to the main application. As there is no recission
or variation sought of that
order, Riverlea cannot have any interest
in the outcome of the recission application as that focuses on the
contempt application
itself;
b)
Riverlea also cannot be joined in the main application as this court
is
functus officio
in respect of the 2021 order;
c)
that, if a recission is granted of the contempt order, it will put
the parties back in the
position as if the contempt order had not
been granted at all and the parties must then make their argument to
court as to why
the Minister is or is not in contempt of the 2021
order.
80]
But least one forgets, this court is not seized with determining
whether or not the Minister is, in fact, in contempt
of the 2021
order. The Minister is not required to show “good cause”
for the recission for an application under Rule
42(1)(a) and, insofar
as the court “may” grant or refuse a recission, the
merits of the contempt were not argued. In
fact, Mr Maritz
specifically argued that any threat of incarceration was removed
because the Minister had filed his reporting affidavit.
His argument
regarding whether the recission should be granted was aimed mainly at
the issue of whether or not the Minister’s
version regarding
personal knowledge should be accepted or rejected.
81]
In determining whether or not Riverlea has sufficient direct and
substantial interest to intervene in the recission application,
the
purpose would be to give voice to its rights under the Constitution
which it says are directly affected by the Minister’s
non-compliance. It states:
“
The
RMF therefore has a direct interest in the enforcement of Bokako AJ’s
order which seeks to enforce these rights and the
recission of the
contempt order which seeks to sanction the Minister for his failure
to implement such order. The order relates
to the rehabilitation of
land surrounding Riverlea including the land adjacent to the TC
Esterhuysen primary school and upholds
the community’s right to
a safe and clean environment. It cannot be gainsaid that this is a
legal interest.
82]
When considering whether or not Riverlea has a direct and substantial
interest in the enforcement of the 2021 order, it
is important to
bear in mind the following:
a)
firstly, Riverlea’s stated in interests are similar to those of
Industrial Zone which states
in its answering affidavit:
“
18.3
The remedial measures must be commenced forthwith by the [Minister]
because the affected land is in close
proximity to residential areas
and public schools. Unrehabilitated mining land poses a significant
health and safety risk to the
surrounding communities.
18.4
The development of the land by the applicant will lead to several
positive outcomes for the surrounding
communities such as job
creation, reduction in crime and a safe environment. It has been
illustrated by Central Rand Gold that
mining the affected land in
unviable due to numerous environmental factors, primarily the
flooding of the water bin, so I am advised
by my attorneys, that
there would be no justification to grant the mining right to
Amatshe.”
[25]
18.5
In addition, it would be preferable for the surrounding community,
for the land to be rehabilitated
without further delay and made safe
instead of being further mined by Amatshe.”
83]
In my view, the issue is not whether the Minister is in contempt of
the 2021 order as at date hereof – the issue
is whether or not
the contempt order was erroneously sought and erroneously granted in
his absence.
84]
Part of the evaluation is whether the test, set out in
Fakie
NO
and
Pheko
[26]
,
was met: that an order was granted against the contemnor, that he had
been served with the order or had knowledge of it and that
he had
failed to comply with it.
85]
In my view, in order to exercise the discretion vested with the court
under Rule
42(1)(a),
the court must carefully weigh the issues relevant to each case. Each
set of facts is unique. Whilst the overarching principles
set out in
Fakie
NO, Matjhabeng, Pheko (2)
and
Zuma
[27]
set the tone for the backdrop against which the facts are to be
analysed, they give no hard and fast rule for whether a discretion
may or may not be exercised in any given circumstance – that is
for the court adjudicating the matter to decide based on
the facts
before it.
86]
In casu,
in the main application the Minister was cited
nomine
officio
. He is the responsible functionary appointed by the MPRDA
and tasked with overseeing the implementation of the MPRDA. Thus, in
my view, it was entirely appropriate that he was not cited in his
personal capacity in the main application as a mandamus was sought
in
terms of the provisions of s45 and s46 of the MPRDA.
87]
However, when it came to the contempt application, the position is
entirely different. There, the Minister’s direct
incarceration
was sought. Our courts have, on several occasions, emphasized the
crucial importance of personal notice to the contemnor
in these
circumstances: this is in order to bring to his/her notice the
consequences of further non-compliance with the order granted.
The
purpose of personal notice is “…to ensure that the
person in question knows of the complaint to that they can
enlist
counsel, gather evidence in support of their position, and prepare
themselves adequately in the knowledge that there are
personal
consequences – including a penalty for committal – for
their non-compliance”
[28]
88]
Here, it is common cause that this Minister was not cited personally,
was not
served
personally and it also appears that the provisions of
s2(2)(a)
of the
State Liability Act were
not complied with by Industrial Zone.
89]
Whilst the actions of the State functionaries are most certainly
lamentable and are to be frowned upon, the Minister,
Mr Alberts and
the State Attorney have all stated under oath that the Minister only
acquired knowledge on 27 March 2024 when he
deposed to the reporting
affidavit. Perhaps had this issue been referred to trial,
cross-examination may well have revealed that
the Minister had indeed
acquired knowledge at a far earlier date, but no referral to evidence
was sought and it is therefore not
possible to go behind these
statements made under oath.
90]
Certainly, given all the questions surrounding the manner in which
the State handled this matter make Mr Maritz’s
invitation to
reject the Minister’s version as far-fetched and untenable,
very attractive. However, given what I have stated
supra
, I am
of the view that to do so would not be the correct exercise of my
discretion.
91]
I must also take into account that the Minister’s version of
why he has not complied with the order is set out in
his reporting
affidavit. Industrial Zone and Riverlea argue that the Minister’s
explanation is proof of the fact that he
does not intend to comply
with the 2021 order, that he is therefore in contempt and that
therefore to rescind the order would serve
no purpose and is not in
the interest of justice.
92]
But these arguments are not tenable: firstly, contempt must be
discerned at the time that the order for contempt is sought
–
to justify non-compliance with essential substantive prerequisites
ex
post facto
cannot be countenanced. Furthermore, at the outset I
was informed that it was not for this court to delve into the merits
of the
Minister’s reporting affidavit in order to determine
whether or not the reason for non-compliance sufficed. The argument
was that the facts of the reporting affidavit were only relevant
insofar as they related to
Rule 42(1)(a).
0cm; line-height: 150%">
93]
This being so, the merits of the Minister’s defence were
neither fully before this court
[29]
nor were they fully argued. Thus, to invite the court to dismiss the
recission because, in any event, there is no merit in it and
it is
clear that the Minister remains in contempt of the 2021, would amount
to little more than a trial by ambush in this matter.
To dismiss the
application for recission on this basis would, in my view, be an
incorrect exercise of the court’s discretion.
94]
In my view, the finding of contempt in the absence of the important
jurisdictional requirements of personal citation and
personal service
resulted in a fatal procedural irregularity. As a result, the order
was both erroneously sought
[30]
and was erroneously granted. It was also granted in the absence of
the Minister as the State Attorney was acting on behalf of the
State
functionary and not the Minister personally when an appearance to
oppose was filed.
95]
My view on the issue of recission is fortified by the fact that,
notwithstanding that the Minister has complied with paragraph
3 of
Mnyovu AJ’s order, Riverlea is in any event seeking his direct
imprisonment. Thus, where it is common cause that he
is not
personally cited and has not personally been served, this relief is
incompetent. Thus, on the facts set out supra, as well
as on this
basis, the application for leave to intervene in the recission
application must be refused.
96]
In my view, the finding of contempt on its own carries with it
consequences for the Minister personally. Even though he
has complied
with the provisions of paragraph 3 of the order to avoid
incarceration, were his reporting affidavit to be found to
be
deficient (in the event that such proceedings were instituted), he
would be unable to defend the finding of contempt as, in
that regard,
the court would also be
funcus officio
. Thus, the issue is not
a moot one – the Minister is entitled to present a case to
vindicate a position that he is not in
contempt of the 2021 order.
97]
This all being so, the order of Mnyovu AJ must be rescinded.
98]
This then brings me to the issue of whether Riverlea’s
structural interdict should
be
granted. Industrial Zone has pointed out that the relief sought is
not competent. The Minister opposes Riverlea’s relief.
99]
I agree that the relief is not competent in the present proceedings
as it has no bearing on whether or not the Minister
is in contempt of
the 2021 order. Given the extent of the relief sought, it may have
had a bearing on the terms in which the 2021
order was granted. It
may also have a bearing on the reasons a court may ultimately find
the Minister in contempt - and on this
I make no finding on whether
the Minister is actually in contempt or not - or the terms it
determines would be sufficient for the
Minister to purge his
contempt. Suffice it to state that I find that the structural
interdict sought is not competent at this stage
and that that relief
should be dismissed.
100]
But Riverlea’s application to be joined as an applicant in the
contempt application itself must be granted.
101]
Usually a person who was not a party to the proceedings in which the
order was granted would not have
locus
standi
to bring a contempt application. In my view, however, the 2021 order
directly affects the rights and interests of Riverlea –
the
intention of the order is to ensure the rehabilitation of the
affected land so that it can be developed
[31]
.
This is in the interests not just of Industrial Zone, but also the
nearby communities. The rehabilitation of the land is also
intended
to have a positive effect on the woes that presently plague Riverlea.
In my view, it is clear that Riverlea’s interests
go to the
heart of the community’s health, welfare, education, safety and
daily existence. There can be no better proof of
their direct and
substantial interest in the compliance with the 2021 order than this.
102]
In my view, Riverlea’s intervention in the contempt application
will not only serve the purpose of vindicating
the rule of law, but
will serve to underscore the Minister’s obligations imposed by
the 2021 court order. In stating this,
I emphasise that I make no
finding on whether or not the Minister is or is not in contempt of
the 2021 order.
Costs
103]
Even though Riverlea has not succeeded in most of the relief sought,
they have succeeded in their request to intervene
in the contempt
application. I am therefore of the view that they should be awarded
costs, to be taxed in accordance with Scale
C and shall include the
costs consequent upon the employment of one senior counsel and one
junior counsel.
104]
As to the costs of the recission application: although the recission
is to be granted, I am of the view that the Minister
must pay the
costs of the application - which costs shall be taxed in accordance
with Scale C and shall include the costs consequent
upon the
employment of one senior counsel and one junior counsel - for the
alarmingly lackadaisical manner in which he and his
officials have
acted. Their conduct is simply unacceptable.
Order
1.
Condonation for the late filing of the
Minister’s replying affidavit is granted.
2.
Industrial Zone is ordered to pay the
costs of the application for condonation, which costs are to be taxed
in accordance with Scale
C and shall include the costs consequent
upon the employment of one senior counsel and one junior counsel.
3.
The application for recission of
judgment is granted.
4.
The order of Mnyovu AJ dated 19 February
2024 is rescinded and set aside.
5.
The Minister is ordered to pay the costs
of Industrial Zone for the recission application, excluding the costs
set out in paragraphs
1 and 2 of this order, which costs are to be
taxed in accordance with Scale C and shall include the costs
consequent upon the employment
of one senior counsel and one junior
counsel.
6.
Riverlea Mining Forum is granted leave
to intervene as an applicant in the application for contempt of court
brought by Industrial
Zone dated 18 March 2023.
7.
The remainder of the relief sought in
the application for leave to intervene is refused.
8.
The Minister is ordered to pay the costs
of the application for intervention, which costs are to be taxed in
accordance with Scale
C and shall include the costs consequent upon
the employment of one senior counsel and one junior counsel.
9.
Riverlea shall file its affidavit and/or
any further application, in the contempt of court application,
on/before 16 February 2026.
10.
The Minister is ordered to file an
answering affidavit in the contempt of court application, no later
than 30 days after Riverlea
has filed its affidavit and/or further
application.
11.
The remainder of any affidavits,
practice notes and heads of argument in the contempt of court
application shall be filed in terms
of the Uniform Rules of Court
and/or Practice Directives of this Division.
NEUKIRCHER J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
This judgment was
prepared and authored by the judge whose name is reflected, and is
handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties/their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on CaseLines.
The date for hand-down is deemed
to be 5 January 2026.
Appearances
For
the applicant:
Adv C Badenhorst SC, with him Adv CT Vetter
Instructed
by:
State Attorney, Pretoria
For
the first respondent:
Adv MC Maritz SC, with him Adv
J H Groenewald
Instructed
by:
DDP Attorneys
For
the Intervening Party:
Adv T Ngcukaitobi SC, with him Adv R Tulk,
Adv K
Plaatjies, Adv T Masuku
and Adv B Nortje
Instructed
by:
R Baloyi Inc
Date
of hearing:
11 November 2025
Date
of judgment:
5 January 2026
[1]
Which,
in the context of this application, is a contempt of court
application brought against the Minister of Mineral Resources
and
Energy (the Minister), to declare that he is in contempt of an order
granted against him by Bokako AJ on 29 September 2021
(the 2021
order)
[2]
The
parties are referred to as cited in the recission application
[3]
Riverlea
seeks leave to intervene “in the application” – in
the context of the issues before me and their further
relief and
given the argument before me, it is clear that it seeks leave to
intervene in the contempt application
[4]
The
Minister
[5]
Central
Rand Gold South Africa (Pty) Ltd
[6]
The
events that led to this are not relevant to the issues before this
court. They were relevant to the grant of the 2021 order
[7]
Industrial
Zone contends that at least R126 439 717 will be required
– but nothing turns on this at present
[8]
Section
45
[9]
Although
the counter-application seeks the recission of the entire order
[10]
Ie
four months before Bokako AJ’s order was granted
[11]
Interestingly
none of the party’s state whether there was an appearance on
behalf of the Minister or whether the dates were
by agreement
[12]
From 2021 until 27 March 2024
[13]
2018
(1) SA 1
(CC) pars 90-104
[14]
Morudi
and Others v MC Housing Services and Development Co Limited and
Others
(CCT270/17)
[2018] ZACC 32
(25 September 2018)
[15]
My
emphasis
[16]
Plascon-Evans
Paints (Tvl) Ltd v Van Riebeek Paints (Pty) Ltd
1984 (3) SA 623 (A)
[17]
2006
(4) SA 326 (SCA)
## [18](CCT
52/21) [2021] ZACC 28; 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC) (17 September 2021)
[18]
(CCT
52/21) [2021] ZACC 28; 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC) (17 September 2021)
[19]
1998
(1) SA 697 (T)
[20]
(53195/2019)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 431 (6 June 2023)
[21]
Which
was the removal of Amatshe as the provider to rehabilitate the
affected land
[22]
Collectively referred to as “the other State respondents”
[23]
“
Anyone
listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court,
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been
infringed or
threatened and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a
declaration of rights, The persons who may approach
a court are-
(a)
anyone acting in their own interest;
…
(c )
anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group of
persons…”
[24]
2015
(5) SA 600
(CC) par 56
[25]
Amatashe
is no longer in the picture according to the Minister
[26]
Supra
[27]
Secretary
of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State
Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including
Organs
of State v Zuma and Others
2021
(5) SA 327 (CC)
[28]
Matjhabeng
supra
[29]
Because
“good cause” is not a requirement under Rule 42(1)(a)
[30]
Industrial
Zone knew that no personal service had taken place and should
therefore never have moved the order – it was erroneously
sought.
[31]
This
is what is alleged by Industrial Zone in the main application
sino noindex
make_database footer start
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