Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 64South Africa
Isaacs N.O obo Yantolo v Road Accident Fund (9083/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 64 (13 January 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
13 January 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Isaacs N.O obo Yantolo v Road Accident Fund (9083/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 64 (13 January 2025)
Isaacs N.O obo Yantolo v Road Accident Fund (9083/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 64 (13 January 2025)
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sino date 13 January 2025
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case No:9083/2021
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
13 January 2025
In
the matter between:
ADV
Y ISAACS N.O OBO SIPHOKUHLE JENNIFER YANTOLO
Plaintiff
and
THE
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
Defendant
JUDGMENT
SK HASSIM J
Introduction
[1]
The plaintiff sues in her capacity as
curatrix ad litem
to
Siphokuhle Jennifer Yantolo (hereinafter referred to as
“the plaintiff”) an adult female born on 12 June 1997.
On 6 January 2019, Ms Yantolo was struck by an unidentified motor
vehicle while walking on a pavement. She was 21.
She was
admitted to Helderberg hospital on 6 January 2019 and transferred to
Tygerberg hospital on 7 January 2019.
Common
Cause Issues
[2]
The defendant has conceded that it is liable to pay to the
plaintiff 90% of her proven damages. It has also conceded that
it is liable to pay general damages due to the pelvic fracture,
sciatic nerve injury and the undisplaced fracture of the right
superior pubic ramus.
The
experts
[3]
The plaintiff delivered reports from the
following experts who have confirmed the contents of their reports in
an affidavit:
(a)
Neurosurgeon: Dr Z Domingo;
(b)
Psychiatrist, Dr T Sutherland;
(c)
Orthopaedic Surgeon, Dr J Sagor;
(d)
Dr D Ogilvy, Speech and Language Therapist;
(e)
Neuro Psychologist, R de Witt;
(f)
Occupational Therapist; M le Roux;
(g)
Industrial
Psychologist
,
K Kotze; and
(h)
Actuary
,
Munro
Consulting.
[4]
The defendant did not deliver any expert
reports.
[5]
The defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff will require
future medical treatment. The plaintiff does not persist in
her
claim for past medical expenses. During argument the plaintiff
did not resist the defendant’s suggestion that a
deduction for
contingencies of 10% should be applied to the plaintiff’s
uninjured past earnings as opposed to 5% suggested
by the plaintiff.
The parties agree that a deduction of 15% should be applied to the
plaintiff’s uninjured future earnings.
They also agree
that the plaintiff’s injured past loss is R8 300.00
and
a deduction for contingencies is not necessary.
The
disputes
[6]
Two issues remain. The one whether
the plaintiff is employable, and if so, what her future injured
earnings would be and what
deduction for contingencies should be
applied thereto. The other is a fair and reasonable award for
general damages.
[7]
The
plaintiff applied in terms of rule 38(2) that the expert evidence
adduced on behalf of the plaintiff be given on affidavit.
The
defendant did not oppose the application, and I granted it.
Although the defendant has no expert evidence of its own,
it disputes
some of the facts and opinions expressed by the plaintiff’s
experts. In view of the election not to present
expert
evidence or cross examine the plaintiff’s witnesses I am
constrained to accept the correctness of the
facts
reported to the experts and the opinions expressed by the experts in
the absence of countervailing evidence unless I reject
the
correctness of the facts or the expert’s reasoning
[1]
.
The injuries
[8]
According
to the EMS ambulance record the collision occurred at 19h04 on 6
January 2019. The paramedics arrived at the scene
at 19h13.
At 19h37 the plaintiff’s GCS score was 15/15
[2]
and she was orientated.
[3]
The plaintiff was admitted to Helderberg (“Helderburg”)
Hospital at 20h01.
[4]
She was transferred to Tyberburg Hospital (“Tyberberg”)
where her GCS score on admission to the trauma unit
[5]
is recorded as 15/15, and she was orientated.
[6]
Tyberberg’s admission record notes a head injury and bruising
on the left shoulder and lower limbs.
[7]
An X-Ray revealed pelvic fractures. The plaintiff was
discharged from hospital on 23 January 2019.
The orthopaedic
injuries: Dr Sagor, the orthopaedic surgeon’s evidence
[9]
The Orthopaedic Surgeon, Dr Sagor’s
first assessment of the plaintiff occurred on 21 September 2021.
He synopsised the
injuries and, the treatment administered in
hospital. He noted that the plaintiff suffered fractures of the
pelvis involving
mainly the left hemi pelvis. There was a
lateral compression fracture with a mild vertical shear of the left
hemi pelvis.
There was an associated and secondary sciatic
nerve injury. The CT scans of the brain and spine were normal
as well as a
CT cystogram.
[10]
Open reduction and internal fixation of the
pelvis was performed at Tygerberg hospital on 14 January 2019.
[11]
According to Dr Sagor most of the
plaintiff’s symptoms in hospital were due to a left foot drop
and loss of sensation on the
dorsum of the foot. The left
sciatic nerve symptoms which were noted pre-operatively and were
present post-operatively,
will be ongoing. The radiological
assessment of the pelvis performed on 9 September 2021 showed a
deformity of the pelvic
inlet due to a minimal residual vertical
displacement of the left hemi pelvis.
[12]
The plaintiff complained that she found it
difficult to stand for long periods because of left lower limb
discomfort, there was
weakness in the left leg when walking distances
and she could not run properly, she had a feeling of having lost
mobility of the
left ankle and toes. She also experienced
bladder urgency.
[13]
The plaintiff was not in distress or
discomfort during the clinical examination by Dr Sagor. The
contour of the lumbar spine
was found to be normal, and had good
movement, the pelvis was normal when standing upright and there were
no symptoms on compression
of the pelvis. There was a 15º
loss of external rotation and a 15º loss of abduction on the
left side of the hip
compared to the right side. The straight
leg raising was 90º bilaterally. There was a slight
decreased sensation
on the dorsum of the left foot. The drop
foot had recovered when Dr Sagor examined the plaintiff, and the
motor function
of the ankle and foot was normal. The associated
left sciatic nerve injury that had been causing damage to the left
peroneal
nerve and which affected mainly the left foot function had
virtually resolved. The plaintiff’s gait was normal and, she
was
able to stand on the tips of the toes and, go down onto her
haunches. There were residual symptoms of discomfort in the
left
lower limb when the plaintiff was active. Dr Sagor was
hopeful that the discomfort would abate in due course. However,
it was speculative whether the physical limitations due to the
plaintiff’s left lower limb symptoms would abate completely
in
time to come. While the plaintiff had initially been taking
analgesics regularly, she was taking them now only as needed.
[14]
Dr Sagor concluded that while the plaintiff
had initially lost various amenities of life, was disabled, and was
functionally impaired
for some time, the symptoms had largely
abated. There was however ongoing discomfort in the lower
limbs.
[15]
He opined that while the plaintiff could
permanently not do heavy manual work, or activities that required
climbing ladders and
stairs repetitively, or sitting in uncomfortable
situations, she should be able to do sedentary or semi-sedentary work
in the future.
[16]
Dr Sagor assessed the plaintiff for the
second time on 17 April 2024 and prepared an addendum to his earlier
report. The plaintiff
complained of episodic pain in the left
leg and that she was not able to run, experienced pain in the left
lower limb and lower
lumbar spine on walking rapidly or for more than
10 minutes, and lower leg discomfort during inclement weather when
walking long
distances. These symptoms radiated to the left
foot. The plaintiff also complained of a loss of mobility and
agility,
episodic urinary incontinence and occasional occipital
headaches which tended to radiate to the left parietal region.
Additionally,
she complained of some cognitive symptoms.
[17]
Dr Sagor found the pelvis to be
asymptomatic on compression and the hip joints had normal movement.
The plaintiff had a normal
straight leg raising bilaterally. There
was however decreased L5/S1 sensation in the lower limb. Motor
function was
intact. The plaintiff walked with a normal gait and
could stand on tip toe. There was no residual footdrop.
Even though
the previous footdrop had resolved, the pain was
ongoing. The plaintiff experienced slight discomfort going down
on her haunches.
Though the true leg lengths were equal, there
was a slight left leg shortening between 1cm-2cm as a result of the
displaced left
hemi-pelvis. He recommended a shoe raise on the
left side. The lumbar spine injury required ongoing symptomatic
treatment,
and the left sciatic nerve injury supportive treatment.
[18]
In his view, the plaintiff remained
disabled and functionally impaired mainly due to the effects of the
pelvic and associated left
sciatic nerve injuries.
[19]
When the two reports are considered in
conjunction there has been an improvement, not a deterioration, in
the plaintiff’s
condition. In the first report Dr Sagor opined
that even though the plaintiff permanently could not do heavy manual
work or activities
requiring climbing ladders or stairs repetitively
or sitting in uncomfortable positions, she remained employable until
retirement
age. However, in the addendum to the report, he
states that due to the plaintiff’s level of education and being
totally
reliant on performing physical work, he envisaged her being
unemployable in the future.
[20]
However, the plaintiff’s level of
education must have been known to Dr Sagor when he assessed the
plaintiff on 21 September
2021. He must also have known that
the plaintiff was reliant on her ability to do physical work.
There is no explanation
why the prognosis changed from employable
until retirement age if she did not perform heavy manual work or
activities requiring
climbing stairs or a ladder repetitively or
sitting in uncomfortable positions to being unemployable in the
future because she
was reliant on her ability to perform physical
work. This especially in view of the improvement in the
plaintiff’s
condition. In the absence of an explanation
by Dr Sagor, I cannot find that on Dr Sagor’s evidence the
plaintiff is
unemployable.
The traumatic brain
injury
[21]
All the plaintiff’s experts hold the
view that the plaintiff’s neurocognitive impairments and
behavioural deficits are
the result of a traumatic brain injury.
The traumatic brain
injury: Dr Domingo, the neuro-surgeon’s evidence
[22]
Dr Domingo, the neurosurgeon examined the
plaintiff on 18 July 2022. On an examination of the central
nervous system Dr Domingo
found no neurological deficits, there was
no evidence of “any macroscopic structural brain injury”
on the CT scan and
the plaintiff had no focal neurological deficits
as a consequence of the “brain injury”.
[23]
According to him the plaintiff suffered a
traumatic brain injury resulting in mild cognitive deficits.
This opinion forms
the basis for the other experts’ claim that
the plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury.
[24]
According
to Dr Domingo the plaintiff was assessed at the hospital of having
sustained a traumatic brain injury. This fact
is the foundation
for his opinion that the plaintiff sustained a traumatic brain
injury. In paragraph 1.5.1 of his report
[8]
Dr
Domingo states-
“
Ms
Yantolo was seen in the emergency unit at Tygerberg Hospital.
X-rays and scans were performed. She was
assessed
as having sustained a traumatic brain injury in addition to a
fracture of the pelvis.” (My underlining)
[25]
Dr Domingo’s opinion that the
plaintiff sustained a traumatic brain injury is not based on any
findings by him but is based
on his understanding or assumption that
the plaintiff had been assessed as having sustained a traumatic brain
injury, seemingly
at the hospital after her admission.
[26]
However,
the Tygerberg records which are the only hospital records before the
court do not bear this out. Even though not
all the notes are
legible, I have been able to decipher a reference to a “head
injury”
[9]
but none
to a “brain injury”. There is a single reference to
“headache” and one to “retrograde
amnesia”,
[10]
but this could not have formed the basis of the opinion because Dr
Domingo does not mention these in his report. Apart from
these
references to a “head injury”
[11]
,
“headache” and “retrograde amnesia” there is
no record of the plaintiff complaining of a headache, amnesia
or
forgetfulness during her hospitalisation.
[27]
Dr Domingo notes in his first report that
the plaintiff had lost consciousness, but he does not disclose who
reported this to him.
Dr Domingo appears to have overlooked the
plaintiff’s GCS score of 15/15 when the paramedics attended to
her at the scene
and upon admission to hospital.
[28]
The plaintiff had reported to Dr Ogilvie,
the speech therapist, at a consultation on 1 December 2022 that on
impact she went “blank”
but remained conscious
thereafter. She also reported to Dr Ogilvie that she sustained
a “bump on her head”.
According to her mother’s
report to Dr Ogilvie she visited the plaintiff in hospital a day
after the accident. She noticed
that while the plaintiff was relating
the accident, she lost track of her thoughts, repeated information
and appeared to forget
what she was told. Dr Domingo does not
note these facts. Had the plaintiff conveyed these to him, he
would have mentioned
it in his report.
[29]
The plaintiff reported mild cognitive
problems to Dr Domingo and complained of intermittent headaches, poor
memory and concentration,
a tendency to be short-tempered and
irritable, blurred vision and nosebleeds. I do not know whether
these complaints formed
the “available information” which
led to the conclusion that the plaintiff had suffered a traumatic
brain injury.
[30]
Dr Domingo opines that “based on the
available information, the plaintiff sustained a mild traumatic brain
injury”.
I do not know what information led him to
conclude this.
[31]
In the circumstances, I do not know how, or
why, Dr Domingo came to conclude that the plaintiff suffered a
traumatic brain injury
in the accident.
[32]
According to Dr Domingo the plaintiff’s
mild cognitive deficits due to the brain injury, together with the
chronic pain she
experiences and the psychological impact of the
accident, will have a negative impact on her cognitive functioning.
As
far as the post traumatic headaches are concerned, he is of
the opinion that they will respond to “simple”
analgesia.
[33]
Dr Domingo prepared an addendum to his
report following on an assessment of the plaintiff on 18 April 2024.
Regarding loss
of earnings his earlier opinion that the accident has
a negative impact on her employability in the open labour market
changed
to the plaintiff “will have difficulties obtaining and
retaining employment and is likely to remain unemployed”.
No explanation is given for this nuanced opinion from the accident
having a negative impact on the plaintiff’s employability
in
the open labour market to her likely remaining unemployed.
[34]
I am not satisfied on Dr Domingo’s
evidence that the plaintiff has proven that she suffered a brain
injury or that the cognitive
deficits of which she complains are due
to the collision.
The
traumatic brain injury and the plaintiff’s neurocognitive
deficits: Evidence of Dr Sutherland, the psychiatrist
[35]
The plaintiff was assessed by a
psychiatrist, Dr Sutherland for an opinion whether she had suffered a
brain injury and/or a mental
disorder secondary to the motor vehicle
accident, and if so the nature and severity thereof. The report
is stated to be based
on a clinical assessment and information at the
psychiatrist’s disposal. Dr Sutherland’s diagnosis
of a traumatic
brain injury and neurocognitive disorder secondary to
a traumatic brain injury is based on Dr Domingo’s assessment
that the
plaintiff had sustained a traumatic brain injury. In
this regard Dr Sutherland states the following at paragraph 8 of his
report-
“
8.
CONCLUSION
Ms Yantolo has been
previously assessed as having sustained a traumatic brain injury (Dr
Domingo) with deficits across all domains
on cognitive assessment (R.
de Wit) as well as receptive and expressive communication impairments
in keeping with deficits expected
following a traumatic brain
injury.”
[36]
The plaintiff’s mother informed Dr
Sutherland that the plaintiff’s early development was typical.
Dr Sutherland concluded
that the plaintiff’s complaints are
indicative of a brain injury, but he did not explore whether the
complaints existed prior
to the accident. According to Dr
Sutherland the ongoing cognitive difficulties reported to him by the
plaintiff were consistent
with her presentation during the clinical
interview and on cognitive screening tests performed. He found
signs suggestive
of cerebellar dysfunction.
[37]
It was brought to his attention that the
plaintiff had passed grade 10 but failed grade 11 which the plaintiff
intended repeating
when the accident occurred. Dr Sutherland
appears not to have explored whether the cerebellar dysfunction could
have been
a pre-accident condition.
Traumatic brain injury
and neuro-cognitive deficits: Evidence of Dr Ogilvie, speech
therapist:
[38]
Dr Ogilvie, the speech therapist sets out
the neuro-cognitive deficits which led him to conclude that the
plaintiff suffered at
least a mild traumatic brain injury, what, in
my view, cannot be excluded on his report is that there were no
neuro-cognitive deficits
present prior to the accident.
The cause of the
neuro-cognitive deficits
[39]
According to what was told to Dr Ogilvy the
plaintiff had failed at least two grades before the accident.
She failed Grade
11 in 2017, and perhaps even twice. She had also
failed grade 6. According to the occupational therapist Ms le
Roux, based
on when she commenced schooling and the year when she
enrolled for Grade 4, there is a year or two which is not accounted
for.
There is no evidence of the plaintiff’s performance
at school nor of her strengths and weaknesses. Such evidence
would
have given insight into the plaintiff’s cognitive
functioning pre-accident.
[40]
I
am not persuaded that the plaintiff did not repeat Grade 11 due to
the accident. She told the neurosurgeon and Ms le Roux,
the
occupational therapist, that she has a grade 10, failed grade 11 in
2018 with the intention to repeat it in 2019 but was unable
to do so
as a result of the accident. Ms le Roux records that the
plaintiff told her that she did not return to school because
she felt
she would not cope owing to her acquired forgetfulness/cognitive
limitations. However, what she told the neurosurgeon,
and the
occupational therapist is inconsistent with what she told the
industrial psychologist, Ms Kotze and what she told these
experts is
inconsistent with what she told the speech therapist Dr Ogilvy. She
told the industrial psychologist Ms Kotze that she
passed Grade 10 in
2016 and attempted grade 11 in 2017.
[12]
However, she failed grade 11 and then abandoned schooling due to
financial constraints. She told Dr Ogilvy that she
failed Grade
11 twice and left school at the end of 2017.
[13]
There are three inconsistencies in the reports to these experts.
The first being the year the plaintiff failed Grade
11, the second,
the number of times she failed Grade 11 and the third, the reason for
abandoning schooling. The plaintiff
did not give evidence.
In view of these inconsistencies, I am not able to find that the
plaintiff intended repeating Grade
11 in 2019 but did not do so due
to the accident. There was no investigation into her scholastic
performance. While
the experts’ reports discuss the
complaints and difficulties experienced by the plaintiff since the
accident it appears that
there was no investigation into the
plaintiff’s cognitive functioning prior to the accident. The
reports are devoid of any
information on the plaintiff’s
pre-accident condition.
None
of the experts explored the possibility that the plaintiff abandoned
her schooling due to cognitive deficits which existed
prior to the
accident. The conclusions on the existence of cognitive
deficits seem to be based on the mere say-so of the
plaintiff and her
mother that the difficulties she presents with were not present when
the accident occurred.
[41]
I am not convinced that the plaintiff’s
cognitive deficits are due to the accident.
[42]
Though I accept that the plaintiff suffers
from headaches, experiences blurred vision and nosebleeds, is
forgetful and her concentration
and attention abilities are impaired,
I am not persuaded on the evidence that the plaintiff suffered a
traumatic brain injury.
Nor am I persuaded that the deficits
and impairments are the result of an accident-related injury.
Deduction for
contingencies on uninjured income
[43]
The parties are agreed that the fair and
reasonable deduction for contingencies on uninjured future earnings
is 15%.
[44]
The plaintiff had attempted to persuade me
that a deduction of 5% on uninjured past income was reasonable.
In his response
to the defendant’s closing argument the
plaintiff’s counsel accepted, in my view correctly, that a 10%
deduction for
contingencies would not be inappropriate in the
circumstances.
[45]
In view of the resolution of the dispute on
the deduction for contingencies on uninjured past and future income,
I do not have to
consider whether the one-year pre-accident
unemployment should be taken into account in the assessment of an
appropriate deduction
for contingencies on the uninjured income.
Assessment of impact
of orthopaedic injuries on earnings
[46]
While I am not satisfied that the plaintiff
sustained a traumatic brain injury and suffers the sequalae
complained of, I am satisfied
that she sustained a pelvic injury
which has left her with chronic pelvic pain and residual sciatic
nerve damage with weakness
and altered sensation in the left foot.
The plaintiff has a foot-drop type gait abnormality and disturbed
bladder function.
She experiences pain in the lower back, the
left hip and leg which is exacerbated by physical activity and during
inclement weather.
She is unable to remain static for prolonged
periods, is unable to walk medium to long distances, handle medium to
heavy objects
or run.
[47]
According to the experts the plaintiff’s
occupational functioning from a physical perspective has been
adversely impacted
by the accident. I accept this. They opine
that the extent of the plaintiff’s pelvic injuries and the
chronic pain
restricts her to sedentary or semi-sedentary work in
future. According to them she is best suited to work that
allows her
to alternate frequently between standing and walking,
requires only occasional bending, limits load to sedentary to light.
She would be compromised if her work requires crouching and kneeling
in combination with bending. However her level of education
excludes her from sedentary to semi-skilled work. Therefore,
they opine that the employment options open to the plaintiff
are
dependent on her ability to perform physical work.
[48]
Based on the plaintiff’s report to
the experts that she abandoned her job at Jackie’s Cleaning
Services due to her inability
to cope with the physical demands of
the job the overwhelming view is that the plaintiff will be
permanently unemployed.
According to the experts the
combination of the physical, neuropsychological, and psychological
difficulties has rendered the plaintiff
essentially unemployable in
the open labour market. The defendant’s case on the other
hand is that the plaintiff secured
employment after the accident and
is not unemployable. Her loss if any, is of earning capacity
and not of earnings.
Ms
Kgoebane argued that the plaintiff
is not unemployable. She submitted that the case should be
approached on the basis that
the plaintiff’s earnings in her
uninjured state and her injured state are the same and that a
higher-than-normal deduction
for contingencies should be applied to
the injured future earnings. She argued that a 35% deduction
for contingencies would
reasonably cater for her diminished earning
capacity.
[49]
I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has
established that she stopped working because of limitations caused by
the accident.
[50]
The
plaintiff commenced her first job on 1 October 2019 with Jackie’s
Cleaning Services
[14]
as
a cleaner in terms of a three-month fixed term contract. This
was almost 10 months after the accident. Based on
her report to
the experts that she abandoned her job at Jackie’s Cleaning
Services two weeks before the three-month contract
expired because
she was unable to cope with the demands, they find that the plaintiff
is unemployable.
[51]
I am not persuaded that the plaintiff left
Jackie’s Cleaning Services because she could not cope with the
physical demands
of the job and is unemployable due to the injuries
sustained in the accident. This being so, I do not accept the
finding
by the experts that the plaintiff is unemployable because she
cannot cope with a job with physical demands such as that of a
cleaner.
[52]
The plaintiff’s past unemployment
history is relevant to assess whether the plaintiff is unemployed due
to her inability to
cope with the physical demands of the job of a
cleaner post-accident or whether she may be unemployed for other
reasons.
[53]
If the plaintiff was a scholar when the
accident occurred, then she was not unemployed. However, if she
was not a scholar
then she had been unemployed for a year before the
accident and there is insufficient evidence to explain the reason for
this.
Without evidence on the number and types of jobs applied
for I am not able to find that despite attempts to secure work she
could
not do so.
[54]
The version given to the various experts on
when she discontinued schooling and why she abandoned schooling was
not consistent.
These inconsistencies are not explained.
[55]
According
to Ms Kotze, the occupational therapist and Dr Domingo, the
neurosurgeon, the plaintiff was a scholar at the time of the
accident; she had failed Grade 11 in 2018 and intended repeating it
when the accident intervened. On the other hand, she reported
to Dr
Ogilvie, the speech therapist that she failed Grade 11 twice and left
school at the end of 2017. The industrial psychologist
appears
to have interrogated the plaintiff’s schooling considering that
she lists the subjects the plaintiff completed when
she was in Grade
10 in 2016 and that the plaintiff failed grade 11 in 2017. On
the industrial psychologist’s evidence,
the plaintiff completed
grade 10 in 2016
[15]
at
the age of nineteen. She failed grade 11 in 2017 after which
she abandoned schooling. This aligns with what she
told the
speech therapist, Dr Ogilvy. The plaintiff had thus been
unemployed for approximately one year after discontinuing
her
schooling.
[56]
The industrial psychologist’s finding
that the plaintiff abandoned school in 2017 explains the one year
which the occupational
therapist found was unaccounted for in the
plaintiff’s schooling. I do not accept that the plaintiff
was a scholar
at the time of the accident nor that she intended
repeating Grade 11 in the year of the accident (i.e., 2019). I
find that
she was unemployed for a year when the accident intervened
and that on the probabilities she completed schooling in 2017 at the
age of 21 rather than in 2018 at the age of 22. Finding that
the plaintiff completed Grade 10 and failed Grade 11 in 2017
leads to
one-year unexplained pre-accident unemployment. This leads me
to doubt whether the plaintiff abandoned her job at
Jackie’s
Cleaning Services two weeks before the contract came to an end
because she could not cope with the demands of physical
work, or
whether it was related to her inability to secure a job for one year
prior to the accident.
[57]
At Jackie’s Cleaning Services the
plaintiff was one of a team of three cleaners cleaning mainly
residences where she was required
to clean bathrooms and stairs,
porches and internal floors. The plaintiff reported
encountering difficulty performing duties
which required frequent to
constant standing and prolonged bending which are movements for
sweeping, mopping, scrubbing toilets,
washing out baths, shower
floors and lower walls for instance.
Notwithstanding
these difficulties the plaintiff was able to complete her work in
time but occasionally was assisted by a fellow
cleaner. She
reported to the speech therapist that she discontinued her contract
two weeks before it expired because she
was unable to cope with the
demands of the job due to pain in the left hip and left leg
especially when she had to walk up and
down stairs, bend a lot and
stand for long periods of time and has been unemployed since then.
The reason she gave to Dr
Domingo for discontinuing her job was
somewhat different. She reported to him that due to her
inability to cope with the
physical demands of the job she was told
she was unfit to work as a cleaner.
[58]
The plaintiff’s employer’s
evidence does not support either of these versions. The
plaintiff’s supervisor
informed Ms le Roux, the occupational
therapist
that while she knew of the
accident, she was not aware of the plaintiff experiencing
difficulties nor did the plaintiff complain
about difficulties.
She also did not know why the plaintiff absconded. I find it
implausible that the plaintiff’s
performance was not affected
if the limitations which she claims to have endured now render her
unemployable. This begs the
question how it is that the
plaintiff’s performance was not adversely affected. And
if her performance was adversely
affected why her employer failed to
disclose this to the occupational therapist. It seems to me
unlikely that the employer
would have been oblivious to the
plaintiff’s poor performance, or to the fact that other
employees had to assist her in completing
her tasks as she reported
to Ms le Roux. There is no evidence regarding (i) how
frequently she needed assistance from a fellow
employee, (ii) what
form the assistance took and in respect of which tasks; (iii) which
two members of their team of three assisted
her. These
questions could all easily have been answered if the plaintiff
testified
viva voce.
[59]
Furthermore, I find it incredulous that the
plaintiff endured the pain and limitations brought on by her injuries
for two-and-a-half-months
yet with only two weeks of a 3-month
contract lapsing she left employment because she was not coping.
There is no explanation
why she left without notifying her employer.
I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has established that she left
Jackie’s
Cleaning Services because she could not cope with the
work due to her physical limitations. I reject her version that
she
was informed that she was not fit for the duties of a cleaner.
I do not accept the finding by the experts that the plaintiff
is
unemployable because she cannot cope with a job with physical demands
such as that of a cleaner.
[60]
I am not persuaded that the plaintiff is
indeed unemployable. She was employed after the accident.
Her case is that
the activities she had to performed caused pain.
Because bending movements according to her brought on lameness of the
lower
back and left leg, she would rather kneel which resulted in the
right knee having to bear her weight. Even though according
to
her this slowed her down she nonetheless completed her work in time,
did not complain and took medication for the pain.
Occasionally
she was assisted by a fellow employee, However, there is no evidence
of the medication she took nor how frequently
she took it. I do
not know whether the medication brought on any relief, to what extent
and for how long.
[61]
The plaintiff elected not to testify about
her attempts at finding work after she left Jackie’s Cleaning
Services. I
have not heard from her what impact her injuries
have had and continue to have on her ability to work. While I
accept that
she is vulnerable, I am not prepared to accept that there
is no prospect at all of the plaintiff securing employment due to her
injuries. She told Ms le Roux the occupational therapist that
she has not applied for a disability grant years after
the accident.
If her injuries are of such a nature that she is unable to work at
all, I would have expected her to at the
very least have applied for
a disability grant.
[62]
The
plaintiff was employed at Jackie’s Cleaning Services,
[16]
her first and also last job, from 8h00 to 17h00 five to six days a
week. The experts have all approached the plaintiff’s
case on
the basis that she will not be able to sustain employment where she
is required to work for 6 to 7½
[17]
hours per day for 5 to 6 days per week. The industrial
psychologist states in her report that “[w]hen evaluating the
plaintiff’s post-accident career prospects, cognisance is taken
of her residual physical capacity”. I do not
find
anything in the report that supports that this approach was indeed
adopted.
[63]
While a daily job spanning 6-7½
hours may be challenging, none of the experts explored whether a day
or two of rest between
the days the plaintiff works, is a viable
option.
[64]
Ms Kgoebane argued that a deduction of 35%
on injured earnings would be fair and reasonable. In my view
this overlooks the
fact that the plaintiff may not have a daily job
or may have a job that pays less because the type of tasks she is
able to perform
are confined to those that do not require bending,
kneeling, and prolonged periods standing.
[65]
A
shorter working week or intermittent periods of unemployment in my
view can be catered by a larger deduction for contingencies
than
submitted by Ms Kgoebane. I am not convinced that in the
circumstances a deduction of 35% on injured future earnings as
suggested
by Ms Kgoebane is fair and reasonable. In my view an
appropriate, fair and reasonable deduction for contingencies would be
50% on injured future earnings. The defendant argued that the
loss of earnings/earning capacity should be assessed on the
basis
that the plaintiff’s earnings in her uninjured and injured
state will be the same. Having found that the plaintiff
is not
unemployable, and that she has suffered monetary damage, I am bound
to award damages and “it is necessary for the
Court to assess
the amount and make the best use it can of the evidence before
it”.
[18]
I have in
assessing the fair and reasonable award for loss of earnings/earning
capacity adopted the approach suggested by
the defendant.
[66]
The industrial psychologist is of the view
that the plaintiff’s post-accident earnings would probably have
been temporarily
affected by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on
employment. In her view this should be catered for by an
appropriate contingency
deduction. The issue was however not
argued before me.
General damages
[67]
Adv
Laubscher submitted that an amount of R1 750 000 would be
reasonable. He referred in this regard to the decision in
Nel
v RAF
[19]
where the award to
the plaintiff in current monetary terms translates to R1 115 269.00.
The plaintiff in the case sustained
closed fractures of the right
tibia and fibula, a traumatic amputation of the right fifth
metacarpal and little finger, a degloving
injury to the right foot
leading to the amputation of the right big toe. He also
sustained fractures of the right lower leg.
A shortening of the
right leg by 3 cm resulted in a marked limp and loss of balance.
He had to use a crutch to ambulate and
was unable to walk long
distances or run. The other decision on which the plaintiff
relies is that of
Zarrabi
v RAF
[20]
where general damages in an amount of R 2,197,000, in current
monetary terms was awarded to the plaintiff. A thirty-year
old
female had suffered a severe diffuse axonal brain injury with severe
neuro physical, neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric consequences
amongst others. In my view neither of these cases are
comparable. In the case of
Nel
the orthopaedic injuries were far more severe than the plaintiff’s.
In view of my finding that a brain injury has not
been established,
Zarrabi’
s
case does not guide the assessment of an appropriate award for
general damages to the plaintiff. However, I am not satisfied
that R500 000.00 for general damages proposed by Ms Kgoebane is fair
and reasonable. I was referred to the decision in
Ramelobeng
v Lowveld Bus Service
[21]
where the award for general damages is equivalent to R860 000.00
in current monetary terms. The orthopaedic injuries
were more
severe but there are other limitations and deficits that the
plaintiff’s injuries have brought on.
[68]
The plaintiff was hospitalised for close to
three weeks. She was functionally impaired for some time
She used crutches for three months before full
weight bearing was possible. She endured severe pain for some
time after the
accident. She continues to endure chronic pain
in the limbs and lower back. The pelvic injury resulted in a
sciatic
nerve injury and a 1cm-2cm shortening of the left lower limb.
She experiences
ongoing discomfort in the
lower limbs. The pelvic injury has caused a pelvic deformity
resulting in an inability to deliver
an infant normally. The
plaintiff will have to undergo a caesarean section. This will
of course bring on additional
pain and discomfort antenatally.
I do not know whether the pelvic deformity will cause a more
challenging pregnancy or not;
it is not unlikely that it may.
The plaintiff is currently just over 27. She has many
child-bearing years left.
She also has bladder control
problems, which likely cause her embarrassment and anxiety. In
view of the plaintiff’s
age and the factors I have listed, an
award of R800 000.00 for general damages is fair and reasonable
in the circumstances
of this case.
Costs
[69]
There is no reason why the general rule
that costs follow the event should not apply. The plaintiff
seeks an order that the
plaintiff’s counsel’s costs as
well as the
curatrix ad litem’s
costs are allowed on scale C. The defendant argued that the
case is not complex and that counsel’s costs should be
allowed
on scale A.
[70]
I find that this case is no different from
the hundreds of third-party matters on the roll every week. The
plaintiff has not
advanced reasons why this case warrants costs on
scale C and I am not able to find any. Accordingly, counsel’s
costs
and the
curatrix ad litem’
s
costs are allowed on Scale A.
Protection of funds
[71]
The plaintiff’s experts recommend the
protection of funds. The defendant is not opposed to this.
I intend making
such an order.
Order
[72]
In the circumstances, the plaintiff is
directed to obtain an updated actuarial calculation of the
plaintiff’s loss of earnings
catering for the following
deductions for contingencies:
(a)
Uninjured past earnings: 10%.
(b)
Uninjured future earnings: 15%.
(c)
Injured future earnings 50% on the basis
that the plaintiff will earn in her injured state what she would have
earned in her uninjured
state.
[73]
The parties are directed to prepare a draft
order setting out the loss of earnings calculated on the basis set
out in paragraph
[72] above to which must be added the past injured
loss of earnings of R8 300.00 and general damages in an amount
of R800 000.00.
Contributory negligence of 10% must be
provided for. The order must also cater for the provision of an
undertaking in terms
of section 17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund
Act, Act No 56 of 1996, costs of the action with counsel’s
costs as well as
the
curatrix ad litem’s
costs allowed on scale A and include
mutatis
mutandis
the contents of the last draft
order uploaded to Caselines by the plaintiff.
S K HASSIM
Judge: Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Plaintiff’s
Counsel:
Adv A Laubscher
Defendants’
Counsel Ms
Kgoebane
This
judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to
the
parties’ legal representatives by e-mail and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines.
The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 13 January 2025.
[1]
Bee
v Road Accident Fund
2018 (4) S A 366
(SCA) at paragraph 22.
[2]
CL
034-9
[3]
CL044-25.
[4]
CL 034-15; CL
044-25.
[5]
On
7 January 2019 at around 2h30. CL 034-34.
[6]
CL034-15
[7]
CL
034-45
[8]
CL005-6
[9]
CL: 034-15.
[10]
CL:
034-45; note dated 7 January 2019.
[11]
CL 034-15.
[12]
CL: 005-125, para
3.1 and 005-111 at para 6.1(c).
[13]
CL: 005-72; para
3.2.2
[14]
There is an
unexplained discrepancy between the information in the occupational
therapist’s report and the industrial psychologist’s
report relating to the plaintiff’s employment. According
to the occupational therapist the plaintiff was employed by
Liesbet’s Cleaning Services from 10 October 2019 to 13
December
2019. According to the industrial psychologist she
was employed by Jackie’s Cleaning Services from 1 October to
14
December 2019. An affidavit is deposed to by the owner of
Jackie’s Cleaning Services in which she confirms the
correctness
of both the information in the occupational therapists
report as well as the information in the occupational therapist’s
report. They both cannot be correct.
[15]
The occupational
therapist states that the plaintiff failed grade 11 in 2018
but does
not say when she passed Grade 10.
[16]
This
is identified as the plaintiff’s employee in the industrial
psychologist’s report. But the occupational
therapist
identifies Liesbet’s Cleaning Services as the employer.
On the face of it, it seems that the plaintiff
was employed by
different employees. However, Ms Rautenbach is identified as
the owner of Jackie’s Cleaning Services
as well Liesbet’s
Cleaning Services.
[17]
Calculated
at cleaning 3 houses per day at 2-2 ½ hrs per
house.
[18]
Hersman
v Shapiro & Co
1926 TPD 367
at 379.
[19]
2017
(7E4) QOD 26 (GP).
[20]
2006
(5B4) QOD 231 (T).
[21]
2012
(7C5) QOD 29 (GNP).
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