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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Masoanganye N.O v Nedbank Limited and Others (2024/089403)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 47 (27 January 2025)
Masoanganye N.O v Nedbank Limited and Others (2024/089403)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 47 (27 January 2025)
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sino date 27 January 2025
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER: 2024/089403
1.REPORTABLE:
NO
2.OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3.REVISED:
NO
27
January 2025
Judge
Dippenaar
In
the matter between:
RICHARD
MASOANGANYE NO
APPLICANT
and
NEDBANK
LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT
THE
SHERIFF, SANDTON SOUTH
SECOND RESPONDENT
THITUKA
LUBILANJI PAUL
THIRD RESPONDENT
TIMOTHY
MAKWAMBA NGOY
FOURTH RESPONDENT
MILENO
TIMOTHEE NGOY
FIFTH RESPONDENT
NGOIE
GLOGLO GLORIA
SIXTH RESPONDENT
CLAUDE
BOKOMO BOKONDO
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
MONGA
EUSTACHE NUMBI
EIGHTH RESPONDENT
NKULI
JULIE KILUMBA
NINTH RESPONDENT
FRANS
EDWARD PRINS ROOTMAN
TENTH RESPONDENT
THE
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF
ELEVENTH RESPONDENT
PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
JUDGMENT
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties’ legal representatives by e-mail and by uploading
it onto the electronic platform. The date and time for hand-down is
deemed to be 10h00 on the 27
th
of JANUARY 2025.
DIPPENAAR
J
:
[1]
This
application concerns interim interdictory relief and a writ of
execution under r 45. The genesis of the application lies in
a
preservation order granted on 11 March 2024 under s 38 of the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA).
[1]
In terms of the order, the applicant was appointed as
curator
bonis
(‘curator’) and was authorised to assume control of the
assets which formed the subject matter of the preservation
order and
to ensure their preservation. The present application concerns the
interest on an amount of R35 million held at the first
respondent
(Nedbank) in an account in the name of the Defence Office Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) Embassy. In due course
a forfeiture order was
granted on 21 June 2024 in terms of s 53 as read with s 48 of POCA.
The order forfeited the R35 million
to the State and it was declared
that its ownership vested in the State as from the effective date of
the forfeiture order. The
forfeiture order did not expressly include
the interest derived from the capital amount.
[2]
After the tenth respondent, Mr Rootman,
became aware of the forfeiture order, the second respondent, (the
Sheriff) at his behest
served a warrant of execution and notice of
attachment in terms of r 45(8)(c) and 45(12) on Nedbank in terms
whereof the movable
goods of the DRC were attached on 25 June 2024
(the first warrant). The warrant was based on a judgment obtained by
the tenth respondent
against the Government of the DRC on 2 September
2003 for payment of some US$ 11 224 744 million and
R122 569.89,
together with interest and costs (the judgment).
Pursuant to a sale in execution, the tenth respondent had only
recovered an amount
of R10 462 024.88.
[3]
Pursuant to the granting of the forfeiture
order, the capital amount of R35 million was transferred to the
curator by Nedbank. It
refused to transfer the interest component as
the forfeiture order did not expressly provide for it. On 15 July
2024, Nedbank paid
the interest component of R1 019 431.97
to the Sheriff in terms of the first warrant, without informing the
curator.
[4]
Shortly thereafter, and on 16 July 2024,
the tenth respondent served a further warrant of execution and
warrant of attachment under
r 45(12) on the applicant in his capacity
as curator, which sought to attach and take into execution the
property relating to the
preservation and forfeiture orders under his
control (the second warrant). The warrant was similarly based on the
judgment. On
1 August 2024, the tenth respondent demanded payment of
the interest held by the Sheriff, triggering the launching of the
interdict
application by the applicant.
[5]
The applicant, in his capacity as curator,
sought interim interdictory relief prohibiting the Sheriff from
making payment of the
monies held in custody, pending the outcome of
an application to be launched by the eleventh respondent (the NDPP),
to vary the
existing forfeiture order to include the interest accrued
on the capital amount of R35 million, representing a forfeited cash
component.
The application was originally launched as an urgent
application, but was postponed on 3 September 2024 by agreement
between the
parties in terms of an order of Van Der Westhuizen J. In
terms of that order, the Sheriff was interdicted to make payment to
the
tenth respondent or any other party pending the final
determination of the matter. Costs were reserved.
[6]
The NDPP delivered an affidavit in support
of the application, setting out various facts. It contended that the
accrued interest
constituted the proceeds of unlawful activities as
defined in s 1(1) of POCA. It adopted the stance that the accumulated
interest
must of necessity form part of the proceeds of unlawful
activities and that the interdictory relief sought by the applicants
was
just and equitable and in the interests of justice. It
further contended that the curator had
locus
standi
to launch the interdict
application as it was intended to preserve the forfeited property.
[7]
Only the tenth respondent actively opposed
the application. The other respondents did not actively participate
in the proceedings.
The first respondent and the third to
eleventh respondents were cited as interested parties in the
application and no relief
was sought against them, save in the event
of opposition.
[8]
On 23 August 2024, Mr Rootman launched a
counter application for an order to compel compliance with the second
warrant and the garnishee
notice under r 45(12). In relevant part, he
sought an order that:
‘
The
Respondent in his capacity as curator bonis appointed in terms of the
forfeiture order granted by this court on 21 June 2024
is ordered to
give effect to the Applicant’s writ of execution issued on 9
July 2024
’
.
[9]
Prior to the hearing of the application and
on 31 October 2024, a supplementary affidavit was delivered by the
curator setting out
certain recent developments. The forfeiture order
had been published in Government Gazette no 51173 on 19 July 2024. On
18 October
2024, the NDPP’s variation application of the
forfeiture order was granted, rendering the interest component part
of the
property forfeited to the State. In relevant part, the
variation order, granted under r42(1)(b), inserted the words ‘plus,
interest accrued thereon’ after the capital amounts referred to
in subparagraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of the forfeiture order. The
latter
pertained to the R35 million in the Nedbank account.
[10]
Pursuant thereto, the applicant on 23
October 2024, proposed to the tenth respondent that the matter be
removed from the opposed
roll, with each party to pay its own costs.
The tenth respondent’s legal representatives in relevant part,
replied the following
day:
‘
Save
for the question of costs, we agree with you that the main
application …has become moot, following the variation order.
Our client’s counter application is a live dispute. Our
client will ask the Court on 11th November 2024 to determine
whether
the Forfeiture Order, can validly defeat a judgment already issued by
the court in favour of our client, and can the Curator
refuse to
comply with the term of the warrant that has been served on him, in
terms of Uniform Rule 45(12)(b).’
[11]
That elicited a long response from the
applicant’s attorneys setting out the reasons why their view of
the remaining disputes
differed from that of the tenth respondent and
why, in their view, the counter application could not succeed. The
applicant defined
the relevant issue as “
not
whether the forfeiture order can defeat a judgment but rather, what
the legal effect of the preservation and forfeiture procedure
under
POCA has on the attachment in execution by a judgment creditor’.
[12]
The tenth respondent elected not to deliver
any supplementary affidavit in response. Prior to the hearing, the
parties were directed
to deliver supplementary heads of argument
pursuant to the developments of 18 October 2024. Both parties did so.
[13]
At the hearing, the tenth respondent
persisted with the contention raised in the main application that the
applicant lacked
locus standi
to have sought the interim relief pending the application by the
NDPP. That argument was persisted with in order to justify an
adverse
costs order sought against the curator in his personal capacity. This
resulted in both parties making submissions on the
merits of the main
application, despite the only outstanding issue in the main
application being that of costs.
[14]
A
determination of the issue of
locus
standi
would have no precedential value in circumstances where the
substantive relief has become academic.
[2]
Moreover, by the time the application was heard, the forfeiture
order had been varied and the interest placed under the control
of
the curator. Any debate about his
locus
standi
also became moot at that stage as the forfeiture order
[3]
authorised the curator to take the necessary steps to preserve the
forfeited property under his control.
[15]
Notwithstanding the variation order, the
tenth respondent persisted in his challenge, despite the entire basis
for the argument
having fallen away. In those circumstances, the
tenth respondent should be liable for the costs of the main
application.
[16]
I turn to the tenth respondent’s
counter application. He argued that it was to be resolved on the
basis of fact, not law.
He submitted that the forfeiture order in
paragraph 6.4 thereof, placed an obligation on the curator to deposit
the cash and the
balance of sale proceeds of the fixed property into
the nominated account of the Embassy of the DRC. It was submitted
that there
was no basis for the contention that the cash amounts have
been forfeited to the State as the forfeited property vests with it
only until the finalisation of the curatorship property and although
DRC cannot enforce claim until conclusion forfeiture process,
the
property has accrued to DRC. It was submitted that consequently, the
DRC’s entire right title and interests were executable
and was
payable to the tenth respondent once the curatorship process was
finalised as the property and proceeds have been forfeited
to the DRC
and not the State.
[17]
The curator on the other hand submitted
that such position was ill conceived and has no basis in law as POCA
does not provide for
a forfeiture to any party other than the State.
He submitted that there was no claimable entitlement under r
45(12)(a) from
the curator as there was no debt as envisaged by the
rule which was owed to the DRC which was capable of attachment. He
submitted
that the DRC has no claim against the curator and would not
be able to execute payment pursuant to the forfeiture order.
[18]
The
counter application is squarely based on r 45(12)(b) as read with r
45(12)(a). The tenth respondent sought a mandamus directing
the
curator to comply with the second warrant of attachment. The
applicable principles are trite. A judgment creditor may
in terms of
r 45(8) as read with r 45(12) attach an accruing debt. Debts owing to
a judgment debtor are executable and capable
of being attached and
sold. The right must have vested in the judgment debtor although the
time for enforcement may not have arrived.
[4]
[19]
The central issues are whether there is a
debt and whether it has accrued to the DRC.
[20]
The aim of POCA is to recover assets that
have been used to commit offences or assets that are the proceeds of
unlawful activity,
for which purpose the Criminal Assets Recovery
Account (CARA) in the National Revenue Fund was established under s
63 of POCA.
S 48 of POCA provides for a forfeiture of assets to the
State. It does not provide for a forfeiture of assets to a victim.
Section
57 obliges the curator to deposit any monies forfeited into
that account, subject to any order for the exclusion of interest in
forfeited property under s 52(2)(a) or 54(8). The tenth respondent
did not rely on any application by him or the DRC or on order
pertaining to the exclusion of any interest in the forfeited property
under s 52 or 52 of POCA.
[21]
The forfeiture order in relevant part
provides:
2 In terms of Section
56(2) of the Act, ownership of the property shall vest in the State
as from the effective date of this order…
6 The curator bonis is
authorised to:
6.3.
Subject to any order of this Court for the exclusion of any interest
in the property under section 52(2) of the Act, to deduct
his fees
and expenditure which were approved by the Master of the High Court;
6.4 Deposit the cash
amounts referred to in paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 above as well as the
balance of the proceeds of the sale of the
fixed property, after his
approved fees has been deducted, into the nominated bank account of
the Embassy of the Democratic Republic
of Congo.
8 Any person, whose
interest in the property concerned is affected by the forfeiture
order, may, within 20 days after he or she
has acquired knowledge of
such order, set the matter down for variation or rescission by the
court.
9 Any person affected
by the forfeiture order, and who was entitled to receive notice of
the application under section 48(2) of
POCA but who did not receive
such notice, may within 45 days after publication of the notice of
the forfeiture order in the Gazette,
apply for an order under section
54 of POCA, excluding his or her interest in the property, or varying
the operation of the order
in respect of the property’.
[22]
On
a purposive, contextual and linguistic interpretation of the
forfeiture order,
[5]
paragraph
6.4 does no more than authorise the curator to pay the cash amounts
after deduction of the fees into the nominated account
of the Embassy
of the DRC. It does not impose an obligation, without more, on him to
do so and the terms of paragraph 6.4 are not
peremptory. Nor does it
of itself vest ownership of such funds in the DRC.
[23]
Paragraph 6.4 cannot be viewed in
isolation. It must be read together with paragraph 2 of the order,
which in express terms provides
that ownership of the forfeited
property vests in the State. The tenth respondent’s contention
that the funds accrued to
the DRC, lack merit. The forfeiture order
does not vest rights to the funds in the DRC.
[24]
In terms of the forfeiture order, ownership
of the capital funds vested in the State with effect from 21 June
2024. Thus, by the
time the second warrant of attachment was served
on 16 July 2024, ownership of the funds already vested in the State.
The variation
order including the reference to the interest in the
forfeiture order was not granted with prospective effect only. It
amended
the existing forfeiture order. By the time the application
was heard, ownership of all the funds, including the interest thus
vested
in the curator on behalf of the State under s 56(2).
Dominium of the monies had passed to the State which now owned the
assets
exclusively and by operation of law.
[25]
In terms of s 57(2) of POCA: ‘Any
right or interest in forfeited property not exercisable by or
transferable to the State,
shall expire and shall not revert to the
person who has possession, or was entitled to possession, of the
property immediately
before the forfeiture order took effect’.
Insofar as the second warrant was served prior to the varied
forfeiture order taking
effect, it thus does not avail the tenth
respondent.
[26]
There was no evidence presented that either
the DRC or the tenth respondent availed themselves of the remedies
provided in the order
or under s 54 of POCA to seek the exclusion of
such funds form the operation of the forfeiture order. I am further
not persuaded
that the provisions of s 30 avails the tenth respondent
as there is no order in existence granted under the section.
[27]
For
r 45 to apply, there must be a relationship of debtor and creditor
between a third party (the State represented by the curator)
and the
judgment debtor (the DRC). That is a prerequisite for attachment
under the subrule. An accruing debt is a debt not yet
payable but a
debt represented by an existing obligation.
[6]
[28]
The
opening words of r 45(12)(a) provide: ‘Whenever it is brought
to the knowledge of the sheriff that there are debts which
are
subject to attachment, and are owing or accruing from a third person
to the judgment debtor…’. Those words define
its
parameters and form the basis for the succeeding provisions.
[7]
For the provisions of the rule to apply, there must be a relationship
of debtor and creditor in existence between a third party
and the
judgment debtor and a debt must be in existence.
[29]
I agree with the curator that there is no
existing obligation or debtor-creditor relationship between him (as
representative of
the State) and the DRC. The assets cannot be the
subject matter of a debtor creditor relationship as between any
parties. The assets
were no longer owned by the DRC, as judgment
debtor, but by the State, There is thus no debt payable or accruing
from the curator
to the DRC susceptible to attachment under
r45(12)(a). The forfeiture order does not give rise to a debt capable
of such attachment.
The DRC has no claim against the curator and
would not be able to execute payment pursuant to the forfeiture
order. The assets
are not those of the curator nor can the curator be
said to be a debtor of the DRC. The property forfeited subject to the
forfeiture
order cannot be said to be a debt owed by the State to the
DRC.
[30]
The provisions of r 45(12) thus do not
avail the tenth respondent and he has not established that he falls
within the parameters
of the rule. It follows that the tenth
respondent’s counter application must fail. There is no basis
to deviate from the
normal principle that costs follow the result.
Considering the complexities of the matter, costs on Scale B would be
appropriate.
[31]
In the result, the following order is
granted:
[1] The tenth respondent
is directed to pay the costs of the main application on Scale B;
[2] The tenth
respondent’s counter application is dismissed with costs on
Scale B.
EF
DIPPENAAR
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT JOHANNESBURG
HEARING
DATE
OF HEARING
: 11
NOVEMBER 2024
DATE
OF JUDGMENT
: 27
JANUARY 2025
APPEARANCES
APPLICANT’S
COUNSEL:
Adv. J.G.
Smit
APPLICANT’S
ATTORNEYS:
C J Brand Attorneys
Inc.
TENTH
RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL
:
Adv N Cassim SC
Adv TV Mabuda
TENTH
RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEYS
:
Malatji & Co
Attorneys
[1]
Act 121 of 1998.
[2]
MEC
for Health, Gauteng v Dr Regan Solomons
(1089/2023) [2024] 184 (30 December 2024) paras 30 to 33.
[3]
Paras 3 to 6.
[4]
Ormerod v Deputy Sheriff Durban
1965 (4) SA 670(D).
[5]
HLB International (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Mwrk Accountants and
Consultants (Pty) Ltd
2022 (5) SA 373
(SCA) paras 25 to 28.
[6]
Honey and Blankenberg v Law
1966 (2) SA 43
(SR) at 48A
[7]
Identiguard International (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa
2008 JDR 1519 (T) at 8H-9A.
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