Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 194South Africa
Botha and Another v Die Hoerskool Menlopark and Others (22089/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 194 (22 February 2025)
Headnotes
by Deed of Transfer no. T14778/2000) (the other property) in favour of Erf 7[...], M[...] P[...] Extension 1 (held by Deed of Transfer T000074601/2015) (the Applicants’ property) as contained in Annexure ‘FA4’ annexed to the Founding Affidavit be cancelled;
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2025
>>
[2025] ZAGPPHC 194
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## Botha and Another v Die Hoerskool Menlopark and Others (22089/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 194 (22 February 2025)
Botha and Another v Die Hoerskool Menlopark and Others (22089/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 194 (22 February 2025)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_194.html
sino date 22 February 2025
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA)
Case No: 22089/2021
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
DATE:
22/02/2025
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
BERNARD
THEUNIS BOTHA
First Applicant
LEONORE
BOTHA
Second Applicant
and
DIE
HOËRSKOOL
MENLOPARK
First
Respondent
THE
PRINCIPAL: DIE HOËRSKOOL MENLOPARK
Second
Respondent
THE
GOVERNING BODY: DIE HOËRSKOOL MENLOPARK
Third Respondent
MEMBER OF THE
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL:
GAUTENG
DEPARTMENT OF BASIC EDUCATION
Fourth Respondent
CITY
OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
Fifth Respondent
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Sixth Respondent
THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT: GAUTENG
PROVINCE
Seventh Respondent
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by email.
The date
for the handing down of the judgment shall be deemed to be
24 February 2025
JUDGMENT
LG
KILMARTIN, AJ:
A.
INTRODUCTION
:
[1]
This is an opposed application brought by
Barnard Theunis Botha (“the first applicant”) and Leonore
Botha (“the
second applicant”) for a spoliation order and
a final interdict against Die Hoërskool Menlopark (“the
first respondent”),
the Principal: Die Hoërskool Menlopark
(“the second respondent” or “the Principal”)
and the Governing
Body: Die Hoërskool Menlopark (“the
third respondent” or “the Governing Body”).
[2]
The first and second applicants are
referred to collectively below as “the applicants” and
the first, second and third
respondents are referred to collectively
below as “the School”. The first respondent
is a public school
as defined in section 1 of the South African
Schools Act, 84 of 1996 (“the
South African Schools Act&rdquo
;),
read with Chapter 3 thereof.
[3]
The fourth respondent - the Member of the
Executive Council: Gauteng Department of Basic Education, the fifth
respondent - the City
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, the sixth
respondent - the Government of the Republic of South Africa, and the
seventh respondent
- the Provincial Government: Gauteng Province
(which was formally joined as a party at the commencement of the
proceedings) did
not file papers or heads of argument.
Notwithstanding this, Mr M Rakgoale (“Mr Rakgoale”)
appeared on behalf
of the fourth respondent and confirmed that the
fourth respondent is in agreement with the grounds of opposition
raised by the
School. Mr JA Venter (“Mr Venter”)
who appeared for the applicants objected to Mr Rakgode making
representations
as no papers or heads of argument had been filed by
the fourth respondent. This objection is sound and, at best, Mr
Rakgoale
was on a watching brief.
[4]
Since 27 August 2015, the applicants have
been the registered owners and occupiers of a residential property
situated at 3[...],
T[...] R[...] Street, M[...] P[...], Pretoria,
which is also known as the Remaining Extent of Erf 7[...], M[...]
P[...] (“the
applicants’ property”).
[5]
The School occupies and operates a public
school on two properties, namely:
[5.1]
the Remaining Extent of Erf 7[...], M[...]
P[...], Registration Division JR, Pretoria (“the Remaining
Extent of Erf 7[...]”);
and
[5.2]
Portion 43 of the Farm Hartebeespoort, 326,
JR Gauteng (“Portion 43”).
[The aforesaid properties
are referred to collectively below as “the School property”.]
[6]
This dispute concerns a borehole servitude
which is registered in favour of the applicants’ property over
Portion 43 (which
forms part of the School property) in terms of
which the applicants are entitled to extract no more than
1 239 818.10
litres of water per month (“the
servitude”). The borehole is situated near the corner of
Lynnwood and Atterbury Roads
and has a pump station.
[7]
The borehole and pump station require
municipal electricity and the applicants accordingly caused a
separate electricity connection
and meter to be installed by the
Municipality on Portion 43, exclusively for purposes of providing
electricity to the pump station.
[8]
The applicants are not connected to the
municipal water supply and exclusively make use of water obtained
from the borehole situated
on Portion 43.
[9]
The current dispute arose during March 2021
when the applicants became aware that the School had caused a peg to
be driven into
the ground to prevent the opening of a specific
pedestrian gate which had been used by the applicants to gain access
to the area
where the borehole, pump station and electricity meter
are situated (“the servitude tenement” or “the
servitude
area”). As will be explained in more detail
below, with reference to the correspondence which has been exchanged
between
the parties, the School, without consulting the applicants,
also unilaterally placed additional restrictions on the manner in
which
the applicants could access the servitude tenement during March
2021. Up until then (save for some instances which will be
referred to below), the applicants and their predecessor in title had
unfettered access through gates to the servitude tenement.
[10]
In terms of the amended notice of motion,
the applicants’ spoliation and interdictory relief is phrased
as follows:
“
SPOLIATION
:
2.
That the First to Third Respondents immediately restore the
Applicants’ undisturbed access to their
borehole servitude
registered over Portion 43 of the Farm Hartebeespoort 362,
Registration Division JR, Gauteng, registered in
favour of the
remainder of Erf 7[...], M[...] P[...], Pretoria, which servitude was
originally registered in notarial deed no.
633/1984S and dated
10 August 1948.
INTERDICT
:
3.
That the First to Third Respondents be interdicted from, in any way
whatsoever, infringing upon the Applicants’
rights emanating
from the servitude described in paragraph 2 above, which
inter
alia
will include:
3.1
Prohibiting the drilling or utilisation of any new borehole or the
drawing of water from
the same aquifer which may detrimentally affect
the yield of the Applicants’ borehole servitude;
3.2
Impeding or in any way restricting the Applicants’ undisturbed
access to their borehole
pump station and pipeline situated on
Portion 43 of the Farm Hartebeespoort 362, Registration Division JR,
Gauteng; and
3.3
Impeding or in any way restricting the Fifth Respondent’s
access to the Applicants’
electricity meter (1[...]) situated
on Portion 43 of the Farm Hartebeespoort 362, Registration Division,
JR, Gauteng Province (4[...]
A[...] Road, M[...] P[...],
alternatively
4[...]
A[...] Road, M[...] P[...]).
”
[11]
The School brought a counter application
wherein it seeks to cancel the servitude based on section 133 of the
National Water Act,
36 of 1998 (“the Water Act”).
In the
alternative
to the cancellation relief, the School has requested a declaratory
order which is aimed at regulating and restricting access to
the
servitude area. The School was represented by Mr A Vorster and Mr A
Kruger.
[12]
The relief sought in the counter
application is phrased as follows:
“
2.
In terms of Section 133 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (‘the
Water Act’) that the servitude
that was over Portion 43 of the
Farm Hartebeespoort 362, Registration Division JR, Province Gauteng
in extent 7,2491 hectares (held
by Deed of Transfer no. T14778/2000)
(the other property) in favour of Erf 7[...], M[...] P[...] Extension
1 (held by Deed of Transfer
T000074601/2015) (the Applicants’
property) as contained in Annexure ‘FA4’ annexed to the
Founding Affidavit
be cancelled;
3.
In the alternative
to prayer 2 above and only in the event of
the Honourable Court finding that the said servitude should not be
cancelled then and
in that event that a declarator be issued
declaring that the School is entitled to limit the Applicants and the
Applicants’
successors in title’s rights in respect of
the execution of the servitude as follows:
3.1
That access to the servient tenement, for whatsoever reason by the
Applicants or any person
acting on behalf of the Applicants only be
obtained:
(i)
for routine maintenance within 24 hours prior notification to the
School; and
(ii)
for emergency access by contacting the persons nominated from time to
time by the School which persons are
at present Mr Hannes Lombard
with cell phone no. 0[...] or Mr Mafalo with cell phone no. 0[...];
(iii)
that neither the Applicants nor any party acting on their behalf
shall enter upon the servient tenement
without being accompanied by a
representative of the school; and
(iv)
that for
[as]
long
as the Covid 19 virus pandemic and the Standard Operating Procedures
for the Prevention, Containment and Management of Covid
19 in Schools
and Schools communities are relevant and applicable that the
Applicants and/or any party acting on their behalf with
comply with
the provisions thereof.
” (sic)
[13]
Before dealing with the relevant legal
principles and merits, it is necessary to have regard to further
relevant background facts
and, in particular, the correspondence
which was exchanged prior to this application being launched, as it
provides context and
constitutes the fundamental backdrop against
which this application must be adjudicated.
B.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND FACTS
:
[14]
The parties provided a summary of common
cause facts and,
inter alia
,
agreed that the content of the correspondence dated between 1977 and
2019 is not in dispute.
[15]
The servitude was registered over Portion
43 between 1945 and 1948. At that time, the applicants’
property was the old
farmhouse. That property was later
subdivided into numerous portions.
[16]
The applicants’ property was
purchased by them from the André De Klerk Familie Trust (“the
Trust”).
Prior to applicants and the Trust becoming the
registered owners of the applicants’ property, a deed of sale
was concluded
between Frank Edward Beattie Struben (“Mr
Struben”) and Eileen Mary Chapman (“Ms Chapman”)
and as an integral
part of the deed of sale a servitude was
registered entitling Ms Chapman to a servitude to withdraw 60 000
gallons of water per
month from an existing borehole that was
situated near the junction of Lynnwood Road and Garstfontein Road
(which is now known
as Atterbury Road), which servitude was also
granted to her successors in title or assigns.
[17]
The proclamation of the township of Menlo
Park Extension 1 took place in 1948. Pursuant to the terms of
the township proclamation,
the servitude was restricted to Erf 7[...]
(i.e. the applicants’ property) by way of Notarial Deed No.
633/1948.
[18]
Since 1948, upon transfer and re-transfer
of the applicants’ property, the notarial deed of servitude was
incorporated in
the title deed and to date remains registered over
the School property.
[19]
As early as 13 October 1977, correspondence
was exchanged between the School’s attorneys, Van Zyl, Le Roux
& Hurter, and
Mr André De Klerk (“Mr De Klerk”)
representing the applicants’ predecessor in title. In a
letter
titled “
I/S: HOëRSKOOL
MENLO PARK – POMPHUISIE”
,
the following is stated:
“
Ons
verwys na ons gesprek met u ‘n tyd gelede met betrekking tot
die pomphuisie op die skool se terrein en u reg om daar water
te pomp
volgens ‘n tans ge-registreerde Serwituut. Teneinde die
onooglikheid uit die weg te ruim en om aan ander behoeftes
te
voorsien (naamlik die uitbreiding van die netbalbane) het ons
ooreengekom:-
1.
dat die skool op sy eie koste die
terrein sal skoonmaak en in stand hou;
2.
dat die oorspronklike hoekpenne
behoue bly en sou dit op een of ander manier verwyder raak, sal die
skool verantwoordelik wees om
dit terug te plaas;
3.
dat alhoewel u onderneem het om die
pomphuisie te herstel, is die skool tog bereid en bied hiermee aan om
dit self te herstel, om
sodoende ‘n mooi konstruksie te kry wat
by die omgewing pas.
U sal dan
geken word in die uitvoering daarvan; en
4.
dat u ten alle tye onbelemmerde
toegang tot die pomphuisie gewaarborg word
.
Graag
ontvang ons u bevestiging hiervan. Die Beheerraad se dank en
waardering word ook aan u oorgedra vir u samewerking en
aanbiedings
van die verlede.
”
(Emphasis
added)
[20]
From the aforesaid letter, it is evident
that the registered servitude was acknowledged by the School and the
School offered to
maintain and repair the pump station or the pump
house but guaranteed Mr De Klerk unrestricted access to the pump
station.
[21]
On 28 October 1977, Mr De Klerk wrote a
letter to the School’s attorneys stating,
inter
alia
, the following:
“
I/S:
HOëRSKOOL MENLO PARK – POMPHUISIE
:
…
Die
terme van die ooreenkoms waarna u verwys is vir my aanvaarbaar op die
uitdruklike voorbehoud dat indien die bestaande boorgat
om een of
ander rede sou opdroog en nie meer die volume water verskaf wat dit
tans verskaf nie, ek geregtig sal wees om op enige
ander plek op die
Serwituut grond te boor, of te laat boor vir water, en indien dit
gevind word ‘n boorgat-pomp en pomphuis
op die nuwe boorgat op
te rig
.
‘
n
Verdere voorbehoud is dat ek redelike toegang tot die Serwituut grond
sal hê vanaf Lynnwoodweg, met ander woorde daar moet,
indien
die bestaande draad verwyder word en met ‘n hoër of nuwe
draad vervang word ‘n hek regoor die pomphuis
aangebring word
sodat ek my reg van toegang gerieflik kan uitoefen
.
Indien
die vermelde twee voorbehoude vir die skool aanvaarbaar is mag hulle
dan voortgaan om uitvoering aan ons ooreenkoms te gee.”
(Emphasis added)
[22]
In essence, Mr De Klerk stated that should
the borehole not deliver the necessary yield or run dry, in terms of
the servitude, he
would be entitled to drill another borehole and
equip the same for the purposes of drawing water. He further
referred in
his correspondence to his reasonable and convenient
access to the servitude from Lynwood Road which he advised should
remain in
place.
[23]
On 3 October 1996, Mr De Klerk addressed a
letter to the Municipality wherein he referred to the servitude in a
paragraph which
reads as follows:
“
Gedurende
uitlegging van die voormelde dorpe het [M]nr Struben die boorgat wat
op die Menlo Park Hoërskool se gronde geleë
is, behou en ‘n
serwituut van waterpypleiding in die oorspronklike aktes opgeteken
ten gunste van erf 7[...] in terme waarvan
die eienaar en opvolgende
eienaars van die eiendom geregtig is om water te pomp vanaf die
boorgat op die gronde van Menlo Park
Hoërskool langs Lynnwoodweg
en oor die parkgedeelte aangrensend aan Die Randstraat tot by
Erf 7[...].”
[24]
In the aforesaid correspondence Mr De Klerk
also referred to fact that some of the Municipal infrastructure work
that was conducted
ignored the said servitude to the Trust’s
detriment.
[25]
On 4 March 1999, Mr De Klerk sent a letter
to the Headmaster of Hoërskool Menlo Park stating the following:
“
I/S
VODACOM MAS
Op
versoek van Mnr Sakkie Burger verwittig ek u hiermee dat ek geen
beswaar het teen die Vodacom mas wat op die serwituut gebied
langs
die pomphuis opgerig is nie.
”
[26]
In the abovementioned correspondence, Mr De
Klerk simply noted that he had no objection to a Vodacom cell phone
tower being erected
in the servitude area next to the pump station.
[27]
On 6 September 2007, Mr De Klerk received a
letter from the School, wherein the School again acknowledged his
borehole servitude
rights. Furthermore, even though mention was
made of the relocation of the netball courts and the erection of a
new boundary
wall, Mr De Klerk was given the assurance that his
rights would not be infringed upon and his access to the servitude
would remain
intact. Attached to the letter was a sketch
depicting the pump station as well as the access gate that existed at
that time.
Mr De Klerk was requested to sign the letter, which
he duly did.
[28]
The letter states,
inter
alia
, the following:
“
I/s
Netbalbane
…
Ons wil dit net
graag bevestig dat met die verskuiwing van die netbalbane en die
oprigting van ‘n nuwe grensmuur ons nie u
belang t.o.v. die
boorgat-pomp sal benadeel nie. Ons sal die stelsel soos, in die
verlede gebruik waar ons, ons slot vas
aan u sin sal sluit en dan
behou u, u eie slot en sleutel wanneer die nuwe skuifhek geïnstalleer
is, sodat u nog steeds toegang
tot die boorgat, kan hê.
Ons voorsien u ook van
‘n plan van wat ons beoog om te doen ter insae.
Ons
versoek u vriendelik om hierdie brief te onderteken en aan ons terug
te besorg.
”
(Emphasis added)
[29]
On 6 May 2009, Mr De Klerk addressed a
further letter to the School. This letter states,
inter
alia
, the following:
“
Ek
het toegestem tot die voorstel deur u gemaak op die uitdruklike
voorwaarde dat daar ‘n hek in Lynnwoodweg sal wees, waar
ek
direkte toegang tot my pomphuis kan verkry.
Die nuwe muur aan die
noordekant van die nuwe netbalbane is opgerig, maar geen voorsiening
is gemaak vir die installering van ‘n
hek soos ooreengekom nie.
Mnr Manie Geldenhuys
het my meegedeel dat ek die hek by die hokkievelde kan gebruik, maar
dit is uiters ongerieflik. Dit is
nie alleen ver van die
pomphuis nie, maar daar is ook voortdurend probleme met die slot aan
die hek by die hokkievelde wat verander
word, wat meebring dat ek dan
geen toegang tot my pomphuis het nie, in besonder gedurende vakansie
periodes.
Ek
versoek u vriendelik om asseblief toe te sien dat daar 'n hek
geïnstalleer word waar die vorige hek was, sodat ek gerieflik
toegang tot my pomphuis kan hê.
”
[30]
In summary, in the aforesaid letter again
made reference to the direct and convenient access that Mr De Klerk
had to the pump house
via Lynwood Road. Mr De Klerk confirmed
that the erection of a new wall had made no provision for the
installation of an
access gate as was agreed upon and it seems that
one Mr Manie Geldenhuys of the School informed Mr De Klerk that he
could utilise
the gate at the hockey field instead which he indicated
would be extremely inconvenient.
[31]
On 5 August 2009, Mr De Klerk addressed
another letter to the School. In that letter he stated, inter
alia, the following:
“
Ons
verwys na bogenoemde aangeleentheid en u skrywe van September 2007
asook die telefoniese gesprek met mnr Manie Geldenhuys op
21 Mei 2009
toe u voorgestel het dat u ’n
ingangshekkie in die skuifhek sal installeer in plaas daarvan om dit
in die grensmuur te doen.
In
my skrywe van 22 Mei 2009 het ek hierdie voorstel aanvaar, maar ek
het nog niks verder van u in die verband verneem nie.
Ek sal
die waardeer om dringend van u te verneem.
”
(Emphasis added)
[32]
In the aforesaid letter, reference was made
to previous correspondence exchanged and the agreement reached on
installing a new access
gate. Mr De Klerk pointed out that
nothing had happened since 22 May 2009 and requested that the matter
be addressed urgently.
[33]
On 13 May 2011, Mr De Klerk again wrote to
the School. He (again) complained about the inconvenience of
the access as provided
by the School and stated that the same was
inconvenient and not freely accessible. In this letter,
inter
alia
, the following was stated:
“…
Die
reëlings om gebruik te maak van die skuifhek is nog steeds nie
gerieflik en ten volle toeganklik vir my nie. So ook
die klein
hekkie wat in die skuifhek voorsien is.
Nie alleen is die
klein hekkie in die skuifhek baie ongerieflik wat betref toegang tot
die slot nie, maar is die hek ook ’n
aansienlike afstand geleë
vanaf my pomphuis.
Toe die ooreenkoms
aanvanklik aangegaan is, op 6 September 2007, het ek ook soos sal
blyk uit my skrywe van 6 September 2007, toegestem
tot die voorstel
deur u gemaak op die uitdruklike voorwaarde dat daar ’n hek in
Lynnwoodweg sal wees, waar ek direkte toegang
tot my pomphuis sal
kry. Ek het ook ’n laasgenoemde skrywe versoek om
asseblief toe te sien dat daar ’n hek geïnstalleer
word
waar die vorige hek was, sodat ek gerieflik toegang tot my pomphuis
kan hê.
Daar was verskeie
geleenthede, veral oor lang naweke en vakansiedae waar dit nie vir my
moontlik was om toegang tot my pomphuis
te verkry nie. Dit was
veral weer die geval tydens die onlangse paasvakansiedae vanaf 22
April 2011 tot en met 3 Mei 2011,
toe ek glad nie toegang tot die
pomphuis kon kry nie omrede daar ’n ketting aan die skuifhek
aangebring is met ’n nuwe
slot waarvan ek nie ’n sleutel
gehad het nie.
Die resultaat was dat
ek die hele naweek nie toegang tot my pomphuis gehad het nie. Eers op
Saterdag die 30ste Mei 2011 kon ek ’n
sleutel van die
terreinopsigter verkry om self ’n duplikaat laat maak van die
sleutel en toegang tot die boorgat te bekom.
Hierdie omstandighede
is uiters ongerieflik vir my en enige lid van my gesin, en ek sou
beslis nie toegestem het tot die gebruik
van die servituut area
waarop ek geregtig is, vir die netbalbane nie, indien ek bewus was
dat daar soveel ongerief vir my veroorsaak
sal word nie.
Al
wat ek wil hê is dat daar in die muur waar die ‘off ramp’
begin, ’n hek geïnstalleer word, waaroor
ek beheer het.
”
[34]
In the aforesaid correspondence
Mr De Klerk again complained about the inconvenience of the access
being provided by the School
and stated that the borehole and pump
station were not freely accessible to him. He raised the
difficulty that over the long
weekends and public holidays it was
impossible for him to obtain access to the pump station as the lock
had been changed at the
access point and he did not have a key for
that lock.
[35]
On 11 July 2011, Mr De Klerk addressed a
further letter to the School. In this letter he thanked the
School for installing
a more convenient access gate in Lynwood Road
close to the pump station. The correspondence stated,
inter
alia
:
“
Ek
verwys na ons onlangse telefoniese gesprek en wens u te bedank
deurdat u ’n nuwe hek in Lynnwoodweg nader aan die pomphuis
geïnstalleer het.
”
[36]
On 19 January 2012, Mr De Klerk again
addressed a letter to the School. In this letter he made
reference to the fact that
a contractor that had to go out for
purposes of attending a leak in the relevant pipeline, which required
some work to be conducted
by a contractor, for which Mr De Klerk
seemingly held the School liable. This correspondence demonstrates
that on some occasions
it is necessary to obtain the services of a
contractor and such services could involve and require access for a
truck or heavy-duty
vehicle to the pump station and pipeline
servitude. The letter states,
inter
alia
, the following:
“
Ek
verwys u na die onlangse telefoniese gesprek wat ek met u [M]nr Manie
Geldenhuys gehad het asook die verskeie persoonlike gesprekke
wat ek
met Hannes en Seef gehad het in verband met die waterpyp wat vanaf my
boorgat die water gelei na die sypaadjie in Lynnwoodweg,
en vandaar
na my woning in die Die Randstraat.
Ek het gebruik gemaak
van die dienste van Wikkies Pompe om te bepaal waar die lekkasie van
water voorgekom het.
In die teenwoordigheid
van ’n werknemer van Wikkies Pompe en Seef, het ons vasgestel
dat die lekkasie onder die opgeboude
oprit aan die weste kant van die
netbalbane is.
Ons het in oorleg met
Seef, bespreek of ons die oprit moet opkap alternatiewelik of ons die
pypleiding moet herlei. Ons het
die laasgenoemde moontlikheid
besluit en Wikkies Pompe het die nodige in die verband gedoen.
Ek het letterlik ure
spandeer om die leksels op te spoor, en ek is net dankbaar dat ons ’n
oplossing kon vind het.
Soos met Seef
oorgekom, heg ek hierby aan die drie fakture, ...
Totaal
R5 339-00.
Volgens Seef was die
plastiese waterpyp onder die ‘ramp’ aanvanklik gelé
in ‘n staal koppeling.
Waar
die lekkasie vandaan gekom het sal ‘n mens net kan vasstel,
indien die oprit en die plaveisel opgekap word….”
(sic)
[37]
The applicants’ Title Deed confirms
that the applicants’ property is entitled to the following
condition:
“
A.
Portion 32 OF THE FARM HARTEBEESPOORT NO 362 Registration Division JR
(formally No 304) district Pretoria,
(of which the property hereby
transferred is a portion) is SUBJECT and ENTITLED to The Following
Conditions:
(a)
…
(b)
at the cost of ten cents 10c per
20663,64 litres (payable monthly) the Transferee, her Successors in
Title or Assigns, shall be
entitled for use upon the said PORTION 32,
to not more than 1239818,10 litres of water per month from supplies
available in the
existing borehole situated near the junction of
Lynnwood Road and Garstfontein Road on the aforesaid remaining extent
of the said
farm; FRANK EDWARD BEATTIE STRUBEN shall erect such
pumping plant as he may deem necessary for the purpose aforesaid, and
for his
own use, and the transferee, her successors in title or
assigns, shall use and operate such plant for the purpose of pumping
the
aforesaid quantify of water and shall be responsible for the
maintenance thereof; and shall further be obliged to deliver into the
said FRANK EDWARD BEATTIE STRUBEN’s reservoir situate[d]
outside the Eastern boundary of the said Portion 32, not more than
20663,64 litres of clean water per week direct from the said
borehole for the use of the said FRANK EDWARD BEATTIE
STRUBEN,
his successors in title or assigns, as varied by Notarial Deed N0
633/1948-S dated 10 August 1948.
”
[38]
In the Title Deed in respect of the School
property, the following restrictive title condition appears:
“
A.(1)
Subject to a servitude whereby EILEEN MARY CHAPMAN a widow, (born on
the 9
th
of May, 1906), and her successors in title or assigns as owners of
Erf Number 7[...], situate[d] on Main Road, in the township
of MENLO
PARK EXTENSION No. 1, District Pretoria, measuring 1,1411 (one comma
one four one one) hectares, and held by her by Deed
of Transfer No.
27584/1945 dated the 3
rd
day of November, 1945, are entitled to use upon the said erf not more
than Sixty thousand (60,000) gallons of water per month from
supplies
available in a borehole existing on the 3
rd
November, 1945, and situate[d] near junction of Lynnwood Road and
Garstfontein Road on the property hereby transferred; which servitude
is to be enjoyed subject to certain conditions, as more fully set out
in Notarial Deed No. 633/1948S dated the 10
th
day of August, 1948.
”
[39]
On 22 January 2019, after the applicants
became the registered owners of the property, it was necessary to
engage the services of
an attorney because the School decided to
cause new boreholes to be drilled adjacent to the applicants’
servitude area but
in the applicants’ aquifer, without the
applicants’ consent.
[40]
In a letter dated 22 January 2019, the
applicants’ attorneys, Dr TC Botha & Prokureurs, demanded
that the School cease
the drilling operation and that it undertake
not to equip the new boreholes in order to utilise the same. At
that stage,
the applicants’ attorneys threatened the School
with an urgent application if the School was to persist with the
unlawful
conduct. The School was advised that the applicants
would appoint an expert, Dr Roger Diamond (“Dr Diamond”)
of the University of Pretoria to conduct tests on the applicants’
borehole in order to determine its yield and the possibility
of it
being detrimentally influenced by any new borehole in close
proximity. It was pointed out that if the applicants’
access to the servitude area was hampered in future a court would be
approached to protect the applicants’ rights.
[41]
In response to the aforesaid letter, the
School’s attorneys provided the undertakings as sought and it
was therefore not necessary
to approach a court at that time.
[42]
In the interim, Dr Diamond was appointed to
do the necessary investigation and compile an expert report on the
applicants’
borehole and the possible impact that would result
if new boreholes were being drilled and utilised in close proximity
to each
other.
[43]
On 1 February 2019, an email was addressed
by the applicants’ attorney, Conrad Botha (“Mr Botha”)
to the School’s
attorneys. In this correspondence,
inter
alia
, the following was stated:
“
Na
verwagting sal die Landmeter se verslag beskikbaar wees teen Woensdag
6 Februarie 2019. Verder, soos reeds aangedui, wag
ons kliënt
op die verslag van Dr Roger Diamond welke verslag aanduidend sal wees
van die negatiewe impak wat u kliënt
se boorgat (gate 1 and 2)
sal hê op ons kliënt se waterlewering in ag genome die
feit dat u kliënt se boorgat in
ons kliënt se hoof wateraar
gesink is.
Wat
betref die gate van u kliënt reeds geboor het bestaan die
dispuut slegs rondom boorgate 1 en 2 en nie rondom boorgat no
3.
”
[44]
On 28 March 2019, the applicants’
attorneys addressed a letter to the School’s attorneys, Anders
Ingelyf. A copy
of the expert report of Dr Diamond was attached
and the content thereof were also brought to the School’s
attention.
In the paragraph titled “
Conclusions
and Recommendations
” the
following was stated by Dr Diamond:
“
Conclusions
Within hundred
segments of pumping at 2 L/s from the old farm borehole, the newly
drilled boreholes began to show a drop in water
level. This
confirms that the three boreholes draw water from the same aquifer.
Pumping from any one of them will cause
a drawdown in the water level
in the other two.
The smooth profiles of
the drawdown curves suggest the primary porosity aquifer. There
is no indication of fracture flow.
This means the effects of
pumping will be roughly equal in all directions from the pumping
borehole.
After 5 hours of
pumping 2 L/s, the old farm borehole was almost empty. This is an
unsafe pumping rate. A rate of 0.5 L/s
is probably a ‘safe
yield’. Safe yield is that which can be pumped
continuously without damage to the borehole,
pump or aquifer.
The ‘unsustainable yield’ is usually lower than the safe
yield, as this considers the broader
environment and other water
users. A reliable sustainable yield cannot be given after this
limited amount of work.
Recommendations
To estimate a
sustainable yield, a water balance calculation for the area will have
to be done, using rainfall, runoff, recharge
estimates and so on, and
including a hydrocensus of all groundwater users in the area (1-2 km
radius).
Monitoring of water
usage should be done. This includes pumped groundwater, as well
as any additional irrigation from municipal
supply. Monitoring
of water levels in boreholes should be done monthly. These
should ideally be monitoring boreholes,
where no nearby pumping has
taken place in the previous 2-3 days. If only pumping boreholes
can be accessed, then ideally
a week of no pumping should proceed the
water level measurements. In addition, rainfall should be
monitored.
Water
quality may also be an issue. Typical concerns in this setting
are septic tanks, leaking sewer pipes, dirty runoff from
roads or
workshops, nutrients (nitrate, phosphate, etc.) from fertilisers and
petrol filling stations. Groundwater users
need to be aware of
such risks.
”
[45]
A confirmatory affidavit by Dr Diamond was
also filed on behalf the applicants confirming the content of his
report.
[46]
Although the applicants initially thought
the new boreholes had been drilled in the servitude area, they later
realised that the
new boreholes were drilled just outside of the
servitude area but advised that this didn’t detract from the
findings of Dr
Diamond and the severe detrimental impact it would
have had on the existing boreholes.
[47]
In response to the correspondence and the
expert report, a letter was received from the School’s
attorneys, Anders Incorporated,
dated 2 April 2019 enquiring about a
report from Mr Retief Strydom and suggesting a round table
conference. Thereafter, the
School appears to have appointed
Boshoff Incorporated Attorneys (“Boshoff Inc.”) to deal
with the matter.
[48]
In early March 2021, the applicants became
aware that they were deprived of their free and unrestricted access
to the pump station
and servitude area as a result of the School
unilaterally locking both the access gates (the pedestrian gate as
well as the vehicle
access gate), which access gates had been used
for a number of years by the applicants to obtain access to the
servitude area.
[49]
On 11 March 2021, the applicants’
attorneys addressed a letter to Boshoff Inc. In the letter, it
was confirmed that
the applicants had been deprived of access and a
photograph was attached demonstrating the peg that had been driven
into the ground
preventing use of the convenient gate which the
applicants had usually used. It was demanded that the School
restore the
access by no later than Friday, 12 March 2021, failing
which urgent application proceedings would be brought. On the same
day,
a short email was received from Boshoff Inc. stating that they
had taken notice of the letter and were awaiting feedback from the
School.
[50]
On 12 March 2021, a further email was
received from Boshoff Inc. – In this email, the writer
apologised for the School’s
actions and indicated that, as a
result of an internal oversight, notice had not been given to the
applicants of the steps that
had been taken by the School.
[51]
The aforesaid email reads as follows:
“
More
Conrad,
Ek vra onverskoning
vir wat soos ’n eensydige handeling kon lyk vir julle welke nie
die geval was nie. Die skool het
’n skrywe aan my gestuur
wat ongelukkig nie deur my vroegtydig, as gevolg van interne oorsig,
aangestuur was aan u nie.
Ek heg die skrywe se inhoud hierby
aan vir u kennisname. Die sluit van die hekkie is geensins
gemik daarop om u regte op
inbraak te maak nie.
‘’
Beste
Dr en Mnr Botha,
as deel van ’n
vernuwingsprojek, verhoogte misdaad en inbrake by openbare skole en
die vereiste streng toegangsregulasies
ten aansien van die Covid-19
pandemie, bou die skool tans ’n nuwe heining in Lynnwoodweg.
Ons wil julle graag hiermee
in kennis stel dat die bestaande
toegangshekkie in Lywoodweg om bestaande redes sal verdwyn.
Daar sal steeds
toegang wees tot die boorgat.
Vir
roetien-onderhoud kan toegang 24 uur vooraf gereël word met die
hoof van sekuriteit by die skool, mnr Hannes Lombaard (0[...])
of die
terreinbestuurder, mnr Mathys Buitendag (0[...]).
Skakel
ons vir mnr Lombaard as daar dringende toegang na-ure nodig is.
Hy is voltyds op terrein
.’
Ek
vertrou u vind bogenoemde in orde en vra weereens omverskoning vir
die oorsig in kommunikasie na u.
”
(Emphasis
added)
[52]
In the notice the applicants are
advised that the access gate in Lynnwood Road would be totally
removed and a new fence was being
erected as a result of,
inter
alia
, increased crime and break-ins at
public schools as well as the strict Covid 19 regulations. Of
significance is that this was the
first time that the School had not
engaged in discussions to try and reach agreement about access
measures to be put in place as
a result of changes which needed to be
implemented.
[53]
I interpolate to point out that, with
reference to the Rule 34 tender which is dealt with under a separate
heading below, this may
have been the ideal time to negotiate a
possible solution to ensure continued unfettered access by the
applicants but which would
ensure no access to the school grounds.
[54]
On 15 March 2021, a further letter was
received from Boshoff Inc. stating,
inter
alia
, that:
“
SPOLIATION
…
1.
We take note of your client’s
intention to proceed with an urgent spoliation application against
our client. We confirm
that our client’s conduct was not
intended on depriving your client of his rights with regard to the
servitude and we place
on record that our client’s conduct was
not unlawful.
2.
Our client is a public-school
governed by a governing body whose functions, obligations and powers
[are] regulated by the South
African School’s Act of 1996 and
the regulations thereto. The governing body is obliged to
manage the school and their
limited functions with regard to the
property upon which the school is erected, in accordance with the
said Act.
3.
The governing body has
responsibility to ensure safety of the learners, educators and other
staff admitted to the school and they
are guided by the Constitution,
the Children’s Act and the School’s Act with regard to
the best interest of the children
in a school. In all
actions concerning children the best interest of a child must be the
primary consideration and
the governing body of our client is guided
by this principle when making decision.
4.
We confirm that the school occupies
the property owned by the Government of South Africa and all the
rights and obligations with
regard to the property is conveyed upon
our client in terms of the South African School’s Act.
5.
As you are aware, the safety of the
learners [is] one of the main factors it considers when acting in the
best interest of children.
The governing body is prohibited to
allow any activity on school property that is hazardous or disruptive
to the learners.
In terms of the regulations for safety
measures at public schools, no person shall enter the school premises
without permission
of the Principal or the Head of the Department.
6.
The governing body is obliged to
continuously develop action plans to counter threats of violence and
to ensure the safety of learners,
staff and educators during school
activities. They are also required to adapt their action plans
for the safety of the learners
as circumstances change and new
threats to the safety and health of the learners come to light.
7.
You are also referred to the
regulations regarding covid 19 protocols in schools, attached hereto
for your ease of reference.
The school must adhere to these
regulations. Should your client require access to the school,
the proper screening for covid
19 symptoms would have to be done.
Our client implements these regulations not only because of their
legal obligations but
also because of their commitment to the best
interests of their learners.
8.
In light of the above, our client
will act unlawfully by allowing your client unauthorised and
unsupervised access to the school’s
property. All persons
who require access to the school require permission to do so prior to
accessing the school, not only
your client. Your client’s
right to access the property to maintain the borehole is ancillary to
the right given by
the registered servitude. Your client’s
rights must be exercised reasonably (
civiliter
modo
).
9.
We place on record that our client
did not deprive your client of the right to draw water from the
borehole and our client did not
refuse access by your client for
maintenance purposes. Our client received no notice or request
from your client to access
the school’s property. We are
of the opinion that our client’s request that your client give
reasonable notice
to access the property and your client’s
legal obligation to obtain prior authorisation, is lawful and
reasonable.
”
[55]
Although there was reference in the above
letter to a “
proposed agreement
”,
none was reached.
[56]
This application was launched on 5 May 2021
in the ordinary course. In the founding affidavit, the first
applicant explained
that the application would only be rendered
urgent if the applicants required immediate access to the pump
station, borehole or
pipeline situated in the servitude area.
[57]
Before dealing with the merits of the
application and the counter application, it is necessary to have
regard to the relevant legal
provisions and authorities.
C.
RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS AND
AUTHORITIES IN MAIN APPLICATION
:
(a)
Spoliation
:
[58]
It
is trite that spoliation is a robust remedy and the rule
spoliatus
ante omnia
is absolute.
[1]
[59]
To succeed with spoliation relief, an
applicant must allege and prove:
[59.1]
that
it was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property or has
a real right;
[2]
[59.2]
there
has been the unlawful deprivation of the property by the respondent.
“
Unlawful”
,
in this context, refers to dispossession without the applicant’s
consent
or due legal process.
[3]
[60]
Partial
deprivation of possession is sufficient to warrant the grant of
spoliation order.
[4]
[61]
If
the application is brought within a year of the active spoliation,
special circumstances have to be present for the relief to
be refused
merely on the basis of excessive delay.
[5]
(b)
Requirements for final
interdictory relief
:
[62]
The
requirements for the right to claim a final interdict are:
[6]
(i) a clear right; (ii) an injury actually committed or
reasonably apprehended; and (iii) the absence of similar protection
by any other ordinary remedy.
[63]
Whether
or not one has a “
clear
right
”
is a matter of substantive law.
[7]
[64]
The
term “
injury
”
must be understood to mean infringement of the right which has been
established and results in prejudice.
[8]
[65]
Prejudice
is not synonymous with damages and it is sufficient to establish
potential prejudice.
[9]
[66]
The
discretion of the court to refuse a final interdict, provided the
abovementioned three requisites are present, is very limited
[10]
and depends exclusively upon the question whether the alternative
remedy is adequate.
[11]
(c)
Interpretation
:
[67]
In
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
(“the
Endumeni
case”)
[12]
the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”), per Wallis JA,
summarised the legal principles of interpretation and stated,
inter
alia
,
that:
[67.1]
interpretation is the
process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it
legislation, some other statutory instrument,
or contract, having
regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or
provisions in the light of the document
as a whole and the
circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence;
[67.2]
whatever the nature
of the document, consideration must be given to the language
used in the light of the ordinary rules of
grammar and syntax; the
context in which the provision appears; the apparent purpose to which
it is directed and the material known
to those responsible for its
production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility
must be weighed in the light
of all these factors;
[67.3]
the process is
objective, not subjective;
[67.4]
a sensible meaning
is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike
results or undermines the apparent
purpose of the document; and
[67.5]
Judges must be alert
to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute what they regard
as reasonable, sensible or businesslike
for the words actually used
as to do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to
cross the divide between interpretation
and legislation.
[68]
In
Bothma-Batho
Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk
[13]
,
the SCA referred with approval to
Endumeni
case
and indicated that, in interpreting a document, whilst the starting
point remains the words of the document, which are the
only relevant
medium through which the parties have expressed their contractual
intentions, the process of interpretation does
not stop at a
perceived literal meaning of those words, but considers them in the
light of all relevant and admissible context,
including the
circumstances in which the document came into being. The former
distinction between permissible background and
surrounding
circumstances, never very clear, has fallen away. Interpretation
is no longer a process that occurs in stages
but is essentially one
unitary exercise.
(d)
Relevant provisions of the
South
African Schools Act and
the Regulations promulgated thereunder
:
[69]
According to the School, changing
circumstances, including the need to comply with the provisions of
the
South African Schools Act and
the Regulations promulgated
thereunder made it necessary to change the manner in which the
applicants had previously accessed the
School property.
[70]
in particular, the School relies on the
need to employ measures to ensure the safety of the learners,
personnel and parties lawfully
attending the premises and submits
that this justifies the implementation of the measures suggested by
it to regulate the applicants’
rights in respect of the
servitude.
[71]
The court was,
inter
alia
, referred to the provisions of
sections 16(1)
,
20
(1)(g),
21
(1) and the Regulations promulgated by
the Minister of Education in terms of section 61 of the
South African
Schools Act for
Safety Measures at Public Schools in terms of
Government Gazette Notice 1040 published in Government Gazette No.
22764, dated 12
October 2001, which came into effect on 12 October
2001 (“the Safety Regulations”).
[72]
Section 16(1)
of the
South African Schools
Act reads
as follows:
“
6
Governance and professional management of public schools
(1)
Su
bject
to this Act, the governance of every public school is vested in its
governing body and it may perform only such functions
and obligations
and exercise only such rights as prescribed by the Act.
”
[73]
Section 20(1)(g)
of the
South African
Schools Act provides
as follows:
“
20
Functions
of all governing bodies
(1)
Subject to this Act, the governing body of a public school must-
…
(g)
administer and control the school's property, and buildings and
grounds occupied by the school, including school
hostels, but the
exercise of this power must not in any manner interfere with or
otherwise hamper the implementation of a decision
made by the Member
of the Executive Council or Head of Department in terms of any law or
policy;
”
[74]
In terms of Regulation 1 of the Safety
Regulations,
“
HOD
”
means the “
Head of the Education
Department in the Province
” and
“
Public School Premises
”
is defined to include “
a building,
structure, hall, room, office, convenience, land enclosure, which is
under the control of a public school, to which
a member of the public
has a right of access, or is usually admitted, or for which he or she
may be admitted
”.
[75]
Regulation 5 of the Safety Regulations is
titled “
Access to public school
premises
” and provides,
inter
alia
, as follows:
“
(1)
Subject to the Constitution, laws and national and provincial
policies, the HOD or principal of any public school
may and for such
timeframes as may be necessary -
(a)
take such steps as he or she may
consider necessary for the safeguarding of the public school
premises, as well as for the protection
of the people therein; and
(b)
direct that the school may only be
entered in accordance with the provisions of subregulation (2).”
[76]
Regulation 6 of the Safety Regulations is
titled “
Exemption of certain
persons
” and provides as follows:
“
6.
Exemption of certain persons
The
provisions of regulation 5 do not apply in respect of any member of a
police service established by or under any law, a member
of the South
African Defence Force, the Minister of Education, the Minister of the
Executive Council responsible for education
in a province or an
official of the Department of Provincial Departments of Education who
is required in the performance of his
or her functions to enter or
enters upon any public school premises and it produces proof of his
or her identity to the satisfaction
of the principal or HOD
concerned.
”
[77]
Regulation 8A is titled “
School
activities
” and Regulation 8A(2)
provides as follows:
“
(2)
a public school must take measures to ensure the safety of learners
doing any school activity including –
(a)
ensuring against accidents,
injuries, general medical expenses, hospitalisation and theft that
may occur, depending on the availability
of funds; …”
[78]
Regulations 9(5) and 9(6) of
the Safety Regulations provide as follows:
“
(5)
Public schools must develop action plans to counter threats of
violence which have the potential to have a negative
impact on school
activities and to implement regulation 4(1).
(6)
The plans in subregulation (5) must ensure the safety of all
learners, staff members and parents during school
activities.
”
[79]
The respondents further referred to the
responsibility of the School and the Governing Body to ensure the
safety of learners, educators
and other staff in terms of the
Constitution and the Children’s Act, 38 of 2005. Furthermore,
it was stated that in all actions
concerning children the best
interest of a child must be the primary consideration and that is the
guiding principle of the School
when making any decision.
(e)
Applicability of the City of
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality: Water Supply Bylaws
:
[80]
The School’s counsel argued that
Bylaw 59 which had been published by the City Manager of the City of
Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality in terms of sections 5 and 6
of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act, 6 of 2007,
read with section 7
of the Gauteng Rationalisation of Local
Government Act, 10 of 1998,
section 13
of the
Local Government
Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000
and section 162 of the
Constitution, demonstrated that the applicants use of the borehole
water is unlawful.
[81]
Bylaw 59 reads as follows:
“
59(1)
No person may use or permit the
use of water from a source other than the water supply system except
for a rainwater tank that is
not connected to a water installation,
provided that
–
(a)
the prior written consent of the
Engineer has been obtained for the use of water from a source other
than the water supply system
or rainwater tank, as the case may be
;
and
(b)
the use of water is in accordance
with the conditions that the Municipality may impose for domestic,
commercial or industrial purposes
.”
[82]
A “
water
supply system
” is defined in the
Bylaws to mean:
“…
the
water supply system of which ownership vests in the Municipality and
which is used or intended to be used by the Municipality
in
connection with the supply of water, and includes the structures,
aqueducts, pipes, valves, pumps, meters or other apparatus
relating
to the water supply system and any part of the water supply system.”
[83]
A “
water
installation
” is defined in the
Bylaws to mean:
“…
the
pipes and water fittings which are situated on any premises and
ownership of which vests in the owner of the premises and which
are
used or intended to be used in connection with the use of the water
on the premises, and includes a pipe and water fitting
situated
outside the boundary of the premises, which either connects to the
connection pipe relating to the premises or are otherwise
laid with
the permission of the Municipality.”
[84]
Bylaw 59 which is relied upon by the School
falls under Part 9, Chapter V, which pertains to “
unauthorised
water supply service
s”.
[85]
The applicants’ counsel referred the
Court to the fact that “
Boreholes
”
are dealt with under Part 8, Chapter V.
[86]
Bylaws 39(1)(a) and 39(3) provide for the
“
Notification of boreholes
”
and read as follows:
“
39.(1)
In respect of any area of the Municipality, the Municipality may by
public notice require –
(a)
the owner of any premises on which a
borehole exists or, if the owner is not in occupation of the
premises, the occupier of the
premises to notify the Municipality of
the existence of a borehole on the premises and to provide it with
such information about
the borehole as it may require; …
(3)
In respect of an owner or occupier
of premises who has an existing borehole on the premises that is used
for water supply services,
the Municipality ay by notice to the owner
or occupier or by public notice –
(a)
require the owner or occupier, as
the case may be, to obtain approval from the Municipality for the use
of the borehole for potable
water supply services in accordance with
sections 6.7 and 22 of the Act; and
(b)
impose conditions in respect of the
use of the borehole for potable water supply services.”
D.
RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS AND
AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE COUNTER APPLICATION
:
[87]
The counter application was brought based
on section 133 of the Water Act. Section 133 of the Water Act
provides as follows:
“
133
Cancellation of servitude
An
owner of land subject to a servitude of abutment, aqueduct or
submersion may-
(a)
if the relevant authorisation associated with the servitude is
terminated;
(
b)
if the rights and obligations in respect of the servitude have not
been exercised on the land subject to the
servitude for a continuous
period of three years; or
(c)
for any other lawful reason,
apply
to a High Court for the cancellation of that servitude.
”
[88]
Counsel
for the School referred me to
De
Kock v Hänel and Others
,
[14]
where the court was faced with the argument that once the utility for
which a servitude was created no longer exists, the servitude
itself
ceases to exist. The court stated the following in this regard:
“
The
issue of
utilitas
was
carefully canvassed by both counsel. Mr Sholto-Douglas appeared
to argue as follows: Once the utility for which a servitude
is
created no longer exists the servitude itself ceases to exist. This
principle referred to as a requirement of
utilitas
demands
that the servitude must offer some permanent benefit to the
dominant tenement and not merely serve the personal pleasure
or
caprice of the owner of the land.
”
[89]
The
School’s counsel also referred me to
Pickard
v Stein and Others
[15]
where the court considered whether a praedial servitude had fallen
away because it no longer had any utility. In doing
so, the
court referred to the following statement of the SCA in
Linvestment
CC v Hammersley and Another
(“
Linvestment
”)
[16]
.
“
[31]
I am persuaded that the interests of justice do
indeed require a change in our established law on the subject.
The
rigid enforcement of a servitude when the sanctity of the contract or
the strict terms of the grant benefit neither party
but, on the
contrary, operate prejudicially on one of them, seems to me
indefensible. Servitudes are by their nature often the
creation of
preceding generations devised in another time to serve ends
which must now be satisfied in a different
environment. Imagine a right of way over a farm portion
registered fifty years ago.
Since then new public roads have been
created providing new access to the dominant tenement, the nature of
the environment has
changed, the contracting parties have long gone.
Why should a present owner, on no rational ground, be entitled to
rely on his
summum ius
derived
from the alleged sanctity of a contract or a grant or
prescriptive acquisition to which he was not privy. Properly
regulated flexibility will not set an unhealthy precedent or
encourage abuse. Nor will it cheapen the value of registered title
or
prejudice third parties.”
E.
MERITS OF THE MAIN
APPLICATION
:
[90]
The applicants allege,
inter
alia
, that:
[90.1]
the conduct of the School amounts to
spoliation (or at least partial spoliation) and constitutes an
infringement of the applicants’
rights in terms of the Notarial
Deed of Servitude;
[90.2]
it is “
cold
comfort to the applicants that 24 hours’ notice must be given
to obtain access and a Mr Lombaard should be contacted
on his cell
phone if urgent access is required
”;
[90.3]
the School has deprived the applicants “
of
the convenient access situated close to the pump station and
servitude area and not only is it impossible for
[the
first applicant]
to obtain access
through the pedestrian gate, but it is also impossible for any
vehicles or maintenance trucks to have access to
the servitude area
to, in case of an emergency, attend to any difficulties encountered
at the pump station
”; and
[90.4]
officials of the Municipality, by virtue of
the School’s conduct, can also not obtain access to the
aforesaid electricity
meter and will not make contact with either Mr
Lombaard or Mr Buitendag in order to obtain access for purposes
of reading
the electricity meter.
[91]
What is clear from the chronology of events
and common cause facts listed by the parties is that there is no
dispute that: (i) there
is a borehole servitude registered in favour
of the applicants over Portion 43 (which forms part of the School
property); the applicants
have been the registered owners and
occupiers of the applicants’ property since 27 August 2015
(i.e. for almost 9 and a half
years); (iii) from 1977 to up until
March 2021, the School acknowledged and accepted the applicants’
and their predecessor
in title’s rights in terms of the
servitude and from time to time reached agreement to ensure
convenient and unfettered access
to the applicants or their
predecessors in title to the servitude tenement; and (iv) from March
2011, the School unilaterally changed
the conditions of access
without any consultation, consent or due process, but still undertook
to provide the applicants with access
to the servitude tenement.
[92]
In explaining the change in stance in
providing unfettered access to Portion 43, the School relies on the
Governing Body’s
and Principal’s responsibility to
protect the safety of the children and teachers in terms of the
Constitution, Children’s
Act and the need to comply with the
provisions of
South African Schools Act and
the Regulations
promulgated thereunder. Although, the applicants contend that
these are irrelevant considerations, I do not
agree. I am of
the view that they are considerations which may require a different
approach to how the servient tenement
can be accessed. The
School also referred to restrictions that arose as a result of the
Covid 19 pandemic but those considerations
are no longer relevant.
Having said that, the Covid 19 pandemic undoubtedly changed the way
people lived their daily lives
and required strict access control to
avoid the virus spreading.
[93]
What is apparent from the correspondence is
that over time, since 1945, the landscape changed and there were
agreements reached
to allow for changes, such as, for example, the
building of netball courts and the building of new boundary walls.
All of
these changes, at least until March 2021, were effected after
consultation with the applicants or their predecessor in title.
[94]
It is also apparent that from time to time
there were complaints when convenient access was interrupted, i.e.
where reference was
made by Mr De Klerk to locks being changed, him
being requested to use alternative gates or the inability to access
the servitude
tenement over holiday weekends.
(a)
Technical arguments raised on
behalf of the School
:
[95]
The School raised various technical points,
some of which were addressed by the applicants in the replying papers
and were not persisted
with at the hearing.
[96]
The first challenge was that the applicants
had no cause of action. This argument was based on the fact
that there was an
erroneous reference to the servitude being
registered in respect of the Remainder of Erf 7[...] and not Portion
43. This
was rectified in the replying papers and by means of
the amended notice of motion and was not persisted with.
[97]
The second challenge was the non-joinder of
the seventh respondent. This was also addressed by the
applicants by bringing
an application for joinder, which was
unopposed and the joinder was granted at the commencement of the
hearing.
[98]
The third challenge was that the spoliation
relief had been rendered moot because there was a delay in having the
matter heard until
November 2023.
[99]
The School submitted that although the SCA
in
Le Riche
considered the period between the act of dispossession (which in this
case was 11 March 2021) and the
bringing
of the application (which in this case was 5 May 2021), by parity of
reasoning the applicants’ election not to “
expeditiously
prosecute the application
”
rendered the relief moot. I do not agree. The
dispossession came to the applicants’ knowledge on 11 March
2021 and this application was brought on 5 May 2021 (i.e. in less
than 2 months). There can be no question of the applicants
displaying a state of mind which demonstrated acquiescence of the
alleged disturbance of their possession. The applicants
have,
in my view, provided an adequate explanation for not proceeding with
an urgent application. Absent grounds for urgency,
the
applicants were wisely advised not to bring the matter as an urgent
application.
[100]
The fourth argument advanced by the School
is that the relief sought in terms of the
mandament
van spolie
is rendered moot by the
further prayers for a final interdict. The respondents’
argument that the spoliation relief
would somehow be “
subsumed
through the determination of the substantive relief sought”
is also, in my view, unsustainable. Spoliation relief is aimed
at restoring possession (whether partial or not) whilst the
interdictory relief sought is very specific and is aimed at achieving
a different result. These forms of relief also have
their own
distinct requirements.
[101]
In the circumstances, I am of the view that
there is no merit in the technical arguments raised by the School.
(b)
Spoliation relief
:
[102]
Turning to the spoliation relief, the
correspondence demonstrates that until March 2021, the applicants
utilised a pedestrian access
and a larger access gate to accommodate
vehicle access.
[103]
I agree with the applicants that the fact
that they had unrestricted and undisturbed access until March 2021 is
not disputed in
any meaningful way.
[104]
It is common cause that access to the
pedestrian access and vehicle access were removed as a result of the
School placing new conditions
on how access could be achieved.
Having said that the School did still say that access would be
provided, albeit under different
conditions.
[105]
It would also appear that, despite some
disagreements over time and this dispute, throughout the applicants’
occupation of
their property they have obtained water from the
borehole.
[106]
I am of the view that, in this instance,
there has only been partial deprivation of possession without consent
or due legal process
and that the requirements of spoliation have
been met.
[107]
Having said that, the question that arises
is what the court is to make of the safety concerns raised by the
schools as a result
of increased crime and theft at public schools
and the fact that the Governing Body and Principal must act in
accordance with certain
legislation in protecting the safety of
children and staff and, in doing so, act in the best interest of the
children? In
my view, just as changes to the manner of access
were rendered necessary due to other issues and developments at the
school, safety
concerns and legislation promulgated over the years
could also justify a change in the way access is given. In this
sense,
the alternative relief in the counter application is somewhat
intertwined with the question of whether unfettered access should
be
given or should be restricted as requested by the applicant. I
deal with this in more detail below when I deal with the
counter
application.
[108]
In this regard, I wish to make it clear
that there is no evidence of the applicants ever having done anything
to jeopardise the
security of children or safety of anyone at the
school. However, unfortunately, in this day and age, one cannot
exclude the
possibility, in circumstances where crime is said to have
increased in the area, that the access key in the possession of the
applicants
could be taken and / or be innocently misplaced or lost
and/or be utilised by an unknown person.
[109]
The Court accordingly needs to weigh the
interests of the School (including safety of pupils and staff) and
the applicants (having
unfettered access to the servitude tenement as
opposed to having access subject to reasonable conditions) in
reaching a decision
on the terms of access. I deal with this in
more detail below where I address the alternative relief sought in
the counter
application.
(c)
Interdictory relief
:
[110]
In the original notice of motion and the
amended notice of motion the applicants sought an interdict in the
following terms:
“
Prohibiting
the drilling or utilisation of any new borehole
or
the drawing of water from the
same aquafer which may detrimentally affect the yield of the
applicants’ borehole servitude;
…”
(Emphasis added)
[111]
According to the School, in the
replying affidavit, there is a partial abandonment,
alternatively
a refinement of the prayer in that the applicants concede that the
drilling of boreholes in itself is not the issue, instead, it
is the
act of drawing water from the specific aquafer which would
detrimentally impact the applicants’ yield. In this
regard, the court was referred to:
[111.1]
paragraph 6.44.2 of the replying affidavit
which reads as follows:
“
Although
the school is entitled to drill new boreholes outside the servitude
area, it is precluded from doing so if the water abstraction
from
such new boreholes would detrimentally affect the applicants’
rights in terms of the borehole servitude.”;
[111.2]
paragraph 6.48.3 of the replying affidavit
which reads as follows:
“
The
school is entitled to drill as many boreholes it wishes outside the
servitude area, but the abstraction of water from those
boreholes may
not infringe upon the applicants’ rights vesting in the
borehole servitude.”
[112]
I do not read the relief sought as quoted
above as being restricted or refined by the quoted paragraphs.
The question is whether
new boreholes drilled or utilised by the
school will or could detrimentally impact upon the applicant’s
rights under the
servitude.
Clear right
[113]
Turning to the requirements to succeed with
interdictory relief, the School’s main attack is that the
applicants have not
established a clear right. The School
further indicates that the clear right “
has
not been articulated beyond a broad reference to the wording of the
registered servitude
.”
[114]
In this regard, the applicants and the
School confirmed that what is required is an interpretation of the
servitude in line with
the principles of interpretation summarised by
our Courts, including
Endumeni
.
[115]
Counsel
for the applicants also referred me to
Unica
Iron & Steel (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mirchandan
[17]
where the SCA stated that the way in which the parties to a contract
carried out their agreement may be considered as part of the
contextual setting to ascertain the meaning of a dispute term as the
parties’ subsequent conduct may be probative of their
common
intention at the time they made the contract.
[116]
According to the School, the applicants’
right as the dominant tenement to the yield of the aquafer is not an
unqualified
one “
nor is it on
equal footing with that of the servient tenement”
.
As a result of the use of the words “
from
supplies available”
it is
submitted by the School to be clear and unambiguous.
[117]
According to the School, the applicants
have a right to the yield of the aquifer from whatever supplies are
available and submit
that this does not prohibit abstraction from any
other boreholes nor does it infer a minimum entitlement or unlimited
entitlement
but quite the opposite: It illustrates a conditional
right in terms of both payment and maximum use. According to
the School,
the applicants have also failed to show compliance with
the payment condition which would create a right of abstraction upon
which
an interdict may be based and have further failed to provide
any basis upon which they would be entitled to a minimum yield of
some kind.
[118]
In my view, if interpreted in a sensible
and businesslike manner and in light of the context (and the parties’
conduct over
the years), there can be no doubt that the registered
servitude provides the applicants with a clear right to extract a
maximum
of 1 239 818.10 litres of water from the borehole
per month The right does not only arise upon proof of payment.
[119]
The School has dealt with the issue of a
clear right separately with reference to the different nature of the
interdicts sought:
(i) the first interdict is aimed at prohibiting
drilling or utilisation of any new borehole or the drawing water from
the same
aquifer which may detrimentally affect the yield of the
applicants’ borehole servitude (put differently, it will
result
in it not being able to obtain its maximum amount of water per
month to which it is entitled in terms of the servitude); (ii) the
second interdict is aimed at impeding in any way or restricting the
applicants’ “
undisturbed
access
” to their borehole pump
station and pipeline; and (iii) the third interdict is aimed at
impeding in any way or restricting
the Municipality’s access to
the Applicant’s electricity meter (1[...]).
[120]
All of the interdicts sought flow from the
clear right the servitude provides. Having said that I am of
the view, for reasons
already explained above that it may be
necessary to regulate the access and restrict “
unfettered
”
access.
[121]
Insofar as School’s reliance on Bylaw
59 is concerned, it argues that: (i) no person may use, or permit to
be used, potable
water obtained from any other source than the
Municipality’s water supply system for domestic use; (ii) water
from other
sources, such as boreholes, may only be used as a potable
water source with permission from the Municipality; (iii) as the
applicants
use the water extracted from the borehole for domestic use
and not merely to irrigate the garden, they are, on their own
version,
disconnected from the Municipality’s water supply
system; and (iv) the applicants do not have permission from an
Engineer
to do so; and (v) the use of water for domestic purposes
from the borehole is an offence.
[122]
Counsel for the School further argued that:
(i) the responsibility to comply with Bylaws rests squarely on the
shoulders of the
applicants and referred the Court to Bylaw 65 in
this regard; (ii) the owner of the premises is responsible for
ensuring compliance
with the Bylaws in respect of all or any matters
relating to any water installation on the premises; and (iii) the
relevant owner
would be the owner of the premises where the
transgression takes place.
[123]
Counsel for the applicants pointed out that
Bylaw 59 falls under
Part 9
, Chapter V, and pertains to “
unauthorised
water supply services
” and that,
as neither the School nor the applicants supply water services, it is
not relevant. Furthermore, it is common
cause that the
applicants’ borehole has been utilised for decades and long
before bylaw 59 came into operation in 2014 and
based on the
presumption that legislative provisions do not have retrospective
effect, “
prior
written consent
” could not find
application. I agree with counsel for the applicants in this
regard.
[124]
In addition, counsel for the applicants
argued that, insofar as Bylaw 39 dealing with “
boreholes
”
is concerned (which was not referred to in the answering affidavit or
relied upon by the School), sub-section (3) pertains
to existing
boreholes and prescribes conditions if boreholes are used for “
water
supply services
”. Mr
Venter submitted that: (i) at best, the applicants are required to
notify the Municipality of the existing
borehole and then, within the
discretion of the Municipality, it may prescribe certain conditions;
and (ii) the applicants have
notified the Municipality of the
borehole and this was acknowledged without the Municipality raising
any contravention of the bylaw.
[125]
There is accordingly no merit in the
arguments regarding the application of Bylaws which demonstrate any
unlawful conduct on the
part of the applicants or detract from their
clear right.
Irreparable
harm
:
[126]
It is common cause that the
applicants exclusively make use of the water from their borehole and
they will therefore suffer irreparable
harm is their rights are
infringed to the extent that they can no longer be supplied from the
borehole.
[127]
It should not be forgotten that the price
paid for the applicants’ property would have included the
benefit of the servitude.
[128]
It has also been demonstrated in Dr
Diamond’s report that the newly drilled boreholes (albeit that
they were drilled outside
of the servitude area) showed a drop in
water level and that after five hours of pumping 2L/s the borehole
was almost empty.
Bearing in mind that the School’s use
of water is likely to be much more and would probably include
irrigation purposes and
the like and probably be much more extensive
than water usage at a single residence, irreparable harm or potential
irreparable
harm is likely as the School’s boreholes may have a
detrimental impact upon water available in the borehole utilised by
the
applicants.
[129]
That said, the School is not prevented from
investigating whether other borehole sites are available on the
School Property which
could be utilised and would not affect the
applicants’ maximum yield.
No alternative
remedy
[130]
A claim for damages in an instance like
this would not be an adequate alternative to interdictory relief,
particularly as damages
would be very difficult to quantify.
[131]
As final relief was persisted with, there
is no need to deal with the balance of convenience.
F.
MERITS OF THE COUNTER
APPLICATION
:
[132]
The cancellation relief in the counter
application was brought based on section 133 of the Water Act.
[133]
With reference to
De
Kock
, I do not agree that it has been
shown that the servitude merely serves the personal pleasure or
caprice of the owner of the land.
[134]
This is also not an instance where the
servitude benefits neither party and operates prejudicially in
respect of one of them as
referred to in
Linvestment
.
[135]
For the reasons referred to above, I am of
the view that there is no merit in the Bylaw arguments.
[136]
I accordingly see no basis upon which the
cancellation relief can or should be granted.
[137]
That brings me to the
alternative
relief aimed at controlling the applicants’ access.
[138]
Certain of the restrictions suggested
in the
alternative
relief seem somewhat rigid and unreasonable, however, I am of the
view that having regard to safety concerns of the School arising
from
the increase in crime and break-ins at public schools and the
provisions of the
South African Schools Act and
the Regulations
promulgated thereunder, it is justifiable to put certain reasonable
access control measures in place.
[139]
Turning to the proposed measures, first,
the request for 24 hours’ notice of routine maintenance is, in
my view, reasonable,
particularly as Wikkies Pumps indicated after
inspecting the borehole pump station that routine maintenance will
not be required
often.
[140]
Second, for emergency access, the Court is
not sure if the information is outdated as this application was
issued in May 2021.
Although it is indicated that two (2)
people can be contacted and one is always onsite, I think that is
inadequate. I think
contact details of at least three (3)
persons should be provided and the School is obliged to ensure that
at least one (1) of those
persons is on site every day and
contactable. I will adjust the order sought by the School
accordingly;
[141]
Third, as the applicants have had
unfettered access to the school for almost a decade, once they are
permitted to enter the school
there is no need for them to be
accompanied as suggested. Having said that, that requirement
may, however, be justified when
dealing with any third party or
contractor acting on the applicants’ behalf or any successor in
title who is not known to
the School. I will, hence, also amend
the order sought accordingly;
[142]
Fourth, there is no need to consider the
Covid 19 restrictions so no order need be made to this effect.
G.
THE “
WITHOUT
PREJUDICE
”
RULE 34
TENDER AND COSTS
:
[143]
It appears from the
Rule 34
tender that
Vodacom has its own access to the Vodacom tower via what was referred
to as “a cubicle”. This enables
Vodacom to access
the tower without being subjected to the restrictions sought to be
imposed on the applicants.
[144]
Contrary to the Rules (which are dealt with
below), a “
without prejudice
”
offer of settlement in terms of
Rules 34(2)
,
34
(4) and
34
(5), dated
26 April 2023, was made available to the Court on CaseLines under
section 019.
As will be apparent from what is stated below, the
Rules provide that the disclosure of a “
without
prejudice
” settlement before
judgment by a party can result in an adverse cost order against such
a party.
[145]
The relevant provisions of
Rule 34
appear
below:
“
34
Offer to settle
(2)
Where the plaintiff claims the performance of some
act by the defendant, the defendant may at any time tender
,
either unconditionally or
without prejudice, to perform such act
.
Unless such act must be performed by the defendant personally, he
shall execute an irrevocable power of attorney authorising the
performance of such act which he shall deliver to the registrar
together with the tender.
…
(4)
One of several defendants, as well as any third party
from whom relief is claimed, may, either unconditionally or without
prejudice,
by way of an offer of settlement make a written offer to
settle the plaintiff’s or defendant’s claim or tender to
perform
any act claimed by the plaintiff or defendant.
(5)
Notice of any offer or tender in terms of this rule
shall be given to all parties to the action and shall state
—
(a)
whether the same is unconditional or without prejudice as an offer of
settlement;
(b)
whether it is accompanied by an offer to pay all or only part of the
costs of the party to whom the offer
or tender is made, and further
that it shall be subject to such conditions as may be stated therein;
(c)
whether the offer or tender is made by way of settlement of both
claim and costs or of the claim only;
(d)
whether the defendant disclaims liability for the payment of costs or
for part thereof, in which case the
reasons for such disclaimer shall
be given, and the action may then be set down on the question of
costs alone.
(6)
A plaintiff or party referred to in subrule (3) may
within 15 days after the receipt of the notice referred to
in subrule
(5), or thereafter with the written consent of the defendant or third
party or order of court, on such conditions as
may be considered to
be fair, accept any offer or tender, whereupon the registrar, having
satisfied himself that the requirements
of this subrule have been
complied with, shall hand over the power of attorney referred to in
subrule (2) to the plaintiff or his
attorney.
…
(10)
No offer or tender in terms of this rule made without prejudice
shall be disclosed to the court at any time before judgment has been
given. No reference to such offer or tender shall appear on any file
in the office of the registrar containing the papers in the
said
case.
(11)
The fact that an offer or tender referred to in this rule has been
made may be brought to the notice of the court after judgment
has
been given as being relevant to the question of costs.
(12)
If the court has given judgment on the question of costs in
ignorance of the offer or tender and it is brought to the notice of
the registrar, in writing, within five days after the date of
judgment, the question of costs shall be considered afresh in the
light of the offer or tender: Provided that nothing in this subrule
contained shall affect the court’s discretion as to an
award of
costs.
(13)
Any party who, contrary to this rule, personally or through any
person representing him, discloses such an offer or tender to the
judge or the court shall be liable to have costs given against him
even if he is successful in the action
.
(14)
This rule shall apply mutatis mutandis where relief is
claimed on motion or claim in reconvention or in terms of
rule 13.
”
[146]
The provision of the
Rule 34
“without
prejudice” tender to the Court prior to judgment is contrary to
Rule 34(10).
[147]
During argument, I was referred to the fact
that the tender was not accepted by the applicants but noted that it
had provided for
an entrance gate to be erected and that access be
granted to the applicants to a cubical similar to the entrance gate
and the access
provided to Vodacom. That would result in the
applicants not being subjected to any restrictions to access.
Prima facie
,
that solution would have appeared to cater for “
unfettered
”
access and the Court noted that the School offered to incur the costs
in relation thereto. Whilst this may have been
a suitable
outcome, the settlement was rejected by the applicants.
[148]
As the tender was not accepted, the only
relevance it has is in relation to the issue of costs. The
Court has already had
sight of the tender and the option to disclose
it after judgment as envisaged in
Rule 34(11)
and an opportunity to
reconsider costs in terms of
Rule 34(12)
is no longer available.
[149]
The School’s counsel suggested I hold
over the issue of costs as certain correspondence which was not
before the Court may
be provided to it after judgment and may
influence the question of costs. Mr Venter advised that
he was unaware of
what correspondence was being referred to and,
despite the Court stating that such correspondence should be sent to
Mr Venter (albeit
under a suitable confidentiality regime), this did
not happen.
[150]
In my view
Rule 34
makes it clear that the
“
without prejudice
”
tender should not form part of the record and that after judgment and
the Court granting a cost order, a party can request
the Court to
reconsider the cost order made. At that stage, the
Rule 34
tender is made available to the Court. That did not happen in
this instance and there is no provision for correspondence
to be
forwarded to the Court to reconsider its cost order as suggested by
the counsel for the School.
[151]
It is also clear from
Rule 34(10)
that,
notwithstanding the Rule, nothing affects the Court’s
discretion to award costs, it merely provides a mechanism by
which
the cost order can be considered afresh (after judgment) with
reference to the tender.
[152]
In the circumstances, there is no basis for
me to hold over the question of costs.
[153]
I
was urged by the applicants to grant a punitive cost order against
the School. In this regard it was alleged that this litigation
is vexatious. I was referred to the matter of
Boost
Sports Africa (Pty) Ltd v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd
[18]
where the SCA applied the
dicta
in
the matter of
In
re: Alluvial Creek Limited
[19]
which states the following with regards to a punitive cost order:
“
Now
sometimes such an order is given because of something in the conduct
of a party which the court considers should be punished,
malice,
misleading the court and things like that, but I think the order may
also be granted without any reflection upon that party
whether
proceedings are vexatious, and by vexatious I mean whether they have
the effect of being vexatious, although the intent
might not have
been that they should be vexatious. There are people who enter
into litigation with the utmost upright purpose
and a most firm
belief in the justice of their case, and yet those proceedings may be
regarded as vexatious when they put the other
side to unnecessary
trouble and expense which the other side ought not to bear.
”
[154]
In my view there is no evidence of malice
or vexatiousness on the part of the School and both parties have
achieved some success.
I am also cognisant of the fact that the
Rule 34
tender provided for each party to pay its own costs and only
regret that the tender was not made before the unilateral decision
of
the school to deprive access to the servitude area and to impose
unilateral terms of restricting access without consultation.
[155]
In the circumstances, I am of the view that
each party should bear its own costs.
H.
ORDER
In
the light of what is stated above, the following order is granted:
1.
The School must immediately restore the
applicants’ access to their borehole servitude registered over
Portion 43 of the Farm
Hartebeespoort 362, Registration Division JR,
Gauteng, registered in favour of the remainder of Erf 7[...], Menlo
Park, Pretoria,
which servitude was originally registered in notarial
deed no. 633/1984S and dated 10 August 1948 (“the
servitude”)
subject to the following conditions:
1.1.
for routine maintenance in the servitude
tenement, there must be 24 hours’ prior notification to the
School;
1.2.
for emergency access, three (3) persons
nominated from time to time by the School, two (2) of which persons
were identified in the
counter application as being Mr Hannes Lombard
with cell phone no. 0[...] or Mr Mafalo with cell phone no. 0[...]
can be contacted
and must provide access within at least three (3)
hours;
1.3.
the School must provide the contact details
of the third (3
rd
)
contact person to the applicants within five (5) days of the date of
this order;
1.4.
the School must ensure that, at all times,
at least one (1) of the designated contact persons is onsite and able
to give access
to the applicants within three (3) hours;
1.5.
the School is ordered to immediately advise
the applicants of any replacement of the three (3) designated persons
and to provide
the applicants with the contact details of the newly
designated person(s);
1.6.
after the applicants are given access to
the School property, they need not be accompanied by a representative
of the school to
the servitude area;
1.7.
in the event of any concerns regarding the
applicants’ conduct in attending the servitude, the School is
entitled to approach
the Court for further directions on supervision
required; and
1.8.
in the event of a third party or agent of
the applicants requiring access to the servient tenement, they shall
be accompanied by
a representative of the school;
2.
The School is interdicted from, in any way whatsoever, infringing
upon the applicants’
rights emanating from the servitude which
will include:
2.1.
drilling or utilising any new borehole or the drawing of water from
the same aquifer which will detrimentally affect
the yield of the
applicants’ borehole servitude; and
2.2.
impeding or in any way restricting the fifth respondent’s
access to the Applicants’ electricity meter (1[...])
situated
on Portion 43 of the Farm Hartebeespoort 362, Registration Division,
JR, Gauteng Province (4[...] A[...] Road, M[...]
P[...],
alternatively
4[...] A[...] Road, M[...] P[...]);
3.
The applicants and the School are ordered to pay their own costs in
the main
application and the counter application.
LG KILMARTIN
ACTING
Judge of the High Court
Pretoria
Date
of hearing:
26
November 2024
Date
of judgment:
24
February 2025
For
the Plaintiff:
Adv
JA Venter
Instructed
by:
Dr
TC Botha Inc. Attorneys
For
the Defendant:
Adv
A Vorster and Adv A Kruger
Instructed
by:
Boshoff
Inc.
[1]
Le
Riche v PSP Properties CC
2005 (3) SA 189
(C) at 193G (“
Le
Riche”)
.
[2]
Amler’s
Precedents of Pleadings (9
th
Edition)
(“
Amlers
”),
p 341, and
Impala
Water Users Association
v Lourens N.O.
2008 (2) SA 495 (SCA).
[3]
Amler’s
,
p 341; and
George
Municipality v Vena
1989 (2) SA 263
(A) at 269D – 272C.
[4]
Van
Rooyen v Burger
1960 (4) SA 356
(O) at 363.
[5]
Le
Riche
,
para [25] at 198D/E.
[6]
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221
at 227 (“
Setlogelo
”).
[7]
Minister
of Law & Order, Bophuthatswana v Committee of the Church Summit
of Bophuthatswana
1994
(3) SA 89
(BG) at 97-98.
[8]
Setlogelo
at 221.
[9]
Capital
Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd & Others v Holiday Inns
Inc. and Others
1977
(2) SA 916
(A) at 930-932.
[10]
Tvl
Property and Investment Co Ltd v Reinhold & Co v SA Townships
Mining & Finance Corporation Limited and the Administrator
1938 TPD 512
at 521.
[11]
Setlogelo
at 221 and 227.
[12]
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) at para [18].
[13]
(802/2012)
[2013] ZASCA 176
, para [12].
[14]
1999
(1) SA 994
(C) at 998 F-G.
[15]
[2014]
3 All SA 631 (GJ).
[16]
[2008] ZASCA 1
;
2008
(3) SA 283
(SCA), para [31] at 292 E/F.
[17]
2015
(2) SA 307
(SCA) at para [21].
[18]
2015
(5) SA 38
(SCA) at para [27].
[19]
1929 CPD at 535.
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
Botha and Another v Coetzee and Others (4847/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 380 (13 April 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 380High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)100% similar
Botha and Others v Zanro Fashion CC and Another (026742-2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1181 (28 September 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1181High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)100% similar
Botha v Minister of Police (54384/2018) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1038 (8 September 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 1038High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)100% similar
Botha and Others v Ruthven and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 159; 29145/2021 (8 March 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 159High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
Botha N.O and Others v Van Der Merwe N.O and Another (056043/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 413 (17 April 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 413High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar