Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 253South Africa
T.J.M v K.J.M and Another (11409/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 253 (3 March 2025)
Headnotes
Summary: Divorce action. Counterclaim for forfeiture of pension benefits and immovable property. The plaintiff will benefit unduly and such is disturbingly unfair. The remaining issues in the divorce action are settled. Held: (1) The decree of divorce is granted. Held: (2) The settlement agreement marked X is made an order of Court. Held: (3) The plaintiff is to forfeit a benefit in respect of the pension benefits and the share of the immovable property. Held: (4) There is no order as to costs.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## T.J.M v K.J.M and Another (11409/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 253 (3 March 2025)
T.J.M v K.J.M and Another (11409/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 253 (3 March 2025)
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sino date 3 March 2025
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
Number: 11409/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
DATE:
3/2/25
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
T[...]
J[...]
M[...]
Plaintiff
and
K[...]
J[...]
M[...]
First Defendant
THE
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND
Second Defendant
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose
name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties/their legal representatives by e-mail and by uploading it
to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines. The date
and for
hand-down is deemed to be 3 March 2025.
Summary:
Divorce action. Counterclaim for forfeiture of pension benefits and
immovable property. The plaintiff will benefit unduly
and such is
disturbingly unfair. The remaining issues in the divorce action are
settled. Held: (1) The decree of divorce is granted.
Held: (2) The
settlement agreement marked X is made an order of Court. Held: (3)
The plaintiff is to forfeit a benefit in respect
of the pension
benefits and the share of the immovable property. Held: (4) There is
no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
MOSHOANA, J
Introduction
[1]
This is a divorce action. Both divorcing parties are in agreement
that the marriage
has irretrievably broken down. Resultantly, the
divorcing parties concluded a settlement agreement dealing with other
issues relevant
to this action. What then remained for determination
was the issue of the maintenance of the minor child, which issue was
abandoned
during argument given the uncontested evidence that the
plaintiff is currently unemployed and has no means of paying for any
maintenance
of the minor child, if so ordered. Given this uncontested
evidence, a maintenance order would do nothing but to invite contempt
proceedings. The legal duty of maintenance remains even in the
situation of unemployment. When evidence of means arise, the claim
for maintenance may be instituted. Following the abandonment of the
maintenance claim, the only issue remaining for determination
is a
forfeiture claim in respect of the half share of the pension interest
and the immovable property.
Background
facts and evidence tendered.
[2]
On 31 March
2011, the plaintiff, Mr T[...] J[...] M[...] got married to the first
defendant, Mrs K[...] J[...] M[...] by civil rights
[1]
in community of property and that marriage subsisted as at the time
of the hearing of this action. Given the issue that remain
for
determination, the salient facts in this action are that about 8
years ago, the plaintiff and the defendant acquired an immovable
property situated at Erf 1[...] M[...] M[...] (“the property”).
The property was bonded to Standard Bank of South Africa
for a 20
years’ period. As at 30 January 2025, the outstanding amount of
the bond was R366 124.72. The monthly instalment
as at 30 January
2025 was standing at R7 042.90.
[3]
Since the acquisition of the property, the plaintiff never paid a
cent towards
the monthly instalments of the bond account. The
plaintiff held various employments during the subsistence of the
marriage and
in some of those employments, he cashed out his
accumulated pension benefits without the consent and knowledge of the
first defendant.
Not once did the plaintiff pay any amount towards
the Standard Bank loan. The loan account was serviced by the
plaintiff alone
for the past 8 years.
[4]
The first defendant held employment in a government department, as a
result
of which, she became a member of the second defendant, the
Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) and had, at the time of this
action, accumulated pension interests, the value of which was never
disclosed to this Court. In his particulars of claim, other
than
praying for the division of the joint estate, the plaintiff prayed
for an order that the GEPF be ordered by this Court to
endorse that
50% or such lesser percentage of the pension interests is payable to
him as contemplated in section 7 of the Divorce
Act, 70 of 1979
(Divorce Act). On the contrary, the first defendant prayed for
forfeiture of any percentage of the pension interest
within the
contemplation of
section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act.
[5]
Additionally, the first defendant prayed for the plaintiff to forfeit
his share
of the property, in terms of
section 9(1)
of the
Divorce
Act. This
Court received testimony from both the plaintiff and the
first defendant. The plaintiff also tendered the evidence of his
nephew.
The nephew’s evidence was confined to the undisputed
assault charges, which were subsequently withdrawn by the State
Prosecutor
on conditions that the parties resolve the issues through
mediation.
[6]
The first defendant tendered her evidence first given the issues
remaining for
determination. For the purpose of this judgment, the
brief testimony of the first defendant was that she is currently
living with
the only minor child born out of the marriage. She has
single handedly been maintaining her for a while. She and the
plaintiff
acquired the property 8 years ago. Since acquisition, she
has been servicing the loan of Standard Bank and the plaintiff never
paid a cent. The plaintiff was employed and he resigned from his
employment in 2012. She does not know what the plaintiff did with
his
pension benefits that had been cashed out upon resignation.
[7]
The plaintiff had left the matrimonial home since July 2022. Since
then, he
had not been contributing anything to the joint estate in
particular the costs associated with the property. As far as she
knows
since 2011 up until 2022, when the plaintiff left the
matrimonial home, the plaintiff was unemployed. She had been paying
for the
rates and taxes to the municipality. Since she was not
coping, the rates and taxes account is sitting in arrears of over R25
000.00.
On 25 June 2022, the plaintiff assaulted her and broke a
toilet window of the property. This after she demanded payment of
money
owed to her by the plaintiff. She presented evidence of
photographs which depicted the injuries she sustained during the
assault.
She had laid a criminal charge for the assault which was
later withdrawn.
[8]
She implored this Court to order forfeiture of the share in the
pension
interests since the plaintiff never contributed and she
had not benefited from his pension interests when he resigned from
various
employments. She only heard from the children that he bought
a car or was planning to buy a car. During cross-examination, it was
suggested to her that the injuries depicted on the photographs were
inflicted on her by another woman after she found her in bed
with her
husband. The first defendant vehemently disputed this suggestion and
referred to that version as a “defence mechanism”
employed by the plaintiff.
[9]
The plaintiff testified. Briefly, his testimony is that indeed he did
not contribute
a cent towards the loan owed to Standard Bank for the
acquisition of the property. He confirmed that he received his
pension funds
pay-out from Pick N Pay. Out of the R31 000.00 of the
benefits he received, he gave the first defendant an amount of R10
000.00
and the remainder of the money, he bought a car, which
he later sold and bought furniture for his rented accommodation at
Mamelodi. With the salary he received from what he termed the
“piece jobs”, he was buying meat and other food
stuff. At
some point he loaned an amount of R22 000.00 from the African Bank in
order to buy a car for the family. He later sold
that car for an
amount of R13 000.00 without informing the first defendant or
obtaining her consent. When he terminated employment
with DHL in July
2023, he received an amount of R22 000.00. This amount he did not
share with the first defendant. He left the
matrimonial home because
the first defendant chased him away. This Court interpose to mention
that in respect of all the amounts
received and expended by the
plaintiff, not a shred of documentary evidence was presented by him.
No plausible explanation was
furnished by the plaintiff for this
failure to provide any document. That he received and expended a
specific amount is his
ipse
dixit
.
[10]
He admitted, only in his evidence in chief, to have slapped the first
defendant once. He however, testified
that he was acting in
self-defence as the first defendant had grabbed him with his private
parts and he was experiencing pain at
that time. He slapped her in
order to ward off the painful grabbing of his private parts. He
disputed that the injuries of the
first defendant as depicted on the
photographs were inflicted by him. On his version, the injuries were
inflicted in 2016 already
by a woman who found the first defendant at
her home on a particular Sunday. The first defendant allegedly fled
the scene of the
assault and left behind a cell phone of her daughter
and her own shoes. On a Monday the woman who assaulted the first
defendant
called him using the cell phone of the daughter and relayed
to him the assault. When he confronted the first defendant about what
was relayed to him she simply became dismissive and did not wish to
speak about the incident any further because she was allegedly
at
work at that time. The assault, which he owned up to, happened on 25
June 2022 and he was arrested on 26 June 2022 for that.
He appeared
in Court on a Monday when the charge of assault was withdrawn. During
cross-examination, he conceded that the bulk
of his version was never
put to the first defendant by his legal representative. He also
conceded that some of the monies he received
never made its way to
the joint estate.
[11]
The nephew of the plaintiff, Mr K[...] M[...], is a lawyer by
profession. In 2022, when the assault
happened, he was still a
candidate attorney. He was appointed by both the first defendant and
his uncle to mediate their differences.
At that time, he did not
observe any injuries depicted on the photographs on the first
defendant, whom he met at the matrimonial
home. He and the legal team
of the plaintiff had agreed that since the mediation agreement is
lost he will not testify in corroboration
with regard to the alleged
terms of the alleged agreement. He was sitting in Court throughout
the testimony of his uncle. He testified
that the first defendant had
asked him to include in the agreement, a condition that the plaintiff
should forfeit the pension interest
and the property should they
divorce each other. He advised her that such would have been against
the law, given how the parties
were married to each other. During
cross-examination, he conceded that the vital portions of his
testimony were never put to the
first defendant when she testified.
Submissions
[12]
Owing to the fact that these were action proceedings, the Court
directed the parties to make oral legal
submissions. Counsel for the
plaintiff indicated unreadiness. After hearing oral submissions made,
this Court afforded both parties
a further opportunity to submit
additional written submissions within a period of a week should the
need arise. Nevertheless, the
nub of the first defendant’s
argument is that the plaintiff has not contributed towards the joint
estate and it will be unfair
for the plaintiff to unduly benefit. On
the other hand, the plaintiff, although conceding that he did not pay
anything towards
the property, he is entitled to benefit from the
pension interests as well as the property by virtue of the type of
marriage involved.
[13]
It was further argued that since a single event of a common assault
was involved, such does not amount
to substantial misconduct within
the contemplation of
section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act. The
plaintiff’s
counsel later submitted further helpful written heads as permitted by
this Court. Counsel for the first defendant
submitted nothing
further.
Evaluation
[14]
With regard to the remaining issue,
section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act
and
its applicability is of cardinal importance. As indicated, the
issue of maintenance of the minor child was abandoned since there
was
undisputed evidence that the plaintiff remained unemployed since his
termination of employment with the DHL.
[15]
The default legal position is that where parties are married in
community of property, upon divorce,
the parties will share equally
from the joint estate. However,
section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act
empowers
a Court, when granting a decree of divorce on the ground of
the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage, to order that the
patrimonial
benefits of the marriage be forfeited by one party in
favour of the other. The pleaded case of the first defendant is that
the
plaintiff must forfeit the 50% pension interest and the half
share in the property. This Court was not appraised of what the joint
estate is comprised of as a whole. It was suggested to the first
defendant’s counsel that the case pleaded and made is that
of
partial as opposed to the whole forfeiture.
[16]
In action proceedings too, a party is confined to the relief sought
in the pleadings. The counter-claim
of the first defendant is
confined to the 50% of pension interests and the half share of
the property. This is the case the
plaintiff was to meet and met,
regard had to the evidence of the first defendant. As such, her claim
cannot be enlarged during
submission to include forfeiture of the
whole estate. In order to make an order of forfeiture a Court must
have regard to (a) the
duration of the marriage; (b) the
circumstances which gave rise to the breakdown thereof; (c) any
substantial misconduct on the
part of either of the parties; (d)
satisfaction by the Court that if an order for forfeiture is not
made, the one party will in
relation to the other be unduly
benefited.
[17]
In
Wijker
v Wijker
(
Wijker
)
[2]
,
it was held that the question whether a person will unduly benefit a
two-stage enquiry is involved. Firstly, whether a person
will indeed
benefit, a factual question. Secondly, whether the benefit is undue,
a question involving value judgment, taking into
account all the
facts and the duration of the marriage; the circumstances of the
breakdown; and any substantial misconduct. In
Molapo
v
Molapo
(
Molapo
)
[3]
,
it was held that undue could be described as something disturbingly
unfair.
[18]
Starting with the duration of the marriage factor, the marriage
involved herein endured for 14 years
as at the time of the divorce
action. This could be classified as a long duration. This neutral
factor is considered in order to
make an assumption that both spouses
have made contributions to the joint estate. Contrary to the
submission of the plaintiff’s
counsel, this factor is unhelpful
to this Court because there is overwhelming evidence that the
plaintiff did not make any contributions
to the costs associated with
the acquisition of the property. During the subsistence of the
marriage, he cashed out his pension
benefits and never deployed all
or a portion of those benefits to the growth of the joint estate,
particularly the property. This
Court has already remarked that what
he cashed out is not supported by any documentary evidence.
[19]
With regard to the circumstances giving rise to the breakdown of the
marriage, it is common cause that
since June 2022, the parties did
not live together as husband and wife. It was at this time that the
marriage began to brake down.
It is also common cause that at that
time, the plaintiff had assaulted the first defendant. Undoubtedly,
the assault gave rise
to the breakdown of the marriage and the
separation of the couple. On the issue of the separation, the first
defendant testified
that she suggested that the plaintiff must be
away from the matrimonial home for six months in order to deal with
his anger issues.
He left and never returned after six months. The
plaintiff corroborates the six months separation but gives a
different reason
– until the heart of the first defendant
settles, as he testified.
[20]
The plaintiff gave unreliable evidence with regard to the happening
of the assault. During cross-examination
of the first defendant, a
version was put by his counsel that he never assaulted the first
defendant. The first defendant was assaulted
by a woman who found her
in bed with her husband, so it was put to the first defendant. When
he testified in chief, this version
changed and he unreliably
testified that the assault by that woman took place on a Sunday of
2016. He only admitted to having slapped
the first defendant once
whilst acting in self-defence. The evidence of the plaintiff on this
score is rejected as being false
and a recent fabrication. The
plaintiff did not struck the Court as a reliable and honest witness.
His demeanour in the witness
box was observably unimpressive. It was
clear by mere observation of his demeanour that he manufactured
versions as he went along.
[21]
With regard to substantial misconduct, it is undisputed that the
plaintiff assaulted the first defendant.
Additionally, the first
defendant testified at length about the emotional abuse that the
plaintiff had put her through. That evidence
remained unchallenged.
In the Court’s view, it is emotional and financial abuse for
the plaintiff to expend his pension benefits
and leave the first
defendant to her own devices, with regard to the costs associated
with the property. Such conduct on its own
constitute substantial
misconduct. Although evidence was not led as to when and by whom were
the pictures depicting the injuries
taken, there is an admission that
the plaintiff did in fact assault the first defendant. His version
that he slapped the first
defendant, who on his version, if it is
accepted, was inflicting excruciating and unbearable pain, only once
in order to ward off
what was undoubtedly a vicious attack is hard to
believe. Given vacillating versions on this aspect, this Court finds
the version
of the plaintiff to be improbable when compared to that
of the first defendant. The fact that the State prosecutor decided to
allege
a charge of common assault does not in of itself suggest that
in a common assault a visible injury cannot be inflicted. The
evidence
of the nephew that there were no visible injuries must be
treated with extreme caution. He was present in Court when his uncle
admitted to a one slap. Given his familial relations to the plaintiff
he is prone to tailoring his testimony in order to suit that
of his
uncle. Accordingly, this Court rejects his version as being
unreliable and untrue. There can be no doubt that assault of
a person
does constitute an act of misconduct. It encroaches on the dignity of
a person. The preamble of the
Domestic Violence Act, 116 of 1998
states that domestic violence is a social evil.
Section 1
of the
Domestic Violence Act, defines
domestic violence to mean amongst
others physical abuse. There can be no doubt that an assault is a
form of physical abuse. Accordingly,
this Court concludes that the
plaintiff misconducted himself substantially. The argument that the
assault was not repetitive, thus
not constituting a substantial
misconduct, is rejected. Even in a sexual harassment instances a
single event of harassment is sufficient
and serious enough to
constitute a punishable misconduct. Nevertheless, this Court does
accept that substantial misconduct alone
does not lead to a
forfeiture order. However, in
casu
, it is coupled with dearth
of contribution on the part of the plaintiff to the augmentation of
the joint estate. The plaintiff
was, on the available evidence, in a
financial position to contribute, yet he, for reasons unknown to this
Court, found it befitting
for him to ignore, as it were, the
financial obligations towards the costs associated with the property.
It is perspicuous that
had the first defendant also ignored her
financial obligations, the property could have long been foreclosed.
Over a period of
time the plaintiff had received a lump sum of over
R50 000.00, albeit not supported by any document. Yet he paid not
even a single
cent towards the bond repayments.
[22]
Although
the value of the pension interest is unknown at this stage, the
plaintiff will certainly benefit 50% of that possible substantial
value of the pension interest, in the circumstances where all his
pension benefits were enjoyed by him alone. His evidence that
he gave
the first defendant R10 000.00 must be regarded as false and a recent
fabrication. When the first defendant testified in
chief that he
received nothing from his pension benefits, the version that he paid
her R10 000.00 was never put to her during cross-examination
dexterously conducted by his counsel. As held in
President
of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union
(
SARFU
)
[4]
a cross-examiner has a duty to put a differing version before it can
be argued that the challenged witness is not being truthful.
[5]
The plaintiff was ably represented by an advocate. Failure to put
versions was fatal to the case of the plaintiff.
[23]
In the circumstances, it is disturbingly unfair for the plaintiff to
benefit from the property and
the pension interest. He left the
property almost three years ago and used the proceeds of his own
pension benefits to acquire
other assets outside the matrimonial
home. He received his own pension benefits and not used it to augment
the value of the joint
estate. Such a benefit for the half share of
the property is certainly undue. Although the conduct of the
plaintiff in encumbering
the joint estate without consent and
disposing the assets of the joint assets without consent has not been
pleaded as forms of
substantial misconduct, when value judgment is
exercised by this Court, as it should, if forfeiture is not ordered,
the plaintiff
will be unduly benefited.
[24]
For all the above reason, this Court is satisfied that if forfeiture
of the 50% of the pension interests
and the half share of the
property is not ordered, the plaintiff will, in relation to the first
defendant be unduly benefited.
Order
1.
The decree of divorce is granted and the
marriage between the plaintiff and the first defendant is hereby
dissolved.
2.
The settlement agreement marked X is hereby
made an order of Court.
3.
The plaintiff is ordered to forfeit 50% of
the pension interest held by the first defendant at Government
Employees Pension Fund
(GEPF) as defined in section 1(1) of the
Pension Fund Act 24 of 1996 as well as his 50% share in the property
situated at Erf 1[...]
M[...] M[...], in terms of
section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act.
4.
There
is no order as to costs.
GN MOSHOANA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
Mr T Mokgoatsane
Instructed
by:
GN
Sibuyi Attorneys, Pretoria
For
the 1st Defendant:
Mr
M Marweshe of Marweshe Attorneys
Date of the
hearing:
20-21 February 2025
Date of judgment:
03 March 2025
[1]
A
true copy of the marriage certificate was entered into evidence and
marked exhibit “A”.
[2]
1993
(4) SA 720 (A)
[3]
(4411/10)
2013 (14 March 2013).
[4]
2000
(1) SA 1 (CC)
[5]
See
also
Absa
Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Moshoana NO and others
[2005] 10 BLLR 939
(LAC) at para 39-41.
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