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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Memela v Chairperson of the State Capture Commission of Inquiry and Others (34177/22)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 816 (14 August 2025)
Memela v Chairperson of the State Capture Commission of Inquiry and Others (34177/22)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 816 (14 August 2025)
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sino date 14 August 2025
FLYNOTES:
ADMINISTRATIVE
– State Capture Commission –
Review
application
–
Findings
and recommendations – Jurisdiction – Chairperson
acting in non-judicial capacity – Jurisdiction
of court
confirmed – Criticisms were largely factual disputes and
personal disagreements rather than legal grounds
for review –
Commission acted within statutory mandate – Findings
supported by evidence – Rationally connected
to
investigative purpose – Failed to demonstrate irregularity –
Application dismissed.
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case Number: 34177/22
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
NONTSASA
MEMELA
Applicant
and
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE
STATE CAPTURE
COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY
First Respondent
THE
STATE CAPTURE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
Second Respondent
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH
AFRICA
Third Respondent
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and
authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down
electronically by circulation to
the parties/their legal
representatives by e-mail and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on Caselines. The date
for hand-down is deemed to be
14 August 2025.
Summary: Application
to judicially review certain findings and recommendations of a
commission of inquiry. The chairperson of the
commission of inquiry
is a judicial officer of a superior Court. The review application was
launched without the consent of the
head of Court. The respondents
contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the judicial
review application in the absence
of the consent of the head of Court
to institute the review application, particularly as against the
chairperson of the commission
of inquiry. Section 47(1) of the
Superior Courts Act properly interpreted does not oust the
jurisdiction of this Court. This Court
retains jurisdiction in terms
of section 169(1) of the Constitution. The judicial officer was cited
in his capacity as chairperson
of the commission and not as a
judicial officer. The functions he performed were governed by the
Commissions Act and were not judicial
in nature. The provisions of
section 47(1) do not apply to those functions. Accordingly, the
applicant did not require consent
of the head of the Constitutional
Court to launch a judicial review against the findings and
recommendations of the chairperson
of the commission.
An application for a
postponement is not there for the mere taking. Absent proper grounds,
a Court in the exercise of its true discretion
must refuse a
postponement application.
This being a legality
review, the applicant must demonstrate that the findings and the
recommendations are reviewable in law and
that they are (a) unlawful;
(b) irrational; or (c) arbitrary. The applicant failed to demonstrate
that the impugned findings and
recommendations are reviewable in law;
unlawful; irrational or arbitrary. The appropriate standard of review
in respect of findings
and recommendations of a commission of inquiry
has not been properly pleaded nor demonstrated. The review
application falls to
be dismissed.
Regarding costs, the
applicant must bear the costs of the failed postponement application
as well as the costs attendant to the
review application. The present
application is not one that required the employment of two counsel.
However, it is a matter that
deserved the employment of one senior
counsel. Accordingly, the costs will include the costs of employing
one senior counsel.
Held: (1) The
application for postponement is dismissed. Held: (2) The application
for review is dismissed. Held: (3) The applicant
must pay the costs
attendant to the postponement application and the review application
at the scale of party and party taxable
or to be settled at scale C,
which costs include the employment of one senior counsel.
JUDGMENT
MOSHOANA, J
Introduction
[1]
The State Capture Commission of Inquiry (SCC)
captivated the attention of many South Africans as well as the world
over. Most South
Africans were religiously glued to their television
sets for a considerable period to witness telling revelations
involving their
beloved country. Ultimately, after days of
revelations, the chairperson of the SCC, in the name of the then
Honourable Deputy Chief
Justice RMM Zondo presented his report, which
contained findings and recommendations to the President of the
Republic of South
Africa. Several individuals were implicated in the
findings made by the SCC. The applicant, Ms Nontsasa Memela, was one
of the
individuals against whom findings were made and
recommendations were proposed.
[2]
Chagrined by those findings and recommendations,
the applicant launched the present application seeking an order
setting aside the
findings and recommendations made in Part 1 Volume
1, dealing with the South African Airways and its Associated
Companies, of the
SCC report. The application is opposed by the cited
chairperson and the SCC (“hereinafter jointly referred to as
respondents”).
Surprisingly, the bodies to whom the
recommendations of the SCC are made were not joined in the present
proceedings. That being
the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and
the South African Legal Practice Council (SALPC). This simply implies
that there is
nothing preventing the NPA and the SALPC from actioning
the recommendations of the SCC.
[3]
On 11 July 2025, the applicant, who is allegedly
severely prejudiced by the findings and recommendations of the SCC,
sought a postponement
of the present application, which was
effectively ripe for a hearing in that all the relevant heads of
arguments were submitted.
Barring the President of the Republic of
South Africa, the application was opposed by the respondents. The
present application
was set down on the opposed roll of 4 August
2025. As the allocated judicial officer, I allocated the present
application for oral
hearing on 5 August 2025. At the commencement of
the hearing, Mr Hugo, who emphatically stated that he was only
briefed to move
the postponement application and not to make
submissions on the merits of the review application, sought a
postponement of the
review application. True to course, Mr Hugo
sought to be excused after this Court issued an
ex-tempore
ruling refusing a postponement application, to be
reasoned in this judgment.
[4]
Owing to the departure of Mr Hugo, this Court had
to rely on the already submitted heads of argument by Mr Hodes SC on
behalf of
the applicant. Ms Hofmeyer SC orally defended the heads of
argument submitted on behalf of the respondents. I pause to mention
that ordinarily, motion proceedings may be disposed of without oral
submission in an instance where heads of arguments are at hand.
At
best, there was nothing that would have prevented Mr Hugo to have
read into the record, as it were, the heads of argument drafted
and
submitted by Mr Hodes SC. The applicant was apparently indisposed and
sought to be excused from attending the proceedings.
Brief relevant factual
matrix
[5]
As a precursor, it is recorded that this case is
not about rehashing the evidence extensively processed at the SCC.
Thus, only the
brief facts relevant to the present review application
shall be narrated for the purposes of this judgment. It suffices to
mention
that the applicant seeks to review and set aside findings and
recommendations outlined in paragraphs 1094 to 1105 in the first part
of the SCC report dated 4 January 2022. It is unnecessary for
purposes of this judgment to regurgitate those paragraphs. The
applicant
has annexed an extract thereof to the founding affidavit.
To regurgitate the paragraphs will serve no useful purpose but to
elongate
this judgment.
[6]
Since 15 April 2013, the applicant had been
employed by the South African Airways Technical (SAAT). She was
employed in the capacity
of a Senior Legal and Contracts Management
Specialist. In October 2014, she took the role of Head of
Procurement. Following a restructuring
process, her title changed to
Head of Supply Chain Management (SCM). In this role, she reported
directly to the CEO of SAAT. She
had about six portfolios reporting
to her. In the main, the department she headed was responsible for
ensuring that aircraft spares
were always available.
[7]
In May of 2018, she was placed on a precautionary
suspension pending the outcome of a disciplinary hearing. Such a
disciplinary
hearing was conducted whereat she was found guilty as
charged. At the end of 2018, she was dismissed from the employ of the
SAAT.
Aggrieved by the unfairness of her dismissal, she approached
the CCMA and lodged an unfair dismissal claim against the SAAT. The
CCMA found that her dismissal was both substantively and procedurally
unfair and ordered the SAAT to compensate and reinstate her.
She
however, opted not to take the reinstatement relief issued to her.
[8]
Around November 2019, she was contacted by the
investigators of the SCC. They informed her that they were
investigating transactions
concluded between the South African
Airways (SAA) and the SAAT. She cooperated and gave information
regarding four transactions.
Those were in relation to (a) the
disposal of Ground Power Units (GPUs); (b) the components tender; (c)
the tyre tender; and (d)
the logistical tender. She provided them
with information within her knowledge. In the process, she was
questioned about the R2 500 000
that was paid to her
alleged transferring attorneys, Mbanjwa Attorneys Inc (Mbanjwa).
[9]
She met with the investigators again on 6 December
2019 and provided the same information she provided before.
Ultimately, she received
a notice to appear before the SCC for the
purposes of giving evidence. She complied with the notice and
appeared on 7 February
2020. For the period of appearances after 7
February 2020, she enlisted the services of Mbanjwa to represent her.
[10]
After tendering her evidence, as indicated above,
a report containing certain findings and recommendations against her
was made
known. She was aggrieved by those findings and
recommendations. Resultantly, on or about 27 June 2022, she launched
the present
application.
Grounds of review
[11]
The applicant raised a barrage of grounds for
review. In the main, she griped that the SCC’s findings and
recommendations
were unreasonable, irrational, and unfair. In her
founding affidavit, she dissected each of the findings and
recommendations and
criticised them. In the whole, she suggested that
those findings were factually wrong and otherwise. At the end of her
founding
affidavit, she attenuated the criticism by alleging that the
impugned findings and recommendations ought to be reviewed and set
aside in that they are (i) irregular; (ii) irrational; (iii) unfair;
and (iv) are bereft of factual and legal basis.
Analysis
[12]
In
considering the present application, this Court keeps in mind what
was said in
Canada
(AG) v Canada (Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System)
(
Blood
Systems
)
[1]
,
where the following was stated:
“
A
commission of inquiry is neither a criminal trial nor a civil action
for the determination of liability. It cannot establish either
criminal culpability or civil responsibility for damages. Rather, an
inquiry is an investigation into an issue, event or series
of events.
The
findings of a commissioner are simply findings of fact and statements
of opinion reached by the commissioner at the end of the
inquiry.
They
are based upon and flow from a procedure which is not bound by the
evidentiary and procedural rules of a courtroom.
There
are no legal consequences attached to the determinations of a
commissioner. They are not enforceable and do not bind courts
considering the same subject matter
.”
[13]
In
S
v Sparks
(
Sparks
)
[2]
,
Human J, writing for the full Court had this to say: -
“
An
inquiry before a Commission is not a proceeding in which there are
interested individual parties who are entitled to a hearing
and a
verdict on the evidence. A Commission of Inquiry deals with matters
of public interest, frequently matters which have already
been
publicly ventilated.”
[14]
In this judgment, this Court shall
ad
seriatim
deal with (a) the postponement
application; (b) the issue of jurisdiction; (c) the merits of the
review; and (d) the issue of costs.
The postponement
application
[15]
As indicated at the dawn of this judgment, the
postponement application was not granted. As a matter of trite
principle, a postponement
application is not there for a mere taking.
An application for postponement impacts on the principle of finality
of litigation
and puts a strain on the smooth administration of
justice. It is in the interest of both the applicant and the
respondents to achieve
finality in litigation. This Division is under
immense pressure to process opposed motion matters. When a motion is
enrolled and
allocated for a hearing, a judicial officer is allocated
to the matter. The judicial officer, in preparation for a hearing of
an
application, reads the papers filed by the parties. Given the
thinly spread judicial resources, deserving matters fail to make it
to the already congested motion court rolls of this Division. Thus,
if an application is generously and without regard to the governing
principles postponed, this means that a deserving application
festering in the office of the Registrar would have lost an available
space. This affects the business of the Court to smoothly administer
justice. It inevitably leads to undue duplication of functions.
Two
or three judicial officers may read the same matter repeatedly. This
cannot be encouraged.
[16]
In
motion proceedings, a party is compelled to make out its case in the
founding affidavit as opposed to the replying affidavit
[3]
.
It is no answer for a party seeking to make out a case in the
replying affidavit to submit that the other party failed to seek
a
striking out of the belated case made out in reply. The striking out
procedure is regulated by rule 6(15) of the Uniform Rules.
It only
happens to a matter which is scandalous, vexatious or irrelevant.
Where a party unprocedurally makes a case in the replying
affidavit,
the disadvantaged party is not compelled to launch a rule 6(15)
application since there is nothing scandalous, vexatious
or
irrelevant in making a case in a wrong affidavit.
[4]
Thus, the submission made by Mr Hugo for the applicant, that the
respondents ought to have applied for a striking out is without
merit.
[17]
It is to the founding affidavit in support of the
postponement application that this Court must look to, to establish
whether a
postponement application is properly grounded. The
applicant stated the following in her founding affidavit:
“
19
It is, therefore, my request to this honourable court to have this
matter postponed to
a
later date
,
to allow me to
collect
funds
and
follow
up on my unpaid invoices, as well as allowing the Senior Counsel to
go through the papers and settle my Heads of arguments.”
[18]
The
above averment illuminates only two grounds in support of the
postponement application: namely, the collection of funds and
allowing senior counsel to settle the heads of argument. As a
departure point, these are not proper grounds for a postponement
application. Howbeit, as at the hearing date, Mr Hodes SC had settled
the heads of arguments on behalf of the applicant. This Court
fails
to understand how the collection of funds relates to the hearing of
the review application. If it relates to financial quandaries,
as
argued by Mr Hugo, such a ground has not been properly motivated.
Given the applicant’s alleged financial difficulties,
it is
perplexing why she insists on being represented by a senior counsel,
regard being had to her state of impecuniousness. The
right to legal
representation does not mean that a litigant must insist on a
Rolls-Royce when he can only afford a Mazda. Having
settled the heads
of argument, on the appointed day for a hearing, Mr Hodes SC failed,
for reasons not apparent to this Court,
to appear and defend the
settled heads of argument. It is not averred by the applicant in the
founding affidavit that Mr Hodes
SC was briefed to appear or not. It
was only in the replying affidavit and some correspondence that it
was mentioned that Mr Hodes
SC was incidentally not available to
appear on behalf of the applicant in the week of 4-8 August 2025.
Perplexingly, the applicant
managed to source the services of Mr Hugo
and instructed him to only move the postponement application. The
Constitutional Court
has already decreed that counsel must not attend
Court only to ask for a postponement
[5]
.
Counsel must be prepared to assist the Court if a postponement sought
is not granted. I understand this decree to underscore that
it is
inappropriate for counsel to accept a brief only to seek a
postponement of a matter. When counsel does that, he or she departs
from an erroneous premise that a postponement is there for the mere
taking. Such is an unacceptable departure. Counsel must accept
a full
brief considering the eventualities mentioned by the Constitutional
Court.
[19]
Mr Hugo, when confronted with the decree of the
Constitutional Court, hoisted the cab rank rule and the voluminous
record in this
matter, which was impossible to read owing to his late
brief. He submitted that the record is constituted by about 19000
pages.
It is doubted that all the 19000 pages are relevant to the
impugn hoisted by the applicant in this application. The applicant,
as a
dominis litis,
is
obliged in terms of rule 53(3) and (4) to provide each of the parties
with the relevant portions of the record of the proceedings
sought to
be reviewed and set aside. The applicant, for reasons that are not
apparent anywhere, failed to do so.
[20]
The
averment of the unavailability of Mr Hodes SC appears nowhere in the
founding affidavit as a ground for a postponement application.
It is
by now trite that the unavailability of a preferred counsel is not a
ground for a postponement.
[6]
This Court is uncertain as to whether Mr Hodes SC is on brief to
appear. On the one hand, an allegation is made that an unnamed
senior
counsel, presumably Mr Hodes SC, who was prepared to argue the case
demanded a R100 000 upfront payment which the applicant
was
unable to raise. There is no evidence presented before this Court as
to whether Mr Hodes SC ultimately accepted the brief without
the
upfront payment. All there is, is an allegation that he incidentally
became unavailable. As to why he incidentally became unavailable,
this Court is in the dark. This Court is not satisfied that good and
sufficient reasons existed for the postponement application
to be
granted. As a parting shot, the applicant is a
dominis
litis
who
is allegedly severely prejudiced by the findings and recommendations
of the SCC. With this postponement application, the applicant
is
effectively stating that she wishes to continue having a proverbial
sword hanging over her head for more days to come. This
conduct is
inconsistent with that of a party seeking to remove an albatross from
around their neck. It was for all the above reasons
that this Court
refused to exercise its discretion in favour of postponing the ripe
review application.
The
issue of jurisdiction
[21]
It is
to this issue that I now turn my attention. The factual basis of the
objection to the exercise of jurisdictional powers by
this Court is
simply that the chairperson of the SCC is a judicial officer of the
Superior Court. As at 2022, when the review application
was launched,
the chairperson of the SCC was, by appointment, a Deputy Chief
Justice (DCJ) of the Republic of South Africa attached
to the
Constitutional Court of South Africa. The respondents contend that
section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act (“the
SC Act)
[7]
prevents the institution of the present application against the
chairperson of the SCC in the absence of the consent of the head
of
the Constitutional Court.
[22]
The
contention is raised as a lack of jurisdiction. The allegation is
that the consent of the head of Court contemplated in section
47(1)
is a jurisdictional requirement. This Court does not believe that the
issue is truly a jurisdictional point. Jurisdiction
is about the
power of a Court to hear a matter. Generally, jurisdiction is
established in the pleadings.
[8]
The pleaded case of the applicant is that of a legality review. Based
on the pleadings, the High Court retains jurisdiction to
hear the
application. Jurisdiction of the High Court arises from section
169(1) of the Constitution.
The reach and purport
of section 47(1) of the SC Act
[23]
Effectively,
this section prevents the institution of civil proceedings against a
judge in the absence of the consent of the head
of Court. In my
considered view, it affords South African judges a limited immunity
from being sued by litigants. All the section
implies, in my view, is
that civil proceedings instituted against a judge without consent are
procedurally defective in a sense.
However, to my mind, the veritable
question is whether the present application is instituted against a
“judge” or not.
Undoubtedly, the chairperson of the SCC
in the name of the Honourable Mr Justice R M M Zondo is a judicial
officer or a judge.
However, the present review application is not
launched against him in his capacity as a judicial officer. When
regard is had to
the preamble of the Commissions Act (CA),
[9]
a commission is appointed for the purposes of investigating matters
of public concern. On the other hand, a judge or judicial officer
as
contemplated in section 165(2) of the Constitution is appointed to
apply the law impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.
[24]
When
the chairperson of the SCC made the impugned findings and
recommendations, he did so as part of investigating matters of public
concern and could not have been a judge as contemplated in section
165(1) of the Constitution. Thus, in my fervently held view,
the
present civil proceedings are not instituted against a judge, but a
chairperson of a commission as established by the CA to
carry out the
functions contemplated in the CA. To buttress this point, the Court
in
Freedom
Under Law v Motata
(
FUL
)
,
[10]
with sufficient sagacity expressed itself in the following felicitous
terms. The learned Mlambo JP, as he then was, said:
“
[26]
… The
core
function of Judges is the adjudication of disputes
involving
competing interests daily. The judgments they hand down as well as
the statements they make in their judgments invariably
displease some
litigants and sometimes their legal representatives.
It
is integral to the adjudication function of Judges that they should
be free from any fear of repercussions for doing their work.
It is
necessary therefore that Judges be protected from the ever-present
threat of legal proceedings directed at them arising from
the
execution of their official responsibilities
.
This is necessary to ensure that they adjudicate disputes unhindered
and that they do so without fear, favour or prejudice.”
(Emphasis added.)
[25]
The learned Mlambo JP further reached the
following apt conclusion, which, in my considered view, underscores
the reach and purport
of section 47(1). He said:
“
[34]
The objective of the review proceedings is therefore aimed at
asserting the proper standard by which
Judges’
misconduct
should
be dealt with by the JSC.
Issues
of judicial integrity and accountability
will
of necessity be ventilated in the review proceedings. It is common
cause that the Judicial Conduct Tribunal, established to
investigate
allegations of gross misconduct against the respondent, had
recommended that the respondent
be
found guilty of gross misconduct which carried with it the prospect
of impeachment
,
but
the JSC rejected that recommendation opting instead to return a
verdict of misconduct
simpliciter
.
The review is aimed [at] testing the appropriateness of that finding.
[35]
This is, in my view, a clear case where consent is warranted
.
“(Emphasis added.)
[26]
What
is perspicuous in the
FUL
matter
is that consent is required in an instance where a judge had
performed the functions of a judge. The corollary of that must
be
that, where a judge functions in a different capacity, consent will
not be required simply by virtue of their judicial status.
There is
no doubt that the purpose of section 47(1) is to afford some limited
immunity and protection to judges when they perform
their official
functions. This, to my mind, is underpinned by the express exclusion
of the application of the section to an application
brought in terms
of the Domestic Violence Act. Nevertheless, the point made herein was
somewhat confirmed by the United States
Courts in
Mireles
v Waco
(
Waco
).
[11]
In the United States, unlike in South Africa, judges enjoy full
immunity against lawsuits
[12]
.
[27]
Waco,
a public defender, sued Judge Mireles out of an episode in which the
judge had Waco frog-marched backwards to his courtroom.
Waco had
earned the ire of the judge for failing to appear in his courtroom as
scheduled. The irate Mireles J ordered the police
officers on duty to
forcibly bring Waco back to the courtroom. The Federal District Court
dismissed the action against Mireles
J on the grounds that the judge
enjoyed complete immunity from civil claims. The Court of Appeals
disagreed and held that Mireles
J was not acting in his judicial
capacity when he ordered the police and had lost immunity which came
with his office. At the United
States Supreme Court, the Court
differed with the Court of Appeals only on the basis that it
classified the actions of Mireles
J as non-judicial
[13]
.
[28]
Grippingly,
at the United States Supreme Court, the Honourable Mr Justice Stevens
dissented on the basis that one of the acts had
no relation to a
function normally performed by a judge. A judge enjoys absolute
protection in respect of all conduct which is
judicial in the sense
that it accords with the normal judicial function.
[14]
If the approach followed in
Mireles
is
adopted, which I suggest it should be, where a judge performs
non-judicial functions, the limited immunity contemplated in section
47(1) of the SC Act finds no application. The chairperson was not
cited in his capacity as a judge but as the chairperson of the
commission. The chairperson in the commission performed a public or
statutory function. Section 172 of the Constitution endows
a Court
with an obligation to declare any conduct that is inconsistent with
the Constitution invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.
The
chairperson functioning as a statutory functionary cannot be
insulated by section 47(1) for the purposes of enforcing section
172
of the Constitution. If it is found by a Court of competent
jurisdiction that the chairperson of the SCC has transgressed,
it
would not have been a transgression within the parameters of his
judicial function. The protection in the section is a procedural
mechanism against meritless lawsuits against judges and not statutory
functionaries. The Court in
FUL
confirmed
that section 47(1) covers retired judges as well. If wearing a badge
of a judge affords the limited immunity, one imagines
a situation
where a retired judge is contracted as a private arbitrator, as it
occasionally happens, and the arbitration award
of the retired judge
is impugned on review, as it usually happens. Does it mean that an
applicant for review of the private arbitration
award must first
obtain consent from the head of the Court where the retired judge
last served, before instituting a review application?
To my mind,
such will be stretching the limited procedural immunity contemplated
in the section beyond what the section seeks to
achieve. This Court
is doubtful that such practice of obtaining consent to cite private
arbitrators exists. If it does, the heads
of Courts are certainly
inundated with consent applications from the private arbitration
sector. Ordinarily, judges who acted as
arbitrators do not even
oppose or get embroiled in review litigations.
[15]
[29]
In summary, this Court concludes that the
chairperson of the SCC is not contemplated in section 47(1), as such
consent is not and
was not required to institute the present
application. The jurisdiction of this Court is not in any manner or
shape ousted by the
lack of consent from the head of the
Constitutional Court.
Merits of the review
application.
[30]
Turning my attention to the merits of the review
application. It is apparent from the grounds punted for that the
present is a legality
as opposed to a Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act (PAJA) review. This Court must, without hesitation, point
out that regard
being had to the barrage of criticisms levelled
against the SCC’s findings, the applicant is effectively
seeking an appeal
disguised as a review. A review is different from
an appeal. In a review, correctness plays no role, whereas in an
appeal, correctness
plays a major role.
[31]
It may be helpful to first recognise the role of
the SCC in terms of the CA. Its role is investigative in nature, and
it investigates
matters of public concern. The way and the powers of
the commission in investigating matters of public concern are
governed by
the provisions of the CA, in particular sections 2, 3, 4,
5 and 6 of the CA. It has not been contended in the founding
affidavit
by the applicant that the SCC straddled outside the
parameters of the CA when it conducted the investigations.
[32]
Regarding
the applicable standard of review, it is of significance to state
that generally, at the judicial review stage, only evidence
relied
upon in the decision under review must be considered
[16]
.
Differently put; in assessing the impugned findings and
recommendations, reliance can only be placed on the evidence tendered
at the SCC and nothing more. Such must be the case because the
purpose of a judicial review is not to determine whether the decision
of the SCC was correct in absolute terms but rather to determine that
it was correct based on the record before it
[17]
.
[33]
The CA
does not afford any aggrieved party a right to appeal the findings
and recommendations of the SCC. Thus, the only available
remedy to an
aggrieved party is to seek a review. Since the SCC performed
investigative functions, the PAJA review is unavailable
as a judicial
review pathway
[18]
. With
regard to a standard of review, it must follow that the applicable
standard of review is that of reasonableness.
[19]
In
Bato
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs
(
Bato
)
[20]
,
the Court confirmed that the reasonableness test implies that in
order for the decision to be reviewed, it must be demonstrated
to be
one that is so unreasonable that a reasonable decision maker would
not make. Applying the
Bato
test,
the findings and the recommendations of the SCC are firstly
consistent with the tendered evidence and secondly, they fall
within
the bands of reasonableness
[21]
.
[34]
To the extent that the applicant alleges that the
findings are irrational. The applicant does not allege any procedural
irrationality.
The Constitutional Court
clarified the principle of legality in the following terms:
[40]
What we glean from this is that the exercise of public power which is
at variance with principle of legality
is inconsistent with the
Constitution itself. In short, it is invalid… Relating all
this to the matter before us, the award
of the DoD agreement was
exercise of public power. The principle of legality may thus be a
vehicle for its review. The question
is:
did
the award conform to legal prescripts? If it did, that is the end of
the matter
.
If it did not, it may be reviewed and possibly set aside under
legality review.
[22]
(Emphasis
added.)
In
Minister
of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau
[23]
it was
said:
The principle of legality
requires that
every exercise of public power
, including every
executive act
, be rational
. For the
exercise of public
power
to meet this standard
it must be rationally related to
the purpose for which the power was given.”
(Emphasis
added.)
In
Democratic
Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa
[24]
,
Yacoob ADCJ, as he then was, stated the following about rationality:
“
[27]
The Minister and Mr Simelane accept that the ‘executive’
is ‘constrained by the principle that [it] may exercise
no
power and perform no function that conferred… by law’
and that the power must not be misconstrued. It is also accepted
that
the decision must be rationally related to the purpose for which the
power was conferred. Otherwise, the exercise of the power
could be
arbitrary and at odds with the Constitution. I agree.”
(Footnotes omitted.)
It has
been confirmed that rationality and reasonableness, although they
overlap significantly, are conceptually different
[25]
.
In
Albutt
v Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and others
[26]
,
the following was said:
“
The
Executive has a wide discretion in selecting the means to achieve its
constitutionally permissible objectives. Courts may not
interfere
with the means selected simply because they do not like them, or
because there are other more appropriate means that
could have been
selected. But, where the decision is challenged on the grounds of
rationality, courts are obliged to examine the
means selected to
determine whether they are rationally related to the objective sought
to be achieved. What must be stressed is
that the purpose of the
enquiry is to determine not whether there are other means that could
have been used, but whether the means
selected are rationally related
to the objective sought to be achieved. And if, objectively speaking
they are not, they fall short
of the standard demanded by the
Constitution.”
[35]
A
submission was made in the heads submitted by Mr Hodes SC that SCC
and its chairperson failed to execute the investigation within
its
terms of reference in that it overlooked critical evidence and
demonstrated bias. Having scoured through the founding affidavit
of
the applicant, this Court was unable to identify any allegation of an
oversight of critical evidence or demonstration of bias.
An applicant
for review is not permitted to make a case only in argument when such
a case is not foreshadowed in the founding papers.
On proper
consideration of the applicant’s founding affidavit, it is
replete with statements like “my version”
and it is “not
true”. Contending that a version is true and the other is not
true does not amount to an oversight of
evidence. Put to its lowest
ebb, it may mean that the alleged truthful evidence is rejected as
opposed to being overlooked. The
conclusions reached in the
Corruption
Watch
[27]
case, heavily relied on by the applicant, are not apposite in the
present application. In
Corruption
Watch
,
a finding was made that the commission failed to conduct the task
assigned to it through its terms of reference. In the present
application, this Court is unable to reach the same conclusion. In
fact, the Court in
Corruption
Watch
cautioned
thus:
“
[70]
We accept that Courts must be cautious before exercising a power of
review over the proceedings of a commission.
To exercise a review
power in an overzealous fashion would be to subvert the flexible
nature of a commission’s choice of
procedure and constrain many
decisions that a commission must make along the way to its ultimate
findings.
However,
where the uncontested evidence reveals so manifest a set of errors of
law, a clear failure to test evidence of key witnesses,
a refusal to
take account of documentary evidence which contained the most serious
allegations which were relevant to its inquiry,
the principle of
legality dictates only one conclusion, that the findings of such a
commission must be set aside.
”
[36]
With
regard to the ripeness argument, on the strength of the decision of
Peters
v Davison
(
Peters
)
[28]
and
Fay,
Richwhite and Co Ltd v Davidson
(
Davidson
)
[29]
this Court takes a view that to the extent that the applicant alleged
some irrationality in the findings, she was entitled to impugn
the
findings, even in the circumstances where the recommendations do not
adversely prejudice any of her rights. On application
of the legality
principle, a party is entitled to a rational decision. However, the
rationality test, as demonstrated in the
Albutt
case,
is a low threshold test. What is to be investigated by a Court of
review is the means employed as opposed to the correctness
of the
decision. The applicant failed to demonstrate that the findings or
recommendations suffer from any form of irrationality.
The
consequence of that failure is that her legality review falls to be
dismissed.
The issue of costs
[37]
The respondents employed the services of three
counsel. The respondents sought an order of costs to include the
costs of employing
two counsel. It may well be so that the present
application is an offshoot of the much-popularised SCC inquiry, but
the present
is confined to a portion of the humongous report. It
remains an ordinary run-of-the-mill review application. The
employment of
two counsel was not warranted. However, this Court
takes the view that the employment of a senior counsel was warranted.
Ms Hofmeyer
SC was steeped in the matter, and for her, it was a
reinvention of the wheel, having been the evidence leader at the SCC.
[38]
Because of all the above reasons, I make the
following order:
Order
1.
The application for postponement is dismissed.
2.
The application for review is dismissed.
3.
The applicant must pay the costs attendant to the
postponement application as well as the review application on a scale
of party
and party to be settled or taxed at scale C. The costs
include the costs of employing one senior counsel.
GN
MOSHOANA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Hugo
(postponement only) Heads, L Hodes SC
Instructed by:
L
Mbanjwa Inc, Pretoria.
For the
Respondents:
K Hofmeyer SC, M Mbikiwa
and A Molver
Instructed by:
Molefe
Dlepu Inc, South Kesington
Date of Hearing
5
August 2025
Date of judgment:
14
August 2025
[1]
[1997]
3 SCR 440.
See also S Ruel
The
Law of Public Inquiries in Canada
(2010)
13.
[2]
1980
(3) SA 952 (T).
[3]
Shepard v Tuckers
Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd
1978
(1) SA 173
(W) at 177 and
Swissborough
Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Government of the RSA
1999 (2) SA 279
(T) at
338.
[4]
Beinash v Wixley
1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA).
[5]
National
Police Services Union and Others v Minister of Safety and Security
and Others
[2000]
ZACC 15; 2000 (4) SA 1110;
2001 (8) BCLR 775 (CC).
[6]
I.K.B
v C.A.B
[2023]
ZAGPJHC 636;
Centirugo
AG v Firestone (SA) Ltd
1969
(3) SA 318 (T); 1969 (3) All SA 330 (T).
[7]
Act 10 of 2013.
[8]
Baloyi v Public
Protector and Others
[2020]
ZACC 27;
2022 (3) SA 321 (CC);
2021 (2) BCLR 101 (CC).
[9]
Act 8 of 1947.
[10]
[2021]
ZAGPPHC 14.
[11]
502 US 9
(1991).
[12]
See
Randall
v Brigham
74
U.S. 523
, 537 (1869) and
Bradley
v Fisher
[1871] USSC 92
;
80
U.S. 335
, 347 (1872).
[13]
See
1799-1800 of McCreath & Koen.
[14]
McCreath & Koen
“Defending the absurd: the iconoclast’s guide to section
47(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of
2023”
(2014) 17(5)
P.E.R
1789
.
[15]
See
for instance
Corruption
Watch and Another v Arms Deal Commission and Others
[2019]
ZAGPPHC 351;
2020 (2) SA 165
(GP);
[2019] 4 All SA 53
(GP), where
the Honourable retired justices were cited without any consent of
the head of Court.
[16]
Smith v Canada
2001 FCA 86.
[17]
Chopra v Canada
(Treasury Board)
1999
CanLII 8044 (FC).
[18]
See
AGSA v MEC for Economic Opportunities, Western Cape and Another
2022
(5) SA 44 (SCA).
[19]
Canadian Federation
of Students v Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of
Canada
2008
FC 493 (CanLII).
[20]
[2004]
ZACC 15;
2004 (4) SA 490 (CC);
2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC).
[21]
Sidumo and Another v
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
[2007]
ZACC 22;
2008 (2) SA 24 (CC);
2008 (2) BCLR 158 (CC).
[22]
State Information
Technology Agency SOC ltd v Gijima Holding (Pty) Ltd
[2017]
ZACC 40
;
2018 (2) SA 23
(CC);
2018 (2) BCLR 240
(CC).
[23]
[2014]
ZACC 18;
2014 (5) SA 69 (CC);
2014 (8) BCLR 930 (CC).
[24]
[2012]
ZACC 24;
2013 (1) SA 248 (CC);
2012 (12) BCLR 1297 (CC).
[25]
See
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: Ex Parte Application of the
President of the RSA
2000
(3) BCLR 241 (CC)
[26]
[2010]
ZACC 4
;
2010
(3) SA 293
(CC);
2010 (5) BCLR 391
(CC) at para 51.
[27]
Corruption Watch and
Another v Arms Procurement Commission and others
[2019] ZAGPPHC 351;
2020
(2) SA 165 (GP);
2019 (10) BCLR 1218 (GP).
[28]
[1999] 3 NZLR 744.
[29]
[1995] 1 NZLR 517
(CA)
at 524.
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