Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 839South Africa
Motloba v Nedbank Limited (015477-2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 839 (15 August 2025)
Headnotes
judgment. This relief the applicant seeks in circumstances when, it is common cause that the order grated indicated that it was sought and obtained by way of an application for default judgment. [3] It is for this reason that the basis and procedural history upon which the applicant relies to rescind an order which was not made, must be considered carefully. UNIFORM RULE 42(1)(b) [4] It is a fundamental principle of our law that a court order must be effective and enforceable, and therefore it must be formulated in such a way that it leaves no doubt as to what the order requires to be done. Not only must the order be coached in clear terms, but it’s purpose must also be readily as attainable from the language used.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Motloba v Nedbank Limited (015477-2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 839 (15 August 2025)
Motloba v Nedbank Limited (015477-2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 839 (15 August 2025)
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sino date 15 August 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case No:
015477-2022
(1)
REPORTABLE:
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
(3)
REVISED:
DATE
15 August 2025
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
OUMA
MARTINA MOTLOBA
Applicant
/ Defendant
and
NEDBANK
LIMITED
Respondent
/ Plaintiff
This
judgment is prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected as such and is handed down electronically by circulation
to the parties / their legal representatives by email and by
uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Case Lines.
The date for handing down is deemed to be 15 August 2025.
JUDGMENT
RETIEF
J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The applicant, the defendant in the main action, seeks to rescind an
order granted
against her on the 19 October 2023,
inter alia
,
for the attachment of a motor vehicle pursuant to the cancellation of
the instalment sale agreement, which was taken due to the
default of
payment [the order].
[2]
The applicant brings her rescission relief in terms of uniform rule
42(1)(c)
and in prayer 1, she seeks to rescind an order granting
summary judgment. This relief the applicant seeks in circumstances
when,
it is common cause that the order grated indicated that it was
sought and obtained by way of an application for default judgment.
[3]
It is for this reason that the basis and procedural history upon
which the applicant
relies to rescind an order which was not made,
must be considered carefully.
UNIFORM
RULE 42(1)(b)
[4]
It is a fundamental principle of our law that a court order must be
effective
and enforceable, and therefore it must be formulated in
such a way that it leaves no doubt as to what the order requires to
be
done. Not only must the order be coached in clear terms, but it’s
purpose must also be readily as attainable from the language
used.
[5]
Therefore, an ambiguity or a patent error or
omission as a result of which a judgment has been granted does not
reflect the real
intention of the judicial officer
.
Rule 42(1)(b) caters for such corrections which need to be addressed
in an order and/or a judgment so that it can be varied to
reflect the
real intention of the judicial officer. The purpose of rule 42(1)(b),
in other words, caters for patent errors or any
ambiguity attributed
to the court itself.
[6]
Against this brief background, the applicant in her founding papers
speaking
to an error, states that: “
What I had received was
the notice of set down for summary judgment. Which was done
erroneously as I was still expecting the respondent
to follow the
correct procedure of serving summons personally upon me before the
matter could proceed for hearing and be allocated
a date of hearing.”
This the applicant alleges in circumstances when it is common
cause that she defended the action in January 2023 and filed a plea.
DISCUSSION
[7]
Both the parties accepted that on the 19 October 2023, as per the
notice of
set down, the respondent intended to move a summary
judgment application at the date of the hearing. The practice note
uploaded
to case lines informed the Judge thereof and, the
application before the Judge was in fact an application for summary
judgment.
It is common cause between the parties that the applicant
was entitled and did serve a plea, by agreement.
[8]
The procedural background on the papers indicates that due to the
applicant’s delay in filing a plea, the respondent initially
and on the 21
st
of June 2023 proceeded to apply for
default judgment relying on a notice of bar. The applicant received
the set down for the application
for default judgment in terms of
rule 31(5). This notice of set down had a few minor typographical
errors
inter alia
, the date upon which it was signed was
unclear. None the less the application was abandoned, and the
respondent accepted an unsigned
plea served via email on the 28th of
June 2023. This arrangement was brought to the Judges attention in
the application for summary
judgment.
[9]
The template used for the notice of set down for the default judgment
was used
by the respondent’s attorney for the notice of set
down in the summary judgment. In consequence the same typographical
errors
appear in the same notice including, the use of the words
summary judgment and default judgment, however, notwithstanding the
errors
the applicant stated that she received a set down for the
summary judgment application and she wishes to rescind an order
granted
in terms of summary judgment in this application. After
receiving the set down notice, the applicant took no further
procedural
steps catered for in terms of rule 32. This included any
intention on the 26 September 2023, to oppose the application after
the
receipt of the set down. This inaction is to be considered
against the fact that she states that her husband is a practising
attorney.
She, on her version, rather alleges to have elected to be
at court on the 19 October 2023 but, due to a mishap was in the
incorrect
court and by the time she found the right court with her
attorney, judgment had already been granted. The circumstances of the
mishap are not confirmed by her attorney under oath and nor was the
Judge approached by her attorney to explain the situation.
[10]
Be that as it may, it appears that the draft order for the default
judgment
was erroneously handed up and signed by the Judge instead of
the summary judgment draft order. Absent this error, the terms of the
order and what the Court was asked to grant remain undisturbed. On
the procedural facts, no application for default judgment served
before the Judge on the 19 October 2023 nor could it have been taken
on the facts. Therein lies the error, a mistake common to
both
parties on the common cause facts, the wording “default
judgment”. Unfortunately, this is not the error relied
on by
applicant as is envisaged in terms of rule 42(1)(b). She contends
that the error is that the Judge should not have entertained
the
summary judgment as she had not received the summons personally and
that her plea set out a triable defence. This is a basis
catered for
in rule 42(1)(a) and not 42(1)(b). The applicant has not made out a
case for rule 42(1)(b) on the papers.
[11]
The applicant’s relief in prayer 1 of this application speaks
to the
rescission of a summary judgment order which is incorrect
ex
facie
the order itself. Therefore, the applicant seeks the
incorrect relief on the incorrect basis. The basis of rule 42(1)(b)
however,
rather addresses that a variation of the order, on the
common cause intend and procedural steps accepted by both parties was
taken,
should be corrected. The respondent’s Counsel argued the
point and requested the Court to
mero motu
entertain the
variation to ensure that the Judge’s intention is reflected on
the order. The applicant’s legal representative
made no attempt
to reply.
COSTS
[12]
It is trite that costs follow the result however, considering the
procedural
mishaps, in particular the respondent’s attorneys at
the material time, this Court exercises its discretion, and each
party
is to pay their own costs.
[13]
The following order:
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The words of “
default judgement
” as they
appear on the order of the 19 October 2023 before Kumalo J is varied
to read “
summary judgement.
”
3.
Each party to pay their own costs.
L.A.
RETIEF
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng
Division
Appearances
:
For the Applicant
attorneys:
Attorneys:
Motloba Attorneys (Mr BW Motloba)
Cell:
083 347
4842
Email:
bwmotloba@motloba-attorneys.co.za
For the
Respondent:
Adv:
Adv. S McTurk
Email:
Adv.shaun@mcturk.co.za
Date of hearing:
12 August 2025
Date of judgment
:
15
August
2025
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