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Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 1236South Africa

Bahurutshe Boo Manyana Traditional Community and Another v MNTK Enterprise (Pty) Ltd and Others (2025/178337) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1236 (19 November 2025)

High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
19 November 2025
OTHER J, MENTZ AJ, Acting J, me that

Headnotes

Summary of disputes

Judgment

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPPHC 1236 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Bahurutshe Boo Manyana Traditional Community and Another v MNTK Enterprise (Pty) Ltd and Others (2025/178337) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1236 (19 November 2025) Bahurutshe Boo Manyana Traditional Community and Another v MNTK Enterprise (Pty) Ltd and Others (2025/178337) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1236 (19 November 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_1236.html sino date 19 November 2025 SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA Case Number: 2025-178337 (1)          REPORTABLE: NO (2)          OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3)          REVISED: YES DATE : 19/11/2025 SIGNATURE In the matter between: BAHURUTSHE BOO MANYANA TRADITIONAL COMMUNITY First Applicant BOO MANYANA CHROME (PTY) LTD Second Applicant and MNTK ENTERPRISE (PTY) LTD First Respondent SYMPHONY OF LIGHT (PTY) LTD Second Respondent INSPIRED TRADE AND INVEST (PTY) LTD Third Respondent BEHIND THE GOLD DOOR (PTY) LTD Fourth Respondent MR MOSHOESHOE Fifth Respondent MINISTER: THE DEPARTMENT OF MINERAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY N.O. Sixth Respondent MINISTER OF POLICE Seventh Respondent NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSIONER Eight Respondent Delivered:  This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines.  The date for hand-down is deemed to be 19 November 2025. JUDGMENT MENTZ AJ Introduction [1] This is an urgent application where the main relief sought by the applicants is a final interdict to restrain the first respondent from conducting commercial mining activities or removing ore from the property situated at the Remaining Extent of the Farm Strydfontein 12 JP, Zeerust, North West Province. Further interdictory relief is also sought against the second to fifth respondents in relation to the mining activities. [2] The matter is opposed by the first to fifth respondents. The first to fourth respondents have their registered addresses within the jurisdictional area of this Court. The sixth to eighth respondents have filed notices to abide. [3] It is common cause on the papers before me that the first to fourth respondents share the same two directors, as evidenced by the CIPC searches attached to the applicants’ founding affidavit. The fifth respondent, Mr Moshoeshoe, is responsible for the operations of the first to fourth respondents at the mining site which is the subject of this dispute. For the sake of convenience and brevity, I refer to the first to fifth respondents collectively as ‘ the respondents’ . [4] The matter first came before me in the urgent court on Wednesday, 15 October 2025, where judgment was reserved upon conclusion of oral argument. On Friday, 17 October 2025, prior to judgment having been given, the applicants brought an application to re-open the case. The date of 12 November 2025 was subsequently arranged through the offices of the Acting Judge President for the hearing to resume and for the application to re-open the case to be heard. [5] A further full set of affidavits were filed in the application to re-open the case. The respondents also brought an application to strike out certain parts of the applicants’ further replying affidavit on the day before the hearing was due to resume. Both the application to re-open the case and the application to strike out were then argued before me on 12 November 2025. [6] The respondents did not oppose the application to re-open the case but did contest the contents of the further affidavits filed by the applicants. [7] I accordingly consider the applicants’ founding affidavit in the application to re-open as supplemental to their founding affidavit in the main application. Similarly, the first to fifth respondents’ answering affidavit in the application to re-open is treated as supplemental to their answering affidavit in the main application, and the applicants’ replying affidavit in the application to re-open as supplemental to their replying affidavit in the main application. I deal with all affidavits filed as a single, complete set in the urgent application. ​ [8] Where it is necessary to distinguish between the application that originally served before me on 15 October 2025 and the subsequent application to re-open the case that was heard on 12 November 2025, I shall refer to the former as ‘ the main application’ and to the latter as ‘ the application to re-open’ . [9] What follows is my judgment in the application (with papers as amplified), as well as in the interlocutory application to strike out. Background [10] The dispute is about commercial mining activities conducted at an open pit mine where the first respondent has erected a sign with the words “MNTK Mining” at the site. It is common cause on the papers that the second to fourth respondents have previously incorrectly mined at the site. While there is some dispute regarding the precise geographic coordinates of the mine, the existence of the mining site and the parties’ awareness of its location are not contested. For the purposes of this matter, the site will be referred to as ‘ the MNTK site ’ . [11] Unlawful mining activities in the area where the MNTK site is situated have twice before been the subject matter of urgent applications that were launched by the applicants out of the North West Division of the High Court, Mahikeng under case numbers 3205/2025 and 3604/2025. In both applications, interdicts were granted in favour of the applicants on 15 August 2025 and 12 September 2025 respectively. [12] In the application under case number 3205/2025 the second and fifth respondents in the present application were also cited as parties, and in the application under case number 3604/2025 the second to fourth respondents in the present application were parties to a settlement agreement that was made an order of court. The first respondent in the present application was not a party to any of these two earlier applications. [13] Following a settlement agreement that was reached between the applicants and the second to fourth respondents in the North West High Court on 12 September 2025, the parties in that application sent their respective surveyors to the MNTK site, who confirmed that the second to fourth respondents were mining outside of the demarcated areas where their mining permits allowed. [14] In the present application it is common cause that the second to fourth respondents are not allowed to mine at the MNTK site. They are only allowed to mine in accordance with their specific mining permits in the demarcated areas as confirmed by the surveyors, which demarcated areas are situated on the Remaining Extent of the Farm Strydfontein 12 JP, Zeerust, North West Province (‘ the Remaining Extent’) [15] Adjacent to the Remaining Extent, is Portion 1 of the Farm Strydfontein 12 JP, Zeerust, North West Province (‘ Portion 1’ ). [16] The first respondent holds a prospecting right over both Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent but does not hold a mining permit. Summary of disputes [17] It is the applicants’ case that there is ongoing unlawful commercial mining activity at the MNTK site. [18] The first applicant claims standing in this application based on its ownership or ownership interest in both Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent. [19] The respondents contend that the MNTK site is situated on Portion 1, rather than on the Remaining Extent. As a result, the respondents argue that the applicants lack standing to pursue relief in respect of mining activities conducted on Portion 1, on the basis that the first applicant is not the owner of that portion. The respondents also challenge the first applicant’s ownership of the Remaining Extent. [20] The respondents further admit that the second to fourth respondents previously incorrectly mined at the MNTK site but deny that commercial mining activities are still conducted at the MNTK site. [21] The respondents claim that, after the second to fourth respondents discovered their mistake on 16 September 2025 when the surveyor reports showed they had been mining at the wrong site, these respondents left the MNTK site. According to the respondents, the only current activity at the MNTK site is the first respondent exercising its prospecting rights. [22] Urgency is also contested. [23] Since the respondents’ objections to the applicants’ standing to seek interdictory relief are central to their opposition, it is necessary to address the issue of standing before considering the other challenges. Locus standi [24] During argument on 12 November 2025, counsel who appeared on behalf of the applicants, indicated that the applicants intend to stand and fall by the standing of the first applicant, and that this Court need not make a pronouncement on the standing of the second applicant. The discussion that follows therefore only deals with the ownership and standing of the first applicant. [25] In Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Rattan NO [1] the test for locus standi was set out by the Supreme Court of Appeal as follows: “ The logical starting point is locus standi — whether in the circumstances the plaintiff had an interest in the relief claimed, which entitled it to bring the action. Generally, the requirements for locus standi are these. The plaintiff must have an adequate interest in the subject matter of the litigation, usually described as a direct interest in the relief sought; the interest must not be too remote; the interest must be actual, not abstract or academic; and it must be a current interest and not a hypothetical one. The duty to allege and prove locus standi rests on the party instituting the proceedings.” [26] In SA Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims Commissioner and Others , [2] the Constitutional Court dealt with what constitutes a direct and substantial interest: “ What constitutes a direct and substantial interest is the legal interest in the subject matter of the case which could be prejudicially affected by the order of the court. This means that the applicant must show that it has a right adversely affected or to be affected by the order sought.” [27] A similar position was articulated in Snyders and Others v De Jager (Joinder ) , [3] where the Constitutional Court held that: “ A person has a direct and substantial interest in an order that is sought in proceedings if the order would directly affect such a person’s rights or interest...” [28] In Giant Concerts CC v Rinaldo Investments [4] , the Constitutional Court remarked in respect of the determination of standing: “ And in determining Giant's standing , we must assume that its complaints about the lawfulness of the transaction are correct. This is because in determining a litigant's standing , a court must, as a matter of logic, assume that the challenge the litigant seeks to bring is justified.” [29] Having regard to these authorities, the question to be decided is whether the first applicant demonstrates a sufficient direct and substantial interest in both Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent to establish standing for relief aimed at stopping unlawful mining on these properties. [30] In his reasons for the judgment under case number 3205/25 in the urgent application in the North West High Court, Matlhape J confirmed the Bahurutshe Boo Manyana Traditional Community’s ownership of the Remaining Extent: [5] “ The Second Applicant is The Bahurutshe Boo Manyana Traditional Community ( the Community ) and the registered owner of the immovable property known as the Portion of the Remaining extent of the Farm Strydfontein 12 JP, Zeerust (“ the Property” ).” [31] The second and fifth respondents in the present matter were also parties to the application under case number 3205/25 referred to above, where an interdict was granted restraining them, together with others, from extracting and removing chrome from the Remaining Extent. [32] In the subsequent urgent application in the North West High Court under case number 3604/25, which culminated in a settlement agreement being made an order of court, both the applicants as well as the second to fourth respondents in the present application were also parties to that agreement. The settlement agreement that was made an order of court forms part of the papers before me. Clause 2.3 thereof reads: “ The Property refers to the property owned by the Bahurutshe Boo Manyana Traditional Community, described in the title deed as “Portion of the Remaining Extent of the Farm Strydfontein 12 JP, Zeerust.” [33] Twice before, the first applicant’s ownership of the Remaining Extent and its standing in respect thereof have been confirmed by court orders to which the second and fifth respondent (in both matters) and the third and fourth respondents (in the September 2025 matter) were parties. [34] It can therefore not be said that the first to fourth respondents, who share the same two directors, were unaware of these orders. The first applicant’s ownership of the Remaining Extent was confirmed in the September 2025 agreement to which the second to fourth respondents were parties. [35] In my view the respondents’ subsequent challenge in the present application to the first applicant’s ownership of the Remaining Extent, does not give rise to a bona fide dispute of fact on the papers concerning such ownership. [36] In the application to re-open the case, the first applicant’s ownership of Portion 1 and its standing in respect thereof became the focus. The respondents have raised several technical points to challenge the first applicant’s ownership of Portion 1. [37] Windeed searches attached by the respondents for both the Remaining Extent and Portion 1 reflect the Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana as registered owner with historic endorsements referring to the Bahurutshe Tribe. The document numbers on both the deed searches correspond with the title deed numbers for the Remaining Extent and Portion 1, being T[...] and T[...]2 respectively. [38] It is historically established that the Government of Bophuthatswana dissolved in 1994, and its territory was incorporated into South Africa with the advent of democracy. To address the legacy of historic discrimination that barred certain individuals or communities from owning property directly, Parliament enacted several remedial statutes. During the hearing on 15 October 2025, counsel for the applicant made detailed submissions regarding this legislative history and the past discriminatory practices at issue. Guidance on the interpretation of how such past discriminatory practices should be dealt with is provided by section 25(6) of the Constitution: [6] “ A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extend provided by and Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.” [39] The title deeds for Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent dating from 1917 show that the first applicant is one such community that was unable to own property directly. Instead, property purchased by the first applicant was held in trust on its behalf. [40] The respondents contend that the applicant did not acquire automatic ownership of Portion 1, but rather that ownership could only have been acquired through conversion in terms of the provisions of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991 (‘the Upgrading Act’). They further contend that, because the first applicant has not produced proof of acquiring full ownership under the procedures of the Upgrading Act, it must either not be the Bo-Manyane Section of the Bahrutsi Tribe of Marico (as reflected in the title deed for Portion 1), or it is not the owner of Portion 1. [41] In my view, whether the first applicant acquired registered ownership through formal statutory conversion or currently holds a registered interest still subject to formal conversion is inconsequential. The respective title deeds, together with the Windeed endorsements, sufficiently demonstrate the first applicant’s direct and substantial interest in both Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent. [42] Furthermore, although the respondents deny engaging in unlawful mining activities and attribute such activities to the Zama Zamas, the following paragraphs contained in the applicant’s founding affidavit in the main application were not placed in dispute: “ 43.        The unlawful mining operations have caused significant environmental damage to the Community’s Property, including the destruction of arable land and the contamination of water sources. The has directly impacted the livelihoods of the Bahurutshe Boo Manyane Traditional Community, which relies on the land for subsistence farming and cattle rearing. 44.          Community members have faced threats and intimidation from individuals associated with the illegal mining operations. Armed guards have been stationed at the mining sites, creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity. 45.          The illegal extraction of chrome ore deprives the Community of its rightful share of the mineral wealth. The Community, as custodians of its resources, is unable to ensure that the exploitation of these resources benefits its members. ……… . 48.          The unlawful mining activities have disrupted the community’s peaceful existence and threaten the sustainable use of land resources. As the Acting Kgosi, I am charged with the responsibility of ensuring that any exploitation of the mineral resources on this Property directly befits the Community. This duty is central to my role as custodian of the community’s interests and heritage.” [43] In the replying affidavit in the application to re-open, the applicant states in respect of Portion 1: “ 10.        The history of the community’s historic attachment to the land (only part of which is reflected in the two title deeds and the Surveyor -General diagram) is not merely a matter for technical linguistic contestation. ……… 13.          The land in question is community land, historically and in the context of land dispossession, held in trust for the Bahurutshe Boo Manyana Traditional Community…” [44] Read in proper context, it is evident from the above that the first applicant has a direct and substantial interest in both Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent, and enjoys significant rights in respect of these properties that warrant the protection of this Court. [45] The respondents’ reliance on semantics and technicalities to challenge the first applicant’s standing, is unpersuasive. [46] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the first applicant has established the requisite standing in respect of both Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent for purposes of preventing unlawful mining activities at locations situated on these properties. Urgency [47] The applicants allege in their founding affidavit that there are ongoing unlawful mining activities taking place at the MNTK site. [48] On the papers before me, there is no dispute that unlawful mining activities (whoever may be responsible) have caused significant environmental damage to the Community’s Property, which includes the destruction of arable land and the contamination of water sources. This has directly impacted on the livelihoods of the members of the first applicant, which relies on the land for subsistence farming and cattle rearing. [49] On these allegations, the urgency appears to be ongoing in nature, particularly as the commercial mining and removal of ore is alleged to occur without authorisation and affect community rights to livelihoods and water sources. Mineral resources, once lost, cannot be replaced, and losses cannot be determined once such resources have been extracted and removed. [50] Further damage occasioned by unlawful mining activity as alleged is irreversible and incapable of being fully remedied. Even if the applicants ultimately succeed, substantial redress would not be available to them. [51] The eruption of violence at locations where unlawful mining activities are taking place and lives are put in danger as described by the applicants in their founding affidavit, further demonstrates the urgency attached to matters of this nature. [52] In these circumstances I am satisfied that urgency has been established. The application to re-open the case and the application to strike out [53] On 17 October 2025, the applicants brought an application to re-open the case to place limited further evidence about the ownership of Portion 1 before this Court. The respondents do not per se oppose the placing of new evidence before the Court but dispute the admissibility of certain evidence contained the applicants’ founding affidavit in support of the application to re-open. [54] The respondents have also brought an application to strike out certain portions of, and annexures to, the applicants’ replying affidavit filed in the application to re-open. Their objection is premised on the assertion that new evidence is introduced for the first time in the replying affidavit. This evidence predominantly relates to three areas: (i) additional material concerning the ownership of Portion 1 and the interpretation of its title deed; (ii) further information regarding the precise location of the MNTK mining site; and (iii) new drone footage depicting ongoing commercial activity at the MNTK site, captured on 6, 7 and 8 November 2025, shortly before the hearing resumed on 12 November 2025. [55] As the admissibility of the evidence placed in issue by the respondents in the application to re-open is closely connected with the respondents’ application to strike out, it requires simultaneous consideration. [56] Firstly, I have already dealt above with the issue of the first applicant’s interest in relation to Portion 1. In my view no bona fide dispute has been raised about the registered interest that the first applicant holds in Portion 1 or the applicant’s standing in respect of Portion 1. [57] Paragraphs 8.2, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.9, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 9, and 35 of the applicants’ further replying affidavit address the technical objections concerning the Portion 1 title deed raised by the respondents in their answering affidavit. In my view, this does not introduce new matter but serves to clarify certain specific technical points raised by the respondents about the title deed that could not necessarily have been anticipated from the outset. [58] Although these paragraphs help clarify the technical issues raised by the respondents, they do not affect my conclusion that there is no genuine dispute regarding the applicant’s standing in respect of Portion 1. The respondents’ application to strike out these paragraphs is therefore refused. [59] The second issue is the challenge to the precise location of the MNTK site and the report attached to the applicants’ founding affidavit described as a “surveyor’s report” prepared by Mr Sunnyboy Nkosi, a professional surveyor, dated 15 October 2025. The report reflects the MNTK site as being situated on the Remaining Extent. [60] This position is challenged by the respondents in the answering affidavit through reference to a report and affidavit of Mr Senna, a professional land surveyor, dated 30 October 2025. In his report Mr Senna refers to a map purporting to depict the location of the MNTK site as being situated on Portion 1, but this map is not attached. [61] In reply, and in response to this challenge, the applicants attach an affidavit from Mr Sunnyboy Nkosi, with further detailed photographs depicting the location of the MNTK site on the Remaining Extent. [62] I do not consider Mr Nkosi’s confirmation under oath in reply that he is the author of the surveyor’s report attached to the founding affidavit, to constitute new evidence. It responds to the challenge raised by the respondents and confirms under oath information already provided in the founding affidavit. Similarly, I do not view the additional enlarged photographs as new evidence; although they offer greater detail, they show the same location depicted in the report attached to the founding affidavit, namely the MNTK site. The enlarged photographs attached to Mr Nkosi’s affidavit assist the court in gaining a clearer understanding of the physical appearance of the MNTK site at ground level. Where such photographs aid the court and cause no prejudice to the respondents, there is no reason to refuse their admission. [63] Paragraphs 40, 50 and 51 of the replying affidavit that the respondents seek to strike out, that deals with the survey plan prepared by Mr Nkosi, together with his affidavit attached to the replying affidavit as “SRA5” are therefore allowed. [64] Thirdly, paragraphs 24 to 28 deal with new drone photographs taken on 6, 7 and 8 November 2025 by Mr Zakhele Mandla Madesi purporting to show ongoing commercial activity at the MNTK site, depicting earth moving machinery, stockpiles and active excavation at the site. [65] The respondents, in their answering affidavit, addressed more than just the ownership of Portion 1 and the MNTK site’s location. They stated that the first respondent is only prospecting, while the second to fourth respondents have ended their operations at the MNTK site, arguing that no interdict can be granted for past events. [66] It has been the applicants’ case from the outset that the commercial mining activities at the MNTK site have not ceased and are ongoing. The re-iteration of the denial in the answering affidavit and the assertion that the first respondent only conducts prospecting activities from the MNTK site, justify allowing further drone footage from the MNTK site showing the contrary. The respondents could have requested an opportunity to refute it. They have not. [67] Allowing this evidence serves the interests of justice, avoids unnecessary further urgent applications based on the later footage of the same activities, and enables the court to resolve the matter with all relevant facts so that finality can be obtained. Paragraphs 24 – 28 of the replying affidavit, together with Mr Madesi’ affidavit are therefore allowed. [68] Paragraph 29 of the replying affidavit contains a generic description of how the remainder of the affidavit will be structured with no new information. There is no basis for it to be struck out. Location of the MNTK site [69] The respondents’ appointed surveyor, Mr Senna prepared a report dated 30 October 2025 wherein he referred to a map purporting to depict the precise location of the mining activities that were conducted by the second to fourth respondents, but this map is not attached. He also refers to where the “current mining activities” are taking place and where the “old mining activities” took place but does not state whether he visited these sites after his initial visit on 16 September 2025 to confirm the correctness of these assertions. [70] In the absence of the map that are supposed to depict the location of the “old mining activities” and further in the absence of any indication that he (Mr Senna) personally visited the site after his report of 16 September 2025 to confirm whether the mining activities at the MNTK site has ceased, it does not in my view raise a bona fide dispute whether there are still ongoing activities at the MNTK site. At most, it creates some confusion about the precise geographical coordinates of the MNTK site and whether it is situated on Portion 1 or on the Remaining Extent. [71] As previously stated, there can be no doubt as to the site to which this application relates. It concerns the mining site bearing MNTK signage from which, on the common cause facts, the second to fourth respondents conducted commercial mining activities at least until 16 September 2025. The requirements for an interdict [72] It is trite that the requirements for a final interdict are: (i) a clear right; (ii) an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and (iii) the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy. [7] [73] Further to what I have stated about the first applicant’s standing above and the threats faced by the community, I am satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated a clear right in respect of both Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent  to prevent unlawful mining activities at these properties. [74] The injury committed or reasonably apprehended lies in the fact that valuable minerals, once extracted, cannot be replaced. It further lies the environmental damage caused by illegal mining and the ongoing threat to the livelihoods and water sources of the community. [75] No remedy available in the ordinary course will be capable of undoing the harm once it has occurred. It will not be possible to ascertain the quantity of chrome unlawfully extracted and removed. The mineral resources taken from the community land are finite and irreplaceable. [76] I am accordingly satisfied that the requirements for a final interdict have been met by the first applicant. Further arguments advanced by the respondents [77] It was submitted in the heads of argument filed on behalf of the respondents in the application to re-open that “ The applicants approach this honourable Court for orders that will have significant consequences for the respondents and seek to do so without having conducted any proper investigations.” [78] I do not see what significant consequences are said to arise for the respondents if an interdict is granted. Section 20 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act [8] is clear on the nature and limitations of a prospecting right: “ 20. (1)   Subject to subsection (2), the holder of a prospecting right may only remove and dispose for his or her own account any mineral found by such holder in the course of prospecting operations conducted pursuant to such prospecting right in such quantities as may be required to conduct tests on    it or to identify or analyse it. (2)     The holder of a prospecting right must obtain the Minister's written permission to remove and dispose for such holder's own account of bulk samples of any minerals found by such holder in the course of prospecting operations conducted pursuant to such prospecting right. [79] Unless the respondents are in fact mining unlawfully mining, the interdictory relief sought by the applicants should have no bearing on them. If the first respondent holds only a prospecting right, an interdict preventing commercial mining would have no effect; it would still be able to exercise its prospecting rights as granted. [80] Likewise, the second to fourth respondents would remain entitled to exercise their mining rights within the demarcated permit areas. There is no apparent reason why the respondents should encounter any difficulty with this relief, or why they would suffer any adverse consequences or prejudice. [81] Insofar as the submission by the respondents’ counsel goes that the applicant should have amended its notice of motion to include Portion 1 in the relief in the event that the court was to find that the contested site is on Portion 1: read in its proper context it is clear that the applicants seek relief to stop unlawful mining activity on their community land and it is in this context that the application should be considered. [82] There is no prejudice for the respondents if the relief is extended to also cover Portion 1 (insofar as a dispute may exist as to whether the MNTK site is located on Portion 1 or on the Remaining Extent), as none of the respondents are allowed to conduct commercial mining activities on Portion 1. [83] Such relief would not materially differ from what has already been canvassed in the papers, and in this instance, it is in the interests of justice to grant relief that encompasses both Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent. Relief pertaining to Portion 1 would be ancillary to that sought in prayer 1 of the Notice of Motion in respect of the Remaining Extent, and would obviate the need for the first applicant to approach the urgent court once more on the same basis and facts. [84] The respondents’ counsel further submitted, both in argument and in their heads of argument filed in the application to re-open, that even if the first applicant were the owner of both Portion 1 and the Remaining Extent, its interest would be limited to surface rights, with no interest in mining or subterranean rights. To the extent that this submission is advanced to suggest that the first applicant lacks the requisite standing to prevent unlawful mining activities on its property simply because such unlawful activities extend beyond surface rights, it is rejected. Conclusion [85] It is in the interest of justice for this dispute to be resolved without the need for further urgent applications based on technical arguments, where the crux of what the first applicant seeks to achieve is clear: that unlawful mining at the MNTK site situated on community property should be stopped. [86] I am satisfied that the first applicant has made out a proper case for the interdictory relief sought to restrain any further commercial mining operations at the MNTK site, as well as to prohibit the removal of ore already extracted or stockpiled at the site. Costs of the application to re-open and the application to strike out heard on 12 November 2025 [87] In order to determine the issue of costs in respect of the application to re-open, it is necessary to assess what led to the application to re-open the case. [88] Upon a proper perusal of the respondents’ answering affidavit filed in the main application, it was clear that the respondents contended that the MNTK site was situated on Portion 1, and that they placed the applicant’s standing in relation to Portion 1 in dispute. [89] The applicant conceded that the respondents’ answering affidavit in the main application was considered under time constraints, and that the full extent of the respondents’ challenge to the applicant’s standing, specifically the contention that the MNTK site is located on Portion 1 and not the Remaining Extent and as a result thereof the applicant had no interest therein, was not fully appreciated when the replying affidavit was prepared. Ordinarily, a misinterpretation of a defence or challenge set out in answering papers would not serve as a valid excuse for failing to address an issue on the papers. [90] The first applicant had an opportunity to put the same evidence about Portion 1 that was contained in its founding affidavit to re-open the case before the court in its replying affidavit in the main application. The respondents’ challenge about the ownership of Portion 1 were already canvassed by the respondents in its answering affidavit in the main application. [91] The applicants themselves describe their request to re-open the case as unusual and seek the court’s indulgence. While re-opening is warranted in the interests of justice to ensure all disputes are properly addressed, the need for it could have been avoided had the applicants fully understood and responded to the respondent’s challenges regarding Portion 1 in their replying affidavit to the main application. [92] The respondents, in turn, were unsuccessful in the application to strike out, brought as an interlocutory application in the application to re-open. [93] In the premises I am of the view that each party should pay its own costs occasioned by the application to re-open and the application to strike out, both which were argued simultaneously before me on 12 November 2025. Cost of the main application heard on 15 October 2025 [94] For the main application heard on 15 October 2025, costs should follow the result. [95] The parties were both represented by two counsel, and the matter is of sufficient complexity and importance to warrant costs on Scale C as provided for in Uniform Rule 67A(3). ORDER Accordingly, I make the following order: 1.      The application is heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12) and the non-compliance with the rules relating to form, service and time periods is condoned. 2.      The first respondent is interdicted and restrained from conducting any commercial mining activities at or removing ore from Portion 1 and/or the Remaining Extent of the Farm 12 Strydfontein JP,  Zeerust, North West Province. 3.      The first to fifth respondents are interdicted and restrained from establishing, operating or maintaining any mining site outside of the designated area totalling 4.5 hectares on the Remaining Extent of Farm 12 Strydfontein JP, Zeerust, North West Province, which area has been demarcated and marked pursuant to a settlement agreement between the applicants and the second to the fourth respondents dated 12 September 2025, and which agreement was made an order of court in the High Court North West Division, Mahikeng under case number 3604/2025. 4.      The first to fifth respondents are interdicted from removing or transporting ore which they (or any of them) have to date caused to be extracted from the MNTK site or which they (or any of them) have caused to be stockpiled at the MNTK site to date. 5.      The South African Police Service and/or Sheriff is authorised and directed to assist the first applicant in giving effect to the above interdictory relief. 6.      The first to fifth respondents, jointly and severally, are to pay the costs of the urgent application heard on 15 October 2025, to include cost of two counsel on Scale C. 7.      For the application to re-open the case and the application to strike out, both heard on 12 November 2025, each party is to pay their own costs. S MENTZ ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA For the Applicant:                                     G Rome SC R Makoanyana Instructed by: Thomson Wilks Incorporated For the Respondent:                                G I Hulley SC B Ford Instructed by: Vhonani Nemakanga Incorporated Attorneys Matter heard in open court on 15 October 2025 and virtually on 12 November 2025 [1] 2019 (3) SA 451 (SCA) [2] 2017 (5) SA 1 (CC) [3] 2017 (5) BCLR 604 (CC) [4] 2013 (3) BCLR (CC) [5] Reasons for judgment dated 7 November 2025 in the matter of Kwena Darius Mangope & 2 Others v Symphony of Light (Pty) Ltd and Others (High Court of South Africa, North West Division, Mahikeng), Case no: 3205/25 at para 7 [6] The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 [7] Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 [8] Act 28 of 2002 sino noindex make_database footer start

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