Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 1249South Africa
Molatoli v Adv Tech Group and Others (061967-2025) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1249 (20 November 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
20 November 2025
Headnotes
and the application dismissed.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Molatoli v Adv Tech Group and Others (061967-2025) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1249 (20 November 2025)
Molatoli v Adv Tech Group and Others (061967-2025) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1249 (20 November 2025)
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sino date 20 November 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION:
PRETORIA)
Date: 20 November 2025
Case number:
061967-2025
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED
DATE 20 November 2025
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
C J MOLATOLI
APPLICANT
And
ADV TECH
GROUP
FIRST RESPONDENT
PINNALE COLLEGE
COPPERLEAF
SECOND
RESPONDENT
DEBBIE
PRINSLOO
THIRD RESPONDENT
MARTIN DE LA
REY
FOURTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MINNAAR AJ,
Introduction:
[1]
The applicant brought an urgent
application, which was set down for 20 May 2025. The second
respondent opposed the application.
In the application, the applicant
sought the following relief:
a.
That the application be treated as urgent
in terms of the provisions of Rule 6(12(b).
b.
That, in terms of the provisions of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’),
the second to fourth
respondents’ decision, made on 24 April
2025, be reviewed and set aside as unlawful, irrational and unfair.
c.
That the second to fourth respondents be
ordered to allow the applicant’s minor child to write the
mathematics cycle test
before the end of May 2025.
d.
The respondents be ordered to pay the costs
of the application on the attorney and client scale.
[2]
On 12 May 2025, the applicant launched an
application to amend prayer 2 of his notice of motion. The
application for amendment was
set down for 20 May 2025. In terms of
the purported amendment, the applicant changed his tack: the decision
taken was no longer
attacked under the auspices of PAJA. The attack
on the decision was now premised on the common law.
[3]
The second respondent objected to this
application to amend. The second respondent further delivered a Rule
30 notice regarding
the application to amend, on the ground that it
does not comply with the provisions of Rule 28. The applicant filed a
replying
affidavit in the application to amend.
[4]
On 21 May 2025, the review application was
struck from the roll for lack of urgency, and the applicant was
ordered to pay the costs
of the urgent application.
[5]
The applicant then proceeded to enrol the
review application on the opposed roll, and the application was heard
on 20 October 2025.
[6]
The mathematics cycle test was meant to be
written by the applicant’s minor son on 22 April 2025. The
minor could not write
the cycle test as the family were away on
holiday.
[7]
Despite an explanatory affidavit from the
applicant’s wife and engagements between the applicant and his
wife with the school,
the school did not permit the minor child to
take the cycle test. According to the applicant, this decision is
irrational, unlawful
and unfair, and it has a negative bearing on the
minor’s academic record.
The application to
amend:
[8]
Rule 28 of the Uniform Rules of Court deals
with the amendment of pleadings. It is trite that any amendment to a
notice of motion
is also subject to the provisions of Rule 28.
Failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 28 would render the
amendment an irregular
step that stands to be set aside.
[9]
It is the second respondent’s case
that the purported amendment is an irregular step. The applicant
contends that the second
respondent, when it delivered its answering
affidavit in response to the application to amend, took a further
step (as envisaged
in Rule 30(2)). As such, the second respondent is
barred from relying on the application for amendment as an irregular
step.
[10]
The applicant's approach is flawed. The
delivery of an answering affidavit in an interlocutory application
(which the application
to amend is) can never be regarded as a
‘further step in the cause’.
[11]
The applicant further relied on Rule 6(12)
and argued that the amendment should be effected in light of the
urgent nature of the
application and the provision in Rule 6(12) that
non-compliance with the Rules may be condoned.
[12]
The applicant clearly lost sight of the
fact that the application was struck from the roll due to lack of
urgency, and any entitlement
to rely on the provisions of Rule 6(12)
disappeared.
[13]
In the absence of Rule 6(12), the applicant
should have pursued his amendment in accordance with Rule 28;
however, he failed to
do so.
[14]
In light of all of the above, the amendment
sought was not effected, and the applicant is bound by his election
to place reliance
on PAJA.
Point
in limine:
incompetent relief claimed:
[15]
In the answering affidavit, the second
respondent raised a point
in limine
that the relief claimed is not competent, as the decision not to
allow the minor child to take the cycle test was not an
administrative
action as defined in PAJA. The decision was not an
exercise in public power, nor was it the performance of a public
function. Instead,
the decision stems from the school’s
academic policy, which forms part of the agreement under which the
minor child was enrolled
for the 2025 academic year. As such, the
implementation and enforcement of the policy were contractual rights
and did not constitute
an administrative action.
[16]
In reply, the applicant pinned his flag to
the intended amendment.
[17]
Since the amendment was not effected, the
applicant has no defence to this point
in
limine;
it follows that this point
in
limine
must be upheld and the
application dismissed.
Point
in limine
:
material misjoinder:
[18]
The second respondent raises the material
non-joinder of the minor child’s mother (the applicant’s
spouse) and the minor
child.
[19]
The minor child is 14 years old. He is
represented by the applicant, who is his biological father. The
applicant is acting in the
best interest of the minor child. As such,
there was no need to join the minor child to these proceedings.
[20]
The
minor child’s mother was involved throughout in engaging with
the school, and she deposed to a confirmatory affidavit
in the
application. She has a direct and substantial interest herein, but it
cannot be fathomed that any of her rights might be
affected
prejudicially by the order of this court.
[1]
[21]
In the premises, the points
in
limine
on the non-joinder of the minor
child and his mother are dismissed with costs to be costs in the
application.
Merits:
[22]
Since the point
in
limine
on incompetent relief sought in
terms of PAJA is upheld, there is no need to address the merits of
the application. As the applicant
places reliance on
Moko
v Acting Principal, Malusi Secondary School and Others
2021 (3) SA 323
(CC), I deem it appropriate to make some remarks on
the merits of the application.
[23]
Independent
schools are bound to provide basic education and to act in the best
interest of the minor child.
[2]
[24]
In
Moko
,
the Constitutional Court addressed a case involving a Grade 12 pupil
who was barred from writing the National Senior Certificate.
In
paragraph 35 of
Moko,
the Constitutional Court stated:
“
Access
to a school is a 'necessary condition for the achievement of the
right to education'.
Access to an
examination, especially one that is integral to completing one's
schooling, is another important component for the
achievement of this
right
.
The
first respondent had both a positive and negative obligation under s
29(1)(a) to allow the applicant to write the examination,
unless
there was an acceptable basis for not doing so. Refusing the
applicant entry into the school, without adequate justification,
and
preventing him from writing the Business Studies Paper 2 examination,
especially when his lateness to the examination was caused
by the
first respondent, undeniably breaches the right to basic education in
s 29(1)(a) of the Constitution
.
None of the respondents sought to provide any acceptable basis for
the first respondent's conduct in refusing the applicant entry
to the
examination, or the earlier conduct of sending the applicant home
from school on the morning of an examination, which resulted
in him
missing the examination.”
(my
emphasis).
[25]
The facts
in
casu
are distinguishable from those in
Moko.
In
this case, the minor child was barred from taking a cycle test
because the applicant and his wife, despite ample notice, chose
to go
away on holiday, leaving the minor child absent when the cycle test
was administered.
[26]
In my view, the cycle test can never be
regarded as integral to complete the minor child’s academic
year. The cycle test represents
only 5.6% of the total year-end mark.
To not allow the minor child to write the cycle test can in no way
infringe on the minor
child’s right to basic education.
[27]
Under clause 19.1 of the Assessment Policy,
if a formal assessment, such as a cycle test, is missed, the student
must produce a
medical certificate; in extenuating circumstances, the
principal may grant a principal waiver.
[28]
The applicant’s understanding that
the mere production of an affidavit would be sufficient to allow the
minor child to write
the cycle test is flawed. Being away on holiday,
whilst having been fully made aware of the academic roster and school
policies,
can never be regarded as an extenuating circumstance,
capable of being explained in an affidavit to warrant a principal’s
waiver. To permit such an understanding would open the floodgates and
create a risky precedent.
[29]
‘
Extenuating circumstances’, by
logic, would include circumstances such as death in the family, a
house that burned down on
the day before the cycle test, or a
mechanical breakdown whilst being transported to school. A legion of
worthy examples can be
given. But being away on holiday would not be
one of those worthy examples.
Costs:
[30]
The applicant is a legally qualified
individual. He pursued this application, which would have impacted
5.6% of the minor child’s
ultimate year mark. The cycle test is
but a fraction of the minor child's academic record, who, from the
papers, excels academically.
[31]
When the application was struck for lack of
urgency, the applicant should have reconsidered his approach. In
essence, the relief
sought became moot. The applicant failed to
pursue the amendment, and the PAJA approach bound him. From the
outset, the applicant
sought costs against the respondents, including
attorney and client costs. The second respondent was compelled to
incur legal costs
to protect its interests and prevent the creation
of an untenable precedent.
[32]
Under the circumstances, there is no basis
why the second respondent should be left out of pocket. It follows
that attorney and
client scale costs are justified.
Consequently, I make the
following order:
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The applicant is to pay the costs of the application on the scale as
between attorney and
client.
Minnaar AJ
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
Heard
on
:
20
October 2025
For
the applicant
:
In
person
Instructed
by
:
In
person
For
the respondent
:
Adv R
Kriek
Instructed
by
:
C R
Bothma & Jooste Attorneys
Date
of judgment
:
20
November 2025
[1]
Judicial
Service Commission and Another v Cape Bar Council and Another
2013
(1) SA 170
(SCA) at para 12
[2]
AB
and Another v Pridwin Preparotory School and Others
2020
(5) SA 327
(CC).
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