Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 75South Africa
Actom Electrical Products v Matlala (42355/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 75 (29 January 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
29 January 2024
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Actom Electrical Products v Matlala (42355/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 75 (29 January 2024)
Actom Electrical Products v Matlala (42355/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 75 (29 January 2024)
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sino date 29 January 2024
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HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case No.: 42355/2020
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED
SIGNATURE
29/01/2024
DATE
In
the application between:
ACTOM ELECTRICAL
PRODUCTS
Applicant
(A DIVISION OF ACTOM
(PTY) LTD)
and
MOHLOMI MAKGOAHLENG
MATLALA
Respondent
In Re:
ACTOM ELECTRICAL
PRODUCTS
Plaintiff
(A DIVISION OF ACTOM
(PTY) LTD)
And
CHICHI GROUP (PTY)
LTD
First Defendant
MOHLOMI MAKGOAHLENG
MATLALA
Second
Defendant
NKWANE ARIEL
MAHLATJI
Third Defendant
ABRAM NKOPODI
MASHABELA
Fourth Defendant
JUDGMENT
NHARMURAVATE
AJ
:
Introduction
[1]
This is an application in terms of Rule 46(1)(a) and rule 46A of the
uniformed rules of
court wherein the Applicant seeks an order
declaring the immovable property of the Respondent specially
executable. This application
is different in that the Applicant
herein is not a Bank or a financial institution as per the norm and
it stems from a judgement
obtained by default o
n
the 20th of January 2021, wherein the Applicant obtained judgement
against the Respondent who in the main action was both the
First and
Second Defendant.
[2]
The order granted was as follows that:
“
1.1
Payment in the sum of R 3 345 296.80
1.2
Interest
on the aforesaid sum at a rate of 3% above the prime interest rate
being quoted by Nedbank (a division of Nedcor
Bank LTD)
as that at which it is prepared to lend on an overdraft to its most
favoured corporate customers in the private sector
in the Republic of
South Africa per annum, calculated from date of default to date of
final payment; and
1.3 Costs on attorney
and own client, to be taxed.”
[3]
There has been non-compliance with the court order
issued in January 2021 from the Respondent. The Applicant now seeks
to execute
against his residential property in accordance with rule
46 as it is his primary place of residence. This application is
opposed
by the Respondent. In opposition he filed the required answer
and subsequently
filed a supplementary affidavit on Friday the
10
th
of November 2023. The Respondent sought leave from
the court to admit the further answering affidavit filed since this
was filed
at a very late stage. This was not opposed by the
Applicants as it did not cause any prejudice and the Applicant’s
did not
see the need to replicate to the supplementary answer
consequently filed.
[4]
Further, the Respondent has raised a point in
limine
lis
pendence
which this court had to determine before the main matter
was argued.
LIS PENDENSE
[5]
The Respondent raised a point in
limine
of
lis
pendense
in that the hearing of the
rule 46 application could not continue as there was a pending
application before this court. The Respondents
Counsel submitted that
the application was filed on the 19th of August 2021 which sought a
declaration that: the Registrar's order
was ambiguous and or unclear
as to whom the order was enforceable against. Further, that
application sought to nullify the writ
of execution which had been
issued pursuant to the order.
[6]
The Counsel for the Applicant argued that there
was no pending application as it had been dismissed by the Honourable
Mgqibisi Thusi
J’s order. The Respondent in the declaratory
application was
dominus litus
they had to ensure that the matter was seen up to its end. However,
this was not the case, the Respondent only filed this application
subsequent to that the Applicants filed answering papers. Thereafter
there was no reply filed nor any heads of argument filed by
the
Respondent. The matter was thereafter laid dormant. Seeing that the
matter was unattended which was causing prejudice to the
Applicant,
the Applicant decided to take the initiative by obtaining an order on
the 1st of April 2022 which directed that the
Respondent must file
heads of argument within 10 days failing which the respondent’s
application dated the 19th of August
2021 would be dismissed. The
Respondents were directed to pay the costs of the application to
compel filing of heads. The Respondents
failed to comply with the
court order which subsequently dismissed the declarator application.
[7]
In reply to the Respondent’s Counsel argued
that the Respondent did not have finances to continue with the matter
hence their
disappearance or inactivity with the application filed in
court.
[8]
In my opinion, the
point
in limine
raised is
mala
fide.
The Respondents has always known
that there was a default judgement order against him and that this
court order needs to be complied
with. There was no appeal filed or
review at this instance. In this regard the default judgment order
remains binding on the parties
which were cited on it. The Respondent
did not deny having knowledge of the Mgqibisi Thusi J order which was
accordingly served
on him which dismissed the declaratory application
due to his failure to file heads of argument. It is therefore
misleading the
court to argue
lis
pendence
as there is no pending
declaratory application as this was dismissed by the Mgqibisi Thusi J
order in April 2022. It would seem
that this application was filed
with the purpose pf delaying and or frustrating the Applicant without
a just cause.
[9]
Even after receipt of the compel order the
Respondent did not communicate anything further to the Applicants be
it the difficulty
with finances which is now being argued by Counsel
for the Respondents from the bar. There is no pending rescission of
this court
order dated the 1st of April 2022 by Mgqibisi Thusi J
therefore the argument raised has no merit in law.
[10]
Therefore, the point
in
limine
raised by the Respondent is
dismissed.
ISSUES TO BE
DETERMINED
[11]
The parties compiled a long list of determinations which have to be
made by this court. In my view the following
were more important that
is:
11.1 Whether the court
order relied upon by the Applicant for the execution against the
Respondent’s residence is enforceable
against the Respondent
since he is not identified therein as the judgement debtor.
11.2 In the event that
the court order is found to be enforceable: Whether the matter can be
adjudicated at all given the applicants
non-compliance with Rule
4(A)(5)(a) in that it did not place an evaluation of the market value
of the property before court as
required.
11.3 Whether or not the
Respondent’s primary residence ought to be declared executable
given his circumstances as per the
supplementary answering filed.
ARGUMENTS BY
PARTIES
[12]
This
court directed the Respondent to pay an
amount of R3 345 296.80 to the Applicant. This order was
obtained by default thereafter
it was served accordingly to all the
parties which were cited. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs
this order still remains
as it has not been set aside in any manner
whatsoever be it through an appeal or review.
[13]
The Applicants Counsel argued that the
first defendant in the main action Chichi Group Pty Ltd is the
Respondent and currently it
has been placed under voluntary
liquidation. In attempts to satisfy the court order a Sheriff was
sent to execute the order on
the 22 April 2021, by attaching the
Respondent’s movable property at his residence. The sheriff
attended to removal of the
attached goods except for the Respondent’s
vehicles. The sheriff then sold the goods and only recovered an
amount of R 12 759.33
(twelve thousand, seven hundred and
fifty-nine Rand and thirty-three Cents) from the sale in execution of
the respondent’s
movable property. There were no sufficient
assets to satisfy the default judgment order.
[14]
The Applicant’s Counsel argued that
the Applicant will only be able to recover the judgment debt by
attaching and selling
the immovable property, which is owned by the
Respondent situated at ERF 2[...], K[...] G[...] extension 19,
Pretoria be declared
specially executable.
[15]
On
the other hand, the Respondent argued that the court order that the
Applicant sought to rely on did not make sense, for a court
order to
be enforceable it must be clear and unambiguous
[1]
.The
Respondent was using the property as his primary residence where he
lived with his ill father, three minor children and his
partner. The
Respondents Father had suffered a heart attack and a stroke and was
undergoing home treatment by a Doctor and a Physio
Therapist 5 days a
week. Additionally, the Applicant had failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 46(A)(5)(a). In that the
application must be
accompanied by a valuation of the market value of the property. In
terms of Rule 46(A)(2)(b) the court shall
not authorise execution
against immovable property which is the primary residence of a
judgment debtor unless the court, having
considered all relevant
factors, considers that execution against such property is warranted.
[16]
The Respondent further argued that he is
indigent and
the sale in execution will not be of any benefit
to the Applicant as there will be no free residue after the secured
creditors being
the municipality and the bank ABSA have been paid as
he still has a home loan with ABSA.
[17]
The Applicant in reply argued that the
Respondent was not an indigent individual and is financially able to
afford to purchase another
immovable property should this immovable
property be declared specially executable. The Applicant was able to
produce documentary
evidence proving that the Respondent is at least
a Director in various entities through proof of the ACI PC
directorship. The Respondent
owned two motor vehicles with a combined
value in excess of R 2 000 000, 00 [Two million Rands]. The sheriff
was unable to attach,
remove and sell these vehicles by way of sale
in execution as the Respondent claims that the vehicles are still
under finance by
a financial institution.
[18]
In support of the above contention the
Applicants argued that the Respondent purchased the immovable
property in 2019 for R 3 200
000,00 [three million, two hundred
thousand rands] and would reasonably be paying approximately R
23,000, 00 (twenty-three thousand
Rand) per month towards his
mortgage bond with Absa bank. This was indicative that the respondent
was far from being an indigent
person.
[19]
Further, there was no possibility that the
Respondent’s liabilities to the Applicant may be liquidated
within a reasonable
time, without having to execute against the
Respondent’s residents. The immovable property which is sought
to be declared
executable was not acquired by means or with
assistance of a state subsidy. The debt which is sought to be
enforced was not incurred
in order to acquire the immovable property
sought to be declared executable.
ANALYSIS OF THE
MATTER
[20]
The first issue which this court called upon to
determine is whether
the court order relied upon by the
Applicant for the execution against the Respondent’s residence
is enforceable against
the Respondent since he is not identified
therein as the judgement debtor.
[21]
It
is important to firstly point out that this court order is still in
existence. The constitution calls upon all parties to obey
court
orders. Section 165(5)
[2]
directs that an order or a decision issued by a court is binding to
all persons to whom it applies. Barring an appeal against this
court
order, the court order of the 26th of January 2021 remains binding to
the Respondent. It is common cause that there is no
appeal pending or
any other application pending before this court in relation to this
matter. This court was not ceased with an
appeal or review of the
main matter that resulted into this order. Any attempt in assessing
or pronouncing on this court order
will be irrational.
[22] In
my opinion
the Respondent is clearly identified in
the court order of January 2021. In fact, even the Respondent in this
application is not
disputing his identity in this court order.
Alternatively, the Respondent is not even disputing the debt that is
owed to the Applicant.
This order remains enforceable to the
Respondent more so because the Respondent has absolved the third and
fourth defendants in
the main action from any liability that arises
as a result of debts incurred by the first defendant. The Respondent
has acknowledged
that he is solely liable for the debts owing to the
creditors which include the Applicant in a resolution that was passed
by the
Board of Directors of the first defendants in the main action.
[23]
The uniformed rules of the court provide
procedures to be followed by a party who is aggrieved with a court
order or a judgment.
None of those procedures were perused by the
Respondent for this court to be able to make such a consideration.
This court order
cannot be revisited by a court sitting as a motion
court hearing a rule 46 application. In line with the resolution
dated the 24
th
of January 2020 the Respondent is liable, and the court order is
enforceable against him. Therefore, there is no confusion as to
who
must make such payment in that regard.
[24]
The second issue for determination is
whether this matter can be
adjudicated given the Applicants non-compliance with Rule 4(A)(5)(a)
i
n that it did not place an evaluation of the market value of the
property before court as required. (sic)
[25] In
terms of Rule 46A(2)(a): A court considering an application under
this rule must–
“
(i) establish
whether the immovable property which the execution creditor intends
to execute against is the primary residence of
the judgment debtor
[...]” Rule
46A(2)(b) especially provides that: “
A
court shall not authorise execution against immovable property which
is the primary residence of a judgment debtor unless the
court,
having considered all property is warranted.” relevant factors,
considers that execution against such.
[26]
Rule 46A seeks to protect homeowners by ensuring
that their homes are not sold in execution for prices which are not
market related.
Courts are called upon to take account of the market
value of the property, making a fair determination of what a fair
reserved
price would be. It is therefore a requirement for an
applicant to have a sworn independent evaluation certificate by a
property
evaluator which in this instance the Applicant does not
have.
[27]
It
is important for the court to be able to establish the true market
value of the property as a starting point before an attachment
can be
ordered to the property. Compliance with the rule is of outmost
importance keeping in mind section 26 of the Constitution
[3]
.
The requirements for rule 46 in this regard are set in stone and they
have been pronounced upon in several important cases. Therefore,
this
non-compliance equates to the Applicant being unsuccessful with the
execution at this stage.
[28]
In
Jaftha
v Schoeman
[4]
,
Mokgoro J in the Constitutional Court found that in a
matter
where execution is sought against property which is the primary
residence of a judgment debtor a court must
consider
whether the rules of court have been complied with; whether there are
alternative ways of recovering the judgement debt;
further take into
account, among other things, the circumstances in which the judgement
debt was incurred; attempts made to pay
off the debt; the financial
position of the parties; the amount of the judgement debt; whether
the judgement debtor is employed
or has a source of income to pay off
the debt; and other factors relevant to this case
.
[29]
The Respondent’s answer is also not
satisfactory inclusive of the supplementary answer. The Respondent
has not attached any
proof of how much he is currently owing to the
municipality the only attachment that has been annexed from the City
of Johannesburg
dates back to February 2023 whereas the application
was heard in November 2023.It was imperative upon the Respondent to
attach
recent statements in their supplementary answer which was
filed on the 10th of November 2023 in support of their argument.
[30]
Further, the Respondent has attached documentation
which he purports to be proof of how much he owes under his home loan
with Absa.
However, the statements which have been attached are for a
current account overdraft which the Respondent is able to pay for. In
terms of these statements, he has not defaulted in paying for this
overdraft. There is no satisfactory documentation that indeed
he has
a bond registered with ABSA except for the argument made from the
Bar. In my opinion the plea of the Respondent being indigent
is not
supported in this application by any documentary evidence. The
Respondent has not even attached a single financial report
or audited
statements to prove that the various companies he enjoys directorship
in are dormant or are in financial destitute.
[31]
Courts are enjoined to ensure that the rights of
all litigants in such matters are balanced fairly special parties
with a direct
interest. It is of importance that the court before it
makes its determination in such applications that it has proper
knowledge
of how much the bond was initially and the current
outstanding balance thereof from the bond originator which in this
instance
is Absa. It is improbable for this court to order
foreclosure on the respondent’s property without this
information as it
is vital and it will also assists in being able to
formulate a reserved price where needs be.
[32]
Hence, it is my opinion that Absa bank should have
been joined in these proceedings as a party with a direct interest in
the matter.
This would have made the transition for the Applicants
easier that is in obtaining documents pertaining to the home loan so
that
there is compliance with the requirements of rule 46A. If ABSA
is a bond originator of the property that the Applicant seeks to
attach at this stage, then the property in issue cannot be attached
without them having knowledge of this application as they are
the
preferential creditor. The bank currently has a real right
enforceable against third parties over this property if indeed there
is a home loan with ABSA.
[33]
The
underlying principle emphasized here is that execution
against
immovable property which is the primary residence of the judgment
debtor
requires
judicial oversight –
the aim of which is to give
effect to section 26 of the Constitution which is to protect the
right to adequate housing and security
of tenure. Tritely, “
the
need for judicial oversight in such applications and the reasons
therefore have been the subject matter of a number of court
applications in the Supreme Court of Appeal, Constitutional Court and
individual divisions of the High Courts
”4
[34]
In
Gundwana
v Steko Development and Other
,
the Constitutional Court clarified that the
Jaftha
decision
applies not only in exceptional cases but also in typical mortgage
foreclosure cases brought before the high court
[5]
.
However, this does not imply that a judgment creditor's right should
be unduly restricted by a Rule 46A defence claim. In
Absa
v Mokebe
the
court referred to the authors of Wille, who stated thus: “
The
right of the mortgagee or pledgee is to retain his hold over the
secured property until his debt is paid and, if the mortgagor
or
pledgor is in default, to have the property sold and obtain payment
of is debt out of the proceeds of sale.
”
[6]
[35]
The
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Petrus
Johannes Bestbier and Others v Nedbank Limited
[7]
cited with approval, the decision in Jaftha and stated that: "
The
text of rule 46A(l) reveals that the rule applies whenever an
execution creditor seeks to execute against residential immovable
property of a judgment
an application in debtor's immovable
debtor. Notably, rule 46A(2) provides that a court considering which
a creditor seeks to execute
against the judgment property must
consider various matters
.”
[36]
Rule 46A seeks to provide protection to all individuals who
are in the process of having their properties declared specially
executable
this gives effect to section 26 of the Constitution.
Compliance with rule 46A cannot be relaxed at the instance of the
Applicant
simply because they are armed with a default order against
the Respondents. The protection provided by rule 46A is objective and
applies equally. Compliance in this regard is key.
COSTS
[37]
Tritely, costs follow the results. However,
courts are within the court’s discretion in this application
both parties at fault
in one way or the other. The Respondent raised
their point
in limine
which was not
bona fide
which were subsequently dismissed. Additionally, the Respondent filed
its supplementary answering affidavit without first seeking
leave to
do so before this court. In addition to that the supplementary
answering affidavit was only filed on a Friday the 10th
of November
whereas the matter had been set down for hearing in the week of the
13th of November 2023 which in my opinion amounts
to ambushing the
Applicant.
[38]
On the other hand, the Applicant has not
complied with the requirements of rule 46A in full as discussed. Even
the notice of motion
for the Applicant is incomplete,I could not see
the prayers sought. In light of the foregoing, I cannot order any
party to pay
costs in this regard.
[39]
In the circumstances the following order is made:
1.
The application is dismissed for
non-compliance with the requirements of rule 46A.
2.
Each party to pay its own costs.
NHARMURAVATE AJ
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Date of
Hearing:
16/11/2023
Judgment
delivered:
29/01/2024
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Applicant
Adv
C Opperman
Attorneys
for Applicant
Vasco
De Oliveira Inc
Counsel
for Respondent
Adv
WB Boonzaaier
Attorneys
Respondent
Mashabane
& associate Inc
[1]
Lujabe v Maruatona (35730/12)[2013} ZAGP JHC 66 (15 April 2013) at
par 17
[2]
The
Constitution Act 104 of 1996
[3] Everyone has a right
to have access to adequate housing.(2) The state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures,within
its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
[4]
2005 (2) SA 140 (CC)
[5]
2011(3)
SA 608 (CC)
[6]
2018(6)
SA 492 (GJ) (12 September 2018)
[7]
2023
(4) SA 25
(SCA) (13 June 2022)
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