Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 59South Africa
Nedbank Limited v Sithole (032118/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 59 (2 February 2024)
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judgment—
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Nedbank Limited v Sithole (032118/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 59 (2 February 2024)
Nedbank Limited v Sithole (032118/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 59 (2 February 2024)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 032118/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED
2024/02/02
In
the matter between:
In
matter between:
NEDBANK
LIMITED
PLAINTIFF/ APPLICANT
(Reg.
No. 1951/000009/06)
and
ALFRED
MAFODI SITHOLE
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
(Id.
No.: 7[...])
JUDGMENT
MOTHA,
J:
Introduction
[1]
Having entered into a written variable instalment sale
agreement with the defendant, within the meaning of the National
Credit Act
34 of 2005 (NCA), on 25 July 2019, the plaintiff proceeded
in terms of section127 of the NCA, when the defendant returned the
motor
vehicle on 21 January 2020. The defendant submitted that the
Consumer Protection Act of 68 2008 (CPA) finds application in this
matter. Disputing this assertion, the plaintiff seeks an order in
terms of Rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court.
The
parties
[2]
The plaintiff is
Nedbank Limited a public company
with limited liability duly registered and incorporated in accordance
with the company laws of
the Republic of South Africa, with the
registration number: 1951/000009/06.
[3]
The defendant is Alfred Mafodi Sithole an adult male with Identity No
7[...].
Facts
[4]
The
essentialia
of the agreement are,
inter alia
, the
following:
“
The
plaintiff sold to the defendant the following goods:
2018 Renault Clio IV
900T Authentique 5DR
Registration number:
unknown
Engine
number: H[...] Chassis number: V[...]
(“the
vehicle”)
The
goods were sold for an amount of R298 429.63 which amount was made up
of,
inter
alia
,
a principal debt of R186 122.50 (“principal debt”) plus
finance charges of R112 307.03.”
[1]
[5]
The said amount was going to be repaid in installments calculated in
the following
fashion:
“
[O]ne
payment of R3 525.13 on 1 September 2019, and 70 payments of R3
440.55 each at monthly intervals beginning on 1 October 2019,
and
thereafter 1 balloon payment of R54 066.00 on 1 August 2025.”
[2]
[6]
The defendant stated that:
“
During
the first week the defendant purchased the motor vehicle from the
plaintiff he accidentally hit a rock, he went to investigate
the
damage caused by the accident. Apart from the damage caused he
noticed that there were small particles which fell from the
motor
vehicle and saw that the particles were body filler indicating that
the motor vehicle was once involved in an accident and
was repaired.
The
motor vehicle was taken to the plaintiff and the defendant informed
the plaintiff about the body filler in which they said they
knew
nothing about, and that they do not sell motor vehicles that had been
previously involved in an accident.”
[3]
[7]
The defendant took the motor vehicle to Diamond Panel beaters:
“
They
confirmed that the LHS RHS Locker had body filler and that it seemed
that motor vehicle was repaired prior to me purchasing
it from the
applicant”
[4]
[8]
As a result of this, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff
misrepresented the
condition of the motor vehicle when he purchased
it. In line with section 56 of the CPA, he handed over the motor
vehicle on or
about 21 January 2020. The plaintiff submitted that the
defendant repudiated the credit agreement by stating he could not
make
any further payments and delivered the vehicle to the plaintiff.
Issues
[9]
The question that faces this court is whether the plaintiff can deal
with the motor
vehicle in terms of section127 of the NCA, and whether
the defendant can find protection under the CPA. But importantly, the
question
asked of this court is whether the defendant has raised
triable issues to starve off the attack in terms of Rule 32 of the
Uniform
Rules of Court.
The law
[10]
Rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court reads:
“
32.
Summary judgment—
(1)
Where the plaintiff may, after the defendant has delivered notice of
intention to
defend a plea, the plaintiff may apply to court for
summary judgment on each of such claims in the summons as is only
[5]
—
(a)
on a liquid document;
(b)
for a liquidated amount in money;
(c)
for delivery of specified movable property; or
(d)
for ejectment,
together with any claim
for interest and costs.”
[11]
To be successful against an application for summary judgement, the
defendant must set out in
his or her affidavit facts, which, if
proven at trial, will constitute an answer to the plaintiff’s
case.
[6]
On this subject, the
court in
Maharaj
v Barclays National Bank Ltd
[7]
held:
“
Accordingly,
one of the ways in which a defendant may successfully oppose a claim
for summary judgment is by satisfying the Court
by affidavit that he
has a
bona
fide
defense to the claim. Where the defense is based upon facts, in the
sense that material facts alleged by the plaintiff in his summons,
or
combined summons, are disputed or new facts are alleged constituting
a defence, the Court does not attempt to decide these issues
or to
determine whether or not there is a balance of probabilities in
favour of the one party or the other. All that the court
enquires
into is: (a) whether the defendant has “fully” disclosed
the nature and grounds of his defence and the material
facts upon
which it is founded, and (b) whether on the facts so disclosed the
defendant appears to have, as to either the whole
or part of the
claim, a defence which is
bona
fide
and good in law. If satisfied on these matters the court must refuse
summary judgment, either wholly or in part, as the case may
be.”
[8]
[12]
Section 127 of the NCA provides:
“
127.Surrender
of goods
—
(1)
A consumer under an installment
agreement, secured loan or lease
—
(a)
may give written notice to the credit provider to terminate the
agreement;
and
(b)
if-
(i) the
goods are in the credit provider’s possession, require the
credit provider to sell the
goods; or
(ii)
otherwise, return the goods that are the subject of that agreement to
the credit provider’s place of business
during ordinary
business hours within five business days after the date of the notice
or within such other period or at such other
time or place as maybe
agreed with the credit provider.
(2)
within 10 business days after the later of-
(a)
receiving a notice in terms of subsection (1) (b) (i): or
(b)
receiving goods tendered in terms of subsection (1)(b) (ii) a credit
provider
must give the customer rating notice setting out the
estimated value of the goods and any other prescribed information,
(3)
within 10 business days after receiving a notice under subsection
(2), the consumer
may unconditionally withdraw the notice to
terminate the agreement in terms of subsection (1) (a), and resume
possession of any
goods that are in the creditors credit provider’s
possession, unless the consumer is in default under the credit
agreement.”
[13]
When it comes to the CPA, the legal position is as clear as mud.
Section 5(2)(d) of the CPA reads
as follows:
“
(2)
This Act does not apply to any transaction—
(d)
that constitutes a credit agreement under the
National Credit Act,
but
the goods or services that are the subject of the credit
agreement are not excluded from the ambit of this Act”.
[14]
Section 56(2) of the CPA reads:
“
(2)
Within six months after the delivery of any goods to a consumer, the
consumer may return the goods to the
supplier, without penalty and at
the supplier’s risk and expense, if the goods fail to satisfy
the requirements and standards
contemplated in section 55, and the
supplier must, at the direction of the consumer, - either—
(a)
repair or replace the failed, unsafe or defective goods; or
(b)
refund to the consumer the price paid by the consumer, for the goods”
Discussion
[15]
For an in-depth analysis of the issues, this court will quote
extensively and liberally from
the sources counsel relied on.
Counsel for the
plaintiff ’s submissions
[16]
Counsel for the plaintiff relied on the matter of the
MFC
(A Division of Nedbank Ltd) v JAJ Botha,
[9]
in which the court was faced with a similar challenge. As in this
case, the applicant in
Botha’s
case:
“
[H]ad
purchased the vehicle in question from a car dealership at the
instance of the respondent for the purpose of being able to
sell it
on to the respondent in terms of the installment sale agreement. The
instalment sale agreement is a credit agreement within
the meaning of
the NCA. The applicant’s real role in the sale of the vehicle
was thus one of credit provider, and not one
of supplier of the goods
in question. It is therefore unsurprising that the agreement between
the applicant and the respondent
expressly excluded any warranty by
the applicant as to the condition of the vehicle selected by the
respondent. The respondent
had nevertheless returned the vehicle to
the applicant on or about 30 August 2012 because he had become
dissatisfied with it on
account of its allegedly defective condition…
The
applicant wishes to deal with the return of the vehicle in terms of
s127 of the NCAA…The effect of the court acceding
to this
would be that the vehicle would be sold, and the proceeds credited in
reduction of the amount owed by the respondent to
the applicant in
terms of the aforementioned instalment sale agreement. The respondent
on the other hand appears to consider that
consenting to such a cause
and not opposing the current application would compromise what he
considers to be his rights in terms
of Part H of chap. 2 of the
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008
(‘the CPA’). He
maintains that he returned the vehicle to the applicant in exercise
of his rights in terms of
s 56(2)
of the CPA…”
[10]
[17]
The court in
Botha
chose a middle-of-the-road approach. On the one hand, the court held
that the NCA was excluded by
section 5(2)(d)
of the CPA and rejected
the respondent’s submission that he was covered by
section
56(2)
of the CPA
[11]
. On the
other hand, the court held that the applicant had not complied with
the provisions of
section 129(1)
and adjourned the matter
sine
die
pending the compliance with
section 129(1)
of the NCA.
[12]
[18]
In
casu
, Counsel, accordingly, submitted that the defendant
did not enjoy the protection under
section 56(2)(d)
of the CPA.
Counsel for the
defendant’s submissions.
[19]
The defendant’s counsel submitted that
Botha
’s
case elicited major disquiet amongst the ranks of academia. She
referred the court to a joint academic paper penned by
Professor
Jannie Otto of the University of Johannesburg, Professor Corlia M Van
Hieerden of the University of Pretoria and Jacolien
Barnard a Senior
lecturer at the University of Pretoria. Zeroing in on the all too
familiar situation of an instalment sale agreement,
they wrote:
[13]
“
[T]he
consumer buys a motor vehicle from a motor dealership. He cannot pay
the full amount of the purchase price immediately. The
motor
dealership assists him to apply for finance at a financial
institution (for example, a bank). that the motor vehicle is financed
and an installment agreement (previously called an installment sale
agreement) is concluded between the consumer and the bank.
Within six
months after the delivery of the vehicle, the consumer starts to
experience problems with it and it becomes too clear
that the vehicle
is of an unsatisfactory quality, cannot be used for the purposes for
which it was bought, and is defective.
If
the customer attempts to hold the motor dealership responsible, the
dealership argues that it no longer owns the vehicle and
that the
bank should be approached. Indeed, the dealership argues that the
bank was the seller of the vehicle- which it often is.
Should the
consumer attempt to hold the bank responsible, the bank refers to the
installment agreement in which any warranty as
to the condition of
the vehicle is expressly excluded, and the bank also argues that it
only financed the deal. After all, the
bank is not a seller of
vehicles in the first place. To make matters worse, it seems that
uncertainty over the application of two
very important pieces of
consumer protection legislation [National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and
the
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008
] may leave the consumer
without adequate protection…”
[14]
[20]
Interestingly, they placed the
Botha
matter under a microscope and shredded it, for instance they pointed
out that the bank cannot be a consumer. A bank is a juristic
person
whose asset value or annual turnover equals or exceeds the threshold
value determined by the Minister (R2 million).
[15]
[21]
Fascinating as this debate may be, this court’s role is a
limited one. The essence of the
question confronting this court
frontally is whether the defendant has raised triable issues. I am
persuaded that it cannot be
simply said without more that the bank’s
real role was that of a credit provider and not one of supplier of
goods in question.
I could not agree more with the afore-mentioned
writers that, in this instance, a bank wears two hats, namely: “that
of a
seller and that of a financier or credit provider.”
[16]
.
[22]
In
casu
, the plaintiff cannot shrug off its responsibility by
pointing out to the car dealer. The defendant is entitled to approach
the
plaintiff for redress. Hence, I am satisfied that the defendant
has raised
bona fide
defence to the claim
.
It is when
the consumer takes out a personal loan to purchase a car that the
bank is solely a credit provider. The CPA ’s
section 5(2)(d)
applies
ex lege
to goods sold and financed in contracts
involving instalment agreements governed by the NCA.
Costs
[23]
The matter was set down to be heard on 13 November 2023. It did not
proceed due to the applicant’s
doing, to put it politely.
Hence, Counsel’s protestation against his opponent’s
submission that the costs for that
day should be borne by the
applicant was muted. Accordingly, the applicant will be saddled with
wasted costs for that day. The
costs of the hearing will be costs in
the cause.
[24]
In the result I make the following order:
ORDER
1.The application for
summary judgment is dismissed.
2. The costs of the
summary judgment application are costs in the cause.
3. The defendant is
granted leave to defend.
4. The applicant has to
pay the wasted costs of 13 November 2023.
M.
P. MOTHA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT, PRETORIA
Date
of hearing:
13 November 2023
Date
of judgement:
02 February 2024
APPEARANCES
For the
plaintiff/applicant
E. Mann instructed
by
Vezi & De Beer
INC
For the defendant/
respondent
L.Z Msiza
Instructed by
Sithole Attorneys.
[1]
Particulars of claim paras 4 to 5.
[2]
Id
para 6
[3]
Defendant’s plea sub-paras 6.2 and 6.3.
[4]
Affidavit resisting summary judgment para16.
[5]
GNR.842
of 31 May 2019.
[6]
Joob
Joob
Investments
v Stocks Mavundla Zek
2009(5) SA 1 at para 32 page 12.
[7]
1976
(1) SA 418 (A).
[8]
Id p 426 A and B.
[9]
[2013] ZAWCHC 107.
[10]
Id
paras 2 to 3.
[11]
Id
para 13
[12]
Id para 19,2.
[13]
Barnard, Otto and van Heerden “Redress
in
terms of the national Credit Act and the
Consumer Protection Act for
defective goods sold and finance in terms of an installment
agreement” (2014) 24 SAMLJ 247-248.
[14]
Id page 247 -248.
[15]
Id page 272.
[16]
Id page 256.
-256.
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