Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 119South Africa
Smith v Sci Essel Offshore Services Limited (A740/2014) [2024] ZAGPPHC 119 (15 February 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
13 May 2014
Headnotes
to the requirements and time-periods set out in Rule 30.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Smith v Sci Essel Offshore Services Limited (A740/2014) [2024] ZAGPPHC 119 (15 February 2024)
Smith v Sci Essel Offshore Services Limited (A740/2014) [2024] ZAGPPHC 119 (15 February 2024)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO: A740/2014
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED:
Date: 15
February 2024
E van der Schyff
In
the matter between:
DAVID
HENRY SMITH
APPLICANT
and
SCI
ESSEL OFFSHORE SERVICES LIMITED
RESPONDENT
In
Re
SCI
ESSEL OFFSHORE SERVICES LIMITED
APPELLANT
and
DAVID
HENRY SMITH
RESPONDENT
REASONS
Van
der Schyff J (Davis J and Mahosi J concurring)
Introduction
[1]
On 31 January 2024 this
court granted an order:
i.
Declaring that the
enrolment of the appeal under case number A7402014 set down for 31
January 2024 in the absence of compliance
with the provisions of Rule
7(2), constituted an irregular step;
ii.
The irregular step was
set aside, and the appeal was removed from the roll with costs;
iii.
The respondent was
ordered to pay the costs of his application claiming the
irregularity;
At the
time, it was indicated that reasons would be furnished in ten days.
[2]
This exposition
constitutes the reasons for the order.
Background
[3]
The respondent in this
application (hereafter SCI) is a
peregrinus
company situated in Mauritius. SCI instituted action proceedings in
2010 against various defendants on the strength of an acknowledgement
of debt in respect of monies ostensibly lent and advanced to a
principal debtor and secured by certain personal suretyships. SCI
eventually proceeded only against one of the sureties, being the
applicant (Mr. Smith).
[4]
The court
a
quo
found in Mr.
Smith’s favour in a judgment handed down on 13 May 2014. SCI
applied for and was granted leave to appeal to
the Full Court. On 12
August 2015, the appeal was postponed
sine
die
. Almost six
years later in July 2021, Mr. Smith issued an application to declare
that the appeal had lapsed because SCI had not
taken any steps to
further its appeal since the postponement. On 21 September 2022,
Mazibuko AJ handed down a judgment in the declaratory
application.
For purposes of these reasons, it suffices to state that Mazibuko AJ
was not called upon to consider the issue of
whether the provisions
of Rule 7(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court were adhered to. The
application before Mazibuko AJ was limited
to a declaratory order
that the appeal has lapsed for failure to prosecute it within the
periods allowed. Subsequent to the Mazibuko
judgment being handed
down, SCI approached the Appeals Registrar, applying for the
allocation of an appeal hearing.
[5]
After a date was
obtained and the notice of setdown was filed, Mr. Smith issued the
interlocutory application which served before
court on 31 January
2024. Therein he took issue with the respondent’s ostensible
non-compliance with Rule 7(2) and Rule 49(13)(a).
Mr. Smith also
sought an order declaring the judgment of the court
a
quo
to be final.
Rule 49(13)
[6]
As an aside, Mr Smith
complained that the amount of security for costs initially determined
was no longer sufficient. This
court drew Mr. Smith’s
counsel’s attention to the provisions of Rule 49(13)(b). The
rule provides that the registrar
shall fix the appropriate amount for
security of costs for an appeal where the parties fail to agree on
the amount of security.
The issue regarding the extent of security
for costs is thus not an issue that this Court can, at this point,
adjudicate.
Rule 7(2)
[7]
Mr. Smith contended
that the enrollment of the Appeal in the absence of compliance with
the provisions of Rule 7(2) constituted
an irregular step. The effect
of Rule 7(2) is that the filing of a power of attorney in compliance
with the rule needed to occur
simultaneously with the filing of the
application for a date of hearing. The requirement is peremptory, and
where it is not adhered
to, the appeal has not been properly
enrolled. As a result, Mr. Smith sought an order that the appeal to
be struck from the roll,
alternatively to be removed from the Roll.
[8]
Mr. Smith contended
that although he initially only took issue with the fact that no
power of attorney was filed when the appeal
was re-enrolled after the
Mazibuko order, it became apparent that there had been no compliance
with Rule 7(2) since when the appeal
had initially been enrolled.
The attorneys who had initially prosecuted the appeal was Stroh
Coetzee Inc. SCI had failed
to demonstrate that a power of attorney
for Stroh Coetzee Inc. had been filed authorising the prosecution of
the appeal. There
was also no indication that SCI had mandated Göthe
Attorneys Inc. who represented SCI when the new date for the appeal
was
applied for. Mr. Smith’s issue with the non-compliance with
Rule 7(2) was founded on his view that the
peregrinus
company no longer exists, a belief communicated to SCI’s legal
representatives. Mr. Smith took issue with a later power of
attorney
dated 21 November 2023 and avers that in addition to not complying
with Rule 7(2) is also does not comply with Rule 7(4).
This
power of attorney is dealt with in par 10 hereunder.
[9]
SCI submitted that Mr.
Smith is relying on a purely technical point. Mr. Lutzkie, SCI’s
agent, averred that the entirety of
the relief sought is
res
judicata
since it
was dealt with by Mazibuko AJ. SCI regarded the power of attorney
dated 24 May 2010, signed by one Kim Fat HO FONG nominating
and
appointing Stemela & Lubbe Inc. ‘
as
its attorneys to represent the company in all its legal proceedings
in the Republic of South Africa in respect of the action
instituted
by the company against Fantasy Construction (Central) (Pty) Ltd,
David Henry Smith, Kennith Bernard Stricker and Adam
Johannes
Sherpherd in the North Gauteng High Court … and further to
take such legal steps and/or action in any Court necessary
to protect
the Company interest in the Republic of South Africa’
,
as sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 7(2).
[10]
In a supplementary
answering affidavit Mr. Lutzkie attached two powers of attorney. The
first, dated 24 May 2010 authorises Mr.
Lutzkie to represent SCI in
all legal proceedings against, amongst others, Mr. Smith. The
second, dated 21 November 2023,
is a power of attorney granted by Mr.
Lutzkie to Göthe Attorneys Inc. to institute and defend legal
proceedings against Mr.
Smith under case numbers 17195/2010 and
A740/2014 (the latter case number being that of the appeal).
[11]
Since the appeal was
simply re-enrolled, SCI contended that it was unnecessary to file a
power of attorney again. SCI further submitted
that the provisions of
Rule 30 were not adhered to and that the applicant, who is a
‘stickler for rules’ should also
be held to the
requirements and time-periods set out in Rule 30.
Discussion
[12]
Rule 7(2) of the
Uniform Rules provides:
‘
The
registrar shall not set down any appeal at the instance of an
attorney unless such attorney has filed with the registrar a power
of
attorney authorizing him to appeal, and such power of attorney shall
be filed together with the application for a date of hearing
.’
[13]
A
power of attorney is necessary for the prosecution of an appeal
because it is proof of authorisation for the conduct of further
proceedings. It is to prevent a person whose name is used in the
process from afterward repudiating the process altogether and
denying
the giving of authority and to prevent the institution of an appeal
in the name of a person who never authorised it.
[1]
[14]
On
a plain reading of the rule, it is evident that to prosecute an
appeal, it is essential to file the power of attorney when the
application is made for a hearing date. Filing an application for a
date of hearing without a power of attorney is not the proper
‘making’ of that application within the meaning of the
rules.
[2]
The imperative of Rule
7(2) becomes clearer when considered in light of the fact that Rule
7(1) does not prescribe the general
filing of a power of attorney
when litigation commences.
[15]
Dendy
and Loots, in
Herbstein
& Van Winsen
The
Civil Practice of the Superior Courts of South Africa,
[3]
explain with reference to authority, that the courts of various
Divisions have for many years adhered to the practice of striking
off
the roll with costs an appeal prosecuted without authority in the
form of a power of attorney filed at the time of set-down.
[4]
They suggest, however, that the practice of striking off an appeal
should be reconsidered in light of the decision in
Smith
v Kwanonqubela Town Council
.
[5]
Since the appeal
in
casu
was removed from the roll and not struck off, dealing with this
aspect further is unnecessary.
[16]
As stated above, the
issue of compliance with Rule 7(2) was not raised before Mazibuko AJ,
and the judgment and order she handed
down cannot be regarded as
having finally dealt with this issue. The matter is thus not
res
judicata.
SCI and
Mr. Lutzkie did nothing to allay Mr. Smith’s fears that SCI
does not exist anymore. In the factual context where
the appeal is
re-enrolled eight years after it was postponed
sine
die
, where the
applicant expressly states that it believes that the appellant does
not exist anymore, I find no justification for the
argument that Rule
7(2) simply does not apply. The issue of whether an attorney
has a mandate from an existing appellant
is a material one.
[17]
The fact of the matter
is that no power of attorney had been filed authorising either Stroh
Coetzee Inc. or Göthe Attorneys
Inc., respectively, to prosecute
an appeal, when the appeal was enrolled and re-enrolled. The only
power of attorney existent at
the time when the appeal was initially
enrolled is a power of attorney appointing Stemela & Lubbe Inc.
Since no power of attorney
had been filed authorising either Stroh
Coetzee Inc. or Gothe Attorneys Inc. to enroll or re-enroll the
appeal, it is not necessary
to deal with the question of whether a
general power of attorney authorising the institution of legal
proceedings sufficient for
purposes of prosecuting an appeal.
[18]
SCI had taken issue
with the fact that the requirements of Rule 30 were not followed.
However, the nature of the improper step renders
adherence to the
time periods and process provided for in Rule 30 nugatory. I am of
the view that the Rule 30 application had been
justified and, even if
the criticism against it might have been legitimate, a court hearing
the appeal, once alerted to the non-compliance
with Rule 7(2), may
then
mero motu
proceed to deal with the issue since it relates to the question of
whether the appeal was properly before the court. The
combination of these factors led to the granting of the order already
described above.
E van der Schyff
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
I
agree
D Mahosi
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
I
agree
N Davis
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
For the applicant:
Adv. T. Ellerbeck
Instructed by:
Edeling Van Niekerk
Inc.
For the respondent:
Adv. J.G. Smit
Instructed by:
Göthe
Attorneys Inc.
Date of the
hearing:
31 January 2024
Date of judgment:
15 February 2024
[1]
Oos-Randse
Bantoesake Administrasieraad v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk en
Andere (1)
1978
(1) SA 160
(W) at 162C-D;
Eskom
v Soweto City Council
1992 (2) SA 703
(W) at 705E-F.
[2]
Corlett
Drive Estate Ltd v Boland Bank Ltd and Another
1978
(4) SA 420
(C) at 425D-E,
Aymac
CC and Another v Widgerow
2009 (6) SA 433
(W) para [6].
[3]
6
th
ed, JUTA, 6-17.
[4]
See,
amongst others,
Combrink
v Maritz
1951 (4) SA 288
(T) at 290B-291B.
[5]
1999
(4) SA 947
(SCA).
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