Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 190South Africa
Khan v S (A89/2023) [2024] ZAGPPHC 190 (15 February 2024)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Khan v S (A89/2023) [2024] ZAGPPHC 190 (15 February 2024)
Khan v S (A89/2023) [2024] ZAGPPHC 190 (15 February 2024)
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sino date 15 February 2024
FLYNOTES:
CRIMINAL – Murder –
Self-defence
–
Group
aggressively confronted appellant – Lost balance during
struggle resulting in firearm discharge – Pleading
self-defence – Court misdirected itself by finding there was
dolus directus – Undisputed bullet trajectory finding
–
Shot at deceased without aiming and was not stable on his feet –
Expert evidence was proof of no direct intent
to commit act –
Acted lawfully in believing that his life or property was in
danger – Conviction and sentence
set aside.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case
No: A89/2023
REPORTABLE: NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED:
NO
DATE:
15 FEBRUARY 2024
In
the matter between:
MUHAMAD
SAJID KHAN
Appellant
And
THE
STATE
Respondent
APPEAL
JUDGMENT
MOGALEAJ
Introduction
[1]
This
is
an
appeal
against
both
the
conviction
and
sentence.
The
appellant
was convicted
of two counts of murder (1
st
deceased being Kabelo Tshetlo Matlala and
2
nd
deceased
being Avelo Mbewu) read in terms of
Section 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997
and one count of attempted murder of Oriel
Goitseone Moopane.
[2]
The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment
in respect of the two counts of murder and six years imprisonment for
the count
of attempted murder. The court found no compelling and
substantial factors justified a lesser sentence than the prescribed
life
imprisonment.
[3]
The appeal is against both the the judgment and
orders granted by Mosopa J on 4 March 2022 and 31 May 2022. The trial
court dismissed
the application for leave to appeal against both
the
conviction
and
sentence
on
29
July
2022.
The
Appellant
petitioned
the Supreme
Court of Appeal, and on 28 September
2022,
leave to appeal was granted against conviction and sentence to the
full court of this division
[4]
It is
trite that an appeal court may only interfere where there is a
misdirection of the law and/or facts.
The
issue in this appeal is whether the trial court misdirected itself in
finding that the offence was premeditated there was an
intention to
commit the crimes
(dolus
directus).
The
essential
function
of an
appeal court is to determine whether
the
court below came to a correct conclusion
[1]
.
Grounds
of appeal
[5]
The appellant's grounds of appeal pertaining to
conviction, in essence, was that the trial court erred in rejecting
the defence
of the applicant (private defence) and further accepting
the evidence of the State despite the glaring contradictions.
Moreover the trial court failed to apply the law
applicable to private defence correctly.
The
court failed to evaluate the evidence presented by the State and
defence properly and further failed to consider the objective
expert
evidence of the ballistic expert Mr Pieterse.
Background
[6]
The appellant was a businessman and owned various
properties in Pretoria West, Atteridgeville, and Laudium. He is a
naturalized
South
African
citizen but of Pakistan origin. On the date of the incident, the
appellant was contacted and-informed that a group of people
were at
one of his properties.
Upon his arrival at
the said premises, this group identified themselves as the Concerned
Tshwane Residency Group ("CTR").
They
were represented by the deceased and wanted proof of the appeilant's
ownership of the said property in question.
They
demanded to see the Title Deeds of the property.
[7]
The
appellant
testified
that
he
had
previously
sought
the
court's
assistance
to interdict the CTR group from illegally
occupying his properties.
The deceased, in
count 1, was a member of CTR and was due to appear in the Pretoria
Magistrate's Court on 3 February 2020 for violent
and illegal
dispossession of immovable property. The appellant pleaded not guilty
to the charges, and a written plea explanation
in terms of
section
115
of 'Act 51 of 1977 was admitted into evidence.
[8]
Central
to
the
evidence
was
a
video
footage
which
recorded
the
initial
argument between the appellant and the group of
people, including the deceased. The footage depicts the altercation
between the
CTR group members and the appellant at the scene.
The recording does not however encapsulate the
altercation till the end.
State's
evidence
[9]
Oriel Goitsemang Moopane and Joseph Oliphant
testified on behalf of the State. They claimed
to
be both members
of the CRT
group.
They testified that on the day of the incident,
they were together with other people, including both deceased (in
count 1 and count
2), when they proceeded to the appellant's
property. The appellant was contacted to come to the scene.
On
his arrival, he was asked to produce proof of ownership of the
property
being the
title
deed.
He said he would
bring
it on Monday,
and they
should
meet at the police station. There was a forceful
and violent struggle between the appellant and members of the group
at the appellant's
gate. During that struggle, the appellant turned
towards Mr. Moopane and fired a shot that missed him but the bullet
hit the deceased
(in count 2), who was behind him. Mr. Moopane fled
the scene and saw the appellant walking towards the deceased
(in count 1), who was lying on the ground.
He then at the time fired two shots at the
deceased (in count 2), who was also on the ground.
[10]
Mr Oliphant testified that the appellant shot the
deceased's chest (in count 1) whilst the deceased lifted his hands
and was retreating.
[11]
During cross-examination, both witnesses testified
that the appellant was the only person who
carried
a
firearm.
Mr
Oliphant
confirmed
that
he
was
carrying
a
bottle
of cold drink and not a firearm.
Hence
the appellant's explanation that it was a holster of a gun was
incorrect.
Appellant's
case
[12]
The appellant testified that the demand from the
group to produce his title deed was aggressive. He noticed some group
members were
armed and concealed their firearms under their shirts.
He tried to close the gate of the property manually, but the group
prevented
him from closing it. A violent and forceful struggle
occurred as he was trying to close the gate.
The
appellant specifically recalled a firearm being pointed at him, then
took out his firearm.
There was an attempt
made to grab his firearm from his hand, but he managed to break free
from their grip.
During this struggle, he
was pushed away and lost his balance.
While
he stumbled in a backward motion inside the yard, he started firing
shots with his licensed firearm, a 9mm Parabellum Caliber
Block Model
19 semi-automatic Pistol, at the members
who
tried to overpower
him.
Both
deceased's
(in count 1 and count 2) death
was caused by injuries they sustained during the shooting. The
appellant denied that he acted unlawfully
as he feared for his life.
[13]
The
appellant
also
testified
that
he
was
threatened
by
this
group
and
that
they wanted to kill
him. One of them uttered:
"You do not
know how many people I have killed before."
Someone
also pointed a finger at him.
He testified
that he saw something at the back of Mr. Oliphant's T-shirt that
looked like a holster, which gave him the impression
that there was a
firearm.
He also saw a person in a green
T-shirt carrying a firearm on his waist. Based on these observations
and utterances, he
believed
that his life was in danger.
[14]
Mr. Uner Habib confirmed that one of the people in
the group wearing a green T-shirt was armed and entered the premises
with a cocked
firearm. Mr. Shoaib Rasheed recorded the video
footage
and called
the 10111 emergency
number
attempting
to seek help.
The police did not responde to his call.
[15]
Mr.
David
Stefanus
Landsberg
Pieterse,
a
ballistic
expert,
testified
the
probable position the appellant was in when both
the deceased were shot. According to him, there was an absence of
"shored exit wounds"
on the bodies of both deceased. The bullet
trajectory showed that the person was shooting without aiming and was
not stable on his
feet. The court accepted the expert's evidence.
Analysis
[16]
The
trial court made the following findings:
[2]
"However,
there is scientific evidence to prove that the accused
was
moving backward when they started
shooting,
according
to the expert evidence
by
Mr. Pieterse. Mr. Moopane
saw the
accused retreating backward, even though he could not say whether he
was upright or bending backward, but he saw the accused
retreating
backward and started firing. The bullet trajectory in the bodies of
the deceased is in line with such movement at the
time of the
shooting."
[17]
Despite
accepting the expert's finding, I find that the court misdirected
itself by finding that there was
dolus
directus,
and
the appellant's conduct was premeditated.
The
undisputed bullet trajectory finding shows that the person who was
shooting shot at the deceased without aiming and was not
stable on
his feet
This
evidence corroborates the appellant's version that he was stumbling
backward when he started shooting.
The
expert evidence is proof that there could not have been an intention
on the part of the appellant to commit the act.
The
trial court erred in its finding that the deceased was shot multiple
times on the upper part of the body; this shows that the
appellant
had
dolus
directus.
On
the facts, therefore,
there
was no
direct intention.
Dolus
directus
(direct
intention)
is a form of intention that comprises a person directing his will
towards achieving the prohibited results and performing
the
prohibited act.
[3]
The
result or act is his goal
[4]
.
[18]
It
is
evident
that
the
trial
court
accepted
the
evidence
of
the
State
as
reasonably possibly true and but at the same time
accepted uncontested ballistic evidence of Mr Pieterse.
The
trial court misdirected itself
by
not accepting the version of the appellant since
it
ws in accordance with the finding of the
ballistic expert, Mr Pieterse.
[19]
On the
finding of premeditation, it was argued that there was a
misdirection.
[5]
The
trial court found:
"He
arrived there with his pistol on the cock mode, ready to fire shots.
The explanation that his firearm is always cocked
is very suspicious,
as there are instances where
a
firearm
can mistakenly be discharged."
[20]
In
Baloyi
v
S
[6]
the
court
stated
as follows:
"Having
outlined
the
above,
it
is
essential to state that a finding of premeditation requires
inferential reasoning. The trier of facts (a presiding officer) has
to interrogate the facts of each case and adduce from them whether
the commission of the offence was premeditated or not. That
is partly
due to the legislature not having defined "planned" or
"premeditation" in the CLAA''.
[21]
In
my
view,
the
court
also
misdirected
itself
by
not
accepting
the
appellant's
explanation that his firearm is always cocked.
It
did so without supporting expert evidence. Furthermore the fact that
the appellant requested Mr. Rasheed to seek assistance of
the police
demonstrated that there was no premeditation.
[22]
It is my view that the appellant acted lawfully in
believing that his life or property
was in
danger.
The version of the appellant was
reasonably possibly true.
The appellant
admitted to shooting and killing the deceased but alleged that he
acted in private defence, since he feared for his
life and the fact
that a firearm was pointed at him. In a defence excluding
unlawfulness, the test is objective. The test to be
applied is
whether the appellant genuinely
believed
the attack was imminent
and had to act to
ward off an attack.
[23]
During oral submissions, the appellant argued that
the trial court misapplied the test for putative private defence as
well. The
appellant's submissions relied primarily on the contention
that the trial court failed to correctly articulate the test for
putative
private defence and that it conflated
the
requirements
for fault and negligence.
The appellant
argued
that the incorrect understanding of the putative private defence test
constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
[24]
The
trial court's finding on putative private defence
[7]
was:
"The
defence of putative private defence is not available to him based on
his version. He cannot say that he mistakenly thought
that his life
was in danger as he was grabbed and an attempt was made to disarm him
of his firearm by the group, and more specifically,
he saw
a
person cocking
a
firearm and pointing the firearm at him.
The accused failed to
meet the requirements available for the defence of private defence,
as he was not attacked, and his life was
not threatened."
"Both
the deceased were not armed, they were not posing
a
real threat to the appellant, and the
accused cannot say whether they were
a
part of the group that grabbed him. The
threat was imminent if the person with
a
green T-shirt and Mr. Oliphant were the
ones shot as they were posing
a
real
threat to the appellant. The trial court finds that the appellant's
version excludes the applicant's reliance upon putative
defence".
[25]
In
this regard the trial court failed to take into account the
appellant's testimony pertaining to the altercation between the
parties.
[8]
[26]
In
S
v
De
Oliveira
[9]
1993
(2)
SACR
59
(A),
"the
appellate
division
held
that
the
difference between private defence and putative private defence was
significant: A person who acted in private defence acted
lawfully,
provided his account satisfied the
requirements
laid down for such defence and did not exceed its limits. In putative
private defence it was not lawfulness, which
was an issue, but
culpability. If an accused honestly believed his or her life or
property to be in danger but objectively viewed
were not, the
defensive
steps
he
or
she
took
could
not
constitute
a
private
defence.
If,
in
those
circumstances, he or she killed someone, his or her conduct was
unlawful. His or her erroneous belief that his or her life
or
property was in danger may well exclude dolus, in which case
liability for the person's death based on intention will also be
excluded, at worst for him or her, he or she could then be convicted
of
culpable homicide".
[27]
Even if the trial court did not err in law, the contention remains
that she erred on the facts. The appellant
counsel
relied
on the case of
S
v Tuta
[10]
where
it was held that
"If
the trial court made no error of law in formulating the test for
putative private defence, then the misapplication of the
correct test
to the evidence before the trial court is not a matter that engages
our
jurisdiction.
The
written
submissions
made
on
behalf
of
the applicant
sought
to persuade us that the trial court failed to consider all the
evidence and thus failed properly to draw warranted
inferences
as
to the applicant's
subjective
state
of mind. That may or may not be so, but the failure of a trial court
to properly evaluate the evidence is an error of fact
and not one of
law."
[28]
This court is of the view that the appellant was genuine in his
belief that his life was in danger and he
had the right to protect
himself and his property. The appellant's belief that his life was in
danger was not a mistake. Hence
the issue of putative private defence
does not come into play.
[29]
The trial court placed emphasis on the evidence of state witnesses.
The appellant argued that the court was
highly critical of the
appellant's version and found that he was dishonest
without
providing reasons for the finding.
It
is trite that an accused's version cannot be rejected only because it
is improbable. It can only be rejected based on the inherent
probabilities if it can be said to be so improbable that it cannot be
reasonably possibly true.
[11]
[30]
Moreover
a
trial court is required to consider
the
totality of the evidence to determine whether
the
essential
elements
of a
crime have been
proved.
[12]
Nugent J stated in
Van
der Meyden
[13]
,
a
passage
oft-cited
with
approval
in
this court:
"The proper test
is that an accused is bound to be convicted if the evidence
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and the logical
corollary is that he must be acquitted if it is reasonably possible
that he might be innocent. The process of reasoning
appropriate to
the application of that test in any particular case will depend on
the nature of the evidence the court has before
it. What must be
borne in mind, however, is that the conclusion which is reached
(whether it be to convict or to acquit) must account
for all the
evidence. Some of the evidence might be found to be false; some of it
might be found to be unreliable; and some of
it might be found to be
only possibly false or unreliable, but none of it may simply be
ignored."
[31]
It is my view the State failed to prove beyond
reasonable
doubt that the appellant had the
intent to commit murder when believing that his life and his property
were threatened.
He testified he was
entitled to act in private defence. No evidence refutes the version
that he was acting in private defence is
found to be reasonably
possibly true.
As a result, the appellant
acted lawfully in defending himself and his property; this excludes
criminal liability.
[32]
In summary, the evidence reflects that this was a
spur-of-the-moment incident that escalated by several events that led
to the shooting
incident. The CTR had no legal authority and was not
lawfully entitled to enquire or demand that the appellant prove
ownership
of his property by providing them with the title deed,
neither
was the CTR lawfully permitted to
become aggressive and threatening when the appellant informed them,
they would receive the title
deed on Monday
at
the police station. There was a forceful
and
violent struggle
with the appellant
at his gate. Some
of the
CTR members were allegedly
armed
with a firearm and pointed at the appellant.
As he was pushed and stumbling backwards, he
discharged his firearm, genuinely believing that his life was in
danger at the hands
of the aggressive members of the group. His
belief was genuine and reasonable and lacked the intention of
unlawfulness.
[33]
In
conclusion,
the
trial
court
misdirected
itself
in
convicting
and
sentencing
the
appellant.
Under these circumstances, the
convictions of murder and attempted murder cannot be sustained.
As a result, the appeal succeeds.
The
conviction on two counts of murder and attempted murder is hereby set
aside.
Order
[34]
Consequently,
the
following order is made:
1.
The appeal is upheld.
2.
The conviction and sentence
are
set aside.
3.
The appellant
to be
released immediately.
KJ
MOGALE
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION,
PRETORIA
I
agree, and it is so ordered
JS
NYATHI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION,
PRETORIA
I
agree
H
KOOVERJIE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Electronically
submitted.
Delivered:
This Judgment was prepared and authored by the Judges whose names are
reflected and is handed down electronically by
circulation to the
parties/their legal representatives by email and uploading to the
electronic file of this matter on
Case
Lines. The date for hand-down is deemed
to be 15 February 2024
Date
of hearing: The matter was heard in an open court. The matter may be
determined accordingly.
The matter
was set down for
a
court date on 20
th
November
2024
Date
of Judgment: 15 February 2024
Appearances
For
the Appellant:
Adv.
P PISTORIUS SC
Circle
Advocates Chambers
PRETORIA
For
the Respondent:
Adv.
E V SIHLANGU
The
Director of Public Prosecutions
PRETORIA
[1]
See
Quatermark
Investments v Mkhwanazi
2014
(3) SA 96
SCA at 103A- Band
Sarrahwitz
v Maritz
2015
(4) SA 4
SA 491 CC at 505).
[2]
Volume
9 -
14
page 761
[3]
Snyman's
Criminal Law Seventh edition, updated by SV Hoctor
[4]
Ferreira
2004(2) SACR 454 (SCA) 475c-d; Humphreys
2013 (2) SACR 1
(SCA) par
12
[5]
Volume
9-14 page 762-763
[6]
(2022)
ZASCA 35
(1 April 2022) para 17
[7]
Volume
9-14 page 762
[8]
Volume
4 Of 14 page 314-315
The accused testified:
"Accused:
Then they started while I was waiting, M'Lord, they started
threatening me with the group of people; they were
saying they would
kill me. Then, M'Lord, all of the members of those groups, if I can
see them, I can recognise them, but right
now, I do not remember
their names. He informed me, and he told me you do not know how many
people I have killed before. Then
I saw the group members they were
more aggressive. Then I was thinking to myself, M'Lord, let me go
and close that gate so that
they can remain outside the yard. Then I
tried to close the gate; M'Lord, those members, all of the people,
came to me and grabbed
my hand. Then M'Lord, when I tried to close
it, the members of that group held the gate, and there was
a
struggle. Then they again, the one
wearing a green T-shirt, was sited outside, loaded the gun and
pointed at me, and the members
of the group grabbed me.
Then when I took out
the firearm, they grabbed me, all of the people, all the members who
held my right hand, and they tried to
take my firearm from me. At
that time, I was struggling to take out their hands and also the
firearm. They wanted to take my
firearm from my possession, M'Lord,
then I start firing, I start shooting.
Ms:
Killian:
In
what
position
were
you
when
you
shot, in
other
words,
were
you
up
straight
what exactly what was your position?
Accused: M'Lord, I
went to move back, but I remained standing, but my body was a little
bit back. Ms Killian: Now at the time
when you fired, can you recall
where exactly the firearm was pointing? Accused: it was in the
group; it went straight to them
Ms Killian: When you
use the word fire, what exactly did you have in mind?
Accused:
because they grabbed me, four or five people, and it was
a
struggle."
[9]
1993]
ZASCA 62
;
1993 (2) SACR 59
(A) at 63I-64B
[10]
Tuta
v S
supra
at paragraph 50.
[11]
S
v
Shackell
2001(2) SACR 185 (SCA)
[12]
S
v
Libazi
&
another
2010
(2) SACR 233
(SCA) para 17
[13]
S
v
Van der Meyden
1999
(1) SACR 447
(W) at 449I-450B
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