Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 258South Africa
Mudawo and Others v Minister of Transport and Another (011795/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 258 (26 March 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
26 March 2024
Headnotes
Summary: Administrative action – policy decision by a Minister effectively resulting in an amendment of as Statutory provision – beyond the powers of a Minister to do so – the use of the words “any person” in section 17 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (the Act) does not exclude illegal foreigners – neither the publication of an amended RAF 1 form nor the circulation of a Management Directive by the Road Accident Fund may preclude illegal foreigners from claiming compensation under the Act nor prevent such persons from lodging claims.
Judgment
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## Mudawo and Others v Minister of Transport and Another (011795/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 258 (26 March 2024)
Mudawo and Others v Minister of Transport and Another (011795/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 258 (26 March 2024)
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sino date 26 March 2024
HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 011795/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO.
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
26 MARCH 2024
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
ADAM
MUDAWO
First
Applicant
WENILE
SIMON NDLOVU
Second
Applicant
BRUCE
MTHOKOZI SIBANDA
Third Applicant
OYETUNDE
ONENIYI AREO
Fourth
Applicant
and
MINISTER
OF TRANSPORT
First
Respondent
THE
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
Second
Respondent
Summary
:
A
dministrative action – policy
decision by a Minister effectively resulting in an amendment of as
Statutory provision –
beyond the powers of a Minister to do so
– the use of the words “any person” in section 17
of the Road Accident
Fund Act 56 of 1996 (the Act) does not exclude
illegal foreigners – neither the publication of an amended RAF
1 form nor
the circulation of a Management Directive by the Road
Accident Fund may preclude illegal foreigners from claiming
compensation
under the Act nor prevent such persons from lodging
claims.
ORDER
1.
The provisions
of the substituted RAF1 claim form prescribed by Government Notice
R2235 published in Government Gazette 46661 dated
4 July 2022 issued
by the Minister of Transport (first respondent) in terms of
section
26
of the
Road Accident Fund Act, 56 of 1996
, is reviewed and set
aside to the extent that both
part 6.1
(substantial compliance injury
claims) and
part 12.1
(substantial compliance death claims) thereof
require that, if a claimant is a foreigner, proof of identity must be
accompanied
by documentary proof that the claimant was legally in
South Africa at the time of the accident.
2.
The provisions
of the RAF Management Directive dated 21 June 2022 titled Critical
Validations to Confirm the Identity of South African
Citizens and
Claims Lodged by Foreigners, is reviewed and set aside to the extent
that:
2.1
In respect of
foreign claimants, it requires that proof of identity must be
accompanied by documentary proof that the claimant was
legally in
South African at the time of the accident;
2.2
In respect of
foreign claimants, they are required to provide copies of their
passports with an entry stamp and where they have
left South Africa,
the passport must have an exit stamp and should the foreign claimant
still be in the country, that proof of
an approved visa must be
submitted before the RAF is prepared to register such claimants’
claims;
2.3
It is required
that copies of the passports of foreign claimants may only be
certified by the South African Police Service.
3.
The first and
second respondents are jointly and severally ordered to pay the
applicants’ costs of the application, including
the costs of
two counsel and senior counsel, where utilized, the one paying the
other to be absolved.
JUDGMENT
This
matter has been heard in open court and is otherwise disposed of in
terms of the Directives of the Judge President of this
Division. The
judgment and order are accordingly published and distributed
electronically.
DAVIS,
J (Mnyovu AJ and Kok AJ concurring)
Introduction
[1]
The
Road Traffic Management Corporation has reported in public
documents
[1]
that, during the
year in which this application had been launched 12 436 people have
died in road traffic accidents in South Africa.
In addition to
this tragic statistic, many more thousands of people are annually
injured in road traffic accidents on South African
roads. These
accidents don’t discriminate in respect of the victims thereof
between race, gender, age, income or, importantly
for this matter,
between illegal foreigners and citizens or persons legally in the
country.
[2]
The
Road Accident Fund (the RAF) has an obligation in terms of
section
17(1)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act
[2
]
to “…
compensate
any person (the third party) for any loss or damage which the third
party has suffered as a result of any bodily injury
to himself or
herself or the death of or any bodily injury to any other person,
caused by or arising from the driving of a motor
vehicle by any
person at any place within the Republic …
”.
[3]
Until recently
“any person” was treated and interpreted by the RAF to
include illegal foreigners injured or killed in
road accidents which
took place in South Africa.
[4]
The
CEO of the RAF, Mr Collins Letsoalo, contended in papers before us
that the Minister of Transport (who is cited as the first
respondent
in this matter, hereafter “the Minister”) has in July
2022 taken a policy decision to exclude illegal foreigners
from the
benefit of claiming damages against the RAF. The Minister
sought to achieve this by publishing a new RAF 1 form
[3]
inter alia dealing with new requirements of nationality and legal
entry into South Africa.
[5]
The
publication followed a Management Directive of the RAF dated 21 June
2022 dealing with “
Critical
Validations to Confirm the Identity of South African Citizens and
Claims Lodged by Foreigners
”.
[6]
Both
the new RAF 1 form (and the strict requirement of full compliance
therewith) and the Management Directive have been described
by the
CEO to be Constitutionally valid on the following basis: “
The
management directive and the RAF 1 form do not discriminate against
any person on any of the prohibited grounds. These
two
instruments only require foreign claimants to produce proof that they
were lawfully in the Republic when their claims arose.
This is
clearly intended to ensure that illegal foreigners do not benefit
from the social benefit scheme administered by the Fund
which was
designed and is implemented for the benefit of South African
citizens, permanent residents and those who are lawfully
in the
Republic
”.
[4]
[7]
The applicants
seek to have the requirements of the published new RAF 1 form
(pertaining to foreigners) and the management directive
reviewed and
set aside on the basis that the new requirements are unconstitutional
and
ultra
vires
.
[8]
Whilst the
general validity and legality of the Minister’s publication
form the subject matter of an independent review under
case no
046038/2022, which was heard by another full court of this Division
on 26 – 28 February 2024 (that is a week prior
to the hearing
of this matter), the current matter is limited to the issue of claims
by illegal foreigners.
The
parties
[9]
The first
applicant is a foreign national who had been issued an asylum seeker
permit in terms of
section 22
of the
Refugees Act, 130 of 1998
on 20
August 2020. This entitled him to work and study in the
Republic. He was involved in a motor vehicle accident
on 26
January 2022 when an oncoming overtaking vehicle collided head-on
with the scooter he was driving. The first
applicant
sustained severe injuries, including multiple facial fractures, a
left orbital fracture, a mandible fracture, a de-gloving
injury to
his nose and a skull base fracture. His asylum seeker permit
had lapsed on 20 February 2021 and because he now
has no valid
passport, stamped to affirm his entry into South Africa nor a valid
asylum seeker permit, he cannot satisfy the requirements
of the new
RAF 1 form nor would the RAF entertain any claim by him in terms of
the Act.
[10]
The second applicant sustained
injuries whilst being run over by a motor vehicle on 23 November
2021. Pursuant to this, the
second applicant had lodged a claim
with the RAF on 15 June 2022 (that is before the date of the
Management Directive and the Minister’s
publication of the new
RAF 1 form). Although the RAF had assigned a reference number
to the second applicant’s claim
(No 19891223 PEF), it now
refuses to register his claim due to the fact that he is a foreign
national without a passport stamped
with his entry into South Africa.
[11]
The third
applicant was also a pedestrian who was injured in a motor vehicle
accident, this time on 8 September 2021. The
incident had been
reported to the Moffatview SAPS, pursuant to which a claim had been
lodged with the RAF on 30 August 2023.
Despite his claim having
been assigned a reference number (083 02023 495000 RT), the RAF
refuses to register his claim. The
reasons for this was that
applicant is a foreign national in possession of a valid passport but
with no stamped proof of entry
into South Africa or a valid visa.
[12]
The position
of the fourth applicant is slightly different from the other
applicants in that, although he is similarly a foreign
national who
had sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident in the Republic
(on 15 March 2020), he had already obtained judgment
in case no
9130/21 in this Division against the RAF for payment of compensation
for the injuries sustained and loss of earnings
suffered by him.
The date of the judgment is 24 July 2023 and the amount of it is
R2 612 934.40. No
rescission application is
pending against this judgment but the RAF has to date failed or
refused to pay it. The fourth applicant
claims that the reason
for this refusal is the fact that although his matter pre-dates the
management directive and the Minister’s
publication, payment is
held back because he is a foreign national with only a passport (and
no visa). The RAF has not denied
this accusation nor has it
furnished Adv Tsatsawane SC, who appeared for the RAF in this matter,
with any other reasons for its
refusal to satisfy the court order in
question.
[13]
The second,
third and fourth applicants were all granted leave to intervene in
this matter by various judges prior to the matter
being enrolled
before this full court.
[14]
The first
respondent is the Minister. He has withdrawn his initial notice
of intention to oppose and has since delivered a
notice to abide.
The Minister has also declined to deliver an affidavit, nor has he
furnished reasons for the policy decision
ascribed to him and neither
did the record filed in terms of Rule 53 contain any details of such
policy decision. The only
indication of administrative action
by the Minister is contained as follows in the publication of 4 July
2022 itself: “
The
Minister of Transport, in terms of section 26 of the Road Accident
Fund Act 1996 (Act No 56 of 1996) herewith prescribed the
RAF Form 1
(sic) in the Schedule. (Signed) Mr F A Mbalula. Minister of
Transport 30/06/2022
”.
The
new RAF 1 form
[15]
The “important
information” prescribed as an introduction to the RAF 1 form
inter alia warns claimants that “
your
attention is drawn to the provisions of section 24(4)(a) that any
form that is not completed in its full particulars shall
not be
acceptable as a claim under the Act
”.
Claimants are then warned of the consequences of this as
follows: “
Consequently,
your submitted form would not interrupt prescription as provided for
in section 23 of the Act
”.
[16]
The portions
of the form objected to by the applicants are the requirements that a
foreign national must provide proof by way of
annexures in the form
of a passport with stamped entry stamps and a visa, indicating that
the foreigner was legally in South Africa
at the time of the
accident.
The
Management Directive
[17]
The Management
Directive targeted in this application is that of the RAF dated 21
June 2022. It was issued by the RAF’s
Acting Chief
Operations Officer.
[18]
The heading of
the Management Directive reads “
Critical
Validations to Confirm the Identity of South African Citizen and
Claims Lodged by Foreigners
”.
After dealing with the procedures regarding claims by South African
citizens, the Management Directive prescribes
the following regarding
claimants who are foreign nationals: “
In
instances where the claimant or injured is a foreigner, proof of
identity must be accompanied by documentary proof that the claimant
was legally in South African at the time of the accident.
A copy of the foreign claimant’s passport showing the
entry
stamp and/or exit stamp must be submitted. Where the passport
does not have any stamp, the RAF will not be lodging
such a claim.
Where the passport does not have an exit stamp, proof that the
claimant is still in the country must be produced.
In this
instance the passport copy indicating approved Visa must be
submitted. Copies of the passport must be certified by
the
SAPS
”.
[19]
Apart from the
evidentiary requirements stipulated by the Management Directive and
the new RAF 1 form, some of which may, even for
legitimate reasons,
be difficult or impossible to comply with, the outcome sought to be
achieved, has expressly been stated by
the RAF’s CEO, was to
exclude illegal foreigners from claiming compensation in terms of the
Act for injuries sustained and
damages suffered, of whatever nature,
due to accidents which had occurred inside South Africa.
The
applicants’ respective cases
[20]
The first and
second applicants’ grounds of attack and claims for the
reviewing and setting aside of the Minister’s
decision and the
publication of the new RAF 1 form as well as the Management Directive
were that these decisions offend various
Constitutional rights which
the applicants claim even illegal foreigners are entitled to.
The rights claimed vary from rights
to equality, dignity, health care
and social security, just administrative action and access to courts.
[21]
The
assertion of these Constitutional rights were hotly contested and
debated, not only in the papers but also in argument before
the
court, but the direct and more frontal attack was based on the
ultra
vires
principle
[5]
. This
has been put as follows in the founding affidavit: “
Neither
the [RAF] nor the [Minister] has the authority to make laws and
regulations which offend the main Act and exclude persons
otherwise
entitled to claim from its ambit. This is trite law and
principles encapsulated in the doctrine of legality and
the Rule of
Law
”.
Later on in the founding affidavit the conduct of the Minister and
the RAF respectively are described as constituting
“
a
remarkable change in the law … not envisaged by the Act
”.
[22]
The third
applicant made common cause with the first two applicants, but was
more concerned about the impossibility to comply with
certain of the
prescripts. So, for example, would a person with a valid asylum
seekers permit (entitling such a person to
remain in South Africa
pending determination of his or her status) but not being in
possession of a passport, be excluded from
submitting a claim.
The way in which the form has been designed and the manner in which
the wording of the Management Directive
has been couched, would
therefore in some instances even exclude persons who are legally in
the country. Examples of other
permutations of travel
documentation have also been cited.
[23]
The fourth
applicant’s case was that, despite being armed with a court
order, payment of that order is being withheld or refused
simply
because he is an illegal foreigner, even though the new RAF 1 form
and the Management Directive were not even in force when
his claim
had been lodged.
The
ultra vires
review
[24]
Section
6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA has statutorily concretised the basis of judicial
review under this rubric as follows: “
A
court … has the power to judicially review an administrative
action if … the administrator who took it …
was not
authorised to do so by the empowering provision …
”.
[25]
The
exercise of administrative action, including the exercise of public
power must “
happen
within the bounds set by the legal framework …
”
[6]
,
in this case, the Act.
[26]
The
ultra
vires
doctrine
“…
demands,
of every exercise of public power, a consistent compliance with the
bounds set for the exercise of that power as provided
for by the
applicable law and the Constitution
”.
[7]
[27]
In
Fedsure
[8]
,
the Constitutional Court put it as follows: “
It
seems central to the concept of our Constitutional order that the
Legislature and the Executive in every sphere are constrained
by the
principle that they may exercise no power and perform no function
beyond that conferred upon them by law
”.
[28]
The
respondents accepted that their conduct was based on a (new)
interpretation of the Act (without any amendment thereto).
In
addition the RAF’s CEO claimed that this interpretation was
enforceable due to it constituting “a policy decision”
by
the Minister. If their interpretation is therefore incorrect,
the decisions could not have been taken because to allow
them to
stand, would in effect amount to an amendment of the Act or a
limitation thereof, something neither the Minister nor the
CEO was
empowered to do. That power resides in the Legislature.
[29]
The
interpretation of a provision of a statute (in this case section
17(1) of the Act, referred to in paragraph [2] above) comprises
of “…
a
unitary endeavour requiring the consideration of text, context and
purpose
”.
[9]
[30]
The
Constitutional Court has determined that the principles of statutory
interpretation start with the words used in the text, but
that these
are three interrelated “riders” to “giving”
the words used their ordinary grammatical meaning
namely:
“
(a)
that statutory provisions should always be interpreted purposively;
(b)
the relevant statutory provisions must be properly contextualized;
and
(c)
all statutes must be construed consistently with the Constitution,
that is, where
reasonably possible, legislative provisions ought to
be interpreted to preserve their constitutional validity. This
proviso
to the general principle is closely related to the purposive
approach referred to in (a)
”
.
[31]
Starting
with the text, the ordinary meaning of the words “any person”
in the context of the one of the Acts predecessors
[10]
has been determined as being a phrase with an “obviously wide
meaning”.
[11]
The
wide meaning is clearly denoted by the grammatical interpretation of
the word “any”.
[32]
Turning
to context and purpose, the “primary concern” of the Act,
has recently been found by the Supreme Court of Appeal
“…
to
give the greatest possible protection to persons who have suffered
loss through negligence or through unlawful acts on the part
of the
driver of a motor vehicle. For this reason the provisions of
the Act must be interpreted as extensively as possible
in favour of
third parties to afford them the widest possible protection
”.
[12]
[33]
Although
the Act has been described as social legislation, that does not
equate to damages claims being “social benefits”
in the
same manner as say, social grants or unemployment benefits are.
Social benefits are those the Government dispenses
at its discretion
while the social legislative intention of the Act is to protect
drivers from delictual claims they could not
otherwise satisfy and to
ensure that those who have suffered delictual damages are not,
through the impecunity of the wrongdoer,
made to suffer as a
consequence.
[13]
[34]
Similarly,
where the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Busuku
referred to the exclusion of certain claims as being “illegal”,
it referred to fraudulent claims, that is where claims
are instituted
where there have been no accidents or actual injuries. It did not
disqualify illegal foreigners from otherwise valid
claims.
[35]
I am of the
respectful view that this court is bound by the Supreme Court of
Appeal’s interpretation of the wide application
of the Act,
which should inform the interpretation of the words “any
person” insofar as it relates to illegal foreigners.
[36]
Moreover,
that wide interpretation of the purpose of the Act, has been
confirmed by the Constitutional Court in
Coughlan
NO v RAF.
[14]
[37]
So, if the
text of the Act (using the words “any person”) and the
purpose of the Act (to provide the widest possible
protection to
victims of vehicle accidents) are wide enough to include any
claimant, whether he is legally in South Africa or not,
is there any
other context which would lead to a narrower interpretation?
[38]
The
RAF relied on
Chola
v Road Accident Fund
,
[15]
a judgment of the Johannesburg Court of this Division, in support of
its argument that the Minister and the RAF were entitled to
interpret
the Act as excluding illegal foreigners from claiming against the RAF
and that they were therefore entitled to take the
administrative
actions which they did. In that matter Baqwa J found as
follows: “
It
is true and it is trite that the Road Accident Fund will be liable to
compensate any person who is a victim of a motor vehicle
accident
within the Republic of South Africa in terms of the … Act, but
I must state at the very beginning of this brief
judgment that I
accept as submitted by Ms Aamir Singh for the defendant, that “any
person” does not include an illegal
foreigner ….
The requirement to prove legality of entry into the Republic of South
Africa is provided for in terms
of Regulation 7(1) of the Road
Accident Fund Regulations 2008, and in that sense, it is a
requirement which has been factored into
the so-called RAF 1 in terms
of the Act and it came into effect on 1 June 2022. Its
provisions cannot therefore be ignored
by this court ….
Counsel for the defendant submits, as a matter of law, … the
plaintiff is duty bound
to prove that he entered the country legally
and that “any person” in the Act does not include an
illegal foreigner.
I am inclined, as already alluded to, to
accept the correctness of that submission
”.
[39]
I
have quoted the relevant parts of my learned brother’s judgment
rather extensively to illustrate how he got to his conclusion.
It matters not that Baqwa J’s judgment was in respect of a
prior RAF 1 form devised by the RAF and which has since been set
aside as having been published
ultra
vires
,
as the power to promulgate regulations resides with the Minister,
[16]
the current RAF 1 form is in pari materia with the RAF’s
previous attempts at amending the form, the only difference is that
the amendments have this time round been published by the Minister.
[40]
It is clear
however, that Baqwa J merely accepted the arguments of the RAF and
based his judgment on the RAF 1 requirements.
This is so
because there was not before him, as before us, a direct attack on
the decision to exclude illegal foreigners
in
toto
from the operation of the Act. Baqwa J was faced with an
application for postponement, which he granted. The comments
by
Baqwa J are therefore obiter in relation to the issues we have to
decide and even if those comments were not obiter, we respectfully
find that they were clearly wrong.
[41]
The fact that
the issues relating to claims by illegal foreigners would still have
to be decided separately from the issue of a
postponement which
served before Baqwa J, was dearly foreseen by him as is apparent from
the following passage of his judgment:
“
I
have given serious consideration to the possibility of ordering a
separation of issues and making an order in terms of section
17(4),
for the issuing of a certificate by the defendant and an order for
general damages separate from the loss of earnings but
as defendant’s
counsel submits, the Mudawo case [the present application] is about
“capacity to claim by a plaintiff”.
The fact of the
matter therefore is, it is either he has that capacity or
alternatively he does not have. This, to use a
colloquial
phrase, is the postponement granted the million dollar question which
has to be answered by the ape court
”.
It was for that reason that Baqwa J granted a postponement of the
matter before him. For the RAF to rely on the judgment
of Baqwa J as
being determinative of the issues is therefore incorrect.
[42]
There
are two further indications that the law has not changed and that the
Act has always been interpreted to include claims of
illegal
foreigners. The first such indication is that the RAF itself
has, since the promulgation of the Act interpreted the
Act as being
inclusive of such claimants and it has over the course of more than
25 years paid out such claims without demur
[17]
.
The second is that our courts have also upheld claims of illegal
foreigners against the RAF without the RAF appealing or
applying for
rescission of such orders
[18]
,
despite even having been represented. Admittedly in these cases
the issues mostly related to the absence of work permits
and the
arguments centered around the validity of a claim for a loss of an
illegal income, but that factual circumstance came about
as a result
of the claimants’ status as illegal foreigners.
[43]
In
RAF
v Sheriff of the High Court, Pretoria and Macamo
[19]
,
a matter which only came before court some four months ago, the facts
were as follows: the plaintiff (
Macamo
)
was a foreign national who had instituted action in 2019 against the
RAF for damages suffered pursuant to a motor vehicle accident
which
had occurred in the Republic. Due to litigation delinquency on
the part of the RAF, its defence had been struck out
on 4 October
2021. On 21 July 2022 the RAF made an offer to
Macamo
which
was accepted by him. On 26 August 2022 the parties to that
action submitted joint submissions on the settlement offer
and the
acceptance thereof, in accordance with this Division’s Practice
Directives. On 18 April 2023 the accepted settlement
offer was
made an order of court. Due to non-payment of the order, it was
included in a list of unfulfilled execution orders
which has led to a
proposed sale in execution on 7 November 2023. The RAF applied
to have the sale stayed, claiming that
the order had erroneously been
granted. The RAF claimed that since there had not been
compliance with the Management Directive
of 21 June 2022, no offer of
settlement should have been made alternatively, insofar as it had
been made, it had been done without
authority. Twala J referred
to the issue of the RAF’s attempted exclusion of illegal
foreigners with reliance on Section
4(1)(a) of the Act appearing to
be in breach of the Constitution’s equality provisions but in
the end found that the Management
Directive did not have such
retrospective effect that it invalidated the authority to settle.
The application for a stay
was refused. Although both
parties relied on different parts of this judgment, it was not
conclusive of the issue to be determined
in this matter.
[44]
The
reference to Section 4(1)(a) of the Act briefly needs attention.
This is the section which empowers the RAF to issue directives
dealing with the internal administration of the RAF and the manner in
which claims “shall be administered”. These
directives do no acquire the force of law and cannot impermissibly
conflict with the provisions of the Act.
[20]
[45]
In
a last-ditch attempt, the RAF argued that, in allowing illegal
foreigners to claim from the RAF in terms of the Act, would offend
against the provisions prohibiting the “aiding and abetting”
of illegal foreigners.
[21]
In my view the entertainment of the enforcement of a delictual claim
provided for in the Act cannot be interpreted
as “aiding”
or “abetting” an illegal foreigner to contravene either
the Immigration Act or the
Refugees Act.
[22
]
The RAF is obliged to compensate victims of motor vehicle accidents
as provided for in section 17 of the Act and the discharge
of such
obligations cannot be interpreted to constitute “aiding”
and “abetting”. The proposition
that it would do
so, needs only to be stated to illustrate its absurdity.
Summation
and conclusion
[46]
We find
nothing in the text of the Act, the context of the RAF scheme as a
whole and the purpose of the Act which leads us to conclude
that the
words “any person” in section 17 of the Act should be
restrictively interpreted so as to exclude illegal foreigners.
[47]
We find that
the administrative actions of the RAF in prescribing the Management
Directive of 21 June 2022 and that of the Minister
in publishing the
new RAF 1 form on 4 July 2022, insofar as those actions, in the way
they have been formulated and are to be enforced
to exclude claims by
illegal foreigners, offend against the provisions of section 17 of
the Act.
[48]
Neither the
Minister, nor the RAF, are in law permitted, either by way of a
“policy decision” or by way of a novel interpretation
of
the Act, to amend or limit the ambit of the Act. To do so would be
beyond their powers.
[49]
The impugned
decisions therefore fall foul of section 6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA and they
are to be reviewed and set aside to the extent
necessary.
[50]
Having reached
the above conclusions, we find it unnecessary to deal with the
Constitutionality arguments relating to the attempted
exclusion of
illegal foreigners as claimants against the RAF.
Costs
[51]
We find no
cogent reasons to depart from the customary rule that costs should
follow the event. Having regard to the complexity
of the matter
and the public interests involved, we are of the view that the
employment of multiple and senior counsel was justified.
Having
regard to the absence of an explanation as to why the fourth
applicant has not been paid and the failure to deal with his
accusations that non-payment was an
ex-post
facto
attempt at making the exclusion of illegal foreigners also applicable
to him, despite an order of this court, we find, in the exercise
of
our discretion, that he should not be excluded from the order for
costs.
Order
The
following orders are made:
1.
The provisions
of the substituted RAF1 claim form prescribed by Government Notice
R2235 published in Government Gazette 46661 dated
4 July 2022 issued
by the Minister of Transport (first respondent) in terms of
section
26
of the
Road Accident Fund Act, 56 of 1996
, is reviewed and set
aside to the extent that both
part 6.1
(substantial compliance injury
claims) and
part 12.1
(substantial compliance death claims) thereof
require that, if a claimant is a foreigner, proof of identity must be
accompanied
by documentary proof that the claimant was legally in
South Africa at the time of the accident.
2.
The provisions
of the RAF Management Directive dated 21 June 2022 titled Critical
Validations to Confirm the Identity of South African
Citizens and
Claims Lodged by Foreigners, is reviewed and set aside to the extent
that:
2.1
In respect of
foreign claimants, it requires that proof of identity must be
accompanied by documentary proof that the claimant was
legally in
South African at the time of the accident;
2.2
In respect of
foreign claimants, they are required to provide copies of their
passports with an entry stamp and where they have
left South Africa,
the passport must have an exit stamp and should the foreign claimant
still be in the country, that proof of
an approved visa must be
submitted before the RAF is prepared to register such claimants’
claims;
2.3
It is required
that copies of the passports of foreign claimants may only be
certified by the South African Police Service.
3.
The first and
second respondents are jointly and severally ordered to pay the
applicants’ costs of the application, including
the costs of
two counsel and senior counsel, where utilized, the one paying the
other to be absolved.
N DAVIS
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
I agree
B
F
MNYOVU
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
I agree
A KOK
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Date
of Hearing: 5 March 2024
Judgment
delivered: 26 March 2024
APPEARANCES:
For the First
Applicant:
Adv B P Geach SC
together with
Adv R Hawman
Attorney for the
First Applicant:
Roets & van
Rensburg Inc., Pretoria
For the Second
Applicant:
Adv F H H Kehrhahn
together with
Adv S
Cliff
Attorney for the
Second Applicant:
Mduzulwana
Attorneys Inc.,
Pretoria
For the Third
Applicant:
Adv M Snyman SC
together with
Adv F
H H Kehrhahn
Attorney for the
Third Applicant:
KWP Attorneys,
Randburg
For the Fourth
Applicant:
Adv P van der Schyf
Attorney for the
Fourth Applicant:
Slabbert &
Slabbert Attorneys,
Pretoria
For the First
Respondent:
No appearances.
For the Second
Respondent:
Adv K Tsatsawane SC
together with Adv C Rip
Attorney for the
Second Respondent:
Malatji & Co
Attorneys, Sandton
c/o Ditsela Inc.,
Pretoria
[1]
aa.co.za/road-fatality-numbers-are-a
continuing-national-crisis/
and https://www.rtmc.co.za>traffic
reports
[2]
56 of 1996 (the Act).
[3]
Published by way of R 2255 in Government Gazette 46661 of 4 July
2022.
[4]
Second respondents Heads of Argument par 3.9 and par 2.12 of the
CEO’s answering affidavit.
[5]
The principle that a functionary cannot exercise more power that
afforded to him or her by the enabling statute. To do
so,
would be to act beyond the scope of one’s powers.
[6]
Minister
of Finance v Afribusiness NPC
2022 (4) SA 362
(CC) at par [40] (
Afribusiness
).
[7]
Afribusiness
(above) at par [39].
[8]
Fedsure
Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan
Council
[1998] ZACC 17
;
1999 (1) SA 374
(CC) at par
[58]
.
[9]
Betterbridge
(Pty) Ltd v Masilo & Others
NNO
2015 (2) SA 396
(GNP) at par [8], referring to
Natal
Joint Municipality Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).
[10]
The Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 56 of 1972.
[11]
Stegen
& Others v Shield Insurance Co Ltd
1976 (2) SA 175
(N) at 177B - C
[12]
Road
Accident Fund v Busuku
2023 (4) SA 507
(SCA) at par [6] (
Busuku
).
[13]
See for example
Monyamane,
Social Security
“benefits” and the collateral source rule, De Jure
Pretoria Vol 49 2016 in which article the difference between damages
and social benefits (such as child care grants and foster care
grants) feature.
[14]
2015
(4) SA 1
(CC) at par [59] with reference also to
Mvumvu
& Others v Minister of Transport and Another
2011 (2) SA 473
(CC) and
Engelbrecht
v RAF
2007 (6) SA 96 (CC).
[15]
4182/2019
(Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg) 9 May 2023.
[16]
Mautla
& Others v RAF
(29459/2021) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1843 (6November 2023) (
Mautla
)
[17]
This conduct constitutes
subsecuta
observatio
(subsequent observance of a provision in a certain way) which has
traditionally been regarded as of assistance in interpreting
legislation: L. C. Steyn, Die Uitleg van Wette, 5
th
Ed at par 157.
[18]
Rumbidza
v RAF
(83879/2014) [2015] ZAGPPHC 1071 (2 September 2015) and
Lesoana
v RAF
(1135/2011)
[2013] ZAFSHC 39
(7 March 2013).
[19]
(0114226/2023) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1336 (20 November 2023).
[20]
Mautla
(above) at paras [47], [57] and [69].
[21]
Section 42(1)(a)(ix) of the Immigration Act, 13 of 2002 (the
Immigration Act).
[22
]
130 of 1998.
sino noindex
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