Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 317South Africa
PN v S (A192/2023) [2024] ZAGPPHC 317 (28 March 2024)
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2024
>>
[2024] ZAGPPHC 317
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## PN v S (A192/2023) [2024] ZAGPPHC 317 (28 March 2024)
PN v S (A192/2023) [2024] ZAGPPHC 317 (28 March 2024)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2024_317.html
sino date 28 March 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA)
Case
No:
A192/2023
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED
DATE:
28 MARCH 2024
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
P
N
Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
This
judgment is prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected as such, and is handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties / their legal representatives by email
and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter
on
CaseLines. The date for handing down is deemed to be 28 March
2024.
JUDGMENT
RETIEF
J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This appeal is brought by way of the
appellant’s automatic right of appeal as against sentence only.
The sentence was handed
down in the Reginal Court, Pretoria on the
16
th
August 2022 [Court
a quo
].
The Court
a quo
found the appellant guilty of 5 (five) counts of rape and acquitted
him on the 6
th
count in respect of the charge of sexual assault in April 2016.
[2]
Counts 1 and 2 attracted
the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment in terms of Part
1 of Schedule 2 read with section
51(1) of Act 105 of 1997 as amended
[the Act] in that the appellant raped the complainant more than once
when, at the time, she
was a minor and under the age of 16 years. The
Court
a quo
sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment in respect of both
counts 1 and 2. In respect of counts 3 to 5 the appellant was
sentenced to 10 (ten) years imprisonment for each count. In addition,
the appellant was declared unfit to work with children in
terms of
the section 120 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 [Children’s
Act], his name was to be entered into the register
of sexual
offenders in terms of section 50(1)(a)(i) of Act 32 of 2007 and he
was declared unfit to possess a firearm in terms of
section 103(1)
of
the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000
.
[3]
The thrust of this appeal relates to the
enquiry whether life imprisonment was indeed an appropriate sentence
in respect of counts
1 and 2. Th appellant’s argument was
advanced raising two issues, namely, the Court
a
quo
’s failure to deviate from the
prescribed minimum sentence of life due to its failure to find
compelling and substantial circumstances
and that, the sentence of
life imprisonment was shockingly
inappropriate in the circumstances.
[4]
In dealing with the
first issue, the Court a
quo’s
failure to deviate from
the
prescribed minimum sentence,
the appellant in noting his appeal relied on the
Court
a quo
’s
failure to cumulatively find that his age, his scholastic
qualifications, and the time he spent in custody as constituting
substantial and compelling circumstances to justify a deviation from
the prescribed minimum sentence [deviation enquiry].
[5]
In
dealing with the second issue, the Court
a
quo’s
failure to hand down an appropriate sentence, the appellant stated
that the Court
a
quo
incorrectly imposed life sentences in respect of count 1 and 2 as a
life sentence was only reserved for more serious and violent
rape
incidents. According to the appellant, the Court
a
quo
,
under-emphasizing
his personal circumstances and over-emphasized the seriousness of the
offence. In consequence the glaring disproportion
which, itself, was
argued to constitute a substantial and compelling circumstance
justifying a deviation
[1]
[seriousness
enquiry].
[6]
This Court in dealing
with the two issues finds it constructive to first entertain the
seriousness enquiry in that, should this
Court find that the Court
a
quo
misdirected itself and failed to strike a balance, it may be
dispositive of the remaining deviation enquiry on appeal. To begin
with, the material facts in support of the arguments which were
before the Court
a
quo
,
require scrutiny.
MATERIAL
FACTS
[7]
The appellant is a
father of three daughters, the complainant is the oldest of the three
daughters. The complaint was 22 (twenty-two)
years old when she
testified in camera. She testified that from the age of 15 (fifteen)
years old her father repeatedly raped her.
These sexual offences
occurred in the family home and at times, in her own bedroom and
always whilst her mother was absent. The
years in which these sexual
offenses occurred were 2014, 2016 to 2017.
[8]
In 2014 the appellant
raped the 15-year-old complainant twice by inserting his finger into
her vagina without her consent. According
to her testimony the
complainant in that same year, 2014, and because of the repeated rape
incidents attempted to commit suicide
by slitting her wrists. These
facts are repeated in respect of count 1 and count 2.
[9]
The appellant being
undeterred raped the complainant again. In fact, several times
between 2016 and 2017. The appellant was found
guilty of repeatedly
raping the complainant yet again, again and again, twice in 2016 and
once in 2017. The complaint again testified
that she attempted to
commit suicide twice between 2015 and 2016, again, in the same manner
as in 2014. These facts are repeated
for in respect of counts 3,4 and
5.
[10]
The missing link in
the chronological chain of events is the year 2015. In 2015, the
complainant testified that the appellant did
not reside with them at
home as her late mother had chased the appellant away due to
matrimonial issues. During that time, the
complainant did not have
physical contact with the appellant and no incidents of rape were
complained of. Unfortunately, on or
about the 16 March 2016 the
appellant returned to the common family home and the sexual
transgressions commenced soon thereafter,
as early as April 2016.
[11]
The first sexual
offense committed by the appellant after his return in April 2016,
was different from the previous two incidents
in 2014. The appellant
during the first incident in early April 2016 was accompanied by
physical threats of throttling and instead
of using his finger to
commit the acts of rape, the appellant inserted his penis, after
which he withdrew and ejaculated on his
daughter’s bedroom
floor.
[12]
The complainant
testified that the frequency of the incidents of rape from April 2016
escalated. She testified that the appellant
would rape her in the
early mornings before she had to go to school.
[13]
The last sexual
offence, perpetrated by the appellant for which he was found guilty
was on the15 January 2017. The evidence demonstrates
that the
appellant gained confidence now raping the complainant, not in
private but, whilst she and her two younger sisters were
sleeping in
their mother’s bedroom. This occurred whilst their mother was
away again and at a time, when amidst domestic
violence allegations,
the appellant and his late wife were not sharing the same bed nor
bedroom.
[14]
Fortunately for the
complainant her younger sister aged 14 years at the time [sister],
woke up during the committal of the offence
and was able to testify
about what she had seen. The sister’s waking up triggered
several important reactions. The first
reaction was that the
appellant, now aware that the sister may have awaken up stopped the
sexual act and rather resorted to following
the complainant into the
bathroom. According to the evidence, the second reaction, the
appellant followed her into the bathroom
so that he could control the
complainant’s actions, namely her silence. This was achieved
both verbally and by his actions.
The complainant testified that the
appellant stood in the bathroom watching her. The complainant was
denied privacy by appellant,
her own father, in a particular moment
when she intended and in fact began to wash herself after the sexual
perpetration. The appellant
who, at that moment must have been aware
of the complainant’s lack of privacy, deemed it appropriate to
command that the
complainant remain silent.
[15]
Notwithstanding and,
despite the appellant’s attempts to control the complainant’s
actions, he was unable to control
that of an eyewitness. It was the
complainant’s sister who would later tell her late mother of
the event she witnessed. The
sister testified that she became aware
of what she had witnessed after a lesson on ‘rape of children
by their fathers’
during a Life Orientation lesson at school.
Armed with this knowledge she testified that she was able to put the
pieces together
and, on the 17 January 2018, told her mother.
[16]
On 18 January 2018,
the appellant left the family home abandoning his daughters and with
it, failed to exercise any parental rights
and responsibilities as
provided for in the Children’s Act in respect of his three
daughters, this included the payment of
any further maintenance. The
trigger event occurred because he was confronted by his late wife
about the sexual offences perpetrated
against the complainant. The
South African Police were called to assist.
[17]
The appellant left
the common home without gathering his personal belongings, eventually
relocating to Durban where he was
finally
arrested
.
[18]
Conversely the
complainant, the appellant’s victim, the one who was subjected
to live in fear, anguish, and horror by the
hands of her father could
not simply just leave and relocate and start a new life, she was a
child. She was a young girl trapped
in untenable circumstances. She
testified acting out in anger against the appellant and as already
dealt with, attempt to take
her life three times. She did, however,
receive counselling for her trauma at the Steve Biko hospital in 2017
and 2018 after the
appellant left the home. No hospital records were
made available however a probation officer, Ms T Mbatha, authored a
report in
which she reports the complainant presents with unresolved
trauma issues which have had a profound impact on her psychological
distress, her decrease in perceived security and her increased
feelings of personal vulnerability. This is because a sexual offence
or as in this case sexual offenses occurred within a trust parental
relationship and after being reported, it results in the termination
of the family unit.
[19]
The complainant’s
mother died in July 2021.
THE
SERIOUSNESS ENQUIRY: WAS THE RAPE SERIOUS ENOUGH
?
[20]
At
first blush to even consider the necessity to determine the
seriousness enquiry itself appears inappropriate. This is simply
because the crimes involve the repeated incestuous rape of a daughter
by her own father. This at times, whilst she was still a
minor.
However, this Court is reminded that “
a
sentence must be tailored to the seriousness of the crime committed
and one expressing the natural indignation of ordinary citizens
would
compensate for seriousness of the crime committed
”,
[2]
whilst
always striking a balance
.
[21]
The
seriousness of this crime was aptly described by Cameron JA, as he
then was, in
S
v Abrahams
,
[3]
[Abrahams matter] when he stated: “
Of
all the grievous violations of the family bond the case manifests,
this is the most complex, since a parent, including the father,
is
indeed in the position of authority and command over a daughter. This
is a position to be exercised with reference in the daughter’s
best interest, and for her flowering as a human being. For a father
to abuse the position
to
obtain forced sexual access to his daughter’s body, constitutes
deflowering in the most grievous and brutal sense
.”
[22]
In
Bailey
v S
,
[4]
[Bailey matter] this Court is reminded by the remarks of Bosielo JA
who described the rape of young girls by their fathers as not
only
scandalous but morally repugnant to all right-thinking people. The
learned Judge expressed concern about the fact that the
rape of young
girls by their fathers have “
emerged
insidiously in recent times as a malignant cancer seriously
threatening the well-being and proper growth and development
of young
girls. It is an understatement to say that it qualifies to be
described as a most serious threat to our social and moral
fabric
”.
[23]
The appellant,
without appealing his conviction, is of the belief that a sentence of
life imprisonment was shockingly inappropriate.
This belief infers
that the appellant is of the view that the seriousness of the acts he
perpetrated against his own daughter were
not serious enough to
warrant a life sentence and in consequence disproportionate and
unjust.
[24]
His
belief spilled over into his attorney’s written heads of
argument and, too in his argument. This occurred, at first glance,
by
reference to the word ‘offence’ in its singular form
instead of “
offences
”
in its plural form. This seemingly insignificant, repeated soft-pedal
is not insignificant and warrants highlighting for
want of relevance.
Relevant to the weight of the authorities this Court was invited to
consider by the appellant’s attorney,
[5]
relevant to the facts the Court
a
quo
accepted when it exercised its sentence discretion
[6]
and relevant to this Court sitting as a court of appeal.
[25]
The relevant proven
facts are that of repeated incestuous rape over a period of 4 (four)
years, 2 (two) counts occurring when the
complainant was still a
minor.
[26]
To
appreciate the seriousness of the crimes in this matter is not only
to consider the description referred to previously by Cameron
JA in
the
Abrahams
,
matter
[7]
but to reconsider the
highlighted misconception that benchmark matters exist which must
slavishly be followed in matters relating
to the rape of children,
albeit by their fathers. This misconception was clearly obliterated
by the SCA in the
Bailey
[8]
matter, and it is from this premise that this Court is of the view
that an expansion of an enquiry into the cumulative effect that
the
repeated offenses had on the complainant becomes relevant and vital
in this matter. In consequence, the offenses in this matter
should
not be viewed in isolation nor, as simply ‘an offence’ in
the singular but, cumulatively. The cumulative effect
consideration
not being an anomaly in the exercise of any Court’s discretion.
[27]
To view the result of the offenses through
a cumulative effect lens assists to bring into focus a clearer
picture from which the
weight or, for that matter, the over-emphasis
thereof by the Court a
quo
,
if any
,
can be considered as against the appellant’s own personal
circumstances. This the nub of the seriousness enquiry argued by
the
appellant’s attorney.
[28]
From the evidence the picture which comes
into focus is the depiction of a father, gradually, skilfully and
deviously grooming his
own daughter for repeated penal penetrative
sexual intercourse. This gradual grooming commenced with a method of
desensitizing
her by, commencing the act of rape with his finger,
before introducing repeated penal vaginal penetration. The repeated
incidents
took place in the ‘sanctity’ of the family home
and mostly in the complainant’s own private
bedroom.
[29]
The repeated incidents of rape were
supported by the clinical findings. The clinical observations as too,
the consequences of the
acts of vaginal intrusions were observed,
recorded and confirmed by the expert witness, Dr O. Eales in 2017.
The weight of the
evidence is not in the absence of acute injuries to
the female genital tract, but in the observations of an old, healed
hymen injury
and the clinical picture of her vagina, which, at her
age, allowed a bulky medical instrument known as a speculum, to be
inserted
with ease. Dr Eales testified that the insertion of the
bulky speculum indicates that it is highly probable that a patient
had previous
sexual intercourse as to even insert the instrument in patients who
have never had sexual intercourse is sometimes
impossible.
[30]
In
consequence, although the clinical picture does not support a picture
of an obvious and brutal physical injurious rape,
[9]
the observations support the evidence of repeated acts of rape which
were a continuous brutal attack inflicted on the complainant.
These
grievous brutal attacks took their toll on the complainant
psychologically and physically
.
The repetition and the anguish of living with your own perpetrator
was sufficiently serious enough to cause the complainant, as
previously alluded, to attempted suicides and need to seek help in
the form of trauma counselling after the fact.
[31]
The Court a
quo
had the opportunity of observing and considering the cumulative
effect of the repeated offenses and understood that it had a profound
impact on the complainant’s own personal life. This was
comprehensively captured in the probation officer’s report
which the Court
a
quo
considered
and to which reference
was made in sentencing.
[32]
In contrast, the
appellant showed no remorse, was convicted and did not appeal the
conviction. Notwithstanding the appellant does
not admit his guilt
nor has he taken responsibility, resorting rather to blaming his life
sentence on others and, in a cavalier
manner still maintains and
describes his relationship with complainant in a positive light.
[33]
In
striking the balance it is important to note that the benchmark
matters referred to in the
Bailey
matter all involving
rape which fell under section 51(1) of the Act, and absent compelling
and substantial circumstances, the
Courts
after
considering the facts, concluded that a sentence of life imprisonment
was disturbingly disproportionate to the offence to
a point where it
could be described as unjust.
[34]
Following
the
Bailey
matter approach, the benchmark are guidelines and not straitjackets
and that an appropriate sentence should be tailor made to fit
the
crime in each matter. This is because each matter presents with a
variation of personal circumstances, not only of the accused,
but in
this case the importance of the cumulative effect consideration on
the complainant. Certain facts and factors arising because
of them
and, not in spite of them, are germane to the sentencing discretion
to be applied by a Trial Court. This matter is no different.
[35]
In considering all the facts argued by the
appellant’s attorney and weighing up the cumulative effect on
the complainant this
Court is satisfied that the offenses perpetrated
are serious enough and were not over emphasised, as argued, and
accordingly the
outcome of the facts into the seriousness enquiry
does not result in a factor to be considered as a substantial and
compelling
factor. However, having determined that, this Court is
enjoined to consider the deviation enquiry to ensure that a just and
proportionate
outcome is achieved.
DEVIATION ENQUIRY
[36]
The appellant’s attorney in advancing
the misdirections of the Court
a quo
when applying the cumulative effect of the appellant’s personal
circumstances to justify a deviation from the life sentence,
in
addition to advancing the appellant’s age of 46
years and his scholastic qualifications (grade 11) now, also
sought
to advance, as a factor, the fact that the appellant was a father of
3 (three) children and that he was providing for his
family. These
being the only circumstances relied on in support of the deviation
enquiry.
[37]
These additional factors were, of course,
ill-founded in the extreme, not only because factually, albeit for
one daughter, “
his children
”,
now majors were ‘abandoned’ by him in January 2017. He
factually failed to maintain them nor exercise any parental
rights
and responsibilities he legally possessed so that he could get on
with another life in Durban. He left all of that to their
mother who
was able to do so.
[38]
The
appellant by his own hand destroyed any father/daughter relationship
which could ever had existed with his daughters the very
first time
he abused the complainant by raping her in 2014.
[10]
These obvious and inescapable facts render the additional factors
argued more as cumulative aggravating factors for consideration
rather than compelling factors which the Court
a
quo
may have failed to consider and/or attached insufficient weight to
when applying the deviation enquiry. Furthermore, to bolster
this
Court’s point, the consequence of the appellant being
incarcerated, on the facts, has not had a negative impact on any
of
his dependants. In fact, the reverse is true.
[39]
As for the remaining factors in the notice
of appeal, the appellant’s attorney failed dismally in his
argument eventually
conceding after enquiry by this Court that,
cumulatively the appellant’s age
and
his scholastic qualifications
were
neutral factors thereby failing to shift the needle one way or
another. Furthermore, he
agreed
that the Court
a
quo
did
consider the appellant’s age and his scholastic qualifications
as factors when it considered
sentence. In consequence, the appellant’s attorney failed to
convince this Court that it should
interfere with the Court
a
quo
’s discretion applying the
cumulative personal factors.
[40]
The Court
a
quo
did not fail to underestimate the
appellant’s personal circumstances, nature and circumstances
under which the offense was
committed and the consequence of
imprisonment on the appellants ‘dependants. No substantial and
compelling circumstances
evident warranting interference.
[41]
In
a final attempt and to remedy the failed contentions, the appellant’s
attorney argued that the period which the appellant
spent in
detention prior to his sentencing remained a factor for this Court to
consider. This he advanced accepting what the SCA
stated in
Radebe
v S
[11]
that consideration of a period of detention pre-sentencing is, but
one factor to consider and that the test is not whether the
period of
detention constitutes a compelling circumstance, but whether the
effective sentence proposed, in this case life, is proportionate
to
the crimes committed. In other words, was the sentence, inclusive of
all the circumstances and the time spent in detention prior
to
sentencing a just one.
[42]
Considering
the absence of compelling and substantial circumstances, having
regard to the best interest of the complainant at the
age of 14 years
for which both life sentences where imposed, the cumulative effect
the offenses had on the complainant, the aggravating
factors, the
Court
a
quo
reference to SCA matter of
D
v The State
,
[12]
the sentence is proportionate to the crimes perpetrated and thus
just.
[43]
This Court does not wish to disturb the
sentence discretion of the Court
a quo.
The provisions of
Correctional
Services Act 111 of 1998
and
section 39(2)(a)(i)
apply.
In consequence, the
following order:
1.
The appeal is dismissed.
L.A.
RETIEF
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng
Division
I
concur,
BALOYI-MERE
Acting Judge, High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Appearances
:
For
the appellant:
Mr MB
Kgagara
Cell:
060 678 225
Email:
Biahopk@legal-aid.co.za
For
the respondent:
Adv
PW Coetzer
Cell:
082 730 2668
Email:
pcoetzer@npa.gov.za
Matter
heard:
20
February 2024
Date
of judgment
:
28
March
2024
[1]
S
v Vilakazi
2009 (1) SACR 552
(SCA);
S
v Madikane
2011 (2) SACR 11) (ECG).
[2]
D
v The State
(89/16) [2016 ] ZASCA 123 (22 September 2016) at para 14.
[3]
2002 (1) SACR 116
(SCA) at par
[17].
[4]
(454/11)
[2012] ZASCA; 2013
(2)
SACR 533 (SCA) (1 October 2012) at para 13.
[5]
S
v MN
2011 (1) SACR 286
(ECG);
S
v MM
,
S
v JS
;
S
v JV
2011 (1) SACR 510 (GNP).
[6]
S
v De Jager
1965 (2) SA 616
(A) at p.629;
S
v Pieters
1987 (3) SA 717 (A).
[7]
Footnote 3.
[8]
Footnote
4 at para 19, Benchmark matters of
S
v Nkomo
2007(2) SACR 198 (SCA),
S
v Sikhipha
2006(2) SACR 439 (SCA) and
Abrahams
matter at footnote 3.
[9]
Lack
of apparent injury not a factor of obvious injury see
section
51(3)(aA)(II)
of Act 105 of 1997; S
v
M
([2007]
(2) SACR 60 (W) and
S
V Ncheche
[2005] ZAGPHC 21
;
[2005] (2) SACR 386
(W) at para 386, rape can be serious regardless
of emotional s
equelae
.
[10]
Footnote
2 at para 13.
[11]
(726/12)
[2013] ZASCA 31
(27 March 2013) at par 14.
[12]
See
footnote 2.
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
H.N v S (A211/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1378 (12 December 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 1378High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
D.P.N v S (A296/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 639 (19 June 2024)
[2024] ZAGPPHC 639High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
S.Z v S (A27/2023) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1940 (16 November 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1940High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
T.M v S (A199/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 699 (16 August 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 699High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
Z.N.S v S (A20/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 195 (28 February 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 195High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar