Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 318South Africa
Ecenter Trading (Pty) Ltd and Others v First National Bank Ltd and Another (28904/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 318 (2 April 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
2 April 2024
Headnotes
by each of the four applicants with the first respondent. The respondents oppose the application. [2] The applicants seek a punitive cost order against the respondents. B. BACKGROUND [3] The Applicants in this matter all have their own bank accounts at the first respondent which they utilise, among others, to pay their suppliers in the normal course of their business.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Ecenter Trading (Pty) Ltd and Others v First National Bank Ltd and Another (28904/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 318 (2 April 2024)
Ecenter Trading (Pty) Ltd and Others v First National Bank Ltd and Another (28904/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 318 (2 April 2024)
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IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO. 28904/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
Date: 02 APRIL 2024
Signature:
In
the matter between:
ECENTER
TRADING (PTY) LTD
First
Applicant
BLACKIRON
TRADING (PTY) LTD
Second
Applicant
NGENISA
KONKE IMPORT & EXPORT (PTY) LTD
Third
Applicant
INTER
SPACE IMPORT & EXPORT (PTY) LTD
Fourth
Applicant
And
FIRST
NATIONAL BANK LTD
First
Respondent
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
NYATHI J
A.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application for a
mandamus
against the respondents ordering them to release
monies on hold in respect of various accounts held by each of the
four applicants
with the first respondent. The respondents oppose the
application.
[2]
The applicants seek a punitive cost order against
the respondents.
B.
BACKGROUND
[3]
The Applicants in this matter
all
have their own bank accounts at the first respondent which they
utilise, among others, to pay their suppliers in the normal
course of
their business.
[4]
During June and July 2021, the applicants made
certain payments to their Chinese suppliers from their respective
bank accounts but
the suppliers did not receive these payments.
[5]
After several attempts to ascertain the status of
the transactions, it appeared that the payments were blocked.
[6]
Neither the first nor the second respondent
notified any of the applicants that the relevant transactions were
blocked and/or on
which grounds.
[7]
It is apparent from the answering papers filed by
the first and second respondents that the holds/blocks were placed on
the transactions,
by the first respondent on instructions from the
second respondent.
[8]
The second respondent requested specific
information and documentation from the first respondent to verify and
clarify certain information
during their compulsory due diligence
checks, before instructions could be given to release such
holds/blocks.
[9]
All the information and documentation were not
provided to the second respondent by the first respondent and the
applicants were
never informed of any required and/or outstanding
information and/or documentation to be able to assist the second
respondent.
[10]
Except for being referred to the second respondent
at the second respondent's physical address and general contact
details, the
applicants were not provided with any information or the
reasons for the holds/blocks placed on their accounts until receipt
of
the respondents' answering papers. The first respondent is of the
view that the applicants should have pursued a judicial review
of the
second respondent's decision to issue blocking orders, but this is
under circumstances that the applicants were never provided
with any
information to put them in a position to even consider such review.
[11]
The applicants amended their Notice of Motion
after receipt of the respondents Answering Affidavits and therefore
after being informed
of the second respondent's instructions to the
first respondent. The amended notice seeks to postpone the initial
relief sought
until after compliance with the interdict.
C.
APPLICABLE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
[1]
[12]
The SARB is the central bank of South Africa. It
is governed by the South African Reserve Bank Act 89 of 1990 (“SARB
Act”)
and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act
108 of 1996 (“the Constitution”).
[13]
The primary objective of SARB is to protect the
value of the currency in the interest of balanced and sustainable
economic growth
in the Republic. The powers and functions of SARB are
those customarily exercised and performed by central banks, as
contemplated
in section 225 of the Constitution.
[14]
Exchange controls are government-imposed
limitations on the purchase and sale of foreign currencies. Exchange
controls are used
inter alia
to ensure the stability of an economy and prevent
exchange rate volatility. In the Republic, exchange controls are
overseen by the
SARB.
[15]
In
South
African Reserve Bank and Another v Shuttleworth and Another
2015
(5) SA 146 (CC)
[2]
the
Constitutional Court explained the purpose of exchange control
regulation in the following terms:
"Here we are
dealing with exchange control legislation.
Its avowed purpose was
to curb or regulate the export of capital from the country.
The
very historic origins of the Act, in 1933, were in the midst of the
1929 Great Depression, pointing to a necessity to curb
outflows of
capital. The Regulations were then passed in the aftermath of the
economic crises following the Sharpeville shootings
in 1960.
The
domestic economy had to be shielded from capital flight. Regulation
10's very heading is "Restriction on Export of Capital".
The measures were introduced and kept to shore up the country's
balance of payments position. The plain dominant purpose of the
measure was to regulate and discourage the export of capital and to
protect the domestic economy.
...[T]he
exchange control system is designed to regulate capital oufflows from
the country.
The fickle nature of the
international financial environment required the exchange control
system to allow for swift responses to
economic changes. Exchange
control provided a framework for the repatriation of foreign
currencies acquired by South African residents
into the South African
banking system.
The controls protected
the South African economy against the ebb and flow of capital. One of
these controls which we are here dealing
with specifically, serves to
prohibit the export of capital from the Republic (unless certain
conditions were complied with)".
(Underlined
for emphasis).
D.
APPLICANTS’ CONTENTIONS
[16]
Both FirstRand and the Reserve Bank assert that
the applicants should have brought a review application in terms of
PAJA, but the
applicants say that PAJA either does not apply or is
not the only relief provided for in section 9 of the Currency and
Exchanges
Act; an aggrieved person may also institute action or lodge
proceedings in court for any other relief.
[17]
It was contended on behalf of the applicants that
they were not afforded a right to be heard before the blocking orders
were issued.
[18]
Mr. Du
Preez referred to caselaw, more specifically
Evergrand
Trading (Pty) Ltd v. SARB & Another
[2022]
ZAGPPHC
,
Yanling International Trade CC v SARB
[2023]
ZAGPPHC 79
,
Odendaal v SARB
[2023]
ZAWCHC 160
and
SARB v Leathern & Others
2021
(5) SA 543 (SCA).
[3]
I will deal
with each in paragraphs that follow hereunder.
E.
THE RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS:
[19]
the
second respondent issued blocking orders in terms of regulations 22A
and or 22C of the Exchange Control Regulations
[4]
(“
the
regulations”
),
read with section 9(2) of the Currency and Exchanges Act 9 of 1933
(“
the
Act"
)
in respect of each of the four applicants. The issue of the blocking
orders constitutes “administrative action” as
contemplated in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
(“PAJA”).
[20]
The respondents contend that
instead of
pursuing a review of the blocking orders in terms of regulation 22D,
the applicants brought a mandatory interdict to
release the funds
subject to the blocking orders. Which application was later amended
to seek orders against the first respondent
only, that the first
respondent be compelled to furnish to the second respondent all the
information which the second respondent
had previously requested from
the first respondent pertaining to the applicants' banking
transactions, alternatively that the second
respondent be compelled
to tell the applicant what information is required so that the
applicants can assist the first respondent
to provide the information
to the first respondent.
[21]
A blocking order may endure for a period of up to 36 months as
provided for in section 9(2)(g) of the Act
read with regulation 22B.
[22]
Firstly, the respondents submitted that the relief
sought by the applicants is not competent, given that the 36 months
period afforded
under section 9(2)(g) of the Act has not yet expired,
and the blocking orders remain valid unless and until reviewed and
set aside.
[23]
Secondly, the second respondent in this regard
submits that the applicants, jointly or severally, have not
demonstrated the grounds
contained in section 9(2)(d)(i) of the Act
read with regulation 22D, and therefore have failed to make out a
proper case for the
relief sought.
[24]
Thirdly, the relief sought against the first
respondent in terms of prayers 1 and 2 of the amended notice of
motion is a precursor
to the relief sought in terms of prayers 4 and
5 therein. Therefore, given prayers 4 and 5 are wholly incompetent
and unsustainable,
the relief sought in prayers 1 and 2 will serve no
purpose and should also be dismissed.
[25]
As regards the
applicants’ contention that they were not given a right to be
heard before the blocking orders were issued,
Mr Maritz submitted
that a party has no right to be heard in respect of the issue of a
blocking order. A party has no right to
be heard before seizure of
their funds which are suspected to be involved in a contravention of
the Exchange control legislation.
He referred to the Constitutional
Court decision of
Ambruster
v SARB
[5]
which dealt with the seizure and forfeiture of foreign currency under
the Exchange Control Regulations and the constitutional validity
of
the forfeiture provision. The Constitutional Court held that the
Regulations would never work if a party was warned and given
a
hearing before action was taken by the SARB. The SARB preserves
first, then grants the hearing before forfeiture.
[26]
Finally, the second respondent submits, a punitive
costs order is justified given the conspectus of this matter.
F.
CONSIDERATION
[27]
In
Yangling
International Trade CC v SARB,
the
court dealt with an application for condonation where a review
application was out of time. The court confirmed the findings
in
Evergrand Trading (Pty) Ltd v SARB and
Another
. In
Evergrand
Trading,
Ceylon AJ found that an
application to review a forfeiture decision is governed by the
Currency Act, read with the Regulations,
and not PAJA. The importance
of this distinction is that an application to review a forfeiture
decision must be made within 90
days as provided in the Currency Act
and Regulations. In reviews under PAJA, the timeframe is 180 days.
[28]
A case
that is more on point is
SARB
v Leathern and Others.
In
an application for a review of a blocking order by the SARB, which
succeeded in the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal held
that
provided the Reserve Bank’s blocking order complies with the
regulations, it may block the funds and the trustees
(applicants
in the case)
[6]
cannot enjoy access to them, whatever is ultimately proven as to who
has a claim to the funds. Viewed in this light, Makgoka JA
concluded,
the trustees’ application to the High Court was premature and
should not have succeeded.
[29]
In
SARB
and Another v Maddocks N.O. and Another
[7]
the
respondents upon their appointment as liquidators of the companies
whose monies had been declared forfeit consequent to blocking
orders,
demanded that the forfeited monies be paid out to them to be
administered in terms of the insolvency laws. The SARB refused
to
accede
to the demand contending that the forfeiture orders were validly made
pursuant to blocking orders made prior to the liquidation
of the
companies. The liquidators launched a review of the forfeiture orders
and were successful in the High Court. This led the
SARB to escalate
their unhappiness to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[30]
The
SCA stated in
Maddocks
that
the effect of the blocking orders issued in terms of Regulation 22A
and/or Regulation 22C of the Regulations is that ‘no
person may
withdraw or cause the withdrawal of funds together with the interest
thereon and/or accrual thereto in accounts held
at the banks.’
[8]
[31]
Maddocks
further
confirms that in terms of the Act and the regulations the Reserve
Bank notifies the companies whose funds are flagged as
suspicious and
to the attorney representing them, advising them of the issue of the
blocking orders and informing them that the
funds in the blocked
banking accounts could be forfeited to the State. The Reserve Bank
invites them to make representations as
to why all or any of the
monies should not be forfeited.
[32]
In
Maddocks,
responses were sent to the Reserve Bank, but the
liquidators failed to provide valid reasons as to why the amounts
standing to the
credit of the blocked banking accounts should not be
declared forfeited to the State. They instead contended that
forfeiture could
not validly take place after the winding-up of the
companies. In the result the appeal by the Reserve Bank succeeded and
the liquidators’
review application was dismissed.
G.
CONCLUSION
[33]
The weight of authority points out emphatically
that the applicants’ review application is not founded on a
sustainable legal
basis and stands to be dismissed. The issue of the
award of costs needs determination during events. There is nothing
suggestive
of a departure from the normal rule applicable in
applications of this nature.
[34]
The following order is hereby made:
The application is
dismissed with costs, including costs of two Counsel where so
employed.
J.S. NYATHI
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Date
of hearing:
05
October 2023
Date
of Judgment:
02
April 2024
On
behalf of the Applicant:
Adv.
D.B. Du Preez SC
With
him:
Adv.
E. de Lange
Attorneys
for the Applicant:
Muthray
and Associates Inc.
Tel:
(012) 651 9000 / E-mail:
kineil@malaw.co.za
and
kaitli@malaw.co.za
On
behalf of the First Respondent:
Adv.
G.W. Amm
Attorneys
for the First Respondent:
Glover
Kannieappan Inc.
Tel:
(011) 482 5652
E-mail:
roger@gkinc.co.za
On
behalf of the Second Respondent:
Adv.
NGD Maritz SC
With
him: Adv. MN Davids
Attorneys
for the Second Respondent:
Gildenhuys
Malatji Inc:
Tel
(012) 428 8600 / E-mail:
AduToit@gminc.co.za
,
Nmanganyi@gminc.co.za
Delivery
:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' legal representatives by email and uploaded on the
CaseLines
electronic platform. The date for hand-down is deemed to be
02
April 2024
.
[1]
Excerpted
from second respondent’s heads of argument Para 10.
[2]
South
African Reserve Bank and Another v Shuttleworth and Another
2015 (5)
SA 146
(CC) at paras 53 to 54.
[3]
Evergrand
Trading (Pty) Ltd v. SARB & Another [2022] ZAGPPHC, Yanling
International Trade CC v SARB [2023] ZAGPPHC 79, Odendaal
v SARB
[2023] ZAWCHC 160
and SARB v Leathern & Others 2021 (5) SA 543
(SCA).
[4]
GNR
1111 of 1 December 1961: Regulations made under the
Currency and
Exchanges Act 9 of 1933
.
[5]
Armbruster
v SARB [2007] ZACC 17, 2007 (6) SA 550 (CC).
[6]
Inserted
for clarity.
[7]
SARB and
Another v Maddocks N.O. and Another [2023] ZASCA 04
[8]
Para
7 of SARB and Another v Maddocks N.O. and Another
[2023] ZASCA 04.
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