Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 360South Africa
SB Guarantee Company (RF) Pty Limited v Hadien (10141/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 360 (9 April 2024)
Headnotes
judgment in terms of Rule 32 read with Rules 46 and 46A of the Uniform Rules of Court, against the Respondent, Nasirah Aisha Hadien (“the Respondent”). The Respondent opposed the application. The Applicant in the summary judgment application is the Plaintiff in the main action and the Respondent in the summary judgment application is the Defendant in the main action. For ease of reference, the Court will refer to the parties as in the application for summary judgment.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## SB Guarantee Company (RF) Pty Limited v Hadien (10141/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 360 (9 April 2024)
SB Guarantee Company (RF) Pty Limited v Hadien (10141/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 360 (9 April 2024)
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sino date 9 April 2024
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 10141/2020
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE:
9 APRIL 2024
SIGNATURE:
SM MARITZ AJ
In
the matter between:
SB
GUARANTEE COMPANY (RF) PTY LIMITED
APPLICANT/PLAINTIFF
[REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 2006/021576/07]
and
NASIRAH
AISHA HADIEN
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT
[IDENTITY
NUMBER: 7[....]]
JUDGMENT
MARITZ
AJ
Introduction
[1]
The Applicant, SB Guarantee Company (RF) Pty Ltd (“the
Applicant”), applied
for summary judgment in terms of Rule 32
read with Rules 46 and 46A of the Uniform Rules of Court, against the
Respondent, Nasirah
Aisha Hadien (“the Respondent”).
The Respondent opposed the application. The Applicant in the
summary judgment
application is the Plaintiff in the main action and
the Respondent in the summary judgment application is the Defendant
in the
main action. For ease of reference, the Court will refer
to the parties as in the application for summary judgment.
[2]
The Applicant seeks relief against the Respondent as follows:
2.1
Payment of the amount of R482 458.35 [FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY
TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
AND FIFTY EIGHT RAND AND THIRTY FIVE
CENTS];
2.2
Payment on the amount referred to above at the rate of 9.40% per
annum from 29 January 2020,
to date of payment, both days inclusive;
2.3
That the immovable property describe as:
ERF 1[....] ZAKARIYYA
PARK EXTENSION 8 TOWNSHIIP
REGISTRATION DIVISION
I.Q., THE PROVINCE OF GAUTENG
MEASURING 1768 (ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN-HUNDRED AND SIXTY EIGHT) SQUARE METERS
HELD BY DEED OF TRANSFER
NO. T[....]
SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS
THEREIN CONTAINED (“the immovable property”)
be declared executable
for the aforesaid amounts;
2.4
An order authorising the issuing of a writ of execution in terms of
Rule 46 read with Rule
46A for the attachment of the immovable
property;
2.5
That the immovable property be sold in execution at a reserve price
of R 328 748.32;
2.6
That in the event that a reserve price is set in terms of Rule
46A(8)(e) and the reserve
price is not attained, and subject to Rule
46(9)(d) and (e), the Applicant may approach this Honourable Court on
these papers,
duly supplemented, for an order that the Honourable
Court reconsider the reserve price in terms of Rule 46A(9)(c);
2.8
Costs of suit on attorney and client scale.
[3]
The Respondent prays that the application for summary judgment be
dismissed with costs.
Additionally, the Respondent prays that
the immovable property described in the notice of motion (summary
judgment application)
be declared not specially executable, the loan
be cancelled and the title deed of the Respondent’s house be
returned.
Relevant Background
Facts and Legal Nexus
[4]
At the time of applying for the loan the Respondent was self-employed
involved in
selling automotive paint directly from her car to panel
beaters. The Respondent asserted that her business was failing
due
to theft and mismanagement. According to the Respondent,
she saw a billboard advertisement by the a company named Financial
Services Bond (“FS Bond”), which advertised about the
possibility to apply and secure a loan in the event that a person
has
a bond free property that is registered in one’s name.
She stated that she was interested as she was the owner
of a house,
which she inherited from her mother in 2000 and which is bond free.
[5]
The Respondent claimed to have applied for a home loan through FS
Bond, refuting any
direct application to the Standard Bank of South
Africa Limited (“Standard Bank”) for the loan.
[6]
The legal nexus between the parties arose from a loan agreement
concluded between
Standard Bank and the Respondent on 14 January
2016. Pursuant to the conclusion of the loan agreement, the
Respondent caused
to be registered over the aforementioned immovable
property a first covering continuing mortgage bond. On 14
January 2016,
Standard Bank advanced the sum of R 430 000.00
(FOUR HUNDERED AND THIRTY THOUSAND RAND) to the Respondent. The
principle debt
incurred by the Respondent was R 430 150.58 (FOUR
HUNDERED AND THIRTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDERED AND FIFTY RAND AND FIFTY
EIGHT
CENTS), which amount was to be repaid in 240 (TWO HUNDERED AND
FORTY) months. The initial monthly instalment was R 3 980.13
(THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDERED AND EIGHTY RAND AND THIRTEEN CENTS).
[7]
The aforementioned loan agreement was subject to certain conditions,
which included
that:
7.1
the Applicant provided a guarantee to Standard Bank in respect of the
loan agreement, in
terms of which the Applicant agreed to pay the
amount owing in terms of the loan agreement to Standard Bank in the
event of a default
by the Respondent under the loan agreement;
7.2
the Respondent signed a written indemnity in terms of which the
Respondent indemnified the
Applicant against any claim by Standard
Bank under the guarantee given by the Applicant to Standard Bank in
respect of all sums
then and subsequently due by the Respondent to
Standard Bank in terms of the loan agreement.
[8]
On 14 January 2016, the Respondent executed a written indemnity
agreement in favour
of the Applicant and its successors in title or
assigns (“the indemnity agreement”).
[9]
As far back as 1 March 2015, the Applicant and Standard Bank
concluded a written common
terms guarantee agreement. On 14
January 2016, pursuant to Standard Bank and the Respondent’s
conclusion of the aforementioned
loan agreement and the Respondent’s
executing of the indemnity, the Applicant furnished Standard Bank
with a written guarantee
in terms of which,
inter alia,
the
Applicant guaranteed the due and punctual payment of all sums which
were then and which may subsequently become due by the Respondent
to
Standard Bank, pursuant to the conclusion of the loan agreement.
[10]
It was submitted that Standard Bank and the Applicant fulfilled all
its obligations in terms of the
aforesaid agreements.
[11]
The Respondent breached the terms and conditions of the loan
agreement, by failing to pay the monthly
instalments due. That
is not in dispute. On 26 November 2019, Standard Bank
notified the Applicant,
inter alia
, that the Respondent was in
breach of the loan agreement. The Applicant was forthwith
required to discharge all of its obligations
to Standard Bank in
terms of the Applicant’s guarantee, by promptly proceeding in a
competent court against the Respondent,
under the indemnity, by
calling up and foreclosing on the mortgage bond and enforcing such
other remedies as were available to
the Applicant at law.
[12]
On 26 November 2019, the Applicant sent a letter of demand for
payment in terms of the indemnity to
the Respondent requiring the
Respondent to pay the full amount so due and payable.
Notwithstanding, the demand, the Respondent
has failed and/or refused
and/or neglected to make payment of the amount as set out in the
Applicant’s letter of demand and
the Applicant is accordingly
entitled to claim the total of all amounts owing by the Respondent to
the Applicant.
[13]
According to the Applicant’s certificate of balance, the
Respondent is indebted to Standard Bank
under the loan agreement, and
therefore to the Applicant under the indemnity, in the amount of R
482 458.35 (FOUR HUNDRED
AND EIGHTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDERED
AND FIFTY EIGHT RAND AND THIRTY FIVE CENTS), together with interest
at the rate of 9.40%
per annum from 29 November 2020 to date of
payment.
[14]
On 14 January 2020, Standard Bank sent a letter of demand and
statutory notice in terms of section
129(1) read with section 130 of
the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005 (“the NCA”) to the
Respondent. Despite this
notice, the Respondent did not make
any payment and/or execute any of the available remedies referred to
therein. On 29 January
2020, prior to issuing the summons, the
Respondent was indebted to Standard Bank under the loan agreement,
and therefore to the
Applicant under the indemnity, in the amount of
R 482 458.35 and the arrears in monthly instalments amounted to
R 57 801.88.
[15]
On or about 12 February 2020, the Applicant issued summons against
the Respondent, which was duly served
on 11 June 2020 on the
Respondent’s chosen
domicilium citandi et executandi
address.
[16]
On 23 June 2020, the Respondent filed a Notice of Intention to Defend
the action.
[17]
As at 21 November 2020, the Respondent’s monthly arrears has
escalated to R 107 690.83,
which is more than 22 months in
arrears with an instalment amount of R 4 739.27. The last
payment received from the
Respondent was the amount of R 1 200.00
which was received on 29 March 2019.
Respondent’s
Plea and Defences
[18]
On or about 10 November 2020 the Respondent filed her plea. The
following defences, against the
Applicant’s claim, were raised:
18.1
The Respondent pleaded that she is a victim of reckless credit
lending by Standard Bank, in particular
that the credit provider,
Standard Bank, failed to conduct an affordability assessment, and
that Standard Bank did not explain
anything to her. She pleaded
that “
all that was said to me sign here and here and here”.
Furthermore, that she did not understand the risks of the
credit, and that the debt pushed her into a situation where she
became over-indebted.
18.2
She pleaded that the credit provider did not check and verify her
affordability against her pay slips,
credit bureau records and bank
statements even though she is/was a customer of Standard Bank.
18.3
She pleaded that the credit provider failed to take reasonable steps
to establish her financial means
and obligations.
18.4
She further pleaded that she believes that there is a corrupt
relationship between the “agent”
of Standard Bank and the
third party company called FS Bond. She pleaded that she used
the company called FS Bond to apply
for refinancing of her house that
she inherited and she paid R 16 000 as a service fee to FS
Bond. She pleaded that
all FS Bond wanted to know was whether
she has the title deed to her house and whether the house was in her
name.
18.5
She pleaded that according to her, the over-indebted situation was
forced upon her by Standard Bank
due to the fact that Standard Bank
has failed to do an affordability assessment and/or failed to conduct
a proper affordability
assessment.
Applicant’s
Summary Judgment Application
[19]
On 27 November 2020, the Applicant served the application for summary
judgment on the Respondent, via
email, in which the Applicant
sought relief as set out in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.8 above.
[20]
In the Applicant’s affidavit in support of the application for
summary judgment, the Applicant
stated that none of the defences
raised constitute a
bona fide
defence fit for trial and that
the Respondent has entered an appearance to defend simply for
purposes of delaying the proceedings
and judgment.
[21]
It is the submission of the Applicant that the defence of reckless
credit lending and a corrupt relationship
between Standard Bank and
an alleged third party “agent” is not a
bona fide
defence. It was further submitted that Standard Bank complied
with section 81(2) of the NCA.
[22]
The Applicant submitted that the Respondent does not dispute having
concluded a loan agreement with
Standard Bank, but that she merely
makes sketchy propositions about an alleged third party “agent.”
[23]
It is submitted by the Applicant that the defences raised are bold
averments and sketchy propositions
which are not sufficient to stave
off summary judgment.
[24]
The Applicant submitted that the Respondent is unable to service the
loan agreement as she is unable
to work and is relying on family,
friends and the Mosque. The Applicant referred to the
Respondent’s answering affidavit
in which the Respondent
mentioned that she is self-employed and that as a result of the
Covid-19 pandemic she was unable to continue
working and her business
was crippled. The last payment from the Respondent was on or about
March 2019.
[25]
The Applicant further submitted that numerous attempts were made to
assist the Respondent by affording
her an opportunity to make payment
in order to remedy the breach of the loan agreement, i.e., in access
of 50 (FIFTY) telephone
calls were made to the Respondent in an
attempt to assist her in making payment arrangements to bring the
arrears up to date.
[26]
The Applicant submitted that despite the aforesaid attempts, the
Respondent failed to conclude a payment
arrangement with the
Applicant and/or neglected to adhere to payment arrangements
concluded between the Applicant and the Respondent.
[27]
It was further submitted that the Applicant would not have provided
the Respondent with the guarantee
in the absence of an indemnity
signed by the Respondent, which indemnity provides the aforesaid
immovable property to act as security
to satisfy the judgment debt
which is sought.
[28]
In the Applicant’s supplementary heads of argument it
submitted that the Respondent’s
main contention, is that
the credit provider (Standard Bank) failed to conduct an
affordability assessment and that it (Standard
Bank) has failed to
verify her affordability assessment against her payslips.
Furthermore, that Standard Bank has failed
to establish her financial
means and that it has failed to explain the loan agreement’s
terms and conditions to her.
Based on this the Respondent
sought that the mortgage bond be cancelled and the title deed be
returned due to reckless credit lending.
[29]
It is the Applicant’s contention that the Respondent did not
aver that the information in the
bond application was inaccurate or
irrelevant.
[30]
It was further submitted that the Respondent did not say what
information should have been considered
but was not considered.
Similarly, it was submitted that the Respondent did not say that the
information considered by the
Applicant/Standard Bank did not reflect
the status of her financial affairs at the time when the
Applicant/Standard Bank undertook
assessments, nor on what basis it
can be said that she is unable to afford the monthly instalments.
The Court was referred
to
First Rand Bank Limited v Madigage 2021
JDR 2317 (GJ) (27 September 2021)
in support of these submissions
as well as to
Horwood v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2010/36853 [2011] ZAGP
JHC 121
in support of the submission that a prospective consumer
must fully and truthfully answer any request for information made by
the
credit provider as part of the assessment in terms of section 81
of the NCA. Furthermore, a credit provider is entitled to
accept for this purpose the veracity of the information provided to
it by or on behalf of a prospective consumer.
[31]
It was submitted by the Applicant that the alleged failures by
Standard Bank to conduct an affordability
assessment and to explain
the terms of the agreement, are meritless. In support of this
submission reference was made to
the
Acceptance by the Borrower
section of the loan agreement, wherein
inter alia,
the
following is recorded:
“
1.1
The quotation (“Part A”) and the terms and conditions
(“Part B”) have
been fully explained to me/us and I/we
understand my/our rights and obligations, and the risks and costs of
the loan;
1.2
I/we have been informed that I/we can refer any further questions
I/we may have to the Bank;
1.3
I am/we are aware of the importance of the wording printed in bold;
1.4
I/we acknowledge that we have been free to secure independent advice
in respect of the contents
of this Agreement;
1.5
I am/we are aware that any assessment by the bank of any Property or
asset for purposes
of determining the value of any Collateral (i.e.
security) under this Agreement, has been performed (done) for bank
use only in
order to secure this Agreement;
1.6
I/we accept the offer of the loan contained in Part A and the related
terms and conditions
in Part B, acknowledge that I/we have been given
copies of this Agreement, and confirm that:
1.6.1 I/we
can afford the Loan and interest payments as well as the costs, fees
and charges referred to in this Agreement;
1.6.2 I/we
have fully and truthfully disclosed my/our income and expenses to the
Bank and have fully and truthfully
answered all requests for
information made by the Bank leading up to the conclusion of this
Agreement; and
1.6.3 I/we
have disclosed to the Bank all other applications that I/we have made
to third parties for credit, whether
processed or not at the date of
my/our application for this Loan;...”
[32]
It was submitted by the Applicant that based on the principle of
caveat subscriptor
, the Respondent is bound by the loan
agreement. The Court was referred to
Burger v Central South
African Railways
1903 TS 571
at pp 577 to 579
in this regard and
also to
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha
2011 (1) SA 310
(GSJ)
in respect of a defence of “
reckless credit
”
and “
over-indebted
”.
Respondent’s
Opposing Affidavit
The
Respondent made the following submissions in her opposing affidavit:
[33]
The Respondent stated that her business was severely affected by the
Covid-19 pandemic lockdown, leading
to a complete halt in sales,
which greatly devastated her business. Adding to her
challenges, she mentioned experiencing
ill-health during this period,
providing evidence such as a referral letter from her medical
practitioner.
[34]
The Respondent claimed to have applied for a home loan through a
company named FS Bond, refuting any
direct application to Standard
Bank for the loan. She clarified that her only interaction with
Standard Bank was on the day
she signed the loan documents.
[35]
Furthermore, the Respondent stated that she did not receive any
emails or other forms of communication
from Standard Bank regarding
an affordability assessment. She mentioned that her only
notification was a phone call from
FS Bond instructing her to sign,
with assurance that everything was approved, along with the address,
time and date of signing.
[36]
She expressed dissatisfaction, noting that she was not adequately
informed about the loan’s risks
during the signing process.
She alleged that she was simply instructed to sign without any
detailed explanation, leading
to her unawareness of the financial
risks and ultimately finding herself in a state of over-indebtedness.
[37]
The Respondent claimed to have made several attempts to arrange
payment schedules with Standard Bank,
providing details of the
individuals she contacted within Standard Bank and the dates of her
attempts to reach out or arrange meetings.
However, she
asserted that she received no response from these bank
representatives.
[38]
Additionally, the Respondent pointed out that the application form
from FS Bond explicitly welcomed
“blacklisted”
applicants, suggesting that her status was known to the agent
handling her loan application. She
argued that the attorney
failed to perform a thorough assessment despite having access to all
her financial information through
her personal banking account with
Standard Bank. She alleged that Standard Bank and/or FS Bond
did not check or verified
her affordability against her pay slips,
credit bureau records and bank statements even though she is/was a
customer/client of
Standard Bank and they had full access to her
personal bank account.
[39]
The Respondent alleged that there was a corrupt relationship between
the agent who represented Standard
Bank and a third party company
called FS Bond which she alleged she has used to refinance the
aforesaid immovable property.
[40]
Although the Respondent elaborated on and supplemented the
allegations stated in her plea and opposing
affidavit by attaching
annexures as proof of her allegations, to her heads of argument, the
Court cannot consider the annexures
attached to her heads as these
had to be attached to her opposing affidavit and not to her heads of
argument. Heads of argument
is not evidence as it is not given
under oath. Heads of argument is merely a persuasive comment
made by the Respondent and/or
her legal representative with regards
to question of fact or law. Heads of argument cannot serve as
the opposing affidavit
or plea.
Decision
[41]
Against this backdrop, was the application for summary judgment
before this Court.
Legal Principles
Rule 32
[42]
The relevant part of Rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court, and more
specifically Rule 32(3)(b), provides
as follows:
“
Rule 32(3) –
Upon the hearing of an application for summary judgment the defendant
may-
(a)
...
(b)
satisfy the court by affidavit (which shall be delivered before noon
on the court
day but one preceding the day on which the application
is to be heard) or with the leave of the court by oral evidence of
himself
or of any person who can swear positively to the fact that he
has a bona fide defence to the action; such affidavit or evidence
shall disclose fully the nature and grounds of the defence and the
material facts relied upon therefor.”
[43]
The law applicable to the above was well set out by Corbett JA (as he
then was) in
Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd
1976 (1) SA 418
(A) at 426
as follows:
“
All that the
court enquires into is:
(a)
Whether the defendant has ‘fully disclosed the nature and
grounds of his defence
and the material facts upon which it is
founded, and
(b)
whether on the facts so disclosed the defendant appears to have, as
to either the
whole or part of the claim, a defence which is both
bona fide and good in law. If satisfied on these matters the
court must
refuse summary judgment either wholly or in part, as the
case may be.”
Reckless Credit
Lending –
National Credit Act
[44]
Section 80
of the NCA provides as follows:
“
80.
Reckless credit.- (1) A credit agreement is reckless if, at the time
that the agreement was made, or at the time when
the amount approved
in terms of the agreement is increased, other than an increase in
terms of
section 119(4)
-
(a)
the credit provider failed to conduct an assessment as required by
section 81(2)
, irrespective of what the outcome of such an assessment
might have concluded at the time; or
(b)
the credit provider, having conducted an assessment as required by
section 81(2)
, entered into the credit agreement with the consumer
despite the fact that the preponderance of information available to
the credit
provider indicated that-
(i)
the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate the
consumer’s
risks, costs or obligations under the proposed
credit agreement; or
(ii)
entering into that credit agreement would make the consumer
over-indebted.
(2)
When a determination is to be made whether a credit agreement is
reckless or not,
the person making that determination must apply the
criteria set out in subsection (1) as they existed at the time the
agreement
was made, without regard for the liability of the consumer
to-
(a)
meet the obligations under that credit agreement; or
(b)
understand or appreciate the risks, costs and obligations under the
proposed credit
agreement, at the time the determination is being
made...”
[45]
Section 81
provides as follows:
“
81. Prevention
of reckless credit.- (1) When applying for a credit agreement, and
while that application is being considered by
the credit provider,
the prospective consumer must fully and truthfully answer any
requests for information made by the credit
provider as part of the
assessment required by this section.
(2)
A credit provider
must not enter into a reckless credit agreement
without first taking reasonable steps to assess-
(a)
the proposed consumer’s-
(i)
general understanding
and appreciation of the risks and costs of the
proposed credit, and of the rights and obligations of a consumer
under a credit
agreement;
(ii)
debt re-payment
history as a consumer under credit agreements;
(iii)
existing financial means,
prospects and obligations; and
(b)
whether there is a reasonable basis to conclude that any commercial
purpose may prove to
be successful, if the consumer has such a
purpose for applying for that credit agreement.”
[46]
Section 81(4)
provides as follows:
“
(4)
For all purposes of this Act, it is a complete defence to an
allegation that a credit agreement
is reckless if-
(a)
the credit provider established that the consumer failed to fully and
truthfully answer
any requests for information made by the credit
provider as part of the assessment required by this section: and...”
[47]
The gist of the Respondent’s defence is that she is a victim of
reckless credit lending by Standard
Bank, in particular that the
credit provider, Standard Bank, failed to conduct an affordability
assessment, and that Standard Bank
did not explain anything to her.
She pleaded that “
all that was said to me sign here and here
and here”.
Furthermore, that she did not
understand the risks of the credit, and that the debt pushed her into
a situation where she
became over-indebted and that she believes that
there is a corrupt relationship between the “agent” of
Standard Bank
and the third party company called FS Bond.
[48]
In terms of section 80(2) of the NCA the question whether reckless
credit was granted is determined
with regard to the time the
agreement was made. In this case the agreement was concluded in
2016.
[49]
On the Respondent’s own version she applied for a loan at FS
Bond and submitted all her documentation
to FS Bond. For all
practical purposes this Court accepts that FS Bond was the
bond/mortgage originator. The Respondent
further alleged that
Standard Bank and/or FS Bond did not check or verify her
affordability against her pay slips, credit bureau
records and bank
statements even though she is/was a customer/client of Standard Bank
and they had full access to her personal
bank account.
[50]
The Respondent has submitted with her opposing affidavit and
accompanying documentation evidence that
an assessment was conducted
by FS Bond prior to advancing the loan to her. From Annexures
1, attached to the Respondent’s
opposing affidavit, it is
evident that on 20 November 2015 FS Bond forwarded application forms
to the Respondent for completion.
On 11 December 2015,
the Respondent duly submitted her duly completed application forms to
FS Bond. However,
the Respondent did not include a copy of
these completed application forms nor did she disclose their contents
to the Court.
[51]
The annexures suggest that FS Bond requested additional documentation
from the Respondent, such as
her bank statements, payslips and the
title deed of her house. These documents were dispatched by the
Respondent to FS Bond
on 5 January 2016. On 12 January
2026, FS Bond dispatched further forms to the Respondent, requesting
completion and
signature. The Respondent promptly returned the
signed documentation to FS Bond on the same day.
[52]
The annexures, provided with the opposing affidavit and heads of
argument, indicate that the documentation
sent on 12 January 2016
included a copy of the application form. This form clearly
outlined the specific documents and/or
information required from the
Respondent to process her loan application. These requirements
included a copy of her ID document,
her spouse’s ID document,
her marriage/divorce certificate, her latest payslip, her spouse’s
latest payslip, copies
of her 3 months bank statements, copies of the
Respondent’s spouse’s 3 months bank statements, copies of
latest 12
months bond statements for her home loan, copies of the
latest water and lights account, as well as detailed personal
information
and, the application form further included an income and
expenditure statement for both the Respondent and her spouse.
[53]
From Annexure 6, attached to the Respondent’s heads of
argument, it is clear that on 12 January
2016 the Respondent
irrevocably accepted the offer made to her by FS Bond as fulfilment
of her instructions and gave her mandate
to proceed with final
registration of the transaction.
[54]
The Respondent did not fully address the information regarding the
assessment done by FS Bond in her
plea and/or in her opposing
affidavit, despite being aware of it throughout the relevant period.
[55]
Based on the abovementioned, even if the Court acknowledges that
Standard Bank may have approved the
loan to the Respondent based on
the assessment conducted by FS Bond, as later submitted to Standard
Bank, it encounters the challenge
that the Applicant did not make
such a claim in its submissions nor did it provide any evidence to
this Court on behalf of the
Applicant and/or Standard Bank supporting
the credit provider’s (lender’s) adherence to the
requirements of section
81 of the NCA. Moreover, even if an
assessment did take place, this Court is confronted with the
difficulty that it cannot
determine from the information presented
whether the FS Bond assessment was sufficient or if the credit
provider (lender) took
appropriate measures to validate the
information presumably supplied by FS Bond.
[56]
The Court acknowledges and accepts that a prospective consumer must
fully and truthfully answer any
request for information made by the
credit provider or on behalf of the credit provider as part of the
assessment in terms of section
81(4) of the NCA. A credit
provider is entitled to accept for this purpose the veracity of the
information provided to it
by or on behalf of a prospective
consumer. If the Respondent has failed to fully and truthfully
answer any requests for information
made by FS Bond or on behalf of
the credit provider as part of the assessment, it is a complete
defence for the credit provider
to an allegation that a credit
agreement is reckless (See:
Horwood v FirstRand Bank Ltd
2010/36853 [2011] ZAGP JHC 121
). The assertion by the
Respondent in her opposing affidavit and accompanying documentation,
that she was in a dire financial
position from the outset and likely
would not have been granted the loan had a proper assessment been
conducted should have been
disclosed during the assessment of FS
Bond. The Court is unable to ascertain the accurate details of
the situation due to
insufficient information provided by the
Applicant and/or Standard Bank.
[57]
Additionally, according to the Respondent’s account, when she
applied for the loan, she was self-employed,
engaged in direct sales
of automotive paint to panel beaters from her vehicle. The
Respondent also stated that her ability
to work was severely impacted
by the Covid-19 pandemic, leading to the collapse of her business.
This unforeseen consequence
of the pandemic could not have been
predicted by either the Applicant or the credit provider.
Moreover, it is important to
note that the Covid-19 pandemic was not
in existence at the time that the agreement was finalized. The
Respondent’s
health issue was also not foreseeable or present
or disclosed when the loan application was granted. The
Respondent signed
the initial loan agreement and subsequent
agreement(s) in 2016, but unfortunately defaulted in 2019. If
the Respondent was
already facing significant financial strain in
2016, it was within her capacity and responsibility to communicate
this to FS Bond,
or the credit provider or the Applicant at that
time. Due to lack of adequate evidence this issue has to be
ventilated at
trial.
[ 58]
This Court disregard the purported defence of the Respondent
regarding the corrupt relationship between
Standard Bank and FS Bond
for the following reasons: firstly, it is irrelevant for
purposes of this claim, secondly, it does
not constitute a defence
against the Applicant’s claim, thirdly, neither Standard Bank
nor FS Bond are cited as parties to
these proceedings and fourthly,
it is totally unsubstantiated.
[59]
While the Court acknowledges the legal principle of
caveat
subscriptor
, which holds the Respondent bound by the loan
agreement she signed, it also must weigh the language of sections 80
and 81 of the
NCA and their mandatory nature. Consequently,
given the facts and circumstances of the given case, the Court
cannot
definitively ascertain whether the credit provider fulfilled
its pre-assessment obligations adequately and the exact procedures
followed during the assessment. Due to these considerations,
the Court refrains from making a determination regarding the
validity
or accuracy of the reckless credit lending defence. Instead, it
objectively finds that, based on the facts and evidence
presented,
the defence of reckless credit lending presents a triable defence for
proper ventilation during the trial process.
[60]
Thus, the application for summary judgment is refused.
Order
1.
The Application for Summary Judgment is dismissed;
2.
Costs to be costs in the cause.
SIGNED ON THIS 9
TH
DAY OF APRIL 2024.
BY ORDER
SM MARITZ AJ
Appearances on behalf
of the parties:
Counsel
for Applicant/Plaintiff:
Adv M
Rakgoale
Instructing
Attorneys for Applicant/Plaintiff:
Vezi
& De Beer Incorporated
Counsel
for Respondent/Defendant:
In
Person (Brother)
Instructing
Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant:
None
Date of Hearing:
8 February 2024
Date of Judgment:
9 April 2024
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