Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 421South Africa
Z.P.M v Road Accident Fund (29281/22) [2024] ZAGPPHC 421 (6 May 2024)
Headnotes
Summary: Default judgment for a claim of loss of earning capacity. A Court is not bound by an opinion of an expert. The Court must be presented with evidence to prove the loss of earning capacity. In the absence of proof, a Court is entitled to refuse a claim for loss of earning capacity even where the claim is by way of default. The Court is not satisfied that the plaintiff has lost his earning capacity as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. Held: (1) The plaintiff’s claim for loss of earning capacity is dismissed. Held: (2) There is no order as to costs.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Z.P.M v Road Accident Fund (29281/22) [2024] ZAGPPHC 421 (6 May 2024)
Z.P.M v Road Accident Fund (29281/22) [2024] ZAGPPHC 421 (6 May 2024)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case
Number: 29281/22
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE: 6/5/24
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
M[...]
Z[...]
P[...]
Plaintiff
and
THE
ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND
Respondent
Summary:
Default judgment for a claim of loss of
earning capacity. A Court is not bound by an opinion of an
expert. The Court
must be presented with evidence to prove the
loss of earning capacity. In the absence of proof, a Court is
entitled to refuse
a claim for loss of earning capacity even where
the claim is by way of default. The Court is not satisfied that
the plaintiff
has lost his earning capacity as a result of the
injuries sustained in the accident. Held: (1) The plaintiff’s
claim
for loss of earning capacity is dismissed. Held: (2) There is
no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
MOSHOANA, J
Introduction
[1]
The melancholy that accentuate the
conundrum faced by Courts in matters of these nature, is the
perspicuous supinity displayed by
the Road Accident Fund (RAF). Even
in instances where the State Attorney’s services are enlisted
to assist the RAF,
counsel who accept briefs stand and inform a
Court, with such temerity, that they hold no instructions. It
baffles this Court
as to how counsel can accept a brief in the
morning of the trial only to rise and inform the Court that he or she
has no instructions
from the RAF. In my view, counsel who has
no instructions must not accept a brief only to appear before a Court
and inform
the Court about lack of instructions. That said, the
matter before me involves a request for default judgment against the
perennially supine RAF. The plaintiff seeks a judgment for a
substantial amount of R 3 959 140 in respect of loss
of
income or earning capacity. The only objective evidence placed
before the Court is opinion evidence of certain experts.
This
Court was informed that the RAF has conceded the issue of liability
to compensate the plaintiff his proven damages.
The issue that was
left for determination is one of quantum in respect of loss of
earning capacity.
Pertinent background
facts to the present default action
[2]
The plaintiff is Mr. Z[...] P[...] M[...]
(P[...]), a 21 years old male, having turned that age on 05 February
2024. At the
time when he was 17 years of age, he, as a
pedestrian, was knocked by an unknown motor vehicle. Resultantly, he
sustained injuries
on his left arm and the right leg. He was
admitted at Legae Mediclinic on 02 January 2019 at 19:25 pm. On
admission,
the hospital diagnosed a fracture of medial malleolus (a
fracture of the lowest part of the tibia). According to the
accident
report (AR) the alleged collision happened on 02 January
2020 at 06:15 am at Biutekant road and an unknown white Toyota bakkie
was involved. This was confirmed by P[...] in his merits
affidavit as well as in the particulars of claim. It is unclear
to this Court as to what accounts for the discrepancy in terms of
dates and times.
[3]
Sadly, on 01 June 2022, the RAF, on a
without prejudice basis, offered to settle the issue of negligence
vis-à-vis
the occurrence of the motor vehicle collision on the basis that the
insured driver was solely negligent in causing the motor vehicle
collision. On 23 June 2023, this Court per Acting Justice
Kehrhahn made an order to the effect that the RAF is 100% liable
to
pay P[...]’s proven damages. Furthermore, the learned Acting
Justice ordered the RAF to pay an amount of R400 000
in respect
of general damages head. The loss of earnings claim was
postponed
sine die
.
It is curious for this Court to note that the order does not
record the reasons why the loss of earning capacity claim was
postponed, nor did counsel disclose any reason for that before me.
It remains curious for this Court because all the relevant
reports in relation to the quantum of damages heads were available as
at 29 May 2023 and provision was made in the order for the
costs
attendant to all the reports. Could it be that the learned
Acting Judge expressed dissatisfaction around the loss of
earning
capacity claim? This Court would leave it at that.
[4]
Ultimately, the case emerged before this
Court for the determination of the damages head mentioned at the
inception of this judgment.
P[...] presented damages affidavits
(Dr N Ndzungu, an Occupational Therapist; Ms C Botha, an Industrial
Psychologist; Ms
Julie Valentini, an Actuary; and Ms Sepenyane, an
educational psychologist) with a prayer that this Court must admit
them within
the contemplation of rule 38(2) of the Uniform Rules of
this Court. Notably, no damages affidavits were availed nor
uploaded
on Caselines for Dr Peta and Dr Ngobeni. Additionally,
P[...] availed reports prepared by Dr R S Ngobeni (Orthopaedic
Surgeon);
(Dr Ndzungu, an Occupational Therapist); (Dr A Peta a
Clinical Psychologist); (Ms T A Sepenyane an Educational
Psychologist); (Ms
C Botha an Industrial Psychologist); and (Munro
Forensic Actuaries).
[5]
In Court a debate ensued between the Court
and Ms Nodada, counsel for P[...]. This Court expressed a
dissatisfaction around the
probity of the opinion evidence with
regard to loss of earning capacity. Since this Court was not
satisfied, after hearing
legal submissions, its judgment on the
default judgment sought by P[...] was reserved.
Analysis
[6]
As a departure point, rule 31(2) of the
Uniform Rules provides that in an action claim, a Court may, after
hearing evidence, grant
judgment against the defendant or make such
order as it seems meet. In
casu
,
this Court did not hear any oral evidence. However, what P[...]
sought to do was to invoke the provisions of rule 38(2)
of the
Uniform Rules. The rule provides as follows:
“
(2)
The witness at the trial of any action shall be examined
viva
voce
, but a Court may at any time,
for
sufficient reason
,
order
that all or any of the evidence to be adduced at any trial be given
on affidavit
or that the affidavit of
any witness be read at the hearing, on such terms and conditions as
to it may seem meet: Provided that
where it appears to the Court that
any other party reasonably require the attendance of a witness for
cross-examination, and such
witness can be produced, the evidence of
such witness shall not be given on affidavit.”
[7]
The default position at any trial is that
of
viva voce
evidence being adduced. A practice seems to have developed,
where parties come to Court with an assumption that a Court shall
order that evidence be given on affidavit. Such an assumption
is wrong. The jurisdictional requirements for a Court
to make
an order that evidence be given on affidavit is the demonstration of
sufficient reason. A sufficient reason shares
similarities with
sufficient cause or good cause which simply refers to a legal
determination being made that there exists sufficient
reason to
support a case or decision. Law reports are replete with
decisions which deals with good or sufficient cause. The
common
thread that runs through the avalanche of those cases is that where
good cause has to be shown in order to obtain a ruling,
obtaining
such a ruling is not there for the mere taking. Accordingly, in my
view, an order that evidence be given on affidavit
is not there for a
mere taking. Absent sufficient reason, it is incompetent for a
Court to make such an order.
[8]
During the debate with P[...]’s
counsel, this Court made it abundantly clear that it was not willing
to accept evidence on
affidavit particularly on the issue of the
alleged loss of earning capacity. The Court desired to put
certain questions,
on the findings, arrived at by the experts as
exposed in their reports. Despite this clarion call, counsel
persistently continued
to make legal submissions on the issue of loss
of earning capacity. This Court, without firmly deciding, takes
a view that
rule 38(2) procedure is being abused in order to deny the
Court an opportunity to question the medico-legal reports issued by
the
experts, which more often than not, with due respect to the
authors thereof, appear to be a copy and paste. Most if not all
are biased towards the party the report is prepared for.
Nevertheless, even in an instance where a Court makes an order
contemplated
in the rule, such does not transmute into acceptance of
such evidence. Depending on where the onus of proof lies, a Court is
still
required to evaluate the evidence in order to establish that an
onus has been discharged to obtain the relief sought.
[9]
In
casu
,
the overall onus lies on P[...] to prove (a) that his earning
capacity has been negatively impacted because of the injuries
sustained
at the accident; and (b) that a sufficient possibility of
an event occurring that will result in a loss of earnings is present.
Once that is shown, then the quantification process may be
assessed and determined. It is in this last process that
the
issue of contingencies to be applied may arise. It is of
cardinal importance to point out that there is a difference
between
loss of earning capacity and future loss of earnings. What
ought to be determined in this case is the former as opposed
to the
latter. Boberg argued that the loss of the capacity and
therefore the diminution of the plaintiff’s patrimony
or estate
occurs immediately after the commission of the delict and not when
the future income would have been earned
[1]
.
Therefore, the determination of P[...]’s loss of earning
capacity must occur at the point of after the motor vehicle
collision.
In due course, it shall be demonstrated that if
educational achievement is the platform to determine the earning
capacity,
P[...] achieved a pass result after the accident happened.
Such is a demonstration of the ability to meet his earning
capacity
irrespective of the injuries. The British Court of
Columbia in
Vincent
v Abu-Bakare
(
Vincent
)
[2]
usefully stated that the earnings approach is often appropriate where
there is an identifiable loss of income at the time of trial.
It
also stated that this frequently happens when a plaintiff has an
established work history and a clear career trajectory.
Where
there has been no loss of income, the Court of Appeal suggested the
capital asset test, which equates the loss of earning
capacity. In
order to deal with the capital asset test, the Court suggested a
tripartite test. That test entails presence
of three
requirements, namely:
(a)
There must be evidence which discloses a
potential future event that could lead to a loss of capacity;
(b)
There must be real and substantial
possibility that the future event in question will cause a loss;
(c)
The value of that possible future loss be
assessed.
[10]
The
Court of Appeal concluded that the trial Court was found wanting in
that the trial judge failed to sufficiently analyse the
likelihood of
potential events; whether the plaintiff had demonstrated and proven
that her injuries would restrict her future earning
capacity; and
whether there was evidence supporting that the plaintiff was capable
of completing full-time work. The Court
of Appeal confirmed
that the evidentiary burden is high in the capital asset test, as the
plaintiff must meet each step of the
tripartite test by presenting
sufficient evidence of the real and substantial possibility that the
future event in question will
cause a pecuniary loss
[3]
.
The Court in
Vincent
confirmed
that with regard to the first requirement of the tripartite test if
the possibility of such a loss is speculative or negligible,
the
Court need go no further, as the claim has not been proven. The
South African situation which mirrors the one discussed
above is
apparent in
Rudman
v Road Accident Fund
(
Rudman
)
[4]
,
where the Court stated the following:
“
I
believe this conclusion is correct. The fallacy in
Mr
Eksteen’s
criticism is that
it
assumes that Rudman suffers loss once he proves that his physical
disabilities bring about a reduction in his earning capacity;
thereafter all that remains is to quantify the loss. This
assumption cannot be made.
A
physical disability which impacts upon capacity to earn
does
not necessarily reduce the estate or patrimony of the person injured
.
It may in some cases follow quite readily that it does, but not
on the facts of this case.
There
must be proof that the reduction in earning capacity indeed gives
rise to pecuniary loss.”
[Own
emphasis]
[11]
This
Court does accept that P[...] sustained injuries out of a motor
vehicle accident. The Radiologist report, following an
X-ray
examination on 14 March 2022, reflects that on the right ankle there
is a previous fracture of the medial malleolus with
fixating
orthopaedic hardware in situ. There were no complications
around the hardware. Normally, a fixating hardware
is used to
provide stability and maintain the alignment of bone fragments during
the healing process. There can be no doubt
that P[...] suffered
orthopaedic injuries. Commonly, such injuries include fractures,
ligament tears, tendon tears, and joint dislocation.
According
to Dr Ngobeni, as at 23 March 2022, P[...] had reached Maximum
Medical Improvement (MMI). This means that
the medical
condition has stabilized. In Dr Ngobeni’s unqualified
opinion (which is not evidence before me as recently
confirmed to be
the legal position by the Constitutional Court in the matter of
Mafisa
v Road Accident Fund (Mafisa
)
[5]
,
the injuries sustained by P[...] will adversely affect his working
ability in duties that involve long hour of standing or walking.
He
is not a fair and good competitor to his peers for general duties.
He will be incapacitated for 2 weeks to recover
after removal
of screws. Correctly, Dr Ngobeni’s assessment defers to the
occupational therapist and the industrial psychologist
on the issue
of future work capacity. With regard to permanent disability,
he opined that P[...] has impairment of the right
ankle.
[12]
Clearly, the evidence of Dr Ngobeni on the
work capacity of P[...] is of no material use for the Court. It
proves nothing. No damage
affidavit was submitted in respect of his
report, and as confirmed in
Mafisa
,
his report does not constitute evidence before Court. The
evidence of Dr Ndzungu is suspect. With regard to residual
work
capacity, he records that P[...] “was employed as a scholar at
Soshanguve Secondary School”. To my mind
this is evidence
of a “cut and paste” that this Court alluded to earlier.
P[...] was never employed. With
regard to the injury on
the ankle, Dr Ndzungu opines that P[...] is prone to unemployment.
However, should he secure employment
he will be a vulnerable
employee who is disadvantaged from career growth, advancements and
promotions. He is rendered an
unfair competitor in the open
labour market. These assumptions are based on the fact that the
only work P[...] can secure
is one that require high physical demand.
In the Court’s view there is no sustainable evidence that
a grade 12 person
can only be employed in employment that requires
high physical demand. There are other forms of employment that
a semi-skilled
grade 12 person may be employed in. For
instance, a shelf packer at a groceries store does not require a high
physical demand.
It is recorded by the industrial psychologist
that he had aspiration to study a Diploma in Marketing but could not
do so
because of funding and not the injuries sustained. The
funding was allegedly withdrawn because of not reaching sufficient
marks. Nevertheless, it was a fact that he obtained a grade 12 pass
with Diploma studies post-accident.
[13]
On the other hand, a completely diametrical
opinion is expressed by the educational psychologist, who stated the
following:
“…
The
writer notes that with the noted
emotional
dysfunctions by the clinical
psychologist Mr M[...]
will likely be
unproductive
,
he
will not function effectively in the workplace if he gets employed.
PSTD is reported to interrupt the emotional and social functioning
of
an individual.”
[14]
It is clear that the educational
psychologist bases her claim of emotional dysfunctions on the
findings of a clinical psychologist.
Dr Peta on the other hand
opined thus:
“
Pain
:
Mr M[...] reported the experience of right ankle pain during
psychological assessment. The experience of pain could possibly
have negative impact upon psychological assessment results, as M[...]
may be
distracted by the pain and
consequently struggle to pay attention and concentrate
.”
[15]
As a point of departure, the pain allegedly
being experienced is one reported by P[...]. Based on that
reported pain, she
reached a conclusion that such pain will make him
struggle to pay attention. This Court must mention that Dr Peta
did not
depose to a damages affidavit. Her report does not
constitute evidence. When this Court compares the reports of these
three
experts, it emerges with divergent consequences that the
injuries may bring forth for P[...]. According to Dr Ndzungu,
the
injury makes him unsuitable for work of high physical demand.
According to the educational psychologist the emotional dysfunctions
will render him unproductive. Whilst Dr Peta suggests that the
pain will cause nothing but a distraction and a struggle to
pay
attention. This Court remains none the wiser with regard to the
earning capacity of P[...]. There is no proof that
the earning
capacity of P[...] has been compromised nor reduced in any manner
whatsoever. Nevertheless, the educational psychologist
report
deferred to the Industrial psychologist with regard to the
employability of P[...]. This Court fails to understand
an
opinion by the Industrial psychologist that P[...]’s
educational capacity has been significantly compromised due to his
involvement in the accident. According to the report of the
educational psychologist, in 2018, a year before the accident,
P[...]
failed grade 10. In 2020, the year of the accident he passed
grade 11. The following year 2021, he passed grade
12 and
obtained Diploma studies. On any assessment, there is no
evidence of a demonstrable and significant compromise or
decline
educationally post-accident. On the contrary, there was an
improvement taking into account what happened in 2018.
[16]
There is no logical reasoning that a person
who acquired a pass of grade 12 with a Diploma studies post-accident,
would suddenly
be a TVET (NQF4) material because of lack of pain
management. According to the educational psychologist, his
grade 12 pass,
which happened a year after the accident, would allow
him to register a Diploma in office administration. Strangely,
that
possibility disappears because of “no treatment been
given”. It is unclear what treatment is being referred to
when P[...] managed to acquire a Diploma studies status at grade 12
without such alleged treatment. Accordingly, there is
no
objective evidence that P[...] was a TVET material. This is
sheer speculation predicated on nothingness. This Court
is not
convinced by such conclusions. The conclusions on decreased
earning capacity reached by the Industrial Psychologist
is, in my
view, premised on a wrong footing. The footing being that from
being a Diploma studies (NQ6) material P[...], because
of lack of
unspecified treatment, degenerated from NQ6 to a TVET (NQ4) material.
It must axiomatically follow that the opinion
that the earning
capacity of P[...] is affected to a point of causing a diminution in
his patrimony is, with respect, baseless,
flawed and unreliable.
[17]
The following statement by the educational
psychologist is illogical and is not supported by any observable
evidence:
“
Considering
that he has already passed Grade 12 (NQF4) with admission to Diploma
studies (NQF6), he could consider registering for
Diploma in Office
Administration.
However, as it stands no
treatment has been given since the accident and the years have
passed
. This then suggest TVET
qualification in line with his conditions, and for this he would
require a career specialist to guide and
support. He would further
require pain and emotional management as these could affect his
schooling and/or work in the future.
The reasonable and possible
postulation is TVET (NQ4).”
[18]
In the Court’s view, it is an
illogical and unsupported statement that drove the Industrial
Psychologist into a wonderland.
All her conclusions on the
earning capacity of P[...] flows from that. Yet the issue
regarding the treatment P[...]
is referring to is unknown to this
Court. Furthermore, what is baffling to this Court is how such
absence of treatment caused
a sudden change of P[...] being a Diploma
studies material, which feat was achieved post-accident, to a TVET
studies material.
This Court is unable to rely on this
illogical reasoning to reach a conclusion that P[...] lost earning
capacity. This
is too speculative and most unhelpful to the
Court.
[19]
The
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in
MEC
for Health and Social Development, Gauteng v MM on behalf of OM
(
MEC
)
[6]
had the following to say with regard to opinion evidence:
“…
The
opinion
must be properly motivated
so
that the court can arrive at its own view on the issue. Where
the opinions of experts differ, the underlying reasoning
of the
various experts must be weighed by the court so as to choose which,
if any,
of the opinions to adopt and to
what extent
. The opinion of an
expert
does not bind a court
.
It does no more than
assist a
court to itself arrive at an informed opinion in an area where it has
little or no knowledge
due to the
specialised field of knowledge bearing the issues.” [Own
emphasis]
[20]
To my mind, the opinion of the educational
psychologist is not properly motivated at all. It is unhelpful
to the Court. Since
it is not binding on this Court it is
rejected by this Court. In this Court’s view, it is
illogical for orthopaedic
injuries, which reached MMI, to affect the
educational capabilities of a person. On Dr Ngobeni’s
version, as at 2022,
P[...] had reached the MMI. However long
before reaching MMI, P[...] managed to obtain a grade 12 pass with
Diploma studies.
This exaggerated, in my view, Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) has no basis when regard is had to the fact that
post-accident,
P[...] managed to progress educationally to a point of
acquiring a Diploma studies.
[21]
In
NSS
obo AS v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape Province
(
NSS
)
[7]
,
the SCA with similar sagacity stated the following:
“
It
is settled principle that in order to evaluate expert evidence, the
Court
must be appraised of and analyse
the process of reasoning which led to the expert’s conclusion,
including the premises from
which that reasoning proceeds
.
The court must be satisfied that
the
opinion is based on facts
and that the
expert has
reached a defensible
conclusion on the matter
. The
purported admission by the defendant cannot, and
does
not, absolve the court from this duty
…”
[Own emphasis]
[22]
This
Court might add that even in instances where there is no opposing
report, it remains the duty of this Court to analyse the
report and
be satisfied. Accordingly, this Court is not satisfied that the
opinion that the earning capacity of P[...] had
been lost to a point
that his patrimony is reduced in due course. It is common cause
that P[...] never worked and may not
work, not because of him not
being able to achieve NQ6 but because of other independent factors.
The Supreme Court of Appeal
in
Road
Accident Fund v Kerridge
(
Kerridge
)
[8]
confirmed that any claim for future loss of earning capacity requires
a comparison of what the claimant would have earned had the
accident
not occurred, with what a claimant is likely to earn thereafter. The
loss is the difference between the monetary
values of earning
capacity immediately prior to the injury and immediately thereafter.
[23]
In
Mvundle
v Road Accident Fund
(
Mvundle
)
[9]
Kubushi AJ, as she then was, correctly stated damages for loss of
income can be granted where a person has in fact suffered or
will
suffer a true patrimonial loss in that his employment situation has
manifestly changed. She further stated that plaintiff’s
performance can also influence his patrimony if there was a
possibility that he could lose his current job and or be limited in
the number and quality of his or her choices should he decide to find
other employment. In the final analysis the claim for
loss of
earning capacity must fail.
[24]
In
Grewal
v Nauman
(
Grewal
)
[10]
the Court of Appeal for British Columbia,
per
the Honourable Mr. Justice Goepel approved the following sentiments
as expressed by the trial judge:
“
The
essential purpose of an award for past loss of opportunity diminished
earning capacity is
to provide the
plaintiff with full compensation for all of his pecuniary losses,
subject to rules of remoteness
…
As an initial threshold
issue,
the plaintiff must demonstrate both impairment to his or
her earing capacity and that, in this case there is a real and
substantial
possibility that diminishment in earning capacity will
result in a pecuniary loss
.” [Own emphasis]
[25]
In
Brown v
Golaiy
(
Brown
),
Finch J stated that:
“
The
means by which the value of the lost, or impaired, asset is to be
assessed varies of course from case to case. Some of the
considerations to take into account in making that assessment include
whether:
1.
The plaintiff
has
been rendered less capable overall from earning income from all types
of employment;
2.
The plaintiff is
less
marketable or attractive
as an employee
to potential employers;
3.
The plaintiff has lost the
ability
to take advantage of all job opportunities
which might otherwise have not been open to him, had he not been
injured; and
4.
The plaintiff is
less
valuable to himself as a person capable of earning income
in a competitive labour market.”
[26]
In
Grewal
,
the Court also mentioned that:
“
The
onus is on Mr. Grewal
to prove that
there is a substantial possibility of an event occurring which will
result in a loss of earnings
…”
[Own emphasis]
[27]
In
her heads of argument, counsel for P[...] sought to place reliance on
the judgment of
Ramanand
v Department of Labour: Compensation Commissioner
(
Ramanand
)
[11]
.
Unfortunately, this case does not support the case of P[...].
Of significance the Court mentioned that PSTD is always
difficult to pinpoint a single stressful event. Unlike in this
matter, parties there accepted that there was a single stressful
event. Also, in that matter a finding was made that the
appellant was permanently disabled due to PTSD. In this matter,
the educational psychologist opined that symptoms of anxiety and
depression are not permanent. The clinical psychologist
reached
the same conclusion about P[...] and suggested 10 sessions of
psychotherapeutic intervention.
[28]
With regard to costs, the order of 23 June
2023 already made provisions for costs in this default judgment
application. With
regard to the costs of the day the matter was
argued before me, it is appropriate to make no order as to costs
given the fact that
no success was achieved with regard to the loss
of earning capacity claim.
Order
[29]
For all the above reasons, I make the
following order:
1.
The claim for the loss of earning capacity
is dismissed.
2.
There is no order as to costs.
GN MOSHOANA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and
authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down
electronically by circulation to
the parties/their legal
representatives by e-mail and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on Caselines. The
date and for hand-down is
deemed to be 6 May 2024.
APPEARANCES
For
the Plaintiff:
Ms B
Nodada
Instructed
by:
Mashiyi
S Attorneys, Pretoria
For
Defendant:
No
appearance.
[1]
I P Gough
The
lost years: The claim for loss of earnings
1983 De Rebus October and Boberg 77
SALJ
438.
[2]
2003 NBCA 42.
[3]
See also
Ploskon-Ciesla
v Brophy
2022 BCCA 217
, where the Court cautioned that evidence of loss of
capacity alone is insufficient to successfully warrant for a future
loss
of earning capacity claim. More recently, the cases of
Rab
v Prescott
,
2021 BCCA 345
and
Deegan
v L’Heurex
2023 BCCA 159
reaffirmed the application of the tripartite test.
[4]
[2002] 4 All SA 422
(SCA) at para 11. See also
Kannenberg
v Road Accident Fund
(45549/16) [2018] ZAGPPHC 630 (20 August 2018).
[5]
Mafisa
v Road Accident Fund
[2024]
ZACC 4
(25 April 2024).
[6]
(Case no 697/2020)
[2021] ZASCA 128
(30 September 2021) at para 17.
[7]
2023 (6) SA 408
(SCA) at para 25.
[8]
2019 (2) SA 233
(SCA) para 40-44.
[9]
(63500/09) 2012 (NG).
[10]
2017
BCCA 158
at para 134 and 135.
[11]
(2023) 44 ILJ 1816 (KZP).
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