Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 462South Africa
Sayed N.O v Road Accident Fund (Leave to Appeal) (19835/2021) [2024] ZAGPPHC 462 (14 May 2024)
Headnotes
of her loss of income in the actuarial report in which contingencies of 20% and 35% were applied to the value of income but for the accident and the value of income even regard to the accident, I accepted that the net future loss at R8 899 575 was the appropriate one not only in light of the facts set out above but also the fact that the claim is affected by the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005. The annual loss at the time of the accident amounted R266 200 per annum. The limit is accounted for in the calculations. Due to the limitation of the losses, the loss of income reduces to the said amount. See Southern Association Insurance Ltd v Bailey.[1]
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Sayed N.O v Road Accident Fund (Leave to Appeal) (19835/2021) [2024] ZAGPPHC 462 (14 May 2024)
Sayed N.O v Road Accident Fund (Leave to Appeal) (19835/2021) [2024] ZAGPPHC 462 (14 May 2024)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
Number:19835 /2021
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED: YES/
NO
14/05/2024
In
the matters between: -
ADVOCATE
SAYED N.O
FIRST APPLICANT
(CURATOR AD LITEM)
And
ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND
FIRST RESPONDENT
LEAVE
TO APPEAL JUDGMENT
BAQWA,
J
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for leave to appeal against an order of this
court handed down on
27 February 2023. Subsequent to that order this
court delivered its reasons for judgment upon being requested to do
so by the applicant.
The Law
[2]
Section 17 (1) of the Superior Courts Act No 10 of 2013 (The Act)
provides:
“
Leave to appeal my
only be given when the judges concerned are of the opinion that;
I.
The appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success;
II.
There is some compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting
judgments on the matter:
Background
[3]
Adv Sayed No (
Curator-ad-litem
for KJD L[...] S[...]) claims
for damages subsequent to a motor-collision which occurred on 23
February 2019 when she was 11 years
old. The plaintiff lost her
mother in the accident.
[4]
Merits were conceded 100% in favour of the plaintiff and it was
agreed between parties
that the matter would proceed on the issue of
loss of earnings, general damages as well as future medical expenses.
[5] Only the
plaintiff appointed experts and the order made at the judicial case
management meeting, the experts reports of the
plaintiff were deemed
to be admitted as the defendant was in a default of filing its own
reports within three months of service
of the form 10.
Plaintiff’s
injuries
[6] In terms of the 2022
report of the off the orthopaedic surgeon, doctor Engelbrecht, the
plaintiff suffered the following injuries:
6.1 A fracture of humerus
6.2 Open/compound
fracture of the right femur
6.3 Laceration of the
scalp
6.4 Abrasions of the left
knee
[7] She underwent a
debridement/external fixator to the right femur. The left humerus
fracture was treated conservatively with a
plaster of paris.
Expert Evidence
(Reports)
[8] The plastic surgeon,
Dr Pienaar forsees improvement on only 30% with treatment and states
that she would retain considerable
scarring which would not lend
itself to further surgical improvements.
[9] Dr Pienaar further
notes that the serious permanent scarring and disfigurement affects
the quality of life of the plaintiff
and would do so in future and
that it affects her appearance and dignity which would in turn cause
her social anxiety and embarrassment.
[10] The expect also
qualified her for general damages in terms of the narrative test.
[11] According to Dr
Botha (Specialist Physician), the patient underwent a CT-scan which
though not revealing any underlying pathology
explained intermittent
discomfort and pain as a function disorder associated with
psychological consequences of the accident.
[12] Michael Sision, the
clinical psychologist noted as reported by the grandmother that the
patient struggles to concentrate and
is forgetful and that she
forgets her school books and homework. She derives less life’s
pleasure and has socially withdrawn
into the house. She also
displayed anxiety when travelling in a motor vehicle,
[13] The clinical
psychologist opines that her trauma and significant loss will play
out in distractedness and forgetfulness influencing
her cognitive
functioning and academic performance and that this will impact her
capacity to hold and assimilate new learning information.
[14] The neuro
psychologist, Ingrid Jonker concludes that from the above information
the plaintiff has been left vulnerable as a
result of the accident
which in turn affects her overall functioning.
[15] With regard to her
scholastic functioning, she notes that her grade 5 school report in
2020 demonstrated mostly poor results
in which the plaintiff achieved
below 40% in maths, science, history, as well as geography. Her class
teacher had complained about
her forgetfulness.
[16] Regarding premorbid
career progression, the industrial psychologist postulates that
plaintiff would have progressed to reach
her career ceilling at
Paterson D5 level by the age of 45. He further states categorically
that her premorbid career path will
not prevail which leaves her at
the unskilled career path level. This means that there she will reach
her career ceiling learning
a basic salary commensurate with Paterson
B1/3 median level by the age of 45.
[17] Taking into account
the summary of her loss of income in the actuarial report in which
contingencies of 20% and 35% were applied
to the value of income but
for the accident and the value of income even regard to the accident,
I accepted that the net future
loss at R8 899 575 was the
appropriate one not only in light of the facts set out above but also
the fact that the claim is
affected by the
Road Accident Fund
Amendment Act 19 of 2005
. The annual loss at the time of the accident
amounted R266 200 per annum. The limit is accounted for in the
calculations. Due to
the limitation of the losses, the loss of income
reduces to the said amount. See
Southern
Association Insurance Ltd v Bailey.
[1]
[18] In
Bailey
,
the court quoting Koch said;
“
what's is
described SA sliding scale is used under which it is allocated a 1 /
2 percent for year to retirement age, i.e. 25% for
a child, 20% for a
youth and 10% in the middle age”.
[19] The uncontested
postulation of the industrial psychologist was incorporated in the
calculation by the actuary, Mr Jacobson.
In my view, the calculation
was reasonable and fair and on that basis, I accepted it.
[20] Regarding general
damages the courts approach as stated in
Protea
Assurance Company Ltd vs Lamb
[2]
is that a judge has a large discretion to award what the judge, in
the circumstances considers to be fair and adequate compensation
to
the injured party for the sequelae of the injuries and guided by the
evidence, expert reports and the law, I assessed these
at R850 000
see
Janse
Van Rensburg v Road Accident Fund.
[3]
[21] A total amount of
are R9 749 575.00 was awarded to the plaintiff and an appropriate
order was granted.
Application for Leave
to Appeal
[22] Subsequent to the
order, I received a request for reasons for the order from the
applicant defendant. These were prepared and
dispatched on or about
31 October 2023.
[23] Notably, the grounds
for application for leave are set out on an incorrect basis in
alleging that an order was made with regard
to liability despite the
fact that it was not in issue. There was no order regarding
liability.
[24] The applicant also
disputes the total amount awarded for the loss of earnings and
general damages without setting out the basis
therefor.
[25] It is common cause
that the order was granted on 27 February 2023 and that the
application for leave is dated the 17 October
2023. Even if applicant
would count the days with reference to the reasons for judgement
those are dated 31 October 2023. That
would necessitate the filing of
an application for condonation for the late filing of the application
for leave to appeal which
had not been filed on the date of hearing
of the application.
[26] On that date, I
requested counsel for both parties to address me regarding the issue
of the appealability of judgments given
against the RAF in default of
the appearance. It is necessary to deal with this as a preliminary
issue before considering condonation
or merits of the application for
leave to appeal.
Appealability
[27] On the day of trial,
the applicant/defendant (applicant)was represented by the State
Attorney who chose not to appear when
the matter was called. The
respondent submits that the default of appearance by defendant ought
to be considered as wilful default
for purposes of rescission.
[28] The respondent
submits further that the applicant’s stratagen around the
inconvenience of explaining their wilful default
for the purpose of
rescission has been to launch this application for leave to appeal.
[29] Applying for leave
to appeal instead of applying for rescission in a case such as the
present application is an irregular step
which ought not to be
allowed. I can do no better that make a reference to a decision of
Wilson J of this division in the matter
of
Lee
v Road Accident Fund
,
[4]
where he states as follows;
“
[13] …. The
very concept of appealing against an order granted in default of
appearance is incompatible with an appreciation
of a court of
appeal’s true function: to reconsider cases that have been
fully I argued at the first instance. A court of
appeal asked to
reconsider an order granted in the absence of the party against whom
it operates will always be faced with the
choice of deciding a case
as a court of the first and final instance (unless a further appeal
is, exceptionally allowed), or remitting
the case to the court a quo
to be decided again, which is exactly what the effect of the
successful rescission application would
have been.
[14] Neither of these
courses of action is consistent with the hearing of an appeal in the
true sense. The decision in Pitelli recognises
this. A court of
appeal ought generally only to intervene where the proceedings in the
court below are complete. For as long as
the court a quo can, in
principle, after or reconsider its order, an aggrieved party’s
remedy lies in there…………….
[15] On the decision in
Pittelli, then, Lenyai AJ’s order (as she then was) is plainly
not susceptible to appeal. Having been
granted in the RAF’s
absence, the order is only rescindable, whether under
rule 42
(1)(a)
or under
rule 31
(2) (b), or under common law. It follows from
Pittelli that the attempt to appeal rather than rescind the order is
irregular.”
[30] Even though the
respondent seemed to understand the principle referred to above in
both in
Lee
and Pittelli
[5]
judgments
it seems to miss the point where
Pittelli
specifies
the very narrow grounds upon which an appeal would be allowed as an
exception, namely, where the court a quo has made
a wrong order where
there is lack of jurisdiction or in the case off an exception. Such
was not the case in the present application,
caedit
questio
.
The respondent seeks to apply
Pittelli
incorrectly.
[31] Further, the
applicant seeks to argue that the application enjoys prospects of
success. That question is otiose and I am satisfied
that there are no
such prospects.
Costs
[32] There are no grounds
upon which the leave to appeal can be granted. As suggested by the
respondent, the applicant has engaged
in dilatory tactics which ought
to be justifiably met with costs on a punitive cost order.
Order
[33] In the result, I
make the following order:
The application for leave
is dismissed with costs on an attorney and client scale which will
include costs off employment of one
counsel.
SELBY BAQWA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Date
of hearing: 28 March
Date
of judgment: May 2024
Appearance
On behalf of the
Applicants
Adv C Setlhako
On behalf of the
Respondents
Adv K Strydom
[1]
2015 (2) 2 1997 at 107 par 19..
[2]
1971 (1) SA 503 (A).
[3]
[11522\ 2011] [2014] ZAGPJAC 71 [4 April 2014].
[4]
(22812/2020)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1068 2024(1) SA 183 (GJ)26 September 2023 par 13-15.
[5]
2010 [5] SA 171 [SCA].
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