LexisNexis South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services (2023-010096) [2024] ZAGPPHC 569 (13 June 2024)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2024 >> [2024] ZAGPPHC 569 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## LexisNexis South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services (2023-010096) [2024] ZAGPPHC 569 (13 June 2024) LexisNexis South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services (2023-010096) [2024] ZAGPPHC 569 (13 June 2024) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2024_569.html sino date 13 June 2024 # IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA # GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA ## Case number: 2023-010096 Case number: 2023-010096 ## (1)REPORTABLE: NO (1) REPORTABLE: NO ## (2)OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO ## (3)REVISED (3) REVISED ## DATE: 13 JUNE 2024 DATE: 13 JUNE 2024 ## SIGNATURE: SIGNATURE: In the matter of: # LEXISNEXIS SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD                              Applicant LEXISNEXIS SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD                              Applicant and # MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES Respondent JUDGMENT SWANEPOEL J: [1] This is an application for leave to appeal against my order of 29 April 2024 dismissing the application. The grounds for leave to appeal essentially repeat the averments made in the papers, upon which I have already expressed my views in the aforementioned judgment. [2] Applicant says that in interpreting the words "in the presence of" I should have taken a purposive approach considering the modern technologies now available, and that I should have substituted the words used "with words to be regarded as reasonable, sensible or businesslike". [3] As much as I agree with counsel for the applicant that modern technology lends itself to achieving the goals of the Regulations by modern means, I disagree that this is a matter for the Courts to decide. In my view the applicant misses the point as far as interpretation of documents is concerned, which is that the interpreter is tasked with finding the meaning of the words used, given the context and purpose within which they were written and the "circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence" . [1] (my emphasis) [4] The Regulations were written at a time when no one conceived of the possibility of communicating through the internet. The meaning of the words used in the Regulations is clear, and I do not understand counsel for the applicant to argue otherwise. What he contends for is that given the development of technology one should re-interpret the words in a purposive manner and give them a meaning that is businesslike in a modern context. This argument again misses a point: A purposive approach is only permissible when the "language of a provision lets the interpreter down. The purposive approach is, in other words, second to the literalist-cum-intentionalist approach: as a rule 'ordinary' or 'clear and unambiguous language' trumps other indicia of policy, object or purpose". [2] [5] The meaning of the words is clear. The fact that technology has developed, and that it allows one to achieve the regulatory purpose in another more businesslike fashion, does not make it permissible to put a different meaning on the words as opposed to their original meaning. That would be encroaching onto the terrain of the legislator, and it is for the latter to amend the wording of the Regulations if it is of the view that an amendment is required. [6] In the circumstances I make the following order: The application for leave to appeal is dismissed. SWANEPOEL J JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT GAUTENG DIVISION PRETORIA COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Adv C. Thompson ATTORNEY FOR THE APPLICANT: Lee Attorneys DATE HEARD: 31 May 2024 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13 June 2024 [1] Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at para 18 [2] Du Plessis, L, Re-Interpretation of Statutes, Butterworths, Durban, page 118 sino noindex make_database footer start