Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 637South Africa
Molaudzi v Minister of Police (72804/2014; 71742/2014) [2024] ZAGPPHC 637 (13 June 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
13 June 2024
Judgment
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## Molaudzi v Minister of Police (72804/2014; 71742/2014) [2024] ZAGPPHC 637 (13 June 2024)
Molaudzi v Minister of Police (72804/2014; 71742/2014) [2024] ZAGPPHC 637 (13 June 2024)
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sino date 13 June 2024
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER:
72804/2014
(1)
REPORTABLE:
Yes
/ No
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
Yes
/ No
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
13/06/2024
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
SARAH
JANE MOLAUDZI
Plaintiff
And
THE
MINISTER OF POLICE
Defendant
AND
CASE NUMBER:
71742/2014
In
the matter between:
KABELO
MARK MOLAUDZI
Plaintiff
And
THE
MINISTER OF POLICE
Defendant
JUDGMENT
MBONGWE
J:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
These action proceedings concern two individual claims for damages
instituted
by the respective plaintiffs under each of the above case
numbers. The events leading to the plaintiffs’ common cause of
action occurred at the same place and at the same time. The
plaintiffs’ claims are founded on alleged unlawful arrest
without
a warrant and the detention of the plaintiffs. The evidence
necessary for each party to prove its case or disprove that of the
other will be tendered by the same witnesses of the respective
parties. Only the first mentioned matter was set down for this
hearing,
but as a result of the nature and circumstances of the cause
of action already alluded to, the parties requested that both matters
be heard at the same time.
[2]
Counsel for the parties informed this court that the police officer
who was
the investigating officer and had executed the arrest and
detention of the plaintiffs was no longer in the police force and,
therefore;
not available to give evidence in the matter and that it
was agreed between them that his sworn statement contained in the
docket
be admitted in evidence in terms of section 3 of the Law of
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1998 (‘the Evidence Act’).
[3]
The parties have further agreed that the hearing and determination of
the issues
of liability and quantum be separated in terms of rule
33(4). The present hearing will thus be in respect of the
determination
of the issue of liability and the aspect of quantum
postponed
sine die
.
THE
PARTIES
[4]
The plaintiffs are mother and son, Sarah and Kabelo, respectively,
who were
arrested and detained on 18 October 2011 following
allegations that they had approximately three weeks earlier
interfered with
the police during the arrest of Sarah’s other
son, George Nkosi, assaulted the police and attempted to rob one of
them of
his service firearm.
[5]
The defendant has been cited in both claims as the political head of
the police
force and as such the employer of the police officer who
executed the arrest and detention of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’
claims against the defendant are premised primarily on the common law
doctrine of vicarious liability.
[6]
The plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel who, together with
counsel
for the defendant, informed this court that consequent to the
defendant’s admission of the arrest and detention of the
plaintiffs,
the defendant has by law and applicable legal principles
the duty to begin.
BACKGROUND
FACTS
[7]
The facts of this case appear from the evidence of the
witnesses.
FIRST
WITNESS FOR THE DEFENDANT
[8]
The first witness called for the defendant was Constable Nkadimeng
(‘Nkadimeng’),
who testified that he is employed in the
SAPS and stationed at the Intelligence Unit in Siyabuswa, Mpumalanga
Province. He has
remained a member of that unit for the past 18 years
as at the date of this hearing.
[9]
Nkadimeng testified that during February 2010 he received information
from an
informant relating to the identity of persons who were
involved in an unresolved murder of a Mr Kubheka (‘the
deceased’)
on a plot in the Mmaneng Village, Siyabuswa, in
2002
. Following his investigation, he met and interviewed a Mr
Mini Zikhali who admitted to having been involved in the murder of
the
deceased and also revealed the identity of his accomplices,
George Nkosi (‘Nkosi’) and Bosi Kgopane.
[10]
Nkadimeng made contact with Sgt Shirinda, the investigating officer
(‘IO’) in the murder
of the deceased, stationed at the
Dennilton police station. He travelled to the Dennilton police
station where he handed over Zikhali
to the IO.
[11]
Nkadimeng further testified that he knew Nkosi who used to reside in
the same area as him in Mokgeletsane
Village and had played in his
soccer team in the Jikeleza football club.
[12]
On 24 September 2011 at approximately 20h00, Nkadimeng received
telephonic information that George
Nkosi was (had resurfaced) in the
village and had been seen drinking at the local Jikeleza tavern.
Nkadimeng telephoned the police
station seeking that the police
proceed to the named tavern and arrest Nkosi, but the telephone was
not answered. He then telephoned
two of his colleagues, Constable
Sibiya and Constable Bogopa, and requested them to come and accompany
him to the tavern to arrest
Nkosi. Sibiya was the first to arrive at
Nkadimeng’s place and the two drove in Sibiya’s vehicle
towards the tavern.
[13]
They had not reached the tavern when Nkadimeng noticed the suspect,
Nkosi, walking with a group of
about eight people. Nkadimeng
and Sibiya drove past the group then stopped and parked the vehicle
to approach the group on
foot. Sibiya’s vehicle was unmarked
and both him and Nkadimeng were wearing civilian clothing. Nkadimeng
testified that on
reaching the group he had introduced himself as a
police officer. He recognised some in the group, Sarah and her sons,
Kabelo,
Rori as people who lived in the same street with him. He
stated that Nkosi, also a son of Sarah, used to live at his mother’s
house. Nkadimeng did not know the other people in the group.
[14]
Nkadimeng told Nkosi that he was under arrest for the murder of
Kubheka. The other members of the group
charged towards him and Nkosi
ran away. Nkadimeng gave chase, firing ten warning shots in the
process and ordering Nkosi to stop.
The rest of Nkosi’s group
and Sibiya were following. Nkosi did not run for long before he
tripped and fell to the ground.
Nkadimeng was in the process of
arresting him when the group arrived and aggressively approached him.
Some in the group were yelling
insults and remonstrated with him
demanding that he let go of Nkosi.
[15]
Nkadimeng testified that Sibiya tried to push the group back and a
scuffle ensued. He heard a gunshot
and a person screaming that he had
been shot. The scuffle stopped for a short while, but restarted when
Nkadimeng tried to place
Nkosi in the vehicle. Constable Bogopa
arrived and assisted in getting Nkosi into the vehicle to take him to
the police station.
[16]
Nkadimeng testified that before driving to the police station he had
offered to call an ambulance for
the injured Kabelo to be taken to
hospital, but the group refused.
[17]
Nkadimeng was at the police station and busy with paper work before
Nkosi could be processed when Nkosi’s
group arrived at about
21h00, shouting and demanding to lay charges of their own. A senior
police officer had ordered the group
to leave and to return the
following morning to lay charges.
[18]
Nkadimeng left the police station at approximate 23h00 that Saturday.
On Monday, 26 September 2011
at about 16h00 he went to consult with a
doctor as he had been feeling pains in his body since his alleged
assault by Nkosi’s
group. He could not have consulted with the
doctor on Sunday as the doctor’s rooms were closed. The doctor
examined him and
completed the J88 form recording that:
“
assaulted by
suspect. Painful right side of face, painful left shoulder, swollen
Metacarpal”. The J88 was handed in as an
exhibit.
CROSS
EXAMINATION
[19]
Nkadimeng’s responses during cross examination demonstrated his
oblivion to the provisions of
the law relating to the execution of an
arrest in a group and the proper handling and use of a firearm in
such circumstances.
[20]
Asked whether the plaintiffs have ever threatened or done anything to
harm to him or his family since
the occurrence of the 24 September
2011, Nkadimeng testified that he had been threatened while arresting
Nkosi, that his house
was known to the group and that they would deal
with him. He testified further that he had indeed subsequently been
followed by
Sarah’s son, Rori at the football ground while
watching a soccer match and when he left in his car. He had stopped a
police
vehicle he came across and was able in that way to avert an
encounter and possible attack by Rori who drove past as Nkadimeng
talked
to the police.
[21]
It is to be noted that, unlike his mother and his sibling (the
plaintiffs), Rori was not arrested,
despite the allegations against
him.
EVIDENCE
OF CONSTABLE SIBIYA
[22]
Constable Sibiya was called as the second witness for the defendant.
He testified that he is a police
officer attached to the Intelligence
unit in Siyabuswa for 23 years. He was telephonically requested by
his colleague, Constable
Nkadimeng on the evening of 24 September
2011 to come and assist him arrest a suspect, George Nkosi, who was
wanted in connection
with a murder case. He drove in his vehicle to
Nkadimeng’s place where he picked him up to proceeded to where
the suspect
was said to be drinking.
[23]
They were on their way when Nkadimeng noticed George Nkosi walking
with a group of people. He was present
when Nkadimeng introduced
himself to the group and advising Nkosi that he was under arrest for
a murder case. The group resisted
and Nkosi ran away and was pursued
by Nkadimeng. Sibiya and the group followed. Nkosi had tripped and
fallen to the ground and
Nkadimeng was arresting when the group
arrived, approached Nkadimeng violently and assaulted him in an
attempt to free Nkosi. Sibiya
testified that he drew his firearm
which he held in his hand facing the ground. One member of the group
grabbed his arm and tried
to take the firearm from him. A scuffle
ensued and a shot went off hitting his assailant on the upper leg.
[24]
Nkosi was placed in the vehicle and Nkadimeng’s attempt to
assist in getting an ambulance to
transport the injured person to
hospital was rejected by the group. Nkosi was taken to the police
station.
[25]
On Monday 26 September 2011 Sibiya went to consult with a doctor as a
result of injuries he sustained
in the scuffle three days earlier. He
did not go with nor did he see Nkadimeng at the doctor’s rooms
though their J88 forms
were completed five minutes apart. His J88
form recorded that:
“
Assaulted by
suspect. Injured right big toe- swollen and tender; painful right
side of chest”.
[26]
In response to a question, Sibiya testified that he was subsequently
investigated for the shooting
and that the case against him was
withdrawn in court.
[27]
Without specifying when, but Sibiya testified that he did lay charges
against the group regarding the
incident of 24 September 2011,
namely:
27.1
interference with police officers while executing their duties;
27.2
assault on officers;
27.3
attempted robbery of a firearm.
CROSS
EXAMINATION
[28]
Advised that according to information in the docket, he had later on
10 February 2016 withdrawn the
charges he had laid, Sibiya denied
that he had knowingly withdrawn the charges stating that the IO had
requested him to sign a
blank form which he said was a warning
statement that the IO would complete later. It is to be noted that
the charges against the
Plaintiffs had been withdrawn in court on 23
March 2012. Sibiya testified that it turned out that the blank form
was in fact a
withdrawal of the charges against the plaintiffs in
terms of
section 309(4)(a)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
,
as amended. The witness testified that he had never intended to
withdraw the said charges.
[29]
The comment made above regarding Nkadimeng’s responses to
questions in cross examination and
specifically his lack of knowledge
of the laws applicable to effecting an arrest and the handling of a
firearm holds true in respect
of Sibiya.
[30]
Asked why Nkosi’s group was not arrested at the scene, Sibiya
testified that it was not part
of the engagements of the Intelligence
Unit he was a member of to carry out the arrest of suspects.
[31]
In response to the question whether he had experienced any threat
from Nkosi’s group, particularly
the plaintiffs, since the 24
September 2011, Sibiya response was in the negative.
PAUSE
[32]
It is pertinent to mention that the evidence of the two police
officers was not intended to constitute
the required declaration of
the lawfulness of the arrest and detention of the plaintiffs by
Detective Mlambo approximately three
weeks later on 18 October 2011.
It was particularly Mlambo’s consideration of the facts
underpinning the charges against
the plaintiffs and his exercise of
his discretion in determining the most less invasive manner of
bringing the suspects under the
law and securing their attendance in
court for possible prosecution that was at issue in these
proceedings. Mlambo’s conduct
in this regard will be weighed
against the applicable legal provisions and principles to determine
whether it passed muster and
was compliant to render the arrests
lawful and thereby exonerate the defendant from liability to the
plaintiffs.
THE
CASE FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
[33]
The witness, Kabelo, who is the plaintiff and party who sustained the
gunshot wound in the events of
24 September 2011, testified that he
was walking on his way home that evening from a matric dance when he
noticed his brother,
George, drinking at a local tavern. He decided
to call his mother on his phone alerting her as George had not slept
at home the
previous night. His mother came in the company of his
other three siblings, including Rori, to take George home.
[34]
Kabelo, his mother and siblings, including George (‘the
group’), were walking back home
when a Toyota Conquest or Tazz
vehicle stopped near them and two occupants jumped out and started
firing gunshots. He could not
tell the direction to which the shots
were fired as it was dark. The two people approached them and one
told George he was under
arrest. The witness’s mother was
asking questions demanding to know who the two people were when
George, who was drunk, began
to run away. It transpired shortly that
the two men were known police officers and one of them, Nkadimeng,
lived in the same street
with the group.
[35]
George ran for a short distance, being pursued by Nkadimeng who was
firing gunshots and ordering him
to stop, before tripping and falling
to the ground. Nkadimeng was arresting George when Sibiya and the
group arrived. Sibiya drew
his firearm to prevent the group from
getting close to Nkadimeng and George. He fired three shots to the
ground but closer to the
group to force them to retreat. The group
took steps backwards each time a shot was fired. However, in the
third shot the bullet
had ricocheted and hit Kabelo on the ankle.
[36]
The evidence of Kabelo regarding the events relating to the group’s
encounter with the police
was corroborated to a large extent, if not
in toto
, by that of his mother, save that, according to Ms
Molaudzi, Kabelo was shot by Sibiya using Nkadimeng’s firearm
which he
had removed from Nkadimeng’s waist when Nkadimeng was
placing Nkosi in the vehicle.
[37]
Both Kabelo and his mother disputed the evidence of Nkadimeng and
Sibiya that they had interfered with
and assaulted the police,
threatened Nkadimeng, and that Kabelo had grabbed Sibiya’s arm
in an attempt to rob him of his
service firearm.
THE
ARREST AND DETENTION
[38]
The real cause of action in casu is the alleged unlawful arrest and
detention of the plaintiffs by
Detective Mlambo on 18 October 2011.
It is common cause between the parties that Detective Mlambo, drove
to the plaintiffs’
home on 17 October 2011, three weeks after
the events of 24 September 2011, and left a message that Ms Molaudzi
(Sarah) was to
report at the police station the following morning at
07h00 together with the people she was with on 24 September 2011
during the
arrest of her son, George.
[39]
Ms Molaudzi duly reported at the police station on the morning of 18
October 2011 at 07h00 accompanied
by Kabelo and her other two
children. They had to wait as they were advised that Mlambo was still
attending a police morning parade.
[40]
When he later arrived, Mlambo took Ms Molaudzi and her children to
the back of the office building
where he ascertained that two of Ms
Molaudzi’s children were minors and advised that they leave and
go to school. He placed
the plaintiffs under arrest, processed and
detained them in different cells. He later took them to court where
they were detained
in the cells until their appearance in court
around 13h00. A lawyer called by Ms Molaudzi had arrived and spoken
with the prosecutor
before the matter was called and postponed with
the plaintiffs released on warning. The plaintiffs made several
further appearances
until the charges against them were withdrawn on
23 March 2012. It is this arrest and detention of the plaintiffs that
constitutes
their cause of action in these proceedings.
ANALYSIS
[41]
It appeared from the evidence that Sibiya had laid the charges
against the plaintiffs on 24 September
2011 and that his sworn
statement was in the docket that was handed to Mlambo for the
investigation of the matter. Sibiya’s
statement was the only
source available to Mlambo for consideration in his investigations
and had led to his ultimate arrest and
detention of the plaintiffs.
[42]
As stated earlier, the real cause of action in casu was the alleged
unlawful arrest and detention of
the plaintiffs by Detective Mlambo
on 18 October 2011.
LIABILITY
VICARIOUS
LIABILITY
[43]
Vicarious liability is a common law principle in terms of which an
employer may be held liable for
the wrongful conduct of his employee
committed during the latter’s execution of his duties.
# LEGAL PRINCIPLES
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[44]
The circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for the
wrongful conduct of his employee
in terms of the common law principle
of vicarious liability were defined in
Mkize v Martens
1914 AD
382
para 319, in the following words:
“…
a
master is answerable for the torts of his servant committed in the
course of his employment, bearing in mind that an act done
by a
servant solely for his own interests and purpose, and outside his
authority, is not in the course of his employment, even
though it may
have been done during his employment.”
[45]
The law underpinning the application of the principle of vicarious
liability was developed further
in various matters, inter alia,
Minister
of Police v Rabie
1986 (1) SA 117
(A) at 134C - E,
where the court set out the two tests necessary in an inquiry to
determine whether an employer is vicariously
liable for the conduct
of its employee. In this regard the court said the following;
“
It
seems clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interest
and purposes, although occasioned by his employment, may
fall outside
the course or scope of his employment, and that in deciding whether
an act of the servant does so fall, some reference
is to be made to
the servant’s intention. The test in this regard is subjective.
On the other hand, if there is nevertheless
a sufficiently close link
between the servant’s acts for his own interests and purposes
and the business of his master, the
master may yet be liable. This is
an objective test.
” See also
K v Minister of Safety and
Security
2005 (3) SA 179
(SCA),
F v Minister of
Safety and Security and Another
(CCT 30/11)
[2011] ZACC 37
;
2012(1) SA 536 (CC); 2012 (3) BLC 244 (CC); (2012) 33 IL
J
93
(CC)
2013 (2) SACR 20
(CC)]
[46]
It was apparent from the evidence of Ms Molaudzi that Mlambo did not
obtain statements from her and
her son and had advised them that they
would make their statements in court. Mlambo, if at all, had
considered only the sworn statement
of Constable Sibiya who had laid
charges against the plaintiffs in his investigations of the case for
the purpose of the exercise
of his discretion whether to arrest the
plaintiffs in order to charge and secure their attendance in court.
Kabelo had also testified
that Mlambo had advised that he had no
knowledge of a case the plaintiffs had opened against Nkadimeng and
Sibiya.
[47]
It is pertinent in casu to state that evidence adduced by the
plaintiffs in this court confirmed that
Mlambo was on duty on the
date he arrested and detained them and, furthermore, that the arrests
were founded on the charges laid
by Sibiya and had not been motivated
by the personal interests and purpose of Mlambo. All these aspects
considered, in my view,
point to the fact that Mlambo had been acting
in the course and scope of his employment when arresting and
detaining the plaintiffs
and that, unless lawful justification for
the arrests be demonstrated, the defendant would be liable for the
actions of Mlambo
on the principle of vicarious liability
THE
ARREST AND DETENTION
THE
LAW AND APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[48]
Every
person has a right to liberty and freedom of movement in terms of the
provisions of section 12 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South
Africa, 1996, and the Bill of Rights. The arrest and detention of a
person is an infraction of that right as
it deprives him of his
liberty and curtails his freedom of movement. Thus the arrest of a
person prima facie unlawful in our law.
[1]
The plaintiff needs to prove no more than that he was arrested in a
claim premised on unlawful arrest and it is for the defendant
to
declare a justification demonstrating that the arrest was lawful.
[49]
The law
requires that an arrest be effected on justified grounds or
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed an offense.
The
suspicion must not be arbitrary and without just cause. The arrestor
bears the onus to advance a justification for the arrest
and
deprivation of liberty in whatever form it may have occurred.
[2]
[50]
In addition
to the factual basis for the arrest described above,
Section 40(1)
of
the
Criminal Procedure Act 51, 1977
, as amended, provides that a
peace officer may arrest any person who, in terms of sub-section
40(1)(e) is found in possession of
anything which the officer
reasonably suspects to be stolen property or property dishonestly
obtained and who the peace officer
suspects of having committed an
offence with respect to the property / thing. As indicated earlier,
it has been held that the suspicion
has to be on reasonable and
justifiable grounds and that the arrestor / defendant is obliged to
advance justification for the arrest
and thereby proving that the
arrest was lawful.
[3]
APPLICATION
OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS
.
[51]
It is important to state that as the arresting officer, Mlambo was a
necessary witness for the defence
to give evidence advancing
justification for the arrest and detention of the plaintiffs. While
Mlambo was not present in court
to testify, the actions he had taken
prior to and during his arrest of the plaintiffs were, according to
the evidence of the plaintiffs
themselves, in my view, well in
compliance with the law, taking into account the seriousness of the
offences concerned.
[52]
As the investigating officer in the case concerning the three charges
Constable Sibiya had laid against
the plaintiffs, Mlambo would have
had regard in particular to the sworn statement of the complainant,
Constable Sibiya to:
52.1
satisfy himself from the facts disclosed, that there was sufficient
evidence that the alleged criminal offences had been committed;
52.2
consider information pertaining to the alleged suspects to assess
and
determine, in his discretion, the reasonable and least invasive
manner of bringing the suspects before the law and to secure
their
attendance in court. This is a value judgment and will entail
the assessment of all the facts in the particular matter.
[53]
In the
present case, from his written statement, the IO Mlambo, was aware
that the suspects included an adult female and her grown
up sons and
were known at the least to Nkadimeng and lived in the same street
with him. A period of three weeks had lapsed since
the occurrence of
24 September 2011 and plaintiffs had done nothing to harm Nkadimeng
and/or Sibiya. Mlambo appears, from the evidence
of the plaintiffs
regarding the manner in which they had been arrested, to have
exercised his discretion reasonably to subject
the plaintiffs to the
law and secure their attendance in court the following day. He could
not have done any better, in my view.
[4]
There was in fact no better option available to him.
[54]
On the facts of this matter, the evidence of injuries to Nkadimeng
and Sibiya described in their respective
J88 forms, the allegation of
the attempted robbery of Sibiya’s service firearm and the
accidental firing of the gunshot that
injured Kabelo was sufficient
to necessitate criminal charges. The arrest and detention of the
plaintiffs on 18 October 2011, was
as already found, carried out
reasonably and within the parameters of the law. The detention itself
appears to have been more procedural
prior to being granted bail and
in light of the appearance in court shortly after the arrest.
CONCLUSION
[55]
I cannot find, on the facts of this case that the arrest and
detention of the Plaintiff on 18 October
2011 was unlawful. If the
plaintiffs had a case, it would have been on the events of 24
September 2011.
ORDER
[56]
Following the findings in this judgment, an order is made that:
1.
The plaintiffs’ claims under case numbers
72804/2014
and
71742/2014
are dismissed.
MPN
MBONGWE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
APPEARANCES:
For
the Plaintiffs:
Adv
M Vimbi
Instructed
by:
Geldenhuys-Malatji
Attorneys
For
the First and Second Defendants:
Adv
S Manganye
Instructed
by:
State
Attorney, Pretoria
Date
of hearing:
23, 24
and 25 August 2023
Date
of delivery:
13
June 2024
THIS
JUDGMENT WAS ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED TO THE PARTIES’ LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVES AND UPLOADED ONTO CASELINES ON 13 JUNE
2024.
[1]
Minister
of Safety and Security v Sekhoto
2011 (5) SA 367
[2]
Zealand
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
2008 (3) SACR 1 (CC)
[3]
Minister
of Law and Order v Hurley
1986
(3) SA 558 (A)
[4]
MR v
Minister of Safety and Security
2016
(2) SACR 540
(CC)
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