Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 1036South Africa
I.S.M v R.Q.M.M (030395/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1036 (10 October 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
10 October 2024
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## I.S.M v R.Q.M.M (030395/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1036 (10 October 2024)
I.S.M v R.Q.M.M (030395/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1036 (10 October 2024)
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sino date 10 October 2024
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case No. 030395/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE:
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
(3)
REVISED:
YES
DATE 10 October 2024
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
I[...]
S[...] M[...]
PLAINTIFF
And
R[...]
Q[...] M[...] M[...]
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
NEUKIRCHER, J
[1]
This is an opposed divorce action where the
initial issues were:
a)
whether an order of forfeiture of specific
benefits of the joint estate should be granted against the defendant;
b)
the amount of maintenance to be granted in
regards of the parties’ eighteen-year-old (dependent) son;
c)
whether the defendant should be awarded
maintenance and, if so, the amount;
d)
costs of suit.
[2]
By the time the trial concluded the sole
issues that remained were those of forfeiture and costs of suit. The
others were abandoned
by the defendant.
Background
[3]
The
parties were married on 26 September 2005 in community of property. A
son was born of this marriage on 23 March 2006. He is
now a major but
writing his Grade 12 examinations and thus still dependent. It
accordingly still falls to his parents to maintain
him in accordance
with their respective means: but the court’s functions as Upper
Guardian ceased on his 18
th
birthday
[1]
and thus no order in terms of section 18 of the Children’s Act
is required. Insofar as he is still dependent, the plaintiff
has
unequivocally undertaken to maintain his son until he is
self-supporting. On this basis, the defendant abandoned the
maintenance
claim set out in paragraph 1(b) supra.
[4]
It is common cause that the marriage
relationship between the parties has broken down. Although they still
live in the same house,
they have not occupied the same bedroom, or
been intimate, since approximately August 2020. They both seek to end
their marriage.
[5]
The main bone of contention is whether an
order of forfeiture should be granted in favour of plaintiff and in
regard to the following
specific assets:
a)
the immovable property situated at 5[...]
B[...] Crescent, Cedar Creek Estate, Fourways, Gauteng (the Fourways
property);
b)
the immovable property situated at 1[...]
R[...] M[...] G[...] P[...] Street, Weltevredenpark, Roodepoort,
Gauteng, (the Roodepoort
property);
c)
the immovable property situated at 1[...]
T[...] W[...], Rustenburg, North-West Province (the Rustenburg
property);
d)
the plaintiff’s Old Mutual Super
Fund;
e)
the plaintiff’s Alexander Forbes
Preservation Fund;
f)
the plaintiff’s Old Mutual retirement
annuity; and
g)
the plaintiff’s share portfolio.
[6]
Before I deal with the evidence that was
presented to found the claim for forfeiture, it is appropriate to
deal with the provisions
of the
Divorce Act 70 of 1979
, and the
relevant case law.
[7]
Section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act states
:
“
When
a decree of divorce is granted on the ground of the irretrievable
break-down of a marriage, including a Muslim marriage, the
court may
make an order that the patrimonial benefits of the marriage be
forfeited by one party in favour of the other, either
wholly or in
part, if the court, having regard to the duration of the marriage,
the circumstances which gave rise to the break-down
thereof and any
substantial misconduct on the part of either of the parties, is
satisfied that, if the order for forfeiture is
not made, the one
party will in relation to the other be unduly benefited.”
[8]
There are thus three factors, and only
three factors, which a court may consider when exercising its
discretion whether to grant
or refuse forfeiture:
a)
the duration of the marriage;
b)
the circumstances which gave rise to its
breakdown;
c)
any
substantial misconduct on the part of either of the parties.
[2]
[9]
In broad terms, when considering the issue
of forfeiture, the following considerations play a role:
a)
the three factors set out in
s9(1)
are not
considered cumulatively and the three categories of factors are
considered by the court in broad terms;
b)
the first step is to establish whether or
not the defendant will be benefitted – this is a factual issue;
c)
once that is established, the court must
determine, having regard to the
s9(1)
factors, whether that benefit
is undue – this is a value judgment the court makes after it
has considered the facts falling
within the compass of
s9(1)
;
d)
“
The
South African Oxford Dictionary
(2005 ed) defines ‘undue’ as ‘unwarranted’ or
inappropriate because excessive or disproportionate. Thus,
while this
court is enjoined not to consider fairness or equity in the
determination of what may be undue, my view is that, if
regard is had
to the duration of the marriage, then considerations of what may be
proportionate may well be valid and appropriate.”
[3]
;
e)
once the court has found that the benefit
is undue, the discretion to order forfeiture is a narrow one and thus
it would be difficult
to visualize circumstances where a court would
then decide not to grant a forfeiture order;
f)
it is not necessary to prove that the
misconduct complained of is substantial for forfeiture to be ordered;
g)
considerations
of fairness play no part in the evaluation of forfeiture
[4]
,
in all likelihood because the words “or any other factor”
have been excluded from
s9(1).
[5]
The
evidence
[10]
The plaintiff’s evidence sketched the
background to the parties’ relationship, the acquisition of the
assets in the
joint estate, the contribution made in regards of the
maintenance, upkeep and support of their family, their home and the
joint
estate and the reasons for the breakdown of the marriage
relationship. In the main, his evidence was uncontested.
[11]
The
joint estate consists of both movable and immovable property. The
plaintiff conceded that, apart from the assets in respect
of which he
seeks forfeiture
[6]
,
the remainder of the joint estate should be divided.
[12]
The specified assets were acquired, and are
valued, as follows:
a)
The Fourways property
-
was originally purchased by defendant and
registered in the name of P[...] P[...] CC in respect of which the
defendant was the director
and sole member. She paid an amount of
R450 000.00 to purchase the property. When the parties decided
to build their home
on this stand, it was transferred into both their
names.
-
In
2018 the plaintiff liquidated his share portfolio valued at
R3 200 000.00. He also registered a bond over the
Roodepoort
property in the amount of R850 000.00
[7]
.
Although the structure is not yet complete, the parties and their son
reside there.
-
The
Fourways property has been independently valued for an amount of
R2 172 000.00
[8]
.
At the commencement of the trial I was informed by Ms Lebona
[9]
that the defendant accepts the plaintiff’s valuations of all
the assets. However, during cross-examination she attempted
to place
in dispute the value of this property and put it to the plaintiff
that the property was not worth R2 172 000.00,
but far
more.
-
Given
the admission made at the trial’s commencement, I disallowed
this line of questioning: the defendant had no valuations
of her own
but, more importantly, the admission took the value of this property
out of contention and to resurrect the dispute
cannot be countenanced
– it amounts to little more than trial by ambush. It is common
cause that the Fourways property is
unbonded, that plaintiff pays all
expenses
[10]
related to the property and has also funded the building costs.
b)
the Roodepoort property
-
was purchased by plaintiff in 2003, prior
to the parties’ marriage, for R250 000.00. It remained
unencumbered until 2017
when the plaintiff took out a bond of
R850 000.00 to fund the building of the Fourways house. At
present, the property is
valued at R930 000.00 and the
outstanding bond is approximately R650 000.00. The net asset
value of the property is R280 000.00.
It is common cause that
the defendant has never made any contribution towards any of the
expenses of this property.
c)
The Rustenburg property
-
This vacant stand was purchased by
plaintiff during 2004 prior to the parties’ marriage. It is
valued at R570 000.00
and is unencumbered.
d)
The plaintiff’s share portfolio is
valued at R970 653.00;
e)
The plaintiff’s policies, retirement
annuities and other investments is valued at R4 417 480.00.
[13]
Thus, the total value of the assets in
regards of which forfeiture is sought is:
Gross value : R
8 089 480.00
Less bond :
R 650 000.00
Total net
: R 7 439 480.00
[14]
In my view, and given the above values, it
is clear that the defendant will be benefitted were an order for
forfeiture not to be
granted. The question now is whether the benefit
would be undue having regard to the factors set out in
s9(1).
[15]
The plaintiff works at N[...] as an
Economist. According to him, the marriage irretrievably broke down
because of the defendant's
“duplicity and bloody-mindedness”.
He testified that their relationship finally imploded because in
August 2020 his
sister-in-law called him to inform him that the
defendant had borrowed R155 000.00 from her in June 2019 which
despite a lawyer’s
letter of demand – a copy of which she
sent to him – the defendant had yet to repay.
[16]
When he confronted the defendant about this
she became angry and accused him and his family of “ganging up
on her”.
[17]
Whilst this may have been the last straw
that broke the back of this marriage, it was not the only problem:
the plaintiff accused
the defendant of being financially
irresponsible and of being involved in pyramid / Ponzi-schemes.
Despite him warning her of the
pitfalls of these many times, she
simply ignored him.
[18]
The issue with the latter was, according to
his evidence, that it placed his employment with N[...] in jeopardy
because of the terms
of his employment – this was never
disputed by defendant who, whilst denying that she was involved in
pyramid / Ponzi-schemes,
certainly admitted to trading in crypto
currency – an issue that appeared similarly problematic to
plaintiff.
[19]
It
is also undisputed that defendant is, and was over the years,
involved in various business ventures and was a
member/shareholder/director
of various corporate entities. On her
version, whilst one
[11]
may have initially brought in money via the award of small tenders,
none of these entities were particularly successful or profitable
and, at present, her only true (minimal) source of income is derived
from her crypto-trading activities.
[20]
The result is clear: whilst defendant may
have brought in income, it was minimal, came in drips and drabs, was
seldom used for the
common home and although she may have bought some
movables, her main contribution was through P[...] P[...] CC which
purchased
the stand on which the common home in Fourways now sits.
[21]
For the remainder, it is common cause that
plaintiff has paid all the bonds on the properties purchased both
before and after the
marriage, and maintained the Roodepoort and
Randburg properties, maintained the common home, the parties, and
their son and paid
all monthly expenses (with minor exceptions).
[22]
The defendant’s characterisation of
the breakdown of the marriage, unsurprisingly, vastly differs from
that of the plaintiff:
a)
she detailed her suspicions about the
plaintiff’s extra-marital affairs with several of his work
colleagues and/or mentees;
she produced whatsapp conversations and
photographs which lead one to the ineluctable conclusion that the
marriage was not a monogamous
one;
b)
her last straw was that she found text
messages between the plaintiff and one “N[...]” in
October 2020 about which she
confronted him and which led to an
argument during which the plaintiff allegedly threatened to kill her;
c)
this argument was recorded and the
recording played for the court and translated. The plaintiff denied
saying
“I’ll
kill you”. His version is that, properly translated, he said
“
They’ll
kill you” meaning the various people from whom defendant took
money to invest in her alleged “pyramid scheme”.
He
testified that he warned her that these people would kill her and
that when this comes about, he will not bury her because he
had
warned her.
[23]
Much of the plaintiff’s evidence was
left undisturbed by defendant who simply failed to cross-examine on
several important
issues. Furthermore, important issues raised in her
evidence-in-chief were not put to plaintiff in cross-examination. To
name a
few:
a)
it was never put to plaintiff what
defendant actually did to earn an income. Although she admitted in
her evidence-in-chief that
she traded in crypto, this was never put
to plaintiff. Instead a cat-and-mouse game took place around this
issue during plaintiff’s
cross-examination;
b)
it was never put to plaintiff what income
defendant actually earned or earns from her trading activities;
c)
it was never put to plaintiff that he
physically assaulted the defendant after she confronted him about an
affair with N[...] –
specifically that he “beat me and
kicked me and pulled me towards the bathroom, and wanted to hit me
with the tin of air
freshener on the head.”;
d)
that in 2011 he had an affair with one
Lerato and in 2018 the defendant became suspicious that he had
reignited the affair; or that
when she confronted him, he became
angry;
e)
that in 2007, at the beginning of their
marriage, the defendant came across messages between plaintiff and
another woman;
f)
that in 2022 there was an altercation
between them because he alleged she had scratched the door of the
motor vehicle;
g)
that she had lived with his threats because
she was fearful as he had a gun;
h)
that she did not work because plaintiff
told her she did not need to – their child was sickly when
young and they did not
want to expose him at a crèche and so
they agreed she would stay at home but eventually as she did not want
to do nothing,
she did network marketing from home by selling two
products and, as and when she received income, she would purchase
movables for
the house;
i)
that
it was her sister-in-law who heard about her trading activities and
wanted to invest R300 000.00 but defendant refused
and suggested
she start off with half that amount and if she makes a profit she can
invest the rest. Unfortunately,
the investment was
unsuccessful.
[12]
[24]
At
the end of the day, these aspects add weight to the parties’
respective allegations of substantial misconduct and the reasons
for
the breakdown of the marriage. But given that defendant failed to put
this version to the plaintiff, issues of credibility
and the
reliability
[13]
of her version must arise as it is encumbent upon a party to put
his/her version to the opposing party to elicit a response.
[14]
[25]
The defendant’s version also faced
several other challenges:
a)
she failed to make full disclosure of all
her business interests and income: the latter particularly related to
income received
from her mother in regard of the rental of a farmland
near Brits in the amount of R50 000.00 per year between
2019 and
2022;
b)
she failed to disclose any income made
either from her crypto trading or her network marketing activities;
c)
she has no proof for any of the purchases
she made for the common home;
d)
her version of the conduct that led to the
breakdown of the marriage was not fully canvassed with the plaintiff
in cross-examination
and became more and more elaborate as her
evidence progressed.
[26]
But what is more troubling is that, based
on an incomplete and incorrect version of her financial affairs, the
defendant was awarded
a contribution towards her legal costs of
R469 000.00. Some of this was spent appointing an expert to
support her maintenance
claim, which she abandoned. She also
appointed a “financial expert" – this expert was
also never called. Whilst
this does not impact on the
s9(1)
factors,
it does impact on the issue of costs.
[27]
It is without doubt that the marriage is
one of long duration. Even if one accepts that the date of
irretrievable breakdown was
August 2020, it was still one of 15
years. As at date of hearing, it was one of 19 years.
[28]
Both parties had a hand in the breakdown of
the marriage: the plaintiff on his part had - at best for him -
dalliances with other
women and, at worst, several extra-marital
relationships. He knew of the defendant’s suspicions and of the
dissatisfaction
with this conduct and yet continued. The whatsapp
messages and photographs certainly don’t assist in disproving
the defendant’s
suspicions.
[29]
On the other hand the defendant knew that
the plaintiff disapproved of her trading activities. She also knew of
the consequences
for him vis-à-vis his employment if her
activities were discovered or something went wrong which it
ultimately did with
her sister-in-law. This did not deter her. Whilst
it was submitted that her conduct did not amount to substantial
misconduct because
the dire consequences warned of did not
materialize, that is not the point: the defendant knew that the
plaintiff was subjected
to strict compliance procedures because of
his position at N[...], she knew that her activities could
potentially impact his standing
at work. The knock-on effect could
also impact their entire family as the plaintiff is, and always has
been, the breadwinner and
provider.
[30]
It is also common cause that the only asset
of any tangible value that the defendant has contributed towards is
the purchase of
the stand in Fourways. Other than that, the other
substantial assets were acquired by plaintiff, paid for by plaintiff,
maintained
by plaintiff and grew in value thanks to plaintiff’s
efforts.
[31]
Even if I accept that defendant did
purchase a few movables during the marriage, the fact is that she has
been less than candid
about the extent of her income. Had her true
financial position been properly before court perhaps I could have
concluded that
her income was so meagre that her contribution was
focused on her wifely and motherly contributions – but I
cannot.
[32]
Whilst it is the plaintiff who bears the
onus to prove forfeiture his allegations of the defendant’s
fiscal irresponsibility,
the defendant had an obligation to make full
financial disclosure in her FDF – she did not. I expected her
to be more forthright
and forthcoming in her evidence. She was not.
[33]
In
my view, although not a perfect witness
[15]
,
the plaintiff was the better witness. He was candid, made concessions
where he needed to and made full disclosure of his financial
affairs.
Defendant failed to put her version to plaintiff, elaborated on her
version in evidence in chief, failed to place her
financial
information before court and concealed income received
[16]
.
[34]
However, I am of the view that although the
defendant’s failure to properly disclose her financial affairs
at trial is to
be frowned upon, it is not a factor that can be
considered vis-à-vis the breakdown of the marriage
relationship. Insofar
as that is concerned, each party’s
conduct and mistrust in the other was the cause of that and therefore
I find that each
is responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. I
cannot find that the defendant’s dealings in crypto-currency
tipped the
scales in plaintiff’s favour vis-à-vis
forfeiture, when viewed through the lens of his own hand in the
breakdown of
the marriage relationship. This being so, the
plaintiff’s claim for forfeiture must fail.
[35]
However, the defendant’s conduct at
the trial is quite a different issue: she failed to make full and
frank disclosure of
her financial contribution, her income and her
expenses to this court. She concealed income, she failed to put her
true position
before a court which saw her receiving a contribution
towards costs of R469 000.00. This conduct cannot be
countenanced and
a court will express its displeasure regarding a
party’s conduct with an appropriate costs order.
The
order
[36]
The order is the following:
1.
A decree of divorce is granted.
2.
The joint estate is to be divided.
3.
It is ordered that defendant is entitled to
50% of the following assets which will be payable to the defendant
when such accrues
to the plaintiff:
a)
Old Mutual Super Fund;
b)
Alexander Forbes Preservation Fund;
c)
Old Mutal Retirement Annuity;
d)
Plaintiff’s share portfolio.
4.
The defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff’s
costs of suit.
B NEUKIRCHER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
This judgment was
prepared and authored by the judge whose name is reflected, and is
handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties/their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on CaseLines.
The date for hand-down is deemed
to be 10 October 2024.
For
the plaintiff
:
Adv Z
Marx du Plessis
Instructed
by
:
Shapiro
& Ledwaba Inc.
For
the defendant
:
Adv N
Lebona
Instructed
by
:
Ndekwe
Attorneys
Matter
heard on
:
16
August 2024
Judgment
date
:
10
October 2024
[1]
Section 17
of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005
[2]
Wijker
v Wijker 1993 (4) SA 720 (A)
[3]
KT v MR 2017 (1) SA 97 (GP)
[4]
Wijker (supra)
[5]
Botha
v Botha
[2006] ZASCA 6
2006 (4) SA 144
(SCA) para 8
[6]
Para 5 supra
[7]
The outstanding bond is ± R650 000.00 presently
[8]
Because it is not yet completed
[9]
Who acts for the defendant
[10]
Maintenance, rates and taxes, lights and water
[11]
P[...] P[...] CC
[12]
This is the R155 000.00 referred to in paragraph 15 supra
[13]
Small v Smith 1954 (3) SA 434 (SWA)
[14]
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African
Rugby Football Union and Others 2000 (C) SA 1 (CC) par 63
[15]
If there is ever such a witness
[16]
The R50 000.00 per annum set out in par 25 supra
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