Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 1350South Africa
Nxolo v Road Accident Fund (34757/2014; 60468/2018) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1350 (11 December 2024)
Headnotes
Summary: Practice of plaintiffs to apply for a second order to compel the RAF to furnish an undertaking to pay for future medical and ancillary costs where such an order had already been granted, should stop. Such applications are improper. The proper remedy is to apply for orders of contempt of court.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Nxolo v Road Accident Fund (34757/2014; 60468/2018) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1350 (11 December 2024)
Nxolo v Road Accident Fund (34757/2014; 60468/2018) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1350 (11 December 2024)
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sino date 11 December 2024
# IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO
: 34757/2014 & 60468/2018
DATE
:
26-11-2024
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO.
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
11 DECEMBER 2024
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between
L N
NXOLO
Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
CASE NO: 60468/2018
In the matter between:
N N
LIMBA
Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
Summary:
Practice of
plaintiffs to apply for a second order to compel the RAF to furnish
an undertaking to pay for future medical and ancillary
costs where
such an order had already been granted, should stop. Such
applications are improper. The proper remedy
is to apply for
orders of contempt of court.
JUDGMENT
DAVIS,
J
:
[1]
Matters 20 and 21 on this Court’s
unopposed roll of today, 26 November 2024 are similar in nature.
They are also in
similar nature to two other matters on the roll to
which I shall refer to later. In all these matters the Road
Accident Fund
(the RAF) featured as the defendant.
[2]
That means that there are four similar
matters on this Court’s roll, that is approximately 10 percent
of the roll and in my
view the practice evinced by these matters
justifies judicial attention.
[3]
For that purpose I shall render an
ex
tempore
judgment. The matters are
as follows:
L N Nxolo v the RAF,
34757/2014
[4]
In this matter the plaintiff obtained
judgment in this court on 19 April 2022.
[5]
Apart
from the issue of merits, loss of earnings and general damages having
been included in the judgment, the RAF was also ordered
to furnish
the plaintiff with an undertaking in terms of Section 17(4)(a) of the
Road Accident Fund Act
[1]
.
[6]
The plaintiff now claims that, despite
having furnished the RAF with a copy of this order and despite having
sent letters of demand,
the plaintiff has been unable to obtain an
undertaking.
[7]
The plaintiff (as an applicant) therefore
launched the current application seeking an order in the following
terms. “
1.
That pursuant to the applicant’s notices in terms of Section
17(4)(a) the respondent be ordered to furnish the applicant
within 10
days from date of service of this order with an undertaking in
compliance with a court order of 19 April 2022
”.
Certain cost orders are also claimed.
N
N Limba on behalf of a minor and the RAF, 60468/2018
[8]
In this matter Raulinga J granted an order
in favour of the plaintiff as long ago as 23 August 2021. In
that order similarly,
the RAF was ordered to furnish the plaintiff
with an undertaking in terms of Section 17(4)(a) and similarly, the
plaintiff as applicant
now seeks another order compelling the
respondent to furnish the undertaking.
Discussion
[9]
Whilst
the Court has sympathy for the applicants and whilst this Court has
in various judgments already referred to the RAF as a
perpetually
delinquent litigant,
[2]
the
facts of these two cases indicate that the RAF remains in breach of
its obligations, albeit this time in respect of court orders.
[10]
The Court, however, is of the view that in
each of these matters, it would be improper for a Court to grant a
second order, ordering
exactly the same as what had already been
ordered in a first order regarding the furnishing of an undertaking.
Not
only would that be a duplication of orders, it would
be tantamount to granting meaningless orders. There is no sense
in the
Court saying, or ordering the same thing twice. In fact,
if a court does so, then it undermines the validity and the value
of
its own initial orders.
[11]
The question is then what is to be done by
a plaintiff when the RAF is again in default of its obligations?
[12]
Firstly, it should be noted that orders of
court are broadly divided into two categories, namely orders
ad
pecuniam solvendam,
that is orders to
pay a sum of money, and orders
ad factum
praestandum,
that is orders to do, or
abstain from doing a particular thing or to deliver a thing.
[13]
An order
ad
factum praestandum
is by its nature no
different from a
mandamus
which is exactly what the applicants now seek this Court to order a
second time. The approach of our courts have always been
that
civil contempt proceedings is the remedy to be utilised to obtain
compliance with an order
ad factum
praestandum
or to deliver a thing.
[14]
This
approach regarding civil contempt for non-compliance has received
much judicial attention. Also, in particular, in instances
where the distinction between the two types of orders have been
made
[3]
.
[15]
I
need not traverse the requirements for an application for contempt of
court as set out in inter alia
Fakie
[4]
and
Pheko
[5]
.
What one needs to underline however, is as the Constitutional Court
has said in
Department
of Transport
v
Tasima
(Pty) Ltd
[6]
that:
“
The
obligation to obey court orders has at its heart the very
effectiveness and legitimacy of the judicial system and is the
stanchion
around which a State founded on the supremacy of the
Constitution and rule of law is built
.”
[16]
One
should also underline that court orders remain valid and enforceable
until set aside and that necessitates compliance with such
court
orders, regardless of their nature or even whether the party against
whom the order is granted believes it to be a nullity
or not
[7]
.
[17]
One
is further reminded of the fact that the RAF is an organ of State and
that the Constitutional Court has a long ago as 2014 in
MEC
for Health Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye &
Lazer Institute
[8]
held that:
“
There
is a higher duty on the State to respect the law, to fulfil the
procedural requirements and to tread respectfully when dealing
with
rights. Government is not an indigent or bewildered litigant
adrift on a sea of litigious uncertainty to whom the Courts
must
extend a procedural circumventing lifeline
.”
[18]
In my view, to grant a second order,
ordering exactly what has already been ordered, would undermine the
legitimacy of the first
order and would be granting the RAF an
unnecessary “procedural circumventing lifeline” to which
it is not entitled.
[19]
The proper procedure to be followed is that
those officials responsible for the issuing of undertakings be held
accountable by way
of applications for contempt of court. Faced with
such an application, one might more readily extract an attempt to
purge the contempt
by the official obliged to furnish the
undertaking, which he or she should have furnished in the first
place.
[20]
Simply granting a second order would be, as
counsel for the applicants put it, optimistically hoping that a
second “push”
would get the RAF to do what it should have
done.
[21]
Having made these comments, and having
thereby determined that the applications should be refused, in view
of the nature of the
applications and the RAF’s delinquency, I
do not intend mulcting the applicants with any costs.
[22]
I need to add a further rider to this
judgment. On this roll there were two other applications,
V
N Claasen v the RAF
, 41291/2018 and
E
P Da Silva vs the RAF
, 5871/2021.
[23]
In both these matters court orders in
similar terms had previously been granted. In
Claasen’s
matter it was granted on 17 February 2023 by Tolmay J which included
the furnishing of an undertaking and in
Da
Silva’s
matter a settlement had
been made an order of court equally long ago, which also included the
furnishing of an undertaking.
[24]
In both these matters the deponent for the
applicants was an attorney of this court, Mr Gert Nel. He
deposed that he brings
these kind of applications “on a regular
basis”. In his affidavit further, he said that there is
“no alternate
remedy”. The fact that unnecessary
costs have regularly been expended only in an attempt to compel a
court to provide
a duplicate order, is disconcerting.
[25]
The allegation that there is no other
remedy is, as I have indicated, in law misplaced. What is
however further disconcerting,
is that three scant court days before
these matters were to be heard, they were removed by notice.
This was done without
any explanation as to what the reason might
have been for such removal. No indications have been given to
the presiding judge
as to whether the undertakings had indeed been
furnished or why, in these instances, the attorney’s “regular
practice”
was not continued with.
[26]
These two cases illustrate a practice which
is not only prevalent as a result of the number of matters on the
roll, but which has
been confirmed by Mr Nel on oath, which practice
should be halted.
Orders
[27]
In matters 20 and 21, that is the matters
of Noxolo and Limba they are removed from the roll. No order is
made as to costs.
DAVIS, J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATE
JUDGMENT DELIVERED
: 26
NOVEMBER 2024
[1]
56
of 1996.
[2]
For
example in
Mashigo
v Road Accident Fund
(2120/2014) [2018] ZAGPPHC 539 (13 June 2018).
[3]
See
for example
Metropolitan
Industrial Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hughes
1969 (1) SA 224
(T),
East
London Local Transitional Council v MEC for Health Eastern Cape and
Others
2001 (3) SA 1133
(CK),
Kate
v MEC for Welfare Eastern Cape and Another
2005 (1) SA 141 (E).
[4]
Fakie
NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA).
[5]
Pheko v
Ekhurhuleni City
2015 (5) SA 600 (CC).
[6]
2017
(2) SA 622 (CC).
[7]
See
for example
Municipal
Manager OR Tambo District Municipality and Another v Ndabeni
2022 ZACC3.
[8]
2014
(3) SA 481
(CC) at par [82].
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