Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 9South Africa
HOT 1027 FM (PTY) LTD v Independent Communications Authority of South Africa and Others (23582/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 9 (13 January 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
13 January 2023
Headnotes
pursuant to the said correspondence.
Judgment
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## HOT 1027 FM (PTY) LTD v Independent Communications Authority of South Africa and Others (23582/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 9 (13 January 2023)
HOT 1027 FM (PTY) LTD v Independent Communications Authority of South Africa and Others (23582/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 9 (13 January 2023)
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sino date 13 January 2023
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 23582/2022
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED:
YES
13
January 2023
In
the matter between:
HOT
1027 FM (PTY)
LTD
APPLICANT
and
THE
INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS
AUTHORITY
OF SOUTH AFRICA (ICASA)
FIRST RESPONDENT
THE
ACTING CHAIRPERSON OF ICASA
SECOND RESPONDENT
THE
COMPLAINTS AND COMPLIANCE
COMMITTEE
OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMUNICATIONS
AUTHORITY
OF
SOUTH
AFRICA
THIRD RESPONDENT
PRIMEDIA
(PTY)
LTD
FOURTH RESPONDENT
KAGISO
MEDIA (PTY)
LTD
FIFTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
KUBUSHI,
J
#
# INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The Applicant, HOT 1027 FM (Pty) Ltd, (“HOT 1027”)
approached this Court
on an urgent basis seeking an order, in the
main, to review and set aside the decision taken by the Council of
the Independent
Communications Authority of South Africa (“the
Council”). The decision in question, emanates from the
recommendations
of the Complaints and Compliance Committee of the
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (“the
CCC”).
In the said decision, the Council, confirming the
recommendations of the CCC, found against HOT 1027 in two complaints
that were
lodged against it by the Fourth Respondent, Primedia (Pty)
Ltd (“Primedia”) and the Fifth Respondent, Kagiso (Pty)
Ltd, (“Kagiso”).
[2]
The application was brought in two parts, namely, Part A and Part B.
In Part A, HOT
1027 sought urgent interim relief to suspend the
operation of the said decision pending the outcome of the Review
Application.
In Part B, HOT 1027 seeks to review and set aside the
decision of the Council confirming the recommendations of the CCC.
The interim
relief sought in Part A of the Notice of Motion was
disposed of by an Order of Court granted by agreement between the
parties.
Part B of the Notice of Motion is now before this Court.
[3]
The application is opposed by the First to the Third Respondents (the
Independent
Communications Authority of South Africa (“ICASA”)
Respondents) and Primedia. Kagiso is not taking part in these
proceedings.
For the sake of convenience, the ICASA Respondents are
referred to in the judgment as ICASA.
# PARTIES
PARTIES
[4]
ICASA is a juristic person established in terms of section 3(1) of
the Independent
Communications Authority of South Africa Act (“the
ICASA Act”).
[1]
ICASA is the sector
regulatory authority for broadcasting and electronic communications
services. It is ICASA’s function,
amongst others, to monitor
the broadcasting sector to ensure compliance with the Electronic
Communications Act (“the ECA”),
[2]
and the underlying statutes.
[3]
In these proceedings, it
is ICASA's decision in relation to its role in broadcasting that is
at issue.
[5]
In particular, ICASA monitors the compliance of licensees with their
licence conditions.
And through the CCC ICASA investigates and hears
all matters, complaints and allegations of non-compliance with the
ECA or the
underlying statutes referred to it by ICASA or received by
it.
[6]
HOT 1027, Primedia and Kagiso, on the other hand, are licence holders
of individual
broadcasting services and are competitors in the
broadcasting space.
[7]
Before considering HOT 1027’s grounds of review, it is proper
that the factual
matrix be set out in order to give perspective as to
why HOT 1027 launched this application. The factual background is set
out
hereunder.
# FACTUAL BACKGROUND
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[8]
The application has its genesis in two complaints lodged with the CCC
by HOT 1027’s
competing broadcasters, Primedia and Kagiso. The
complaints are said to have come about as follows.
[9]
Until recently, an entity known as Classic FM South Africa (Pty) Ltd
(“Classic
Ltd”) operated a commercial classical music
radio station (“the station”) that identified itself as
Classic FM
or Classic FM 1027 (“Classic FM”). Classic FM
was compelled under its licence, at the time, to play classical music
only. It served a very niche market consisting largely of white,
middle-aged and older males. As the profile of the radio audience
changed over time, the taste of music and the listenership changed.
And overtime the audience numbers dwindled. With the shrinking
audience Classic FM could not attract advertising revenue, it, thus,
went into steady decline. Consequently, Classic Ltd, and by
extension
Classic FM, was placed in business rescue.
[10]
Classic Ltd was taken out of business rescue when the business rescue
practitioner accepted an
offer by a consortium of investors to
purchase more than 80% of the shares in Classic Ltd. The consortium
purchased the interest
in Classic Ltd with the intention to try and
turn Classic FM, around. The commercially viable format for Classic
Ltd was to jettison
classical music altogether from Classic FM, and
introduce other types of music.
[11]
Applications were then made to ICASA to transfer control of the
licence to the new shareholders
and to amend the music format. Most
significantly, Classic Ltd applied to amend the format obligation in
Clause 5.1 of its licence
from "
Classical Music
” to
"
Old Skool and R&B amongst other genres,"
and
sought consequential amendments.
[12]
ICASA is said to have taken more than a year to consider the
applications. It, eventually, approved
transfer of the control of the
licence to the new shareholders unconditionally, and also approved
the licence format amendment.
However, when it issued the Amended
Licence, the licence did not contain the format amendments that
Classic Ltd had applied for.
Instead, ICASA, clearly mindful that
classical music should remain on the airwaves, imposed a formatting
obligation in Clause 5.1
of the Schedule of the Amended Licence to
provide for Classic FM to play “
50% Classical Music and 50%
Old Skool and R&B music
”. Fundamentally, the Amended
Licence did not specify a period of the day applicable for compliance
measurement, which is
a bone of contention in these proceedings.
[13]
In respect of the General Programming Obligations, it was recorded in
the licence that
"[t]he Licensee shall broadcast news on a
regular basis for a minimum of thirty (30) minutes each day between
05h00 and 23h00”
.
[14]
In the meanwhile, Classic Ltd applied to the Companies and
Intellectual Property Commission (“CIPC”)
to change its
name to HOT 1027 FM (Pty) Ltd (“HOT 1027”). CIPC gave
confirmation of the name change of the legal entity,
Classic Ltd, to
HOT 1027. The entity having changed its name as such, it, also,
wanted to change its name as stated in the licence
from Classic Ltd
to HOT 1027 and to change the name of its radio station from Classic
FM to HOT FM 1027.
[15]
It needs to be mentioned that even though the entity had changed its
name as reflected above,
when Primedia and Kagiso lodged their
respective complaints, the name of the licensee was still recorded in
the licence in question
as Classic Ltd, and the station name was
recorded as Classic FM 1027. The complaints were, as a result,
brought against Classic
Ltd as the licensee, and not against the new
entity. Hence, the judgment of the CCC refers to Classic Ltd and not
to HOT 1027.
[16]
In an attempt to effect the change to the names of the licensee and
that of the station, HOT
1027, invoked the provisions of Regulation
14(A) of the Licensing Processes and Procedures Regulations (“the
Processes and
Procedures Regulations”),
[4]
and furnished ICASA with Form O, informing it of the name change of
Classic Ltd to HOT 1027, and the concomitant adjustment of
the
trading name, or station name from Classic FM to HOT FM 1027. There
was no response received from ICASA, despite the numerous
correspondence sent to it by HOT 1027, as well as the teleconference
that was held pursuant to the said correspondence.
[17]
HOT 1027 having sent Form O to ICASA, started making preparations to
change the station name
in the public eye and to adopt the new
division of the musical minutes, as
per
the Amended Licence.
It planned to launch on 1 July 2021 – almost two months after
ICASA was told of the purported changes
to the names.
[18]
In preparation for its launch, HOT 1027 went on to announce to the
public that it was undergoing
a major change: not only would the
station previously known as Classic FM or Classic 1027 be known as
Hot FM 1027, but the radio
station would be switching from playing
predominantly classical music to being the home of Old Skool and R&B
music. In view
of the obligation to split the broadcast between
classical music and Old Skool and R&B music, HOT 1027 announced
that HOT 1027
FM will play the latter genre from 05h00 to 18h59, and
classical music from 19h00 in the evening until 04h59 the next
morning.
The division, according to HOT 1027, ensured that 50% of the
"musical minutes" played in a 24-hour period would be
classical
music.
[19]
Upon learning of these announcements, Primedia lodged a complaint
with the CCC, on an urgent
basis. It contended that Classic FM had
changed the station name without applying for the necessary amendment
to its licence; that
Classic FM had breached its formatting
requirements by changing the format of the station to Old Skool and
R&B instead of its
licensed "50% Classical Music and 50% Old
Skool and R&B Music", and that such conduct by Classic FM
was harmful to
Primedia's business.
[20]
Subsequent to Primedia’s complaint, Kagiso, also, filed a
complaint against Classic Ltd/Classic
FM. Kagiso asserted in its
complaint that Classic FM was acting, or had acted, in contravention
of various terms of its Individual
Broadcasting Service Licence (the
Amended Classic FM Licence). The complaint, in essence, slightly
different from that of Primedia,
was that Classic FM had been
rebranded to HOT FM 1027 without the approval of ICASA, and the
station did not comply with an asserted
obligation to play classical
music 50% of the time, measured between the hours of 05h00 and 23h00.
[21]
After hearing representations from the parties (HOT 1027, Kagiso and
Primedia), the CCC prepared
a judgment containing its findings,
reasons therefore, and recommendations to the Council. In its
judgment, the CCC found that
Classic FM failed to comply with:
21.1 the ECA and
regulations made thereunder, as well as, the terms and conditions of
its licence in that, it changed the
name of the station from Classic
FM to Hot FM 1027, without following the prescribed procedures (the
Rebranding Finding); and
21.2 its format
obligations in terms of Clause 5.1 of its Amended Licence in that it
played less than 50% of classical music
and more than 50% of Old
Skool and R&B music during the performance period (the Format
Finding).
[22]
The CCC made the following recommendations to the Council, that the
Council directs Classic Ltd
to:
22.1 desist from
any further contravention of the ECA, the regulations and its licence
terms and conditions relating to the
change of the name and the
format obligations;
22.2 apply for a
licence amendment "
in the prescribed form with a view to
changing the name of the station"
; and
22.3 pay a fine in
the amount of R25 000, R10 000 of which would be "
payable
immediately
", and the balance "
suspended for 24
months on condition that there is no repeated non-compliance during
the period of suspension”
.
[23]
The Council met and adopted the recommendations of the CCC as they
were. Pursuant to such adoption,
the Council issued the decision as
per
the recommendations of the CCC. It, as such, directed
Classic Ltd to discontinue its contravention of the licence, the ECA
and
regulations. It directed further that Classic Ltd apply to amend
its licence in order to change the station name. Finally, ICASA
directed that Classic Ltd pay a fine of R25,000, R10,000 of which was
suspended for 24 months on condition that there is no repeated
non-compliance during the period of suspension. It is this decision
that is the subject matter of these proceedings. HOT 1027 was
made
aware of the decision in a letter to it from the Council dated 12
April 2022. Aggrieved by this decision, HOT 1027 approached
this
Court for relief as referred to paragraph [2] of this judgment.
[24]
HOT 1027’s Grounds of Review are dealt with, hereunder.
APPLICANT’S
GROUNDS OF REVIEW
[25]
The review is brought under the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act ("PAJA"),
[5]
alternatively, the
principle of legality entrenched in section 1(c) of the Constitution.
It is HOT 1027’s submission that
the decision is reviewable at
least because it: was materially influenced by an error of law;
[6]
was taken because
irrelevant considerations were taken into account and/or relevant
considerations were not considered;
[7]
and, it is not rationally
connected to the information before, and the reasons given for it, by
the decision-maker(s).
[8]
[26]
HOT 1027 admits both the rebranding of its station and the fact that
it broadcasts classical
music between 19h00 and 04h59. It, however,
submits, in its papers, that there was no basis in law for ICASA to
conclude that:
26.1 it had failed
to comply with a prescribed procedure in respect of the station name
change, in circumstances where no
such procedure is prescribed; and
26.2 it had acted
in non-compliance of its obligation to effect the 50/50 split between
the different musical genres, since
the obligation was not linked to
a time period covering less than 24 hours, whereas ICASA assessed
compliance by reference to the
more limited performance period.
[27]
The ultimate contention by HOT 1027 is that both the Rebranding
Finding and the Format Finding
of the Council are, as a result,
materially influenced by an error of law, and that the decision was
ultimately taken because irrelevant
considerations were brought into
account whilst relevant considerations were left out of account. For
these reasons, HOT 1027 concluded
that there is no rational
connection between the information that served before the
decision-maker(s) and the outcome of the complaints.
[28]
A further ground of review that does not fall within the purview of
the findings of the Council
is that the Council, when it came to the
decision it did, it did not exercise its duties properly.
[29]
It is, as a result, submitted on behalf of HOT 1027 that, when all
the above grounds of review
are properly considered, they lead to a
conclusion that the decision of the Council, falls to be reviewed and
set aside.
ISSUES
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT
[30]
In the joint Practice Note uploaded on Caselines, there were numerous
issues agreed to by the
parties that they wanted this Court to
determine. However, in their oral arguments in Court, it became
apparent that only three
main issues were required to be determined.
The three issues are:
30.1 In relation to
the Rebranding Finding, is the issue of the requirements and
procedures for effecting a station name change
under the applicable
legislation. Underlying this issue is whether a station name is a
condition of a broadcasting licence;
30.2 In relation to
the Format Finding, is the issue of the requirements and procedures
for effecting the 50/50 split between
the musical genres. Underlying
this issue is whether HOT 1027 complied with its licence conditions
in relation to the split between
the musical genres; and
30.3 In relation to
the duties of the Council when considering the recommendations of the
CCC, the issue is whether the Council
duly adopted the
recommendations of the CCC.
[31]
Before considering the abovementioned issues, this Court will first,
set out the legislative
framework, relevant to the issues in this
matter.
# LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
[32]
ICASA is a creature of statute, endowed with powers and duties under
two principal statutes,
the ICASA Act and the ECA.
[33]
In the first place, the ECA authorises ICASA to grant licences and to
prescribe standard terms
and conditions for licences it grants. The
source of the authority to grant licences, such as that granted to
Classic FM in the
amended form, derives from the provisions of
section 5(1) of the ECA,
[9]
which empowers ICASA to,
amongst others, grant individual licences. Whereas, the authority to
prescribe standard terms and conditions
to be applied to such
individual licences, is sourced from the terms of section 8(1) of the
ECA.
[10]
[34]
Subsection 8(1) of the ECA, even though is prescriptive in nature, it
is, however, non-exhaustive.
It does not limit the powers of ICASA in
determining the standard terms and conditions because under
subsection 8(2) of the ECA,
ICASA is entitled to determine any other
terms and conditions even those not included in the ECA, itself.
This, ICASA has determined
in terms of regulations, that is, The
Standard Terms and Conditions for Individual Broadcasting Services
Regulations (“the
Standard Terms Regulations”).
[11]
ICASA may, also, in
accordance with the said section 8(1) of the ECA, vary the standard
terms and conditions of a licence in keeping
with the different types
of individual licences, granted.
[35]
Furthermore, the ECA empowers ICASA to make Regulations. The
empowering provisions are embodied
in sections 4(1)
[12]
and 5(7)(a)(i)
[13]
of the ECA. ICASA is in
terms of section 4(1) of the ECA empowered to make regulations with
regard to any matter which in terms
of the ECA or the related
legislation,
[14]
must or may be
prescribed, governed or determined by regulation. Whereas section
5(7)(a)(i) of the ECA, authorises ICASA to prescribe
regulations
setting out processes and procedures for applying for or registering,
amending, transferring and renewing, amongst
others, licences
specified in subsections 5(2)(b) of the ERA.
[15]
[36]
In accordance with sections 4(1) and 5(7)(a)(i) of the ECA, ICASA
has, as such, issued numerous
regulations, which include amongst
others: The ICASA South African Music Content Regulations, 2016 (“the
Music Regulations”);
[16]
and, the Processes and
Procedures Regulations.
[17]
[37]
The relevant provisions of the mentioned acts and regulations will be
dealt with, more fully
hereunder. What follows, immediately,
hereunder is the application of the law to the facts in the matter.
# THE APPLICATION OF THE
LAW TO THE FACTS
THE APPLICATION OF THE
LAW TO THE FACTS
[38]
The facts in these proceedings, are largely common cause. The dispute
lies in how the terms and
conditions of the relevant broadcasting
licence, the ECA and the regulations should be interpreted.
[39]
It is argued on behalf of HOT 1027 that ICASA and Primedia’s
interpretation of the above
prescripts, is not correct. Whilst on
behalf of ICASA and Primedia it is submitted that HOT 1027’s
approach to the law is
incorrect, would lead to absurdity and would
leave the statutory scheme inoperable. It would, further, undermine
the procedural
rights of other licensees who are impacted by HOT
1027's conduct.
[40]
The controversy lies there in that, as regards, the rebranding issue,
HOT 1027 interpret the
ECA and regulations thereto, to mean that the
name of a station is just objective information stated in the
licence, and can simply
be changed by notification to ICASA in terms
of Regulation 14(A) of the Processes and Procedures Regulations, and
Form O, thereof
(“Regulation 14(A)”). Whilst, in terms of
the format issue, HOT 1027 interpret the provisions of the ECA and
the regulations
thereto, to mean that the format of the “music
minutes” should be divided by taking the 24-hours of the
broadcasting
period, into consideration, as envisaged in Regulation
6(1) of the Standard Terms Regulations.
[18]
[41]
Conversely, ICASA and Primedia’s interpretation is to the
effect that, in relation to the
rebranding issue, the name of the
station is a term and condition of a licence and can only be changed
by application as envisaged
in the provisions of sections 8, 9 and 10
of the ECA read with Regulation 9 of the Processes and Procedures
Regulations.
[19]
And, in respect of the
format issue, the “music minutes” must be measured for
compliance by means of the performance
period as defined in
Regulation 1 of the Music Regulations.
[20]
[42]
As is trite, it is, therefore, the duty of this Court to determine
the correct interpretation
of the said prescripts, and in so doing,
determine the correct procedure in relation to the name change of a
station and the correct
formatting of the “music minutes”.
[43]
As a point of departure, this Court takes cognizance of the rule of
law principles raised by
counsel for HOT 1027 and counsel for ICASA,
in oral argument in Court. The arguments raise fundamental principles
of the rule of
law, which are instructive, and find application in
the circumstances of this application.
[44]
The argument of HOT 1027’s counsel is based on the
predictability, reliability and certainty
of the law that is
intrinsic in the rule of law. In this sense, counsel emphasised that
the law must be clear, must be publicised
and stable, and be applied
evenly. The submission of counsel in this regard was to emphasise HOT
1027’s argument that the
reasons and findings in the CCC
judgment and the decision of the Council, are all premised on the
imposition of obligations upon
HOT 1027, that are not found anywhere
in the express statutory or regulatory provisions or in the licence
itself. The contention
is that reliance is placed on a variety of
outside instruments to import duties that are not expressly provided
for in respect
of the duties on HOT 1027, as regards, the process to
be followed to effect the station name change and in respect of its
duties
to divide “musical minutes” in accordance with its
obligations under the licence.
[45]
Counsel for ICASA’s argument is, on the other hand, based on
the fact that the rule of
law does not allow people to take the law
into their own hands and resort to self-help. This is an indication
that HOT 1027 took
the law into its own hands when implementing the
station’s name change and dividing the musical minutes.
[46]
Of importance is that the issue that this Court must resolve, in
relation to the HOT 1027’s
Grounds of Review, is the
interpretative understanding of the legislative provisions applicable
to the change of name of a station
and the division of the “music
minutes”.
[47]
It is trite that judicial precedent now establishes that a so-called
unitary approach to the
interpretation of documents, whether they be
contracts, statutes or other written instruments, must be followed.
Account must,
at all times when interpreting the said instruments, be
taken of the text, context and purpose. This is the state of law as
was
made clear in the
Endumeni
judgment
[21]
by the Supreme Court of
Appeal, and restated by the Constitutional Court in cases like
Bato
Star
.
[22]
In
Chisuse
,
[23]
the Constitutional Court
explained that the purposive or contextual interpretation of
legislation must still remain faithful to
the literal wording of the
statute. That Court, in particular, stated that Courts must not lose
sight of the fact that the construction
given to legislation must
still be reasonable. And, cautioned that strained reading of texts,
no matter how well-intentioned, can
lead to dissonance.
[24]
[48]
The Constitutional Court in that judgment, quoting the judgment in
Abahlali
Basemjondolo Movement SA
,
[25]
stated emphatically so,
that:
“
[124 The rule of
law is a founding value of our constitutional democracy. Its content
has been explained in a long line of cases.
It requires the law must,
on its face, be clear and ascertainable.
…
[125] There can be no
doubt that the over-expansive interpretation of section 16 is not
only strained, but also offends the rule
of law requirement that the
law must be clear and ascertainable. In any event, separation of
power considerations require that
courts should not embark upon an
interpretative exercise which would in effect re-write the text under
consideration. Such an exercise
amounts to usurping the legislative
function through interpretation.”
[49]
In light of the aforementioned backdrop, the issues sought to be
determined in this matter are
dealt with hereunder in turn.
The
Rebranding Finding
[50]
In terms of its Rebranding Finding, as adopted by the Council, the
CCC made a finding that Classic
Ltd failed to comply with the ECA and
regulations made thereunder, as well as the terms and conditions of
its licence in that,
it changed the name of the station from Classic
FM 1027 to HOT FM 1027 without following the prescribed procedures.
[51]
HOT 1027 is challenging this finding and submits in its written
submissions that the CCC’s
reasoning on the Rebranding Finding,
adopted by the Council, exhibits two material errors of law in that:
51.1 it asserts
that the ECA, the Standard Terms Regulations and the Amended Licence
treat the name of the station and the
licensee as separate concepts;
and
51.2 it bases its
decision on the notion that the station name is a condition of the
licence that can be changed only through
an application to amend the
terms and condition of a licence.
[52]
The two purported material errors of law are dealt with hereunder, in
turn.
The
notion that the ECA, the Standard Terms Regulations and the Amended
Licence treat the name of the station and the name of the
licensee as
separate concepts
[53]
HOT 1027, in its papers, contends that the ECA does not treat the
name of the station and the
name of the licensee as separate
concepts, as such, no reliance can be placed on the Standard Terms
Regulations, to argue that
the statute envisages such a distinction.
[54]
This, however, is a different argument, because HOT 1027’s
counsel conceded, on a question
asked by the Court, that the name of
the licensee and that of the station are two separate concepts. This
concession by counsel
was correct, for in denying that the name of
the licensee and that of the station are two different concepts, HOT
1027 conflated
the notion of a station and a licensee when they are
in fact separate concepts, as can be discerned in the ECA, the
Standard Terms
Regulations and the licence.
[55]
In accepting the distinction, counsel, however, failed to explore the
legal consequences of that
difference. As argued, correctly so, by
ICASA’s counsel, the difference is not a mere distinction as a
matter of fact or
wish. It is a distinction based on a clear
regulatory environment in light of the controlling provisions of the
ECA and the regulations
regulating the industry. And, HOT 1027’s
counsel having accepted that there is such a distinction, it stands
to reason that
she must also accept, on behalf of HOT 1027, the
consequences of that distinction. These consequences will become
clear, later
in the judgment.
[56]
The second purported material error of law, follows hereunder.
The
Notion that the Station Name is not a Condition of the Amended
Licence
Submission
by HOT 1027
[57]
It is HOT 1027’s submission that the rebranding finding stands
to be reviewed and set aside
since, neither the legislature in
providing for conditions to be imposed, nor ICASA in issuing
regulations regarding terms and
conditions, provides for the station
name to constitute a condition of the licence. This, HOT 1027
submits is so because,
the ECA does not envisage the name of a
station as a condition of a licence, nor does the Standard Terms
Regulations treat the
name of the station as a condition of a
licence.
[58]
In addition, HOT 1027 submits that even the licence itself, does not
set the name of the station
as a condition of the licence. This, HOT
1027 argues is so, because the name in the licence, is merely
identified at the top of
the Schedule with no obligatory language
used, the name simply identifies what the name of the station is, in
contradistinction
to the remainder of the licence where obligatory
language is used.
[59]
According to HOT 1027, the only obligation regarding the station name
is required in terms of
the General Obligations of Licensees,
Regulation 11(3)
[26]
thereof,
which is that a station must clearly identify itself at intervals of
not more than thirty (30) minutes. However, as HOT
1027 argues, the
requirement is not that the station identify itself in accordance
with a particular name or the name that is in
the licence. HOT 1027,
argues, further, that, if the name of the station is treated as an
obligation of the licence, there can
be no name change. That is, if
the name of the station is a condition of the licence or is treated
as a condition of the licence,
or it is read together with the
regulations to mean that it is a condition of the licence, then, when
the identification announcement
is made, the name used must be
exactly as in the licence. Thus, HOT 1027 contends that the
regulatory scheme interpreted in the
context of the practical
considerations lead to the conclusion that the station name is not an
obligation of the licence and can
be changed in accordance with the
notice procedure set out in Regulation 14(A) of the Processes and
Procedure Regulations.
[27]
[60]
Besides, so HOT 1027 argues, no other regulatory process could have
been followed to change the
name of the station, because none is
prescribed. Neither the relevant legislation nor the regulations made
thereunder, prescribe
any formalities for a change of the name by
which a licence holder identifies itself on air. What is prescribed,
are the formalities
for notification of a change of ownership and/or
any change of name of a licensee. The change of a station name,
accordingly, did
not require an application for an amendment to the
terms and conditions of the licence. ICASA was properly notified of
the name
change in accordance with Regulation 14(A) and Form O and it
is adequate for purposes of the station name change, so it is argued.
Submission
by ICASA
[61]
In opposing the argument by HOT 1027, ICASA’s counsel submits
that there is a factual creep
into HOT 1027’s case justifying
the grounds of review that are mainly based on material errors of
law. The contention by
counsel is that HOT 1027’s
suggestion that the name of a station is not a condition of a
licence, but an objective fact
recorded in the licence, is
fundamentally wrong because, according to counsel, the name of a
station recorded in the licence goes
beyond a mere matter of
objective recording, it is a term and condition of the licence.
[62]
In reinforcing his argument, ICASA’s counsel referred to the
common cause facts between
the parties that, firstly, in sending Form
O to ICASA, HOT 1027 was requesting ICASA to consent to the name
change of the station
as given in the notice. This, according to
counsel, is so because HOT 1027 later on sent a letter to ICASA
seeking ICASA to provide
it with a letter of confirmation of the name
change. Counsel submits that it would have been odd that HOT 1027
would send such
a letter to ICASA, when ICASA was not required to do
anything about the name change.
[63]
Secondly, that the consequences of the application for the amendment
of the shift and change
of the music genre, as well as, the
application of the transfer of the licence to the new proprietor that
did not include the change
of name of the station, was that the
licence continued to identify the station, in Clause 1 of the
Schedule, as Classic FM 1027.
Thus, on the face of the licence
itself, the obligation on the part of Classic FM was to identify
itself through the name recorded
in the licence.
[64]
Thirdly, that, in the context of the highly competitive market under
which HOT 1027 operates,
there is, as counsel argues, an obligation
on HOT 1027, in terms of Regulation 11(3) of the Standard Terms
Regulations, which must
be fulfilled through the terms and conditions
of the licence, and, those terms and conditions include the name of
the station as
specified in the licence.
[65]
Lastly, that, the reference by HOT 1027 in its Annual Report as of
March 2020, that the name
of the station shall be as in Clause 1 of
the Schedule to the licence, is in its own language an indication
given by HOT 1027 that
the station name is not merely a matter of
objective fact, but, is a name as prescribed in the licence, and is,
thus, a term and
condition of the licence.
Submission
by Primedia
[66]
Primedia, on the other hand, supports ICASA’s decision which is
based on the notion that
the station name is a condition of the
licence that can be changed only through an application to amend the
terms and conditions
of a licence.
[67]
It argues, further, that it is a rational and necessary incident of
the legislative scheme that
when ICASA licenses a licensee to
broadcast a sound broadcasting service, it authorises the licensee to
broadcast a named station.
ICASA's licensing powers must, therefore,
be interpreted to include those powers that are reasonably necessary
or incidental to
the powers it is expressly granted in the ECA.
According to Primedia, it follows that the name of a sound
broadcasting service/station
is an express term of an individual
sound broadcasting licence, and HOT 1027’s licence demonstrates
this, in that:
67.1 the title of
the licence says that the licensee (Classic Ltd) is licensed by ICASA
"
for the provision of a commercial sound broadcasting service
to be known as Classic FM 1027.
"
67.2 the name of
the station is, again, explicitly named in Clause 1 of the Schedule
to the licence.
[68]
Primedia submits that HOT 1027’s interpretation that the only
requirement that rests on
a licensee when changing a station name is
to notify ICASA of the change of name of the licensee in accordance
with Regulation
14(A)(2)(a) of the Processes and Procedures
Regulations, is misconceived. It illustrates this by referring to
licensees that operate
multiple stations, where each of the multiple
stations operated by a single licensee has a separate obligation to
identify itself
by the licensed station name every thirty (30)
minutes. Primedia contends that Regulation 14(A)(2)(a) refers
specifically to the
licensee.
[69]
It argues further that HOT 1027’s interpretation if accepted,
will result in absurdity
as nothing in the statutory scheme would
prevent another station changing its name and referring to itself
every thirty (30) minutes
in that changed name. There would as such,
be no opportunity for interested and affected parties to make
representation, and no
power on the part of ICASA to approve or
reject the proposed change.
[70]
The ECA and the regulations do not expressly require the amendment of
specific terms and conditions
found in licences but impose a general
obligation to comply with the terms and conditions of the licence,
and to follow the prescribed
procedure to amend those terms and
conditions, so the argument goes.
Discussion
[71]
Whether the station name is a term and condition of a licence turns
on the interpretation of
the applicable law and the licence. Having
said so, it is this Court’s view that if it is found that the
station name is
a term and condition of the licence, the process to
be followed would be that of an application procedure, as contended
for by
ICASA and Primedia; and if it is found that the station name
is merely objective information, then, the procedure to follow is
that of notification as argued for by HOT 1027.
[72]
For the reasons that follow hereunder, it is this Court’s view
that the station name is,
as argued by ICASA and Primedia, a term of
the licence and can never have been intended to be objective
information stated in the
licence.
[73]
It is the view of this Court that the name clause in the licence, as
correctly submitted by Primedia,
is tied to specific legal
obligations set out in the ECA and its regulations. And, as pointed
out, correctly so as well, by Primedia
in argument, section 5(12) of
the ECA and Regulation 11(3) of the Standard Terms Regulations, when
read together with Clause 1
of the licence, provides the relevant
legal obligations of a licensee.
[74]
Section 5(12) of the ECA provides that “
[a] licence confers
on the holder the privileges and subjects him or her to the
obligations provided for in this Act and specified
in the licence."
That is to say, the conditions stipulated in a broadcasting
licence create privileges, as well as, statutory obligations for
licensees.
On the other hand, the provisions of Regulation 11(3) of
the Standard Terms Regulations, which stipulate that “
[a]
station must clearly identify itself at intervals of not more than
thirty (30) minutes”
, are a standard term of the licence,
which the licensee is obliged to comply with.
[75]
Therefore, section 5(12) of the ECA and Regulation 11(3) of the
Standard Terms Regulations when
read together with Clause 1 of the
licence, enjoined Classic FM 1027 - the sound broadcasting
service/station licensed then to
Classic Ltd – to identify
itself as Classic FM 1027, at regular intervals of thirty (30)
minutes. As such, until the station
name is changed, the station has
to continue identifying itself as Classic FM at intervals of thirty
(30) minutes.
[76]
Moreover, the effect of failing to amend the station name when the
application for the amendment
of the music genre or the application
of the transfer of licence to the new proprietor, was made, meant
that, on the face of the
licence, the licence continued to identify
the name of the station, in Clause 1 of the Schedule, as Classic FM
1027. The legal
consequences of which was that Classic FM remained
obligated to identify itself through the name recorded in the
licence. As
per
the analogy used by ICASA’s counsel
during argument, it would, indeed, be odd that a member of the public
would go to the
records of ICASA, and find that the name of the
station is recorded as Classic FM 1027, and yet, the station operates
publicly
under a different name. It is, therefore quite apparent that
on the face of the licence itself, the obligation on the part of
Classic FM
was to identify itself through the name recorded in
the licence.
[77]
Additionally, the argument by HOT 1027 that the licence does not set
the name of the station
as a condition of the licence, is not
sustainable. By the mere reading of the licence itself, it is
apparent that the title of
the licence says that the licensee
(Classic Ltd) is licensed by ICASA "
for the provision of a
commercial sound broadcasting service to be known as Classic FM
1027
", and the name of the station is, again, explicitly
named in Clause 1 of the Schedule to the licence. It is in that sense
that this Court is of the view that if the station name were simply a
trading name of the licensee, as HOT 1027 contends, there
would be no
need for the licence to describe - as it does - the licensee
distinctly from the station name. This, to this Court,
is a clear
indication that the name of the station is an express term of the
licence conditions.
[78]
This Court is not in agreement with the argument by HOT 1027 that the
ECA did not envisage the
name of a radio station as a term and
condition of a licence. This, HOT 1027 contends is so because the
non-exhaustive list of
conditions envisaged in section 8(2) of the
ECA, expressed in general terms, makes no reference to "station
name", and
that none of the classes of conditions envisaged in
section 8(2) include conditions that appear to have any bearing on a
station
name. It is, this Court’s view that the non-exhaustive
list of conditions envisaged in section 8(2) of the ECA, entitles
ICASA to determine any other term and condition of the licence even
those not included in the ECA. The fact that the station name
is not
referred to therein does not mean that it has been excluded.
[79]
Furthermore, it is of importance to note that Regulation 14(A) cannot
be used to change a station
name. There is, actually, nothing in the
provisions of Regulation 14(A) and the content or format of Form O,
which indicates that
once Form O is given, it entitles the licensee
to proceed with the name change.
[80]
Regulation 14(A), which HOT 1027 used in an attempt to effect the
name change, is titled notice
of change of information in respect of
an individual licence. Sub-regulation (1) thereof provides that a
notice of change of information
in a licence must be submitted in
Form O. Sub-regulation (2) thereof gives the content of the
information that may be changed in
terms of regulation 14(A), namely,
the name or contact details of the licensee changes; or the nature of
the service/s provided
in terms of the licence change; or
shareholding.
[28]
Form O, also, titled
notice of change of information in respect of an individual licence,
states the information required to be
changed as that of a licensee
and not the name of a station. From the aforesaid, it can be seen
that the licence terms and conditions,
which include the name
station, fall outside Regulation 14(A) and must, therefore, be
amended in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in section 10(2)
read with section 9(2) to (6) of the ECA.
[81]
Therefore, the submission by HOT 1027 that the regulatory scheme
interpreted in the context of
the practical considerations lead to
the conclusion that the station name is not an obligation of the
licence and can be changed
in accordance with the notice procedure
set out in Regulation 14(A), falls to be dismissed.
[82]
Furthermore, HOT 1027’s interpretation that the only
requirement that rests on a licensee
when changing a station name is
to notify ICASA of the change of name of the licensee in accordance
with Regulation 14(A)(2)(a)
of the Processes and Procedures
Regulations, is misconceived. This is so because in the context of
the highly competitive market
under which HOT 1027 operates, there
ought to be an obligation on HOT 1027, to inform any interested or
affected party of any intended
change of the name of the station, to
provide them with the opportunity to either make representations
and/or where necessary object
to the name change. ICASA must also be
given the opportunity to exercise its powers in terms of the ECA to
approve or reject the
proposed name change.
[83]
The interpretation given by HOT 1027 in its argument that the
requirement in Regulation 11(3)
of the General Obligations of
Licensees,
[29]
calling upon a
station to identify itself at intervals of not more than thirty (30)
minutes, does not oblige the station to identify
itself in accordance
with a particular name or the name that is in the licence, is without
substance.
Primedia,
in response to this contention, gave a useful illustration in
referring to licensees that operate multiple stations, like
SABC,
Primedia, Kagiso and others. Each of these multiple stations operated
by a single licensee has a separate obligation to identify
itself, as
a station, at intervals of not more than thirty (30) minutes, by
reference to the station name recorded in its licence.
It is indeed
so that if HOT 1027’s interpretation is to be accepted, it will
result in absurdity, as nothing in the statutory
scheme would prevent
another station changing its name and referring to itself every
thirty (30) minutes in that changed name.
[84]
Fundamentally, it is trite that subordinate legislation, as is the
case in this matter, cannot
be used to interpret primary legislation.
This has been made quite clear by the Constitutional Court in more
than one of its judgments.
It is quite obvious that reliance cannot
be placed on Regulation 14(A) and Form O in order to interpret the
provisions of sections
8 to 10 of the ECA, since Regulation 14(A) and
Form O are the products of the controlling provisions of section 8 to
10 of the
ECA. As such, an attempt by HOT 1027 to rely on Form O in
order to unilaterally change its station name does not survive the
clear
jurisprudential starting point that regulations cannot be used
to interpret primary legislation. Hence, HOT 1027 could not rely
on
having furnished ICASA with Form O to unilaterally change the name of
its station.
[85]
HOT 1027’s proposition that the ECA and the regulations do not
expressly provide for an
application to amend a station name, and
that no other regulatory process could have been followed to change
the name of the station,
because none is prescribed, cannot be
sustained in the face of the general obligation of a licensee to
comply with the terms and
conditions of the licence (the station name
is part of that) and to follow the prescribed procedure to amend
those terms and conditions.
[86]
It cannot be correct, as HOT 1027 wants to suggest, that the licence
does not set the name of
the station as a condition of the licence.
That the name of the station is set out as a condition of the licence
is plainly demonstrated
by the fact that, the name of the station is
explicitly stated together with other terms in the licence. The title
of the licence
mentions that the licensee (in this case Classic Ltd)
is licensed by ICASA "
for the provision of a commercial sound
broadcasting service to be known as Classic FM 1027
". The
name of the station is, again, named in Clause 1 of the Schedule to
the licence. The station name as such forms part
and parcel of the
terms and conditions of the licence.
[87]
This Court having made a finding that the name of a station is a term
of the licence, it stands
to reason that the procedure that must be
followed in changing the station name is that contained in sections
8, 9 and 10 of the
ECA read with Regulation 9 of the Processes and
Procedures Regulations, that is, the application procedure.
[88]
This Court, therefore, holds that the CCC by extension the Council's
determination, on this point,
was not influenced by any material
error of law.
The
Format Finding
[89]
In accordance with its format finding, the Council found that Classic
Ltd failed to comply with
its format obligations in terms of Clause
5.1 of its Amended Licence in that it played less than 50% of
Classical Music and more
than 50% of Old Skool and R&B Music
during the performance period" (the Format Finding).
Submission
by HOT 1027
[90]
The submission by HOT 1027 on this issue is that the CCC's judgment
ignores the entirety of the
legal argument presented at the hearing
in relation to the interpretation of the clause in the station’s
licence that relates
to format, namely Clause 5.1, having regard to
the typical licence conditions imposed by ICASA on the licensee, and
having regard
to the argument presented on the only use of the term
"performance period" in the regulations. The argument is
that instead,
the CCC states in the judgement, that
"[w]hether
or not Classic breached its obligations would depend on what
measurement the CCC decided to adopt"
, which according to
HOT 1027, is plainly wrong.
[91]
HOT 1027 argues that the CCC adopted the performance period as it
pleased, as is obvious from
the statement it made in paragraph 50.2
of its judgment, which says:
"The
performance period in terms of which ICASA measures the compliance of
licensees with their programme obligations is during
the period of
05h00 to 23h00 and not on a 24-hour period as suggested by Classic.
It follows, therefore, that where the amended
licence requires
Classic FM to play 50% Classical Music and 50% Old Skool and R&B
Music this is measured over the 18-hour period
of 05h00 to 23h00.
These are the hours when most listeners would be awake."
[92]
It is submitted further that the material error in the Format Finding
lies therein that the CCC,
and ultimately ICASA, read in an
obligation not found in the Amended Licence. That "reading in"
is, according to HOT
1027, motivated by reference to a "practice"
of limiting measurement of compliance to specific hours, as found in
the
Music Regulations and by placing reliance on a measurement
limitation in an unrelated term of the Amended Licence. No reliance
could be placed on these irrelevant considerations, and to have done
so constitutes a material error of law, so it is argued.
[93]
HOT 1027’s further submission is that on the plain reading of
the licence obligation in
question, there is no time period or
"performance period" obligation linked to the division of
the music genres; and,
the licence does not provide for a "shorter
schedule of daily broadcast operations" as contemplated in
Regulation 6(1)
of the Standard Terms Regulations, which states:
"(1)
A Licensee must provide broadcast services for twenty-four (24) hours
per day unless the Authority has approved a shorter
schedule of daily
broadcast operations as specified in the Schedule".
The
contention is that, in fact, the condition in the licence does not
specify how the division of the musical genres ought to be
measured
and ICASA, as well, did not indicate in the decision how the division
should have been allocated.
[94]
The argument is that the absence of reference to a specific time
period must be compared to the
conditions of the Amended Licence in
respect of the obligation to broadcast news, which is expressed
specifically by reference
to the hours between 05h00 and 23h00. In
other words, in the same licence, where ICASA required compliance by
reference to a specific
time period, it expressly regulated the hours
of measurement in the Amended Licence.
[95]
HOT 1027 argues, consequently, that based on a reasonable
interpretation of the condition, the
station divided the total
percentage of "musical minutes" (excluding weather, news,
interviews, advertisements and entertainment
by DJs) over the 24-hour
period that it is required to broadcast, and it, thus, plays
classical music from 19h00 to 04h59 and Old
Skool and R&B music
from 05h00 to 18h59. In the result, HOT 1027, contends that the
station provides 50% classical music and
50% Old Skool and R&B
music. The selected time division, according to HOT 1027, is
consistent with the rationale for the "format
change"
provided to ICASA and accepted in its reasoning.
[96]
Furthermore, although HOT 1027 admits that the station is not
broadcasting classical music between
05h00 and 23h00, it, however,
contends that this fact did not provide the basis for a complaint or
an adverse finding against the
station. According to HOT 1027, the
Amended Licence issued to the station does not link the 50/50
requirement to the performance
period because the performance period
cannot apply by operation of law in the absence of such a requirement
in the licence, since
such performance period is prescribed only in
the Music Regulations, and concerns the calculation of local content
(South
African Music)
.
[30]
[97]
There is, accordingly, no basis in law or fact for any submission
that the licensing obligation
in respect of the 50/50 split is linked
to any particular time of the day and the CCC's attempt to create one
is irrational. The
Format Finding must, therefore, be set aside, so
it is argued.
Submission
by ICASA
[98]
It is conceded on behalf of ICASA that the licence is silent on the
period over which the obligation
should be calculated. ICASA in its
submission confirms that the licence does not state whether the 50%
split is per day, per week,
per month, per year, or some portion of
the day. So, the argument is that, on its face, the licence is
ambiguous, because read
literally, Classic 1027 FM could comply with
its conditions in Clause 5.1 of the licence by only playing classical
music either
on Saturdays to Tuesdays, and then play Old Skool and
R&B music over the weekends, or on any other day, or it could
play it
from July to December, but not from January to June. The
licence as it stands
simply does not make any sense. A proper
period over which to calculate is required. The difficulty is that
the clause does not
exactly state what the period is, so texturally
it is ambiguous.
[99]
ICASA’s further submission is that HOT 1027’s argument
that the “music minutes”
should be divided by using the
24-hour period would have something in it if the text of the licence
said the licensee shall provide
50% classical music and 50% Old Skool
and R&B music over every 24-hour period. If that was what the
licence said, then it would
be acceptable that context cannot be used
to undermine those words. But, the licence does not say so. It also
does not state that
the performance period should be used. It is
effectively silent. It creates ambiguity. So the text does not
resolve the question,
so ICASA argues.
[100]
So, in ICASA’s argument, context and purpose will then have to
be looked at. As regards context, ICASA contends
that
Endumeni
[31]
refers to the material
known to those responsible for the production of the license. ICASA
contends that in this matter, the material
known is: that the licence
expressly uses certain hours regarding the broadcast of news –
which is 05h00 to 23h00; in ICASA’s
reasons when approving the
format amendment there is a specific reference that the listenership
has to be catered for on the traditional
platform; the music
regulations provides that the performance period is between 05h00 and
23h00, which is the same as the news
period; and the COVID-19
National Disaster Regulations speak about a shortened performance
period of between 07h00 and 21h00. Thus,
according to ICASA the whole
thrust is that the focus is always on daylight hours, either between
05h00 in the morning and 23h00
at night when most people are awake,
or between 07h00 and 21h00, that is, the shortened performance
period. This is the material
that was known to ICASA, so it is
argued.
[101]
According to ICASA, when there is a provision which does not specify
whether compliance should be measured by
the performance period or
per day, per week, per month per year, the natural understanding is
that the context, which is provided
by what is known by the material
known to everyone in the industry, will resolve the problem. In this
case that is during the performance
period.
[102] In
addition, ICASA submits that the above is the contextual approach
that the CCC followed which cannot be faulted
because Classic Ltd,
when it applied for the format amendment, it undertook to comply with
the local content obligations imposed
on licensees in terms of the
Music Regulations and it was on that basis that ICASA issued the
Amended Licence.
[103] The
second point that ICASA raises in its argument, is the purpose. It is
ICASA’s contention that the purpose
of the format obligation is
to protect and retain the format. In other words, to protect and
retain classical music. Not all of
the time, but enough of the time
that people who want to listen to it can listen to it. This, ICASA
submits, is clear from the
reasons provided by ICASA when it approved
the format amendment. However, HOT 1027 (Classic FM) intends to
broadcast classical
music only in the middle of the night and intends
to broadcast Old Skool and R&B music during the day when people
are awake.
This, according to ICASA’s counsel, will undermine
the very purpose of imposing format obligations.
[104] Counsel
in oral argument, gave an example which he contends is not
speculative, that if format obligations can
be adhered to whenever,
what it means is that if a licensee has an obligation to play 50% of
its programming in English and 50%
in Zulu, then it would be fine for
the licensee to broadcast Zulu at night when most people are asleep
and broadcast in English
during the day. It would then be fine for
licensees to only broadcast marginalized languages in the middle of
the night because
it is more profitable to broadcast in English
during the day, so counsel submits.
[105]
Furthermore, as ICASA argues, the performance period referred to in
the Music Regulations reflects a prevailing
practice which ICASA
utilises in the monitoring of compliance by licensees of their local
content obligations. A proposition was
made on behalf of ICASA that
ICASA operates in terms of the performance period when it measures
things like local content, COVID-19
risks and a variety of other
things. It measures across the performance period because that is
most of the time when the stations
are broadcasting to their
listeners.
[106]
Moreover, as ICASA argues, the 24-hour period which Hot 1027 relies
on for the division of the “music minutes”
provides for
the service during the night when most listeners are already asleep.
This time period, so ICASA argues, does not provide
access to
classical music and is patently not giving effect to the format
obligation.
[107] So, it
is on all the aforementioned reasons that ICASA argues that the
format finding cannot be assailed.
Submission
by Primedia
[108]
The submission by Primedia on this issue is that Classic Ltd has done
everything in its power to sidestep its
obligation to continue
playing classical music, in that it has relegated the playing of
classical music to the dead of night where
listenership is at its
very lowest, which is impermissible.
[109]
Primedia concedes that the text in Clause 5.1 of the licence, in
isolation, does not provide a clear answer whether
the obligation to
play 50% classical music and 50% Old Skool and R&B music is
calculated over a day, a part thereof or a week,
month or year. It,
however, submits that when the context within which the licence was
issued is considered, including ICASA's
prevailing practice, and the
purpose of the format obligation in the licence, it is clear that the
format obligation must be measured
in accordance with the performance
period.
[110]
According to Primedia, the context in which Classic Ltd's licence was
issued and the material known to those responsible
for its production
is that:
110.1
the licence expressly uses the performance period of 5h00 to 23h00
for measuring the licensee's obligation to broadcast news
for a
minimum of thirty (30) minutes each day.
110.2
in its reasons for the decision to amend the format requirements of
the licence, ICASA stated that it was of the view that
the regular
and classical music listener despite the decline, must not be
isolated but still catered for on the traditional platform.
The
contention is that it is, thus, absurd to suggest that the Amended
Licence allows Classic Ltd to relegate classical music to
the dead of
night.
[111]
It is Primedia’s contention that the obligation to broadcast
news on a regular basis for a minimum of thirty
(30) minutes each
day, the compliance of which is measured using the performance period
as
per
Classic FM's 2020 compliance report, is contextually
instructive as the period over which the format obligations fall to
be measured.
[112]
Primedia accepts, also, that the Music Regulations are concerned with
local content obligations. It submits, however,
that it is not its
argument that these regulations impose a direct obligation on Classic
Ltd to comply with the format requirements
within the performance
period. It, instead, argues that the Music Regulations are
instructive for purposes of the interpretive
exercise in identifying
the context with reference to the performance period. And, ICASA's
prevailing practice is to measure format
obligations with reference
to the performance period.
[113]
It is argued on behalf of Primedia that the purpose of the licence is
the clearest indication that the format
obligations under licences
could never be understood to apply over a 24-hour period. In the
present matter, the purpose of the
format obligation, as set out in
ICASA’s reasons for the decision to amend the format, is to
protect and retain the format
in question, and to ensure a diversity
of formats on the airwaves. In Classic FM's case it is to ensure that
classical music remains
on the airwaves and available and accessible
to listeners. Thus, HOT 1027's interpretation of its format
obligations would
undermine the purpose of the obligation, so the
argument goes.
[114]
Therefore, having regard to the text, context and purpose of Clause
5.1 of the licence, it is clear that the format
obligation in Classic
Ltd's licence, like in all licences, is not measured on the basis of
a 24-hour day. But, falls to be assessed
over what is known as the
performance period - that is the period between 05h00 and 23h00
daily, so Primedia submits.
[115]
Primedia asserts, in the final analysis, that having regard to the
text, context and purpose of Clause 5.1 of
Classic Ltd's licence, the
licence condition plainly falls to be assessed over the performance
period. Primedia concludes, consequently
that ICASA's decision in
respect of the format contravention was reasonable and lawful and
that there is no basis to set it aside
on review.
Discussion
[116]
It is common cause that the station’s Amended Licence states
that
"the Licensee shall provide 50% Classical Music and 50%
Old Skool and R&B Music
". It is, also, not in dispute
that there is no time period obligation linked to the division of the
music genres, that is,
the condition does not specify how the
division of the music should be allocated. ICASA, in the reasons
issued, did not, also,
indicate how the division should be allocated.
[117]
It is common cause that Classic Ltd wanted to do away, altogether,
with classical music, but, ICASA in its wisdom,
wanted to ensure that
classical music still remained on the airwaves in one form or
another. Most probably this was so that listeners
of classical music
should continue to enjoy a station that provides that type of music.
It is in that sense that ICASA made it
a condition of the licence
that Classic FM continue to play classical music.
[118] Indeed,
it may be irrelevant to HOT 1027’s commercial needs and quests
to make money, for it to play classical
music. That type of music may
also, no longer be popular with a number of listeners in different
genres of music. But, that, 50%
of classical music must be played in
its radio station, is a regulatory obligation. The obligation is in
the licence, and it must
be fulfilled. As a result, Classic FM must
continue to broadcast classical music. What is at issue is how to
apply the 50/50 split
to the music it should broadcast; or rather
when to broadcast classical music.
[119]
This, as HOT 1027 argues, is an unusual situation in that there is a
split between Old Skool and R&B music
genre on the one side and
classical music on the other. Old Skool and R&B types of music
are more or less in the same broad
genre. It might even be difficult
to draw precise lines between these particular genres. To the
contrary, classical music falls
totally outside these two genres,
and, is something quite different from the Old Skool and R&B type
of music.
[120]
HOT 1027 relies on the 24hour period in which a station is expected
to broadcast its programmes as specified in
Regulation 6(1) of the
Standard Terms Regulations, for the division of the music minutes.
Whereas, ICASA and Primedia, aligns themselves
with the terms of the
“performance period”, that is the hours between 05h00 and
23h00, as defined in the Music Regulations,
for the split in the
music minutes. On the face of the licence, there is, however, no
"performance period" obligation
linked to the division of
the music genres. Nor does the licence provide for a "shorter
schedule of daily broadcast operations"
as contemplated in
Regulation 6(1) of the Standard Terms Regulations.
[121]
The fundamental question that requires determination is whether the
50/50 split is to be measured on the basis
of 24 hours as contended
for by HOT 1027 or whether the correct measurement is in accordance
with the performance period, that
is, the hours between 05h00 and
23h00 as argued by ICASA and Primedia.
[122]
As earlier stated in this judgment, the text, context and purpose of
the relevant document are of importance when
interpreting a document.
In this matter they will assist this Court in the interpretation of
Clause 5.1 of the Amended Licence.
[123]
It is common cause that the text in this matter, does not resolve the
interpretation issue. This is so because
the clause in question does
not exactly state what the period is, so texturally it is ambiguous.
Therefore, context and purpose
will then have to be looked at.
[124] There
is no dispute in regard to the purpose of Clause 5.1 of the licence.
All the parties are agreed that the
purpose of the clause, as
specifically stated in the reasons for the decision of ICASA when it
approved the format amendment, is
to protect and retain the format.
In other words, to protect and retain classical music on the
airwaves. However, ICASA and Primedia
are of the opinion that
Classic's interpretation of its format obligations undermines the
very purpose of the obligation. As ICASA
argues, Classic undermines
the purpose of imposing the format obligation because it wants to
play classical music only in the middle
of the night when most
listeners of classical music are asleep and to play Old Skool and R&B
music during the day when people
are awake.
[125]
It is common cause that when there is a provision which does not
specify whether compliance should be measured
by the performance
period or in terms of the 24hour period, the natural understanding is
that the context, which is provided by
what is known by the material
known to everyone in the industry, will provide an answer.
[126]
It is not this Court’s understanding that there is a dispute in
respect of the material that is known in
the industry in relation to
the context of the format obligation. As ICASA contends, correctly
so, in this matter, the material
known is: that the licence expressly
uses certain hours regarding the broadcast of news – which is
05h00 to 23h00; in ICASA’s
reasons when approving the format
amendment there is a specific reference that the listenership has to
be catered for on the traditional
platform; the music regulations
provides that the performance period is between 05h00 and 23h00,
which is the same as the news
period; and the COVID disaster
regulations speak about a shortened performance period of between
07h00 and 21h00. Primedia submits
that the material known to the
industry is the licensee's obligation to broadcast news for a minimum
of thirty (30) minutes each
day, and ICASA’s reasons for the
decision to amend the format requirements of the licence,
[127]
This Court is, however, of the view that ICASA and Primedia, when
providing the material that is known to the
industry, left out the
24hour period stipulated in Regulation 6(1) of the Standard Terms
Regulations. This is another material
that is known in the industry
that provides that a station is expected to broadcast its programmes
over a period of 24hours, and
it should also be considered.
[128]
The CCC, in its judgment, held that ICASA was entitled to apply the
performance period yardstick in order to evaluate
and ensure
compliance with HOT 1027’s obligations referred to in Clause
5.1 of the amended licence. HOT 1027 is challenging
this finding and
contends that based on its reasonable interpretation of the
condition, the 24hour period is applicable. Whilst
on the other hand,
ICASA and Primedia do not agree to the use of the 24hour period for
the split of the music genres, they argue
that HOT 1027’s
challenge of the CCC’s finding is mistaken for the following
reasons:
128.1 HOT 1027 has not
contended that it is free from the application of the Regulations on
Local Content and that it is not obliged
to comply with obligations
imposed upon it in clause 3(2) of the Regulations on Local Content
which require it to play at least
35% of South African music spread
across the performance period, which is measured between the hours
05h00 and 23h00. What that
indicates is that the time from 23h01 to
04h49 is excluded from the performance period. The submission is
supported by reference
to the logs of musical recordings submitted by
HOT 1027 in response to the complaint of Kagiso, which make it clear
that HOT 1027
did play South African music in its broadcasting cycle
in terms of the Regulations on Local Content, and in that sense, have
accepted
the application of those Regulations in the presentation of
its music format.
128.2 Further, that ICASA
has always applied the practice of measuring compliance by licensees
with their music format obligations
by means of the yardstick of the
performance period. ICASA supports its argument by indicating that
the deponent to the founding
affidavit of HOT 1027 is aware of that
practice and has in fact invoked it when he submitted the logs of
another community broadcasting
station in which he is the contact
person.
[129]
Based on those reasons, it is submitted that the interpretation of
Clause 5.1 of the station’s Amended Licence
by the CCC is not
open to challenge, and that HOT 1027 has not shown any reviewable
irregularities arising from the conclusions
expressed by the CCC in
that regard.
[130]
In its conclusion that the format obligation must be measured in
accordance with the performance period, the CCC
in its judgment
relied, amongst others, on ICASA’s reasons for the decision to
amend Classic's licence to require it to broadcast
50% Classical
Music and 50% Old Skool and R&B Music. For instance, at paragraph
13.2.5 of ICASA’s reasons for the decision,
the following is
stated -
"In considering the
amendment the Authority was of the view that... allowing for
Classical Music to be provided on an online
platform will prejudice
its loyal listeners across the racial and cultural spectrum who may
not necessarily have means to tune
in on the online platform but are
depended on the traditional platform".
ICASA was further of the
view that "the regular and Classical Music listener despite the
decline, must not be isolated but
still be catered for on the
traditional platform".
The
CCC concluded based on the above passages that
“
It appears that
ICASA was specifically concerned that listeners of Classical Music
should not be "isolated", marginalized
or left in the cold,
as it were. It seems to me that by relegating Classical Music to the
hours when most people have gone to bed,
Classic is doing the very
thing that ICASA wanted to avoid.”
[131]
On this point, this Court is in alignment with HOT 1027’s
submission that the reasons for the decision of
ICASA when it
considered the application for an amendment of its licence, do not
permeate into the licence condition, as set out
in Clause 5.1 of the
licence. On the face of the licence, it is impossible to draw the
inference that the plain wording of Clause
5.1 of the station licence
holds such a meaning or that ICASA intended that classical music be
played at any particular time of
day (or night). The licence
certainly does not specify it.
[132]
Importantly, the passages which the CCC relied on are clear that
ICASA was debating the proper platform, whether
the traditional
platform or the online platform, on which classical music should be
provided. It was more concerned that if classical
music were to be
provided on the online platform, its loyal listeners across the
racial and cultural spectrum who may not necessarily
have means to
tune in on the online platform but are depended on the traditional
platform, would be prejudiced. ICASA was, also
concerned that if the
music was provided on the online platform, the regular and classical
music listeners would be isolated. It,
thus, opted to retain the
provision of classical music on the traditional platform. What is
patently clear is that if it was ICASA’s
intention that HOT
1027 should not play classical music at any time between 19h00 and
04h59, same is not distinct from the reading
of Clause 5.1 of the
licence.
[133]
Another reason provided by the CCC, by implication the Council, in
its judgment why it relied on the performance
period as a yardstick
to divide the music genres is mainly because, in terms of the Music
Regulations, ICASA measures the compliance
of licensees with their
programme obligations during the performance period of 5h00 and
23h00. It is in that sense that it concluded
that where the Amended
Licence requires Classic Ltd to play 50% classical music and 50% Old
Skool and R&B Music this should
be measured over the 18-hour
period of 5h00 to 23h00, which, according to the CCC, are the hours
when most listeners would be awake.
[134]
The challenge, however, is that Music Regulations, as correctly
argued by HOT 1027, were prepared and published
with the specific
purpose to regulate local content, as both the name and the source of
authority to issue the regulations as relied
on makes clear. The
context in which the reference to "performance period"
appears is in a regulation that is solely
concerned with local
content in programming, and not directed to any other purpose. The
compliance by the licensees which is required
to be measured in terms
of those regulations, is nothing else but the local content.
[135]
This Court, is of the view that HOT 1027 is correct in its suggestion
that there is no basis to rely on the performance
period outside the
applicability of the Music Regulations. The reliance by the CCC on
the Music Regulations to find a contravention
by the station, in
circumstances where the Music Regulations find no application in the
assessment of the duty to split playing
time between classical music
and Old Skool and R&B music as contained in the licence, is
indeed misplaced.
[136]
Even if ICASA were to persist in its argument that the performance
period is applicable, the challenge that it
will face is that the
Music Regulations do not stipulate the type of local music that
should be played during the performance period
and the exact time
within the performance period it should be played. What appears to be
of importance is that a station plays
35% of South African music
during the performance period. That period stretches from 5h00 until
23h00, and it is not disputed that
Classic FM plays classical music
within that time period, that is, from 19h00 until 4h59. There is no
evidence on record that the
classical music played by Classic FM is
not South African music.
[137]
Besides, the 35% South African music that must be played by Classic
FM is not only specific to classical music
but is inclusive of the
other music genres that are provided for in the Amended Licence. When
calculating 35% of the local content
ICASA must consider all three
music genres across the performance period. It should not only look
at classical music. Therefore,
the argument that the performance
period should be applied to the format obligation because Classic Ltd
agreed, when it applied
for the format amendment, to comply with the
provisions of the Music Regulations, is misplaced.
[138]
Moreover, this Court does not understand HOT 1027 to be saying that
it is free from the application of the Music
Regulations on local
content and that it is not obliged to comply with obligations imposed
upon it in Regulation 3(2) of the Music
Regulations on local content
which require it to play at least 35% of South African music spread
across the performance period
which is described as a period of 126
hours in a week measured between the hours 05h00 and 23h00.
[139]
HOT 1027’s contention, which in this Court’s view is
correct, is only that the performance period
does not find
application to the format conditions, and applies only to the
calculation of local content (the total amount of music
played by a
licensee that must be composed and/or performed by South Africans) -
not to a particular genre of music, like classical
music and not to
Old Skool and R&B Music. In this Court’s view, it is an
inconceivable error of law, as correctly argued,
that the performance
period, which applies only to a specific set of regulations on local
music content, would apply to a format
related licence obligation.
[140]
Primedia’s submission that because HOT 1027 in its argument
acknowledges that as of now it broadcasts classical
music between
19h00 and 04h59 which translates into only 22,2% of the musical
minutes played, instead of 50%, misses the point
of HOT 1027’s
argument. HOT 1027’s proposition is that during the day, the
lengthier period of time during which Old
Skool and R&B music is
played includes advertising time, news, interviews, and listener
interaction including competitions,
which reduces the "musical
minutes" played to an equivalent 50%, that is, the total music
played within the 24-hour period
translates into 50% classical music,
and 50% Old Skool and R&B music.
[141]
It is clear that the Music Regulations apply only to the calculation
of local content not a particular genre of
music, like classical
music and not Old Skool and R&B music. It is, thus, this Court’s
view, that the performance period
is not a yardstick in terms of
which ICASA should measure the compliance of licensees with their
programme obligations but it should
measure compliance with local
content.
[142]
In the circumstances, HOT 1027 is correct, no reliance can be placed
on the performance period as set out in the
Music Regulations to
impose an obligation on the licensee in regard to a format
obligation. In any event, there is no provision
in the statutes and
the regulations that makes the performance period applicable to the
split in formats envisioned in the licence,
in circumstances where
the Music Regulations find no application in the assessment of the
duty to split playing time between classical
music and Old Skool and
R&B music as contained in the licence. Section 5(12) of the ECA
provides that “
[a] licence confers on the holder the
privileges and subjects him or her to the obligations provided for in
this Act and specified
in the licence"
. The provisions make
clear that the obligations of the station must be sourced either in
the statute or in the licence conditions.
[143]
Furthermore, the reliance by ICASA in its decision on what it refers
to as its "prevailing practice"
to found a contravention by
Hot 1027 of Clause 5.1 of its licence, is to this Court farfetched
and of no consequence, as these
proceedings are concerned with
alleged non-compliance with statutory and regulatory obligations, not
alleged non-compliance with
a practice.
[144]
As it is, HOT 1027 did not at any time suggest that it would offer
two different formats in its broadcast period.
In fact, it
specifically requested a complete format change to Old Skool and R&B
music in its amendment application. It was
ICASA, in its wisdom,
which imposed a 50/50 format and which sat and considered this split.
It is thus within its knowledge how
it foresaw how the split would
operate. It must therefore have determined in what manner the split
was to be made, it should as
such, have indicated same in the
licence.
[145]
ICASA, in its wisdom, specifically endorsed another condition in HOT
1027’s Amended Licence, that obliged
Classic FM to broadcast
news on a regular basis for a minimum of thirty (30) minutes each day
between the hours of 5h00 and 23h00.
When the two conditions are
compared, it shows that the format clause is indeed ambiguous. It is
this Court’s view that if
ICASA was concerned that a specific
obligation must be complied with by reference to a specific time
period, it should have expressly
stated so in the licence. In this
way, it would have avoided the ambiguity that currently exist.
[146]
Moreover, the news broadcast obligation is an indication that where
ICASA is particularly concerned that a specific
obligation must be
complied with by reference to a specific period, that is, when it
wants to impose an obligation by reference
to a time period, as it
did with the time of the news broadcast, it does so, and, it does so
expressly. For example, in the ICT
COVID-19 National Disaster
Regulations,
[32]
ICASA
established minimum standards for the National State of Disaster,
including a shortened performance period and it specifically
set the
period of 07h00 to 21h00.
[147]
Without any guidance provided by ICASA as to when it expected the
classical music to be played, it left it to
HOT 1027 to decide the
best way it would deal with the split. HOT 1027, as a result, divided
the total percentage of "musical
minutes" (excluding
weather, news, interviews, advertisements and entertainment by DJs)
over the 24-hour period that it is
required to broadcast, and it
broadcasts - classical music from 19h00 to 04h59, and Old Skool and
R&B music from 05h00 to 18h59.
In the result, it is providing 50%
classical music and 50% Old Skool and R&B music. The selected
time division, as correctly
argued by HOT 1027, is consistent with
the rationale for the format change provided to ICASA and accepted in
its reasoning.
[148]
It is, therefore, this Court’s view that the CCC's decision
constitutes a reviewable irregularity.
The
duties of the Council when considering the recommendations of the CCC
[149]
The supposition by HOT 1027, in this regard, is that the Council
appears to have rubber-stamped the decision of
the CCC, without
critically engaging in the basis for the decision and the correctness
of the reasoning that underpins the findings.
Moreover, the decision
appears to have been made without any consideration or appreciation
of its practical effect.
[150]
In its further submission, HOT 1027 argues that the Council is by no
means bound by the recommendations of the
CCC, and when considering
the recommendations of the CCC, it must take all relevant matters
into account, one of which is the recommendations
of the CCC. Others
are the nature and gravity of the non-compliance, the consequences of
the non-compliance, the circumstances
in which the non-compliance
occurred and steps taken by the licensee. And, it must, ultimately,
make a decision that is permitted
by the ICASA Act or the underlying
statutes, and provide reasons for the decision to affected persons.
[151]
According to HOT 1027, the Minutes of the Council reveals that the
prescripts of the statute were not met, in
that, the CCC simply
presented its recommendations, Management raised one question
concerning a licensee’s name change, which
was answered with
the assertion that
"a change for a licensee requires a
notification, ...a change of the name of station requires an
amendment of the license as
it involves members of the public"
.
[152]
The submission is that nothing other than the recommendations of the
CCC was considered by the Council. And, this,
as HOT 1027 argues,
means that the Council merely rubber-stamped the recommendations of
the CCC without engaging with the issues
and relevant materials,
including the record, that served before it. This, therefore in HOT
1027’s opinion, renders the decision
reviewable, independently
from the considerations already addressed above.
[153]
Counsel for HOT 1027, in her submission before Court, argued that
there seems to be a mistaken suggestion that
the recommendations of
the CCC come before the Council for the Council to look at what
consequences attaches to the finding, and
not for the Council to
consider them. The contention is that the obligations that the
statute places on the Council is to take
all relevant matters into
consideration. The Council is not just there to take the
recommendations of the CCC and agree with them
without having
considered them. The Council should not just rubber stamp the
recommendations of the CCC, so counsel argues.
[154]
Counsel further suggests that what happened during the Council
meeting was a brief discussion and except for only
one question that
was raised by a member of Council, little else was interrogated of
what the CCC had said in its judgment. This,
according to counsel, is
in stark contradistinction to the exercise this Court was engaged
with at the hearing of these proceedings,
like for instance,
questioning the content of the licence, the meaning of the licence
and the difference between a licence, a licensee’s
name and the
radio station name. The Council seemed to have just accepted that the
CCC was correct in its conclusions, so counsel
argues. That,
according to counsel, was non-compliance with its duties.
[155]
The very reason why the decision of the CCC is not final and binding
is because the legislature thought it good
to impose another level of
consideration by the Council and what it asks of the Council is to
interrogate the legal conclusions
that are drawn by the CCC. The
legislature asks the Council, if it is necessary, to have regard to
the record that must be placed
before it, in order to inform itself
of the correctness or otherwise of the CCC’s decision. None of
that exercise was, according
to counsel, done.
[156]
In support of the argument that the Council should not just rubber
stamp the recommendations of the CCC, counsel
for HOT 1027, referred
this Court to the Constitutional Court’s finding in
Walele
,
[33]
as authority that the
rubber stamping of this nature is not in order, and is, thus, not
acceptable. In
Walele
,
the City of Cape Town (“the City”) made certain
assertions that were not borne out by the objective facts provided.
When asked to furnish the list of documents placed before the
decision-maker, the City mentioned certain documents and confirmed
that those were the only documents that served before that
decision-maker at the time. The Constitutional Court found that
“
there
could be
no
doubt that these documents could not reasonably have satisfied the
decision- maker"
or
that, if indeed the decision-maker was so satisfied,
"his
satisfaction was not based on reasonable grounds"
.
[34]
[157]
Support for the argument was, also, based, in a different context, in
New
Clicks
,
[35]
a judgment of the
Constitutional Court where it was stated that a Minister, who was
required to make regulations based on a recommendation,
was not
allowed merely to
"rubber
stamp the recommendation"
,
but rather had to apply her mind to it and
"make
a decision whether to accept such recommendation"
.
[36]
It was held in that
context that the Minister could only do this if furnished with the
information that formed the basis of the
recommendation, so the
argument goes.
[158]
What is of importance in these judgments, so counsel suggests, is
that the judgments establish the principle that
when a decision-maker
is confronted with a recommendation, that is, something is put, like
in this instance, before the Council
for approval, the Council must
ask for the underlying documents. The Council must interrogate
whether that recommendation is consistent
with the record, and
whether it is consistent with the underlying documents.
[159]
This exercise, as counsel contends, was not done, or at the very
least, it was not done properly. On the basis
of this argument, she
made a proposition that, in the instance of this matter, the
reasoning of the CCC, which effectively stands
as the reasoning of
the Council, is based on an incorrect interpretation of the law.
There are errors of law that underpin the
decision, and for that
reason alone, the decision must be set aside. It must, also, be set
aside because the Council did not perform
its duties in the manner it
was required to perform them when it evaluated the recommendations of
the CCC.
[160]
The above case precedents, according to counsel for HOT 1027,
underscore that it is not sufficient to merely rubber-stamp
the
recommendations of the CCC. And, in doing so, the Council erred and
failed to comply with its statutorily imposed obligations.
[161]
It is trite that in terms of section 17D(1) of the ICASA Act the CCC
must make a finding on all complaints received
by it or referred to
it by ICASA. It must, also recommend to ICASA the action ICASA must
take against the licensee. Then, in accordance
with section 17D(3) of
that Act, the CCC must submit its finding and recommendations
contemplated in subsections 17D(1) and (2)
of that Act, and a record
of such proceedings to the Council for a decision contemplated in
section 17E of the ICASA Act regarding
the action to be taken by
ICASA.
[162]
When making a decision contemplated in section 17D, the Council is
enjoined in terms of section 17E(1) of the
ICASA Act, to take all
relevant matters into account, including – (a) the
recommendations of the CCC; (b) the nature and
gravity of the
non-compliance; (c) the consequences of the non-compliance; (d) the
circumstances under which the non-compliance
occurred; (e) the steps
taken by the licensee to remedy the complaint; and (f) the steps
taken by the licensee to ensure that similar
complaints will not be
lodged in the future.
[163]
It is not in dispute that for purposes of the hearings before the
CCC, the CCC prepared hearing bundles. These
hearing bundles,
together with the heads of argument submitted by the parties, the
transcripts of the proceedings before the CCC,
the CCC recommendation
(including the reasons therefore), served before the Council meeting
at which the recommendations of the
CCC were adopted.
[164]
It is not HOT 1027’s complaint that the Minutes of the Council
are incomplete. Rather, the position that
HOT 1027 adopts is that the
Minutes are wholly inadequate to establish a fair and reasonable
endorsement of the CCC's recommendations,
particularly having regard
to the obligations on ICASA under section 17E(1)(a) to (f) of the
ICASA Act. The main issues being that
at the Council meeting that sat
to consider the CCC recommendations only one question was asked by
management and answered.
[165]
The argument in opposition to HOT 1027’s proposition that the
Council rubber stamped the CCC’s recommendations,
is well
taken. It is the view of this Court that HOT 1027’s argument on
this issue is unsustainable because the principles
it relies on, as
enunciated in
Walele
and
New
Clicks
, have no
application to the facts of this case. These principles, as correctly
argued by Primedia, have not been breached in these
proceedings.
[166]
In
Walele
,
the Building Control Officer had not placed the relevant information
that substantiated his "recommendation" before
the
decision-maker.
[37]
That Court, therefore,
considered that the Building Officer' signature on a document was not
a "recommendation" in terms
of the relevant statute on
which the decision maker could decide.
[38]
Whereas, in
New
Clicks
,
the Court criticised the Minister for rubber stamping the
recommendations of a committee on the basis that the Minister
accepted
the fees recommended by a Pricing Committee without being
furnished with an explanation of how the fees were arrived at.
[39]
[167]
This Court, as a result, agrees with the argument that the facts in
these proceedings are completely distinguishable
from those in
Walele
and
New Clicks
, in that this matter is not the same as in
Walele
where the persons charged with making the
recommendation placed no supporting information before the
decision-maker. It is, also,
not the case as in
New Clicks
where the decision maker was given no explanation for the
recommendation.
[168]
It is common cause that in these proceedings, the Council was
provided with detailed reasons for the CCC’s
recommendations
which appears in the written judgment of the CCC. The Minutes of the
meeting of the Council at which the impugned
decision was taken
indicates that a CCC member presented the CCC's submission and
recommendations to the Council. The Minutes reflects,
further, that
the CCC's written reasons for its decision served before the Council,
and that the Council deliberated on the recommendations
and the
judgment during that meeting. Following the Council’s
considerations of the CCC's written reasons, the oral submission
and
the deliberation, the Minutes records that the Council approved the
submission and made its decision. HOT 1027 was made aware
of the
CCC’s reasons for its recommendations to the Council in the
letter which informed it of the outcome of the complaints,
to which
the CCC judgment was attached.
[169]
There is no evidence on record, none was proffered in oral argument
before this Court, that when the Council members
were provided with
the documents that served before the Council, they did not read them
or that having read them, they were not
satisfied with the contents
thereof. The fact that no questions, except the one asked by
Management, were asked, does not mean
that the Council members did
not interrogate the documents and satisfied themselves that the
recommendations are consistent with
the record and the underlying
documents. To the contrary, that no questions were asked at the
meeting, is in this Court’s
view, an indication that the
Council members were indeed satisfied with the recommendations of the
CCC. They were also content
that the recommendations are consistent
with the record and the documentation that served before Council in
that meeting.
[170]
It is on the basis of all these reasons that this Court comes to a
conclusion that the procedure followed by the
Council when it made
the decision, cannot be assailed.
REMEDY
[171]
As earlier indicated in this judgment, the interim relief sought in
Part A of the Notice of Motion was disposed
of by agreement between
the parties. The agreement was made an Order of Court on 10 May 2022.
In terms of the said Court Order,
the operation of the decision
issued by ICASA to confirm the recommendations of the CCC was
suspended pending the outcome of the
review application in Part B,
which is before this Court for determination.
[172]
Pursuant to the said Court Order, Classic Ltd was allowed the use of
the station name Hot 1027 FM pending the
outcome of the application
before this Court. This Court having found in favour of ICASA and
Primedia in regard to the name change,
it follows that after more
than a year of broadcasting under the new station name, the station
has to change back to being referred
to as Classic FM.
[173]
This will be so even though, in accordance with its licence
provisions, Classic FM is now obliged to play music
that is not 100%
classical music, as it used to do. This, as HOT 1027 argues, has
potential disastrous consequences for its fundamental
strategy aimed
at making the station attractive to a broader audience and,
therefore, a broader spectrum of advertisers. And, also,
on the
backdrop of the station having just been saved from business rescue
and possible liquidation.
[174]
Importantly, if HOT 1027 later opts to revert to the station name of
HOT 1027 FM, it will then have to make a
formal application for the
name change, pay a fee of R70 000 to ICASA and then await
ICASA’s decision on the amendment
process, a process that
previously had taken more than a year to complete. This is the
process that it will follow in the event
the proposed new regulations
for changing the station name are not yet promulgated by the time HOT
1027 starts the process of the
name change.
[175]
All this process of changing names, will lead to confusion amongst
the current listeners and any other potential
listener of the
station, and/or classical music who might end up losing interest in
the station, and with consequences in respect
of any number of
reporting and monitoring obligations for the station. It is this
Court’s view that such a situation should
it be allowed to
persist would certainly be untenable for the station.
[176]
In terms of section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution this Court has a
wide discretion to consider an appropriate
relief which is just and
equitable. In
Hoërskool
Ermelo
,
[40]
the Constitutional Court
when granting a remedy based on section 172(1)(b) of the
Constitution, expressed itself as follows:
“
[96]
Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that when this Court
decides a constitutional matter within its power it ‘may
make
any order that is just and equitable’. The litmus test will be
whether considerations of justice and equity in a particular
case
dictate that the order be made. In other words, the order must be
fair and just within the context of a particular dispute.
[97]
It is clear that section 172(1)(b) confers wide remedial powers on a
competent court adjudicating a constitutional matter.
The remedial
power envisaged in section 172(1)(b) is not only available when a
court makes an order of constitutional invalidity
of a law or conduct
under section 172(1)(a). A just and equitable order may be made even
in instances where the outcome of a constitutional
dispute does not
hinge on constitutional invalidity of legislation or conduct. This
ample and flexible remedial jurisdiction
in constitutional disputes
permits a court to forge an order that would place substance above
mere form by identifying the actual
underlying dispute between the
parties and by requiring the parties to take steps directed at
resolving the dispute in a manner
consistent with constitutional
requirements. In several cases, this Court has found it fair to
fashion orders to facilitate a substantive
resolution of the
underlying dispute between the parties.” (Footnotes omitted).
[177]
This Court has earlier on made a finding to uphold the decision of
ICASA in relation to the rebranding finding.
It has, also, found that
the decision will have a disastrous outcome for HOT 1027, if it is
upheld. It this Court’s view
that in order to avoid the
disastrous outcome, the decision should not be confirmed. Such an
order, if granted, would be just and
equitable in the circumstances
of this matter.
[178]
This Court, is however, of the view that HOT 1027 should still be
held liable to pay a fine for its transgression
in respect of the
rebranding finding. In its finding that HOT 1027 contravened the
provisions of the ECA and its regulations in
relation to the
rebranding and format findings, ICASA directed HOT 1027 to pay a fine
of R25 000. Nonetheless, this Court
found in favour of ICASA in
regard to the rebranding decision and for HOT 1027 in relation to the
format decision.
[179]
Due to the fact that in its judgment, the CCC does not indicate how
the amount of R25 000 is split between
the two contraventions,
it is this Court’s view that the issue be referred back to
ICASA to determine the amount which HOT
1027 should pay as a fine for
the rebranding decision.
COSTS
[180]
Three issues were before this Court for determination. Of those three
issues, HOT 1027 was successful in only
one. ICASA and Primedia are
each successful in respect of the two other issues, and are,
therefore, substantially successful. ICASA
and Primedia are, in that
regard, entitled to be granted the costs of the application.
[181]
Both ICASA and Primedia applied to be granted costs including costs
of two counsel, one senior and one junior,
in the event of their
success. It is this Court’s view that the complexity and
intricacy of this matter required the attendance
of two counsel, and
that such costs should be granted.
[182]
ICASA and Primedia being the successful parties, an order for costs
inclusive of the costs of two counsel should
be granted in their
favour. HOT 1027 should, as a result, be ordered to pay the costs of
the application, which costs must be inclusive
of costs consequent
upon the employment of two counsel, one senior and one junior.
# ORDER
ORDER
[183]
In the circumstances, the following order is made:
1.
The decision issued by the First Respondent to confirm the
recommendations of the Third Respondent
in respect of its internal
case numbers 427/2021 and 423/2021, issued on 12 April 2022 (the
decision), is hereby reviewed and set
aside.
2.
The Applicant is ordered to pay a fine in respect of the Rebranding
Decision.
3.
The calculation of the
quantum
of the fine is remitted to the
First Respondent for determination.
4.
The Applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application for the
First, Second, Third,
and Fourth Respondents, such costs to include
costs consequent upon the employment of two (2) counsel for each of
the Respondents,
one senior and one junior.
E. M. KUBUSHI J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearances
:
Applicant’s
Counsel:
M J Engelbrecht SC
Applicant’s
Attorneys:
Bowman Gilfillan inc.
First
to Third Respondents’ Counsel:
Vincent Maleka SC
K Manyage
First
to Third Respondents’ Attorneys:
Mashiane, Moodley & Monama
Attorneys
Fourth
Respondent’s Counsel:
Steven Budlender SC
Annabel Raw
Fourth
Respondent’s Attorneys:
Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs Inc
Date
Heard:
07 September 2022
Date
of Judgment:
13 January 2023
[1]
Act No. 13 of 2000.
[2]
Act no. 36 of 2005.
[3]
Section 4(3)(b) of the ICASA Act.
[4]
Licensing Processes and
Procedures Regulations, 2010, GG 33293, GN R522, 14 June 2010, as
amended.
[5]
Act No. 3 of 2000.
[6]
Section 6(2)(d) of PAJA.
[7]
Section 6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA.
[8]
Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(cc)
and 6(2)(f)(ii)(dd) of PAJA.
[9]
“
5
Licensing
(1) The Authority
may, in accordance with this Chapter and the regulations prescribed
hereunder, grant individual and class
licences.”
[10]
“
8 Terms
and conditions for licences
(1) The Authority
must prescribe standard terms and conditions to be applied to
individual licences and class licences.
The terms and conditions may
vary according to the different types of individual licences and,
according to different types of
class licenses.”
[11]
Standard Terms and
Conditions for Individual Broadcasting Services, 2010, GG 33296, GN
R523, 14 June 2010, as amended.
[12]
“
4
Regulations by Authority
(1)
The Authority may make regulations with regard to any matter which
in terms of this Act or the related legislation must or
may be
prescribed, governed or determined by regulation. Without derogating
from the generality of this subsection, the Authority
may make
regulations with regard to-
(a)
any technical matter necessary or expedient for the regulation of
the services identified in Chapter 3;
(b)
any matter of procedure or form which may be necessary or expedient
to prescribe for the purposes of this Act or the
related
legislation;
(c)
the payment to the Authority of charges and fees in respect of-
(i)
the supply by the Authority of facilities for the inspection,
examination or copying of material under
the control of
the Authority;
(ii) the
transcription of material from one medium to another;
(iii)
the supply of copies, transcripts and reproductions in whatsoever
form and the certification of copies;
(iv) the
granting of licences in terms of this Act or the related
legislation;
(v)
applications for and the grant, amendment, renewal, transfer or
disposal of licences or any interest in a licence
in terms of this
Act or the related legislation; and
(d)
generally, the control of the radio frequency spectrum, radio
activities and the use of radio apparatus.”
[13]
“
5
Licensing
…
(7)
The Authority must prescribe regulations-
(a)
setting
out-
(i) the
process and procedures for applying for or registering, amending,
transferring and renewing one or more
of the licences specified in
subsections (2) and (4);”
[14]
In terms of the
definition section of the ECA “
related
legislation”
means
the Broadcasting Act and the Independent Communications Authority of
South Africa Act and any regulations, determinations
and guidelines
made in terms of such legislation and not specifically repealed by
this Act.
[15]
“
5
Licensing
(2)
The Authority [ICASA] may, upon application and due consideration in
the prescribed manner, grant individual licences for
the following:
…
(b)
broadcasting services;”
[16]
GG 39844, Vol. 609, GN
344, 23 March 2016.
[17]
Idem
n
4.
[18]
Idem
n
11, “
6
Hours of Operations
(1)
A Licensee must provide broadcast services for twenty-four (24]
hours per day unless the Authority [ICASA] has approved a
shorter
schedule of daily broadcast operations as specified in the
Schedule."
[19]
“
9. Application
to amend an individual Licence
(section
10 of the Act)
An
application to amend a licence must be in the format as set out in
Form C and it must be accompanied by the applicable fee.”
[20]
Idem
n
17. “
1.
Definitions
In
these regulations any word to which a meaning has been assigned to
it in the Independent Communications Authority of South
Africa Act
(Act no. 13 of 2000) and the underlying statutes, will have that
meaning, unless the context indicates otherwise-
"Performance
Period"
means the period of 126 hours in one week measured
between the hours 05h00 and 23h00 each day.”
[21]
Natal Joint Municipal
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012
(4) SA 593 (SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA); [2012] ZASCA 13.
[22]
Bato Star Fishing
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others
2004 (4) SA 490 (CC);
2004 (7) BCLR 687; [2004] ZACC 15.
[23]
Chisuse and Others v
Director General, Department of Home Affairs and Another
2020 (6) SA 14
(CC);
2020 (10) BCLR 1173
(CC);
[2020] ZACC 20
, para [52].
[24]
Idem
n 24,
para [54].
[25]
Abahlali
Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of The Province of KwaZulu-Natal
2010 (2) BCLR 99
(CC);
2009 JDR 1027 (CC);
[2009] ZACC 31
(CC), paras 124 -125.
[26]
Idem
n
11.
[27]
Idem
n
4.
[28]
Regulation 14(A)(2).
[29]
Idem
n 11.
[30]
Idem
n
17.
[31]
Idem
n
22.
[32]
GG
43207, Vol. 658, GN 238, 6 April 2020.
[33]
Walele v City of Cape
Town and Others
2008
(6) SA 129 (CC); 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC); [2008] ZACC 11.
[34]
Idem
n
34, para [60].
[35]
Minister of Health
and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others
(Treatment Action Campaign and Another as Amici
Curiae)
2006 (2) SA 311 (CC);
2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); [2005] ZACC 14.
[36]
Idem
n
36, para [542].
[37]
Idem
n
34, para [70].
[38]
Idem
n 34,
para [71].
[39]
Idem
n
36, para [542].
[40]
Head of Department,
Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v Hoërskool
Ermelo and Another
2010
(2) SA 415
(CC);
2010 (3) BCLR 177
(CC);
[2009] ZACC 32
at para
[96]
-
[97]
.
sino noindex
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