Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 100South Africa
Terblanche v Terblanche and Another [2023] ZAGPPHC 100; 35072/2021 (17 February 2023)
Headnotes
under title deed number [....]and with street address situated at [....] L [....] Street, Murrayfield, Pretoria, Gauteng, remains the registered and exclusive property of the Plaintiff."
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Terblanche v Terblanche and Another [2023] ZAGPPHC 100; 35072/2021 (17 February 2023)
Terblanche v Terblanche and Another [2023] ZAGPPHC 100; 35072/2021 (17 February 2023)
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sino date 17 February 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
PROVINCIAL DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO.: 35072/2021
REPORTABLE:
NO.
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES.
REVISED.
Date
of hearing: 7 February 2023
Date
of Judgment: 17 February 2023
In
the matter between:
REGINA
ELIZABETH
TERBLANCHE
Applicant
and
PIERRE
TERBLANCHE
1
st
Respondent
PIERRE
TERBLANCHE
N.O.
2nd Respondent
JUDGMENT
1.
This
application
turns
on
the
enquiry
whether
the
applicant
has
discharged
the
onus to proof that the respondents are in contempt of court. The
applicant seeks, ancillary
to
a
contempt
of
court
order,
a
suspended
sentence
of
committal
to
jail. The
applicant
also
seeks
an
order
for
payment
of
the
amount
of
R1
700
000.00.
2.
The relief for contempt, committal, and
payment of an amount of R1 700 000.00 is premised on a divorce
settlement
agreement
that was made an order of court on 29
October
2019.
The
content
of
the
settlement
therefore
requires
this
court's scrutiny.
3.
The relevant clauses in the settlement
agreement are this:
"1.
The property known as Erf [....] M
[....], Pretoria, Gauteng, held under title deed number [....]and
with street address
situated at [....] L [....] Street,
Murrayfield, Pretoria, Gauteng, remains the registered and exclusive
property of the
Plaintiff."
and
"3. The First and
Second Defendant will pay the Plaintiff an amount of R1 800 000.00
(one million eight hundred thousand rand),
jointly and severally, the
one paying the other to be absolved, as follows ..."
4.
It then stipulates that the first R100
000.00 is to be paid in the trust account of the present applicant's
attorney of record within
30 days of the settlement agreement.
Important for purposes of the adjudication of this application is
paragraph 3.3 of the settlement
agreement:
"3.3.
The balance
of R1 700 000.00 (one million seven hundred thousand rand)
(hereinafter referred to as 'the balance') out of the sale
of the
property known as the remaining extent of portion [....] of the
farm T [....] [....] JR, Pretoria, held under
Title deed
number: [....], and with address situated at [....]
Graham (M6) Road, T [....] Smallholdings, Tierpoort,
Pretoria
(hereinafter referred to as 'the propetty')."
5.
The
settlement
agreement
further
required
the
respondents
(seemingly
erroneously referred to as the plaintiff)
to register a caveat over the property for payment of the balance of
R1 700 000.00. It
is common cause between the parties that
the
caveat
was
registered
and
the
R100 000.00
was
paid.
Paragraphs
6
and
7 of the settlement agreement stipulate:
"6.
The
property
will
be
sold
within
90
(ninety)
days
from
the
date
hereof,
failing
which
it
will
be
sold
by
public
auction,
with
a
reserve
price
of R3 402
975.00
(three million
four hundred and two thousand
nine hundred and
seventy-five rand);
7.
For purposes of the
above, the parties hereby nominate and appoint Van's Auctioneers
to
attend
to
the
publication
and
arrangements
with
reference to the sale of the property;"
6.
I assume that the word "publication"
constitutes a reference to "public auction", since it is
common cause that
the parties intended to appoint Van's to attend to
the auction. On a proper interpretation of the settlement agreement,
the respondents
would pay the R1 700 000.00 from the proceeds of the
sale of the T [....] property. This was presumably premised on the
fact that
the first defendant did not have the required cash at hand.
7.
Having regard to the settlement agreement,
it is necessary to first deal with prayer 2 of the notice of motion
that is before this
court. The applicant requests this court to order
the respondents to pay the applicant the amount of R1 700 000.00,
allegedly per
the court order granted on 29 October 2019 under case
number 35555/2013. In my view that relief is plainly incompetent
because
the order of 28 October 2019 prescribed a mechanism on how
the money was to be paid. The interpretation of the settlement leads
to the inescapable result that the property must be sold, and if the
property cannot be sold by private treaty, it must be sold
by public
auction (with a reserve price). The auction was to be conducted by
Van's Auctioneers.
I
cannot
alter
this
method
at the
request
of
one
party
into
a
direct
payment
order. As
such, prayer
2
cannot be granted.
8.
That leaves this court with the question
whether there is contempt of the court order of 29 October 2019.
Prayer 1 of the notice
of motion is formulated as follows:
"1.
That the First and Second Respondents be held
to be in contempt of the court order granted on 29 October 2019 under
case
number
35555/2013 and ordered, within 10 days, to sign the necessary
documents to transfer their undivided half share in the immovable
property known as Erf [....] Murrayfield, Pretoria, Gauteng,
with title deed number [....]also known as [....]
L
[....] Street, Murrayfield, Pretoria, Gauteng, to the Applicant,
failing which the Sheriff is authorized to do all things necessary
and sign all necessary
documents
to give effect to the above."
9.
From a perusal of that prayer, it seems
that the applicant envisaged to premise the order for contempt on a
failure to have signed
transfer documents in respect of the property
that would become solely the property of the applicant. If one,
however, considers
the
founding
affidavit,
it
appears
that
the
request
for
a
contempt
order
is premised both on the failure to sign the
transfer documents so that the half undivided share held by the
respondent be transferred
to the applicant,
and
because of the failure to have paid the outstanding balance of R1 700
000.00.
10.
I deal first with the failure to have
signed the so-called transfer documents. It was alleged and argued in
court that demands were
made for the signing of such transfer
documents which demands were ignored. One of such demands was
contained in a letter of the
applicant's attorney, dated 17 January
2020. The demand reads as follows:
"We
shall also be pleased to receive an indication from you whether your
client is amenable to sign the necessary documents
in order to cancel
the bond registered over the property which
is
the residence of the plaintiff."
11.
This does not constitute a request to
transfer a half undivided share in a property but merely a request to
consent to the cancellation
of a bond. The other demand, so it was
argued, was premised on an earlier request made on 20 December 2019
where it was explained
why the bond had to be cancelled. The relevant
electronic mail states:
"We
refer to the above matter and confirm that our client has requested
that the bond registered over the Murrayfield property
be cancelled.
It appears that the mortgage loan account was opened in both Mr and
Mrs Terblanche's names jointly and as
a
result Mr. Terblanche's signature is
also required for purposes of cancellation of the bond.
Please be so kind to
indicate whether your client would be amenable to sign the necessary
form for cancellation of the bond."
12.
How any of the above constitute demands to
transfer a half undivided share in immovable property, escapes me.
The settlement agreement
that was made an order of court did not
require the respondents to sign documents to cancel a bond allegedly
registered over the
Murrayfield property. All that it did is that it
confirmed that the applicant would retain full ownership of the
Murrayfield property.
Whether both parties held an undivided equal
share in that property at some stage is not clear from the papers. Be
that as it may,
there was no demand ever made for the transfer of a
half undivided share in the property from the respondents to the
applicant.
13.
In the answering affidavit the first
respondent admits that he saw the correspondence to the effect that
the applicant wished to
cancel a mortgage bond, but no one ever
contacted him to arrange for the signing of documents. The first
respondent states further
that he has absolutely no issue with
signing the necessary documents and tenders to do so, and that the
applicant merely had to
contact the first respondent to arrange for
the signature of the documents.
14.
At the hearing of the application, it was
confirmed that it is common cause that the consent to cancel the bond
was signed. The
envisaged relief in the notice of motion in any event
did not envisage contempt premised on the failure to sign a consent
to cancel
a bond. It was premised on a failure to sign transfer
documents in respect of a half undivided share in the property.
Whatever
the case may be, there
was
on
the
first
respondent's
version
absolutely
no
unwillingness
to
sign whatever documents he had to sign.
15.
In the premises, it follows that the
allegation that the first respondent refused to sign the necessary
documents to transfer his
half undivided share in the property into
the name of the applicant is incorrect. It does not concur with the
objective evidence
and/or the letters exchanged.
16.
The second basis upon which an order for
contempt is sought is the failure to have paid the R1 700 000.00. I
already alluded to
the fact that there was a payment method agreed
upon between the parties. It entails that the first respondent had to
attempt to
sell the property himself by private treaty and should
that not materialize within 90 days then the property would be
auctioned
off by Van's Auctioneers and the proceeds utilized for the
purposes of the payment of R1 700 000.00.
17.
The applicant tells this court, in the
founding affidavit, only this:
"11. ...
For sake
of completeness, it is pointed out that the auctioneer sought payment
of the amount of R45
000.00
which the First and Second
Respondents
refused
and/or
neglected
to
pay
and
the
contemplated auction could not proceed."
18.
The respondents tell this court, on the
other hand, that it is admitted that the balance of R1 700 000.00 has
not been paid. It
has become impossible due to circumstances created
by COVID-19. They state that it is apparent from the settlement
agreement that
the amount was to be paid from the proceeds of the
sale of the immovable property, and that 90 days would be permitted
for the
respondents to find a private buyer for the property,
whereafter it would be sold on auction.
19.
The first respondent tells this court that
he attempted to sell the property to three individuals, whose names
are listed in the
answering affidavit, but who could not obtain the
necessary loans to finalize the sale.
20.
In respect of the alleged obligation that
the respondents had to make payment of a deposit of R45 000.00 the
first respondent correctly
tells this court that it ought to be
emphasized that the settlement agreement does not make provision for
this expense and who
should pay the same. I agree with that
proposition. There is nothing stipulated in the settlement agreement
that requires such
payment to be made by the first respondent.
21.
I proceed to deal with the applicable legal
principles.
22.
The Constitutional Court in the case of
Secretary, Judicial Commission of
Inquiry into Allegations of
State
Capture v Zuma and Others
2021 (5)
SA
327 (CC)
confirmed
the test laid down in
Fakie N.O. v CCII
Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4)
SA
326
(SCA)
where the Supreme Court of
Appeal, in paragraph 42, confirmed that the test is this. Once it is
proven that an order exists and
that was served on a litigant who did
not comply therewith, the respondent bears an evidential burden in
relation to wilfulness
and ma/a
tides.
The overall onus to prove the
requisites for contempt remains with the applicant who must do so
beyond reasonable doubt.
23.
Therefore, an applicant who alleges
contempt of court must establish that:
23.1.
an order was granted against the contemnor.
23.2.
the
alleged
contemnor
was
served
with
the
order
or
had
somehow knowledge of it; and
23.3.
the alleged contemnor failed to comply with
the order.
24.
One these elements are established;
willfulness and mala
fides
are
presumed, and the respondent bears an evidentiary burden to establish
reasonable doubt. Should the respondent fail to discharge
this
burden, contempt will have been established. It should be borne in
mind that the applicant does not merely request an order
for civil
contempt but also asks this court for the incarceration of the first
respondent. Although the respondent is not an "accused"
person, prove beyond reasonable doubt, is thus the applicable test.
25.
In this case the applicant does not even
meet the threshold of the first requirement in that she failed to
establish that, save
for knowledge of the order, which is common
cause, he first respondent
had
failed to comply with the order. In this case I am unable to make
such a finding. Everything that the first and/or second respondents
had to do in terms of the order they did.
The R100 000.00 was paid. A caveat was registered against the
property and the first respondent
has attempted to find purchasers
for the property.
26.
The execution of the order stopped at a
simple dispute, namely who is liable to pay the R45 000.00 deposit
requested by Van's Auctioneers.
The court order, however, did not
foresee that predicament arising, namely what would happen if a
deposit was required. It was
obviously not in the contemplation of
the parties when they agreed to settle that such a requirement would
ever arise.
27.
Insofar as expenses in relation to the
auction are envisaged in the settlement, the only indication that the
settlement agreement
gives is that the costs of publication and
advertisement of the auction must be paid from the proceeds. Both
parties must contribute
equally should there be a shortfall. The
positive allegation that the respondents ought to pay the deposit is
therefore incorrect.
28.
As such, the applicant has failed to
establish the requirements for contempt, and I do not have to
consider whether the respondents
did establish reasonable doubt in
respect of willfulness and mala
fides.
29.
This judgment obviously does not resolve
the outstanding issue between the parties. The property must be sold.
At the hearing of
this application, I enquired with the parties
whether I could not make an order that would facilitate the sale of
the property
and the finalization of the outstanding issues and
disputes between the parties. This would have avoided the inevitable
necessity
of the parties having to return to court with applications
for alternative relief, but the parties could not meet each other in
this regard. Considering the relief that was sought by the applicant,
I have no discretion to venture into the issue of alternative
relief,
because there is no evidence before this court what could or would be
a practicable alternative solution.
30.
As such, I am duty-bound to dismiss the
application. A request was made by the applicant's counsel that, if I
were to dismiss the
application, I make an order that each party pays
its own costs, because of the failure of the parties to work together
to find
a solution.
31.
It is only in exceptional circumstances
that a court may deviate from the general rule that a successful
party be granted the costs
of the litigation. I am unable to find
such exceptional circumstances in this case and the normal costs
order ought to follow.
32.
I therefore make the following order:
32.1.
the
application is dismissed with costs.
D
VAN DEN BOGERT
Acing
Judge
High
Court of South Africa
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
Counsel
for the Applicant:
RF
De Villiers Instructed by:
Tim
du Tait & Co. Incorporated Ref.: M Meyer/PN4114
Counsel
for the Respondents:
WJ
Saaiman Instructed by: Avery Incorporated
Ref.:
R Avery/RA1255
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