Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 145South Africa
Marule v S [2023] ZAGPPHC 145; A168/22 (27 February 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
27 February 2023
Headnotes
of the facts which gave rise to this appeal are that the complainant and the appellant were staying together. Prior to the day in question the appellant allegedly attempted on several occasions to penetrate the complainant’s anus with his penis. On 16 July 2019 at about 20h00 -21h00pm, the complainant’s father took his friend halfway and returned at a distance of 300-350m. The appellant and the minor child were left sleeping in separate bedrooms. The appellant took the boy to his bed. He caused him to lie on his stomach, removed his pyjama trouser. He put on a condom on his penis
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Marule v S [2023] ZAGPPHC 145; A168/22 (27 February 2023)
Marule v S [2023] ZAGPPHC 145; A168/22 (27 February 2023)
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sino date 27 February 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
APPEAL
CASE NO: A168/22
REGIONAL
COURT CASE NO: SH 356/2019
Reportable: No.
Of interest to other
judges: No
Revised.
27 February 2023
In
the matter between:
THABO
MARULE
Appellant
And
THE
STATE
Respondent
APPEAL JUDGMENT
Mogotsi AJ (Munzhelele
J concurring)
[1]
The appellant is aggrieved by
the conviction on a charge of rape read with section 3 of
the Sexual
Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act
[1]
and a subsequent sentence of life imprisonment handed down by the
Benoni Regional court on 09 October 2022.The appellant pleaded
not
guilty and he was legally represented throughout the trial.
[2]
The summary of the facts which gave rise to this appeal are that the
complainant and the
appellant were staying together. Prior to the day
in question the appellant allegedly attempted on several occasions to
penetrate
the complainant’s anus with his penis. On 16 July
2019 at about 20h00 -21h00pm, the complainant’s father took his
friend
halfway and returned at a distance of 300-350m. The appellant
and the minor child were left sleeping in separate bedrooms. The
appellant took the boy to his bed. He caused him to lie on his
stomach, removed his pyjama trouser. He put on a condom on his penis
and penetrated the boy on his anus. It was for the first time that
the complainant was seeing a condom. Upon the return of the
complainant’s father, he found the boy standing in the kitchen
and crying. The complainant made a report to the effect that
the
appellant used a condom to rape him. The father could not believe it.
A report was also made to the appellant’s mother
the same
night. The complainant’s farther and the appellant’s
mother wanted to see the alleged condom. The appellant
was at first,
hesitant to get out of the bed so that the child could show his
father and the appellant’s mother a used condom
thrown under
the bed after the sexual intercourse.
[3]
The complainant was taken to a clinic the following day. A
professional nurse examined
the complainant and observed “abrasions,
redness bruising and tears around the orifice. The conclusion was
that the injuries
“were consistent with the insertion of a
blunt object in the anus”. The injuries “were not due to
any infection
or constipation”. Having confirmed the report,
the complainants farther took a used condom he found underneath the
appellants
bed, put it in a plastic bag together with the child’s
underwear and proceeded to the police station where he laid a charge.
[4]
The appellant is maintaining his innocence. His version is that the
complainants father
is falsely implicating him. The reason being that
he was asked to evict the complainants father from the house. He said
that he
used the condom in question, in June when he had sexual
intercourse with his girlfriend.
[5]
The appellant believes that another court will come to a different
conclusion on the conviction
because the complainant did not know a
condom before and it is improbable that he told his father about a
condom. The complainant
was influenced by his father to falsely
implicate the appellant as the latter’s father wanted to sell
the house. Meaning
the complainant and his father were to look for
alternative accommodation. The appellant’s DNA was not found on
the alleged
condom. Considering the age on the appellant, the
injuries found on the complainant are superficial.
[6]
It is trite that the
onus
to proof the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt rest on
the respondent. The decision either to convict or acquit
must be
based on the totality of the evidence. In
S
v Van der Meyden
[2]
the court said:
‘
These
are not separate and independent tests, but the expression of the
same test when viewed from opposite perspectives. In order
to
convict, the evidence must establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, which will be so only if there is at
the same time
no reasonable possibility that an innocent explanation which has been
put forward might be true. The two are inseparable,
each being the
logical corollary of the other.
In whichever form the
test is expressed, it must be satisfied upon a consideration of all
the evidence. A court does not look at
the evidence implicating the
accused in isolation in order to determine whether there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and so
too does it not look at the
exculpatory evidence in isolation in order to determine whether it is
reasonably possible that it might
be true.’
[7]
The trail court has to evaluate
the evidence in the light of the discrepancies, probabilities,
possibilities and the law in order to arrive at the required
standard. In
R
v Difford
[3]
it was explained how the court should approach the evidence before
it.
‘
No
onus rests on the accused to convince the court of the truth of any
explanation which he gives. If he gives any explanation,
even if that
explanation is improbable, the court is not entitled to convict
unless it is satisfied, not only that the explanation
is improbable,
but that beyond reasonable doubt it is false. If there is any
reasonable possibility of his explanation being true,
then he is
entitled to his acquittal.
The court does not have
to believe that defence story, still less does it have to believe it
in all its details; it is sufficient
if it thinks that there is a
reasonable possibility that it may be substantially true.’
Ad conviction
[8]
A court of appeal will be reluctant to interfere with the trial
court’s evaluation
of oral evidence unless there is a
misdirection by the trial court. The trial court has the advantage of
seeing and hearing witnesses,
which is not the case in the appellate.
[9]
The complainant was a single
child witness aged 7 years at the time of the incident and
9 when he
testified. The evidence of a child witness is not inherently
unreliable. The article written by
Chetty
N
[4]
says in dealing with such evidence, it is required of the trial court
to;
(a)
[…]
articulate the warning in the judgment, and also the reasons for the
need for caution in general and with reference to
the particular
circumstances of the case;
(b)
[…]
examine the evidence in order to satisfy itself that such evidence
given by the witness is clear and substantially satisfactory
in all
material respects
(c)
although
corroboration is not a prerequisite for a conviction, a court will
sometimes, in appropriate circumstances, see corroboration
which
implicates the accused before it will convict beyond reasonable
doubt;
(d) failing
corroboration, a court will look for some feature in the evidence
which gives the implication by a single child witness
enough hallmark
of trustworthiness to reduce substantially the risk of a wrong upon
her evidence.
[10]
The finding of a condom
albeit
not linked to the appellant
through DNA, is a piece of evidence which took the allegations a step
further. Even though the child
may not have known a condom before,
what was found was indeed a condom. The conduct of the appellant who
was reluctant to get out
of his bed also became a further
corroboration. While it is not expected of the appellant to assist
the state, it is noted that
he could not give an explanation of how
the child could have known about the existence of a used condom and
its location. The behaviour
of the appellant when asked to make way
so that the witness’ father and the appellant’s mother
could see the said condom
cannot be ignored. Corroboration was also
found in the form of injuries sustained exactly where the evidence of
a child’s
alleged penetration. The child as the only witness of
what happened before, did not exaggerate or falsely implicate the
appellant
by saying there was penetration. He only talked of several
attempts. He was left sleeping but upon his father’s return, he
was crying in the kitchen. There is no other evidence of why was he
not sleeping.
[11]
The trial court could not find material contradictions in the state’s
case. The fresh injuries found
in the anus of the victim and a used
condom were found to be corroborating factors. The appellant’s
bare denial was found
not to be reasonably possibly true and it was
rejected as it was found to be falls. The evidence of the child
witness was just
short and to the point. There are no inconsistencies
or improbabilities. It cannot be faulted.
[12] A
consideration of the totality of the evidence of the state is
probably what caused the appellant’s
counsel to concede. This
court is satisfied that the trial court correctly found that the
state had proved the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
Ad sentence
[13]
Considering the sentencing principles outlined in
S
v Zinn
[5]
;
A
minimum sentence prescribed by law which, in the circumstances of a
particular case, would be unjustly disproportionate to the
offence,
the offender and the interest of society, would justify the
imposition of a lesser sentence than the one prescribed by
the law
,
S
v Malgas
[6]
.
[14]
The court
a quo
imposed life imprisonment after finding it
suitable and proportionate to the crime the appellant was convicted
of. He argues that
the sentence is shockingly disproportionate, to
the crime, the offender and the interest of society. The trial court
overemphasised
the seriousness of the offence, failed to accord
weight to his youthfulness during the committal of the offence. The
complainant
did not sustain serious injuries. The appellant grew up
in a violent and abusive environment and he lacked a guiding hand of
a
father. He spent 2 years and 4 four months in custody awaiting
trial. The appellant is not a hardened criminal and there are
prospects
of rehabilitation. There is no evidence on the
psychological impact that the offence had on the complainant and
whether he will
be able to overcome the ordeal with professional
counselling. Also that, the appellant has succeeded to show
substantial and compelling
reasons for the court to deviate from the
prescribed minimum sentence.
[15]
The approach to sentencing remains as expressed in
Maleka
v S
[7]
where the court said;
“
[10]
… the imposition sentence is pre-eminently a matter falling
within the discretion of the trial court.”
In
S
v Phillips
[8]
the court said;
“
It
is trite that a court exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot, in
the absence of material misdirection by the trial court, asses
the
appropriateness of the sentence as if it were a trial court and then
alter the sentence arrived at by that court, simply because
it
disagrees with it. To do so would be to usurp the sentencing
discretion of that court. But where material misdirection has been
demonstrated, an appellate court is not only entitled, but is also
duty bound, to consider the question of sentence afresh to avoid
an
injustice.”
[16]
Therefore, considering the law, the facts, the aim and objective of
sentencing, the question
is whether the court
a quo
misdirected
itself by not finding substantial and compelling reasons which would
have enabled him to deviate from imposing a prescribed
sentence.
[17]
An offence of rape by its very nature goes to the
core of a victim’s fundamental rights to dignity,
privacy,
security of a person. It is dehumanising, invasive and humiliating
for the rape victim, within a psychological impact
that will stay
with the victim for life,
S
v Chapman
[9]
.
It has a severe impact on the mental health of the victim. It
commonly results in depression and post-traumatic stress disorder,
which will impact the child’s emotional well- being and her
ability to form various relationships,
Buso
v S
[10]
.
[18]
Heinous crimes
S
v C
[11]
against
children in South Africa continue at a shocking rate. The government
has introduced measurers to stem the tide. Various
forums and the
courts are also continuously addressing this crisis of epidemic
proportions but the sexual abuse of women and children
continues at
an alarming rate.
[19]
There is a minimum sentence prescribed in respect of the offence of
rape committed under these circumstances.
The court made a finding
that there exist no substantial and compelling circumstances proven
in this case to depart from the prescribed
sentence.
[20]
The complainant was only seven years old at the time of the alleged
incident. The trial court found that
at “the age of 21 years,
the appellant was a young man who was still trying to find his place
in the society. “The
pre-sentence report showed that he was
raised by both parents in a caring and happy family although the
father was said to be abusive
and the parents parted ways when the
appellant was 12 years old. He passed grade 10 and was never
permanently employed. He is a
first offender who was kept in custody
pending the finalisation of his case. He does not have dependants.
The state proved a previous
conviction of unlawful possession of
drugs on the 6 February 2018 and the appellant was cautioned and
discharged.
[21]
There were previous several attempts by the appellant to penetrate
the anus of the complainant with his
penis. “It happened
frequently.” Clearly the complainant was suffering in silence.
On the day in question, the complainant’s
father could not
believe the report made. This is what sometimes causes the victims of
sexual abuse to suffer in silence. On the
other hand, fear of not
being believed has the effect of offenders believing that they may
continue without consequences. The appellant
was aged 21 years at the
time of the committal of the offence. He was residing with the
complainant and was supposed to be trusted.
The appellant had time to
reflect and stop what he was doing but he chose not to do that. He is
not prepared to take responsibility
for his conduct. The court
considered taking responsibility for one’s wrongful conduct as
a step towards rehabilitation.
He however was found to be entitled to
maintain his innocence.
[22]
In
S
v Nkawu
[12]
the complainant had not suffered serious injuries as a result of the
rape. In dealing with the issue of substantial and compelling
reasons
justifying a departure from the prescribed sentence, the court had a
look at section 51
[13]
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act
[14]
,
the section provides that when the court evaluates the evidence on
sentence ‘an apparent lack of physical injury to the
complainant’ shall not be regarded as a substantial and
compelling circumstances. The provision restricts the discretion
to
deviate from a prescribed minimum sentence and that is meant to
ensure a proportionality. So even if there are no serious and
permanent injuries, the evidence must be considered cumulatively. In
S
v PB
[15]
,
the court stressed that a prescribed minimum sentence cannot be
departed from lightly or for flimsy reasons and refused to interfere
with a prescribed sentence of life imprisonment imposed on a father
who raped his 12-year old daughter. While that serves as only
a
guideline, it emphasised the necessity to impose heavy sentences in
similar cases.
[23]
Sexual assault is by its nature a serious offence. According to a
victim impact report, the complainant
used dagga as form of a coping
mechanism.
[24]
Having considered the law and the evidence on record, it is my
well-considered view that aggravating circumstances
outweigh
mitigating circumstance. The appellant’s counsel correctly
conceded that given the evidence before court, the sentence
imposed
by the trial court cannot be faltered.
Conclusion
[25]
In the result, the appeal against both the conviction and sentence is
dismissed.
D.D. Mogotsi
Acting
Judge of the High Court
I agree, and it is so
ordered.
M
Munzhelele
Judge
of the High Court
Heard On: 17 January 2023
Judgment Delivered On: 27
February 2023
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Adv.
J.L Kgokane
Instructed by: Legal Aid
South Africa
For the Respondent: Adv.
J Cronje
Instructed by: The
Director of Public Prosecutions
[1]
32
of 2007
[2]
1999
(1) SACR 447(W)
at 448 F-I
,
[3]
1937
AD 370
at 373 and
R
v M
1946 AD 1023
at 1027
[4]
“
Testimonies
of child –rape victims in South African courts “2006
(47)
Codicillus
25)
[5]
1969
(2) SA 537 (A)
[6]
2001
(2) SA 1222
(SCA),
2001 (1) SACR 469
(SCA)
[2001] 3 ALL SA 220
(SCA)
[7]
(1209/2017)
ZASCA 114 (18 September 2018 at para 10)
[8]
2017
(1) SACR 373
(SCA) at para .5
[9]
[1997] ZASCA 45
;
1997
(3) SA 341
(SCA) at 344J-345 A;
Section
12 (1) (c) and (e) of the RSA Constitution Act 108 of 1996
[10]
MDT v S
[10]
(A
256/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 404 (17 June 2022) para. [49]
[11]
1996
(2) SACR 181 (C) 186 D-F
[12]
2009
(2) SACR 407 (ECG)
[13]
(3)
(Aa)(ii) CLAA Section 51 (3) (Aa)(ii) of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act,105 of 1997
[14]
105
of 1997
[15]
2013
(2) SACR 533
SCA
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