Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 160South Africa
Davids v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 160; 28399/2021 (27 February 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
27 February 2023
Headnotes
Mr Davids’ complaint. The Minister was requested to request the Chief of the SANDF to ensure that Mr Davids was compensated for the period he served in the higher post. The Military Ombud further recommended that the Minister direct the Chief of the SANDF to instruct that a full audit on Mr Davids’ rank and career progression and that any irregularities be rectified. The Minister did not implement the recommendation. 3. On 3 June 2019, Major Miles lodged a complaint with the Military
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Davids v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 160; 28399/2021 (27 February 2023)
Davids v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 160; 28399/2021 (27 February 2023)
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sino date 27 February 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION PRETORIA
Case
Number: 28399/2021
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED
27
February 2023
EDGAR
DAVIDS
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND MILITARY VETERANS
First Respondent
and
two others
Case
Number: 13678/2022
ZILTA
MILES
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND MILITARY
First Respondent
VETERANS
and
three others
JUDGMENT
SC
VIVIAN AJ
1.
The Applicants in each of these matters seek orders enforcing
a
recommendation made by the Military Ombud to the Minister of Defence
and Military Veterans (“the Minister”).
2.
On 6 March 2018, Mr Davids lodged a complaint with the Military
Ombud
regarding non-promotion and the failure to compensate him for a
period when he served in a higher post. On 9 March 2020,
the Military
Ombud issued a final report in respect of the complaint. The Military
Ombud upheld Mr Davids’ complaint. The
Minister was requested
to request the Chief of the SANDF to ensure that Mr Davids was
compensated for the period he served in the
higher post. The Military
Ombud further recommended that the Minister direct the Chief of the
SANDF to instruct that a full audit
on Mr Davids’ rank and
career progression and that any irregularities be rectified. The
Minister did not implement the recommendation.
3.
On 3 June 2019, Major Miles lodged a complaint with the Military
Ombud regarding the non-rectification of her remuneration. In
essence, when the occupational dispensation (“the OSD”)
for pharmacists was implemented in 2008/2009, she was incorrectly
translated to the level of a normal dispensing pharmacist whereas
she
should have been translated to the pharmacist supervisor level. On 12
March 2021, the final report of the Military Ombud was
issued. The
Military Ombud upheld the complaint and recommended that the Minister
(1) direct the Surgeon General to finalise its
processes in order to
ensure the implementation of the OSD in respect of,
inter alia
,
pharmacists and (2) direct the Surgeon General to audit Major Miles’
salary and the Directorate Human Resource Service Systems
to
implement salary adjustments with effect from 1 April 2010. The
recommendation has not been implemented.
4.
In both matters, the opposing respondents submit that the relief
sought is not competent because the recommendations of the Military
Ombud are not binding on the Minister. As the same point of
law
arises in both cases, the parties agreed that the matters be heard
together.
5.
The office of the Military Ombud was established in terms of
the
Military Ombud Act (Act 4 of 2012; “the Military Ombud Act”).
In terms of Section 5(1) of the Act, the President
must appoint a
Military Ombud. The Military Ombud’s role is to investigate
complaints lodged with the office of the Military
Ombud.
6.
Where a complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Military
Ombud, after investigating a complaint, the Military Ombud must
uphold or dismiss the complaint, or issue an alternative resolution
(Section 6(7)). If the complaint is upheld, the Military Ombud must
recommend the appropriate relief to the Minister responsible
for
defence (Section 6(8)).
7.
The question in these matters is: is the Minister obliged to
act in
terms of the recommendation and, if she does not, can she be
compelled to do so?
8.
In
Lembede
,
[1]
Moosa AJ held that the Minister was not obliged to act in terms of
the recommendation of the Military Ombud and could not be compelled
to do so. Counsel for the Applicants, Mr Hamman, sought to persuade
me that Moosa AJ was clearly wrong. I am not so persuaded.
On the
contrary, I respectfully agree with Moosa AJ. On a proper
interpretation of the Military Ombud Act, the Minister is not
obliged
to act in terms of the recommendation. The Minister can accordingly
not be compelled to do so.
Interpretation
of statutes
9.
The modern approach to interpretation of statutes was explained
by
Khampepe J as follows:
“
[47] In
interpreting statutory provisions, recourse is first had to the
plain, ordinary grammatical meaning of the words in question.
Poetry
and philosophical discourses may point to the malleability of words
and the nebulousness of meaning, but, in legal interpretation,
the
ordinary understanding of the words should serve as a vital
constraint on the interpretative exercise, unless this interpretation
would result in an absurdity. As this court has previously noted in
Cool Ideas, this principle has three broad riders, namely—
‘
(a) that
statutory provisions should always be interpreted purposively;
(b) the relevant
statutory provision must be properly contextualised; and
(c) all statutes must
be construed consistently with the Constitution, that is, where
reasonably possible, legislative provisions
ought to be interpreted
to preserve their constitutional validity. This proviso to the
general principle is closely related to
the purposive approach
referred to in (a).’
[48] Judges must
hesitate ‘to substitute what they regard as reasonable,
sensible or businesslike for the words actually used.
To do so in
regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to cross the divide
between interpretation and legislation.’
”
[2]
10.
When
interpreting legislation, courts are required in terms of Section
39(2) of the Constitution to give effect to the “
spirit,
purports and objects of the Bill of Rights.
”
[3]
Mogeong CJ explained that: “…
every
opportunity courts have to interpret legislation must be seen and
utilised as a platform for the promotion of the Bill of
Rights by
infusing its central purpose into the very essence of the legislation
itself.
”
[4]
The
plain, ordinary grammatical meaning of the words in question
11.
The words in question are those in Section 6(8):
“…
the Ombud must recommend
the appropriate relief for implementation to the Minister.
”
12.
In the
context, the word “
recommend
”
is used as a verb. The Oxford English Dictionary lists various
meanings of the verb. In context, the most appropriate are:
“
To
offer counsel or advice to someone (to do something)
”;
“
To
advise (a person) to do a thing
”;
“
To
counsel or advise (to do something, that something be done,
etc.)
”.
[5]
13.
On the plain, ordinary grammatical meaning of the word, the Military
Ombud must
advise or counsel the Minister on the appropriate relief
for implementation.
14.
The verb “
recommend
” is usually not peremptory.
The legislature could easily have used words to show that the
Minister was obliged to implement
the relief. For example, Section
174(6) of the Constitution provides: “
The President must
appoint the judges of all other courts on the advice of the Judicial
Service Commission.
” The legislature instead chose wording
that shows the opposite.
15.
Accordingly, on the plain, ordinary grammatical
meaning of Section 6(8) of the Act,
the Minister was not
obliged to act in terms of the recommendation of the Military Ombud
and could not be compelled to do so.
The
chain of command
16.
The South African National Defence Force (“SANDF”) was
created in
terms of Section 224(1) of the 1993 Constitution and
continues to exist in terms of Section 11 of the Defence Act (Act 42
of 2000;
“the Defence Act”). Section 199(2) of the
Constitution provides that the Defence Force is the only lawful
military
force in the Republic.
17.
Section 200(1) provides that the Defence Force must be structured and
managed
as a disciplined military force. The Constitution accordingly
recognises that discipline and an effective chain of command are
essential to the proper function of the military.
18.
Section 202 of the Constitution provides:
“
(1)
The President as head of the national executive is Commander-in-Chief
of the Defence Force, and must appoint the
Military Command of the
Defence Force.
(2)
Command of the Defence Force must be exercised in accordance with the
directions of the Cabinet member responsible
for defence, under the
authority of the President.
”
19.
Section 199(4) provides that the security services must be structured
and regulated
by national legislation. In the case of the military,
that legislation is the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002).
20.
The next level in the hierarchy is the Military
Command appointed by the President. Section 4A of the Defence Act
prescribes the
composition of the Military Command. The chain
continues down through commissioned and non-commissioned officers on
different hierarchical
levels.
21.
The Chief of the Defence Force is a member of the Military Command.
In terms
of Section 14(b) of the Defence Act, the Chief of the
Defence Force must comply with any direction issued by the Minister
under
the authority of the President as contemplated in section
202(2) of the Constitution. The Minister does not form part of the
Military
Command.
22.
As Moosa AJ
pointed out in
Lembede
,
the Military Ombud is not a member of the Military Command.
[6]
Accordingly, the Military Ombud is not part of the chain of command.
23.
If the recommendations of the Military Ombud were binding on the
Minister, this
would mean that a person outside of the chain of
command can instruct another person outside of the chain of command
to implement
appropriate relief. As is seen in both these cases, this
would require the Minister to issue directions to those in the
Military
Command. The Minister is constitutionally mandated to do so,
but only under the authority of the President. The interpretation
contended for by the Applicants would result in the Minister issuing
directions under the authority of the Military Ombud.
24.
If the Minister were obliged to implement the
recommendation, then the Military Ombud constitutes an alternate
chain of command
in respect of matters within the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Military Ombud.
25.
In my view, this is significant and lends support to the
interpretation that
the recommendations of the Military Ombud are not
binding on the Minister.
The military cannot have
more than one chain of command. There is only one chain of command,
with the President as the commander-in-chief
at the top.
The context and
purpose of the statute
26.
The Military Ombud Act exists within a particular context. That
context includes
the constitutional context in which the military
exists. Chapter 11 of the Constitution deals with security services.
Section 198
sets out the principles that govern national security in
South Africa. Section 199(2) provides that the Defence Force is the
only
lawful military force in the Republic.
27.
Mr Hamman
sought to compare the Military Ombud to the Public Protector. Chapter
9 of the Constitution establishes six institutions
that strengthen
constitutional democracy in the Republic. These include the Public
Protector. The Military Ombud is not a Chapter
9 institution. The
Constitution does not refer to the Military Ombud.
[7]
These are important distinctions.
28.
As I noted above, Section 199(4) provides that the security services
must be
structured and regulated by national legislation. That
legislation is the Defence Act.
29.
The Military Ombud Act must be interpreted consistently with the
Constitution.
Accordingly, where reasonably possible, I must
interpret the Military Ombud Act to have a meaning not inconsistent
with the Constitution.
30.
As the Defence Act was passed before the Military Ombud Act, I must
also assume
that the legislature was aware of the content of the
Defence Act.
31.
Part of the constitutional context is that members of the military
enjoy rights
in terms of the bill of rights.
32.
Mr Hamman
referred me to the Constitutional Court judgment in
SANDU
.
[8]
SANDU
concerned the question as to whether it was constitutional to
prohibit members of the military from participating in public protest
and joining trade unions. In the majority judgment, O’Regan J
held:
“
There can be no
doubt of the constitutional imperative of maintaining a disciplined
and effective Defence Force. I am not persuaded,
however, that
permitting members of the Permanent Force to join a trade union, no
matter how its activities are circumscribed,
will undermine the
discipline and efficiency of the Defence Force. Indeed, it may well
be that in permitting members to join trade
unions and in
establishing proper channels for grievances and complaints,
discipline may be enhanced rather than diminished
.”
[9]
33.
Accordingly,
the Constitutional Court held that provisions in the relevant
statute
[10]
that prohibited
members of the SANDF from becoming members of a trade union were not
a justifiable limitation on members' constitutional
rights.
34.
It is clear, however, that the Constitutional Court recognised the
importance
of discipline in the SANDF.
35.
Subsequently, in
Potsane
, Kriegler J explained:
“
Modern soldiers
in a democracy, those contemplated by chap 11 of the Constitution,
are not mindless automatons. Ideally they are
to be thinking men and
women imbued with the values of the Constitution; and they are to be
disciplined. Such discipline is built
on reciprocal trust between the
leader and the led. The commander needs to know and trust the ability
and willingness of the troops
to obey. They in turn should have
confidence in the judgment and integrity of the commander to give
wise orders. This willingness
to obey orders and the concomitant
trust in such orders are essential to effective discipline. At the
same time discipline aims
to develop reciprocal trust horizontally,
between comrades. Soldiers are taught and trained to think
collectively and act jointly,
the cohesive force being military
discipline built on trust, obedience, loyalty, esprit de corps and
camaraderie. Discipline requires
that breaches be nipped in the bud -
demonstrably, appropriately and fairly.
”
[11]
36.
In
Potsane
,
the Constitutional Court found that the provisions of the
Military
Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999
, which created the
Military Prosecutions Authority, were not inconsistent with Section
179 of the Constitution. Kriegler J concluded
that if decisions
concerning military prosecutions were to be taken by the National
Director of Public Prosecutions “…
the
effect on military lines of authority and command would be
potentially disastrous.
”
[12]
37.
Accordingly, members of the SANDF do enjoy
constitutional rights. However, those rights need to be exercised
within the confines
of the chain of command.
38.
Mr Hamman pointed out that the recommendations of the Military Ombud
include
matters related to the conditions of service of members of
the SANDF. He submitted that this is important because members of the
SANDF have Constitutional rights, including rights as workers.
However, in terms of Section 2 of the Labour Relations Act (Act
66 of
1995) and Section 3 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (Act 75
of 1997), those statutes do not apply to members of
the SANDF.
Accordingly, Mr Hamman submitted that members of the SANDF needed to
exercise their rights as workers through the Office
of the Military
Ombud.
39.
These submissions overlook the provisions of Chapter 9 of the Defence
Act. That
Chapter deals with employment in the SANDF. Section 61
provides for procedures for the redress of grievances.
40.
Pursuant to
Section 61, the Minister promulgated the Individual Grievances
Regulations Regulations, 2016.
[13]
41.
Significantly, Regulation 3 provides: “
A
member or employee must address an individual grievance through his
or her chain of command
…”
42.
Mr Davids mentions in passing in his founding affidavit that he
lodged a grievance.
He acknowledges that he was in fact promoted to
WO2 on 1 November 2018. From the report of the Military Ombud, it
appears that
the grievance was lodged on 3 August 2012. On 10 March
2017, the Grievance Board considered his grievance and concluded that
a
WO2 post should be found for Mr Davids. It is accordingly
reasonable to infer that the grievance procedure did have a positive
outcome, albeit that Mr Davids did not get all he sought.
43.
I do not address the findings of the Grievance Board or the
enforceability of
its decisions because that is not Mr Davids’
case as advanced in his application.
44.
However, the existence of the grievance procedure is part of the
context in
which the Military Ombud Act must be interpreted.
45.
Section
82(1)(n) of the Defence Act provides that the Minister may make
regulations relating to labour relations between members
of the SANDF
or any auxiliary service and the State as their employer. In fact,
those regulations were already promulgated under
the old Defence Act.
On 20 August 1999, following the Constitutional Court’s
decision in
SANDU
,
the Minister issued regulations to regulate labour relations in the
SANDF by inserting a new Chapter XX in the General Regulations
of the
South African National Defence Force and the Reserve.
[14]
Those regulations are still in force.
46.
Accordingly, just as the
Military Discipline Supplementary Measures
Act (Act
16 of 1999) provides for a separate system of Military
Courts, the Defence Act and the Regulations promulgated in terms of
the
Defence Act provide for a separate system of labour relations for
members of the SANDF. The reason for this is clear: whilst members
of
the SANDF have rights in terms of the Constitution, these rights must
be balanced with the need for discipline and for maintenance
of the
chain of command.
47.
The Military Ombud Act is accordingly not the primary instrument
dealing with
labour relations in the SANDF.
48.
I can find nothing in the constitutional and legislative context that
points
to the need for the Military Ombud’s recommendations to
be binding on the Minister. On the contrary,
the
Military Ombud Act creates a structure outside the chain of command
that is not mandated by the Constitution. That structure
is created
in the context of structures created by other statutes that exist
within the chain of command and that deal with conditions
of service
of members.
The
scheme of the statute
49.
The
Military Ombud is a creature of statute.
In
accordance with the doctrine of legality, the Military Ombud’s
jurisdictional powers are to be found within the empowering
legislation: the correct legal approach under our constitutional
dispensation is not to ask what the Military Ombud is prohibited
from
doing by the enabling statute, but to ask what is authorised or
permitted by the enabling statute.
[15]
50.
The long title of the Military Ombud Act records that the purpose of
the statute
includes providing for the establishment of an
independent Office of the Military Ombud and providing for the
appointment and functions
of the Military Ombud.
51.
Section 3 provides that the object of the Office of the Military
Ombud is to
investigate and ensure that complaints are resolved in a
fair, economical and expeditious manner. Its mandate is circumscribed
in Section 4. Again, the mandate is limited to complaints. These can
be about conditions of service or complaints from a member
of the
public regarding the official conduct of a member of the SANDF.
52.
The powers and functions of the Military Ombud are provided for in
Section 6.
Essentially the process commences with the lodging of a
complaint in writing and is followed by investigation. In the course
of
the investigation, the Military Ombud may summon a person to
submit evidence in writing or by appearing before the Military Ombud
or produce a document. The Military Ombud may resolve any dispute by
means of mediation, conciliation or negotiations or in any
other
expedient manner. After investigating a complaint, the Military Ombud
must uphold or dismiss the complaint, or issue an alternative
resolution. The Military Ombud may recommend an alternative
resolution to the Minister or may refer the complaint to the
appropriate
public institution for finalisation if the matter falls
outside his or her jurisdiction.
53.
As set out above, Section 6(8) provides that if the Military Ombud
upholds the
complaint, the Military Ombud must recommend the
appropriate relief for implementation to the Minister. In terms of
Section 6(9),
the Military Ombud must inform the complainant and any
other affected person of the outcome of the investigation.
54.
Section 7 provides for limits on jurisdiction. Section 7(2)(a)
provides that
the Military Ombud may refuse to investigate a
complaint if, the investigation may undermine channels of command, or
constitute
insubordination in the SANDF. Section 7(2)(d) provides
that the Military Ombud may refuse to investigate a complaint if the
complaint
has not first used the mechanisms under the Individual
Grievance Regulations.
55.
These limitations show that the legislature was well aware of the
need for discipline
and for maintenance of the chain of command.
56.
Mr Hamman placed reliance on Section 13. This provides that any
person aggrieved
by a decision of the Military Ombud may apply to the
High Court for review against that decision within 180 days of the
decision
of the Military Ombud.
57.
Mr Hamman
submitted that “
any
person
”
includes the Minister. I am prepared to accept for purposes of this
judgment that “
any
person
”
in the context of Section 13 can include the State and accordingly
the Minister.
[16]
58.
But even if the Minister can review a decision of the Military Ombud,
this does
not mean that the recommendation made in terms of Section
6(8) is binding on the Minister. A non-binding recommendation does
not
become binding merely because the person to whom the
recommendation is made may review the decision to make the
recommendation.
59.
Section 13 refers to the decision of the Military Ombud in terms of
Section
6(7). It does not refer to the recommendation to the Minister
in terms of Section 6(8).
60.
Section 6(7) provides for the various decisions that the Military
Ombud is empowered
to make. It is only in one scenario – where
the Military Ombud decides to uphold the complaint – that the
Military
Ombud is then obligated in terms of Section 6(8) to
recommend the appropriate relief for implementation to the Minister.
Another
possible decision is to recommend an alternative resolution
to the Minister.
61.
In any event, it does not follow that merely because the decision may
be reviewed
that the recommendation must be binding on the Minister.
62.
Accordingly, the scheme of the Military Ombuid Act does not support
the interpretation
that the recommendation in terms of Section 6(8)
is binding on the Minister.
Conclusion
63.
I agree with the decision in
Lembede
.
The Minister is not obliged to act in terms of the
recommendation and she cannot compelled to do so.
64.
Counsel were agreed that if I came to this
conclusion, then both applications must be dismissed.
65.
In respect
of costs, I agree with Mr Hamman that the
Biowatch
[17]
principle applies. The Applicants in these matters were seeking to
assert a constitutionally discernible right against the State.
[18]
The applications could not be said to be frivolous or vexatious. I
shall accordingly make no orders as to costs.
66.
I accordingly make the following orders:
66.1. In case number
28399/2021, the application is dismissed
.
66.2. In case number
13678/2022, the application is dismissed
.
Vivian,
AJ
Acting
Judge of the Gauteng Division of the High Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES:
FOR
THE APPLICANTS:
JGC Hamman, instructed by Griessel van Zenten Inc.
FOR
THE THIRD RESPONDENT
IN
13804/2022:
YF Saloojee, instructed by the State Attorney
FOR
THE RESPONDENTS
IN
13678/2022
J Daniels, instructed by the State Attorney
[1]
Lembede v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and others, GD
9642/2020 (15 December 2021)
[2]
Chisuse and Others v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs
and Another 2020 (6) SA 14 (CC)
[3]
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In re Hyundai
Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others
[2000] ZACC 12
;
2001 (1) SA
545
(CC) at para 22; Chisuse,
supra
at para 49
[4]
Independent Institute of Education (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Law
Society and Others
2020 (2) SA 325
(CC) at para 2
[5]
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/159715?rskey=q9n5Jf&result=2#eid
(accessed 20 February 2023)
[6]
Section
4A of the Defence Act.
[7]
In terms of Section 204, a civilian secretariat for defence must be
established by national legislation, but that is not the
Military
Ombud. This body is established as the Defence Secretariat in terms
of Section 6 of the Defence Act.
[8]
South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and
Another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC)
[9]
SANDU,
supra
at para 35
[10]
Defence Act 44 of 1957
[11]
Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd
and Others v Minister of Defence and Others
2002 (1) SA 1
(CC) at
para 39
[12]
Minister of Defence v Potsane,
supra
at para 40
[13]
Published
under GN R1263 in GG 40347 of 14 October 2016
[14]
R998
published in Government Gazette 20376 of 20 August 1999. See South
African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and
Others
2007
(5) SA 400
(CC) at para 4
[15]
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg
Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others
[1998] ZACC 17
;
1999 (1) SA 374
(CC) at
para 58; Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health
and Others
[2005] ZACC 3
;
2006 (3) SA 247
(CC) at para 50
[16]
Director of Public Prosecutions, Cape of Good Hope v Robinson
2005
(4) SA 1
(CC) at para 30; Director of Public Prosecutions, Cape of
Good Hope v Robinson
2005 (4) SA 1
(CC) at para 2
[17]
Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources
2009 (6) SA 232
(CC)
at para’s 22 to 23
[18]
The Helen Suzman Foundation v The Speaker of the National Assembly
2020 JDR 2119 (GP) at para’s 112 to 115
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