Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 550South Africa
S v Ntshabeleng [2023] ZAGPPHC 550; CC71/2022 (12 June 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
12 June 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## S v Ntshabeleng [2023] ZAGPPHC 550; CC71/2022 (12 June 2023)
S v Ntshabeleng [2023] ZAGPPHC 550; CC71/2022 (12 June 2023)
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sino date 12 June 2023
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO: CC71/2022
REPORTABLE: NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED:
YES
DATE:
12-06-2023
PD.
PHAHLANE
In
the matter between:
THE
STATE
And
JOHN
MALOPE NTSHABELENG
ACCUSED
JUDGMENT
PHAHLANE, J
[1] The
accused was charged with two counts, namely:
Count
1
: Murder, read with the
provisions of sections 51(1), alternatively section 51(2) as well as
Part I and Schedule 2 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
(“the Act”) and further read with section 1 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act
1 of 1988 - in that on or about 7 August
2022 and at or near Schoemansville, in the district of
Hartbeespoortdam, the accused did
unlawfully and intentionally kill
NKWELENG MARTHA ZAMBO, an adult female.
Count
2
: Housebreaking with intent to
murder read with the provisions of section 262 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (“the
CPA”), in that on or about
7 August 2022 and at or near Schoemansville, in the district of
Hartbeespoortdam, the accused
did unlawfully and intentionally broke
in and entered the house of Lydia Gcinisa at 1[…] A[…],
Rietfontein with intent
to murder.
[2] The State
alleges that the murder was pre-meditated, and this also appears from
the indictment. Before the accused
could plead to the charges, the
court fully explained the provisions of sections 51(1) and 51(2) of
the Act to the accused. The
implications of pre-meditation were also
explained to the accused by the court, and so did Ms. Simpson
appearing on behalf of the
accused who informed the court that she
has also explained same to the accused.
[3] The
accused pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges and made a formal
admission in terms of section 220 of the
CPA in respect of count 1 in
which he stated that on 6 August 2022, he acted negligently by
stabbing the deceased once behind her
ear with a knife and
consequently caused her death. He denied the allegation proffered
against him in respect of count 2.
[4] The
accused made further formal admissions in terms of section 220 of the
CPA, the effect of which was explained
to the accused by the court.
The section 220 admissions relate to the following:
1.
The admission themselves were marked as
Exhibit A
2.
Exhibit B
is
the post-mortem examination report compiled by Dr Kgolane Yvonne
Kgoete after conducting a post-mortem on the body of the deceased
on
8 August 2022 in which she recorded the cause of death as:
“
INCISED
PENETRATING INJURY OF THE NECK”.
3.
Exhibit C
is
the photo-album and the sketch plan thereto, depicting
inter
alia
, the scene of crime; the broken
window used by the suspect as the entrance to the house at the time
of the incident; substance
resembling blood from the broken glass on
the stoep outside the house; the body of the deceased; a knife next
to the body of the
deceased; a white jersey received from Sergeant
Mabe that was allegedly worn by the suspect at the time of the
incident; and the
accompanying statement of warrant officer Sydney
Motau.
The authenticity and the
correctness of the report and findings of Dr Kgolane Yvonne Kgoete
were confirmed by the accused.
[5] The
State called four (4) witnesses in support of its case and the
accused also testified in his defence
and did not call any witnesses.
[6]
The first witness on behalf of the State was
warrant officer
Sydney Motau
.
He is a member of the South African Police Services (SAPS) and an
official photographer and draughtsman who compiled the photo
album of
the scene in respect of this case under CAS 57/08/2022
Hartbeespoortdam. He collected the exhibits found at the scene
and
sealed them with seal bag number PAD002510885. He subsequently took
the exhibits to the forensic science LAB and was provided
with the
acknowledgment of receipt as proof that the exhibits were not
tempered with. The evidence of this witness was not contested
as
there was no cross-examination of the witness.
[7] The next
witness was
Ms. Itumeleng Lydia Gcinisa
(“Lydia”).
She testified that in 2022 she resided with her boyfriend Mr. David
Mathebula (“Mr. Mathebula”)
at the address mentioned in
count 2, and stated that she had known both the deceased and the
accused for six (6) months prior to
the date of the incident. Further
that the deceased and the accused were in a love relationship and had
been residing together
as her neighbours in the front opposite house.
She testified that it was after 17:00 on 6 August 2022 when the
deceased came back
from work, and they were seated at her house
drinking Savanna and Black Label beer and listening to hymns/music
playing on the
radio. The accused, whom she refers to as “malome
John” (meaning, Uncle John), bought liquor for them and was
also
drinking, but he was not seated with them. She said on the
morning of 7
th
August around past 2am while still
relaxing, the accused entered her house through the open door and
said he was there to fetch
the deceased, uttering the words: “
let
us go
”.
7.1 She
testified that the deceased wanted to sleep over at her placed and
indicated to her that she does not want to
go with the accused
because the accused is going to kill her. When the deceased said
this, the accused was present in the house.
After the deceased had
said that the accused responded by saying: “
I am going to
kill you right here
”. Lydia indicated that, seeing that
the accused had already consumed liquor, she told him to leave and
that they will talk
in the morning. The accused then left, and she
locked the door by tying up the chain and hooking the padlock and
punched it closed
to lock it. After locking the door, she showed the
deceased the room where she would sleep and the deceased went to
sleep, and
she also went to her room. She said it did not take long
after she had entered her bedroom (ie. it could have been 5 minutes),
and before she could undressed to get to sleep, she heard a sound of
a window breaking and she stepped out of her bedroom. The deceased
also came out of the room where she was and said: “
John it
looks like you have come back here in order to kill me”.
Mr. Mathebula was already sleeping at the time.
7.2 Lydia
said when the deceased uttered these words, the accused was standing
by the kitchen window which was broken.
She said although there was a
curtain on the window, she was able to see the accused because there
was light in the stoep on the
outside of the house which was
illuminating the area because they never switch it off. Lydia
further testified that after
the deceased had said those words, she
also asked the accused if he was going to enter the house through the
window. The accused
then jumped through and entered the house and
launched at the deceased and stabbed her on the neck and the deceased
fell to the
ground. She said when the accused stabbed the
deceased, the deceased was not doing anything and she was not armed,
and the
accused just blatantly stabbed her. She testified that the
accused thereafter chased her around and wanted to stab her as well.
As he was chasing her around the table in the kitchen, the fridge
fell on him, and she managed to jump over the deceased and ran
to her
bedroom.
7.3 She woke
Mr. Mathebula up to explain what had happened and Mr. Mathebula
proceeded to the kitchen, and she followed
him. While walking behind
Mr. Mathebula, the accused went for her and he wanted to go around
Mr. Mathebula in order to stab her.
She used the pan that she had
previously cooked meat in to ward off the accused. She explained that
the accused unleased a few
stabbing blows which landed on the pan
that she used as a shield. He was determined to stab her. When this
was happening, the accused
was chasing her around Mr. Mathebula in an
attempt to stab her. Mr. Mathebula called the police and asked for
the house keys from
the witness and when he could not find them, he
ripped the lock open. When Mr. Mathebula was breaking the lock, the
accused was
still inside the house.
7.4 Mr.
Mathebula stormed out of the house and went to fetch the police
because they had asked him to come and fetch
them at a point of
interest as they could not locate their house. After Mr. Mathebula
stormed out of the house, she quickly went
to her bedroom and blocked
the door to prevent the accused from entering. The accused kept
hitting the door with the knife he had.
Lydia shouted for a tenant
who resides in the outside room named “Maten-ten” to come
and assist. She said she assumed
that the accused had left because
she could no longer hear him and Maten-ten arrived and enquired why
he had been summoned. Mr.
Mathebula arrived with the police and found
Maten-ten with the accused pushing one another at the entrance to her
house. The police
then took the accused and loaded him in the police
vehicle.
[8]
Under cross-examination, she confirmed that when the deceased arrived
from work on Saturday the 6
th
of August 2022 around 5pm,
she found her at her next-door neighbour’s house drinking and
she was sharing drinks with other
people. They were drinking Savannah
cider and Black Label beer (750 ml). Thereafter they proceeded to her
house. They continued
drinking until the next morning of the 7
th
of August around 2am. She could however not tell specifically how
many beers she took. Regarding her state of sobriety, she testified
that she was not under the influence of liquor. Responding to a
specific question as to whether they were drinking from after 5pm
until morning at 2am, she responded in the negative and stated that
they were listening to hymns and that she was not drunk.
8.1 The
witness was referred to photos 3 and 4 of exhibit C to explain how
she was able to see the accused through a
window which had a curtain,
and she repeated her evidence as testified to in chief that when one
is inside the house, one can see
the happenings outside of the house
when the light is switched on.
8.2 Lydia was
confronted and taken to task about
exhibit D
, a statement she
made to the police in which she had stated at paragraph 2 thereof
that she was seated with the deceased and the
accused at her house
drinking alcohol and listening to music while her boyfriend David was
in the bedroom sleeping,
vis-a-vis
her evidence in court that
the accused was not seated with them. She responded that the accused
was not seated with them all the
time but took intervals where he
would be seating with them for a bit and would then leave and go back
to where he was initially
seated. She testified that when the accused
told the deceased that they should leave and go home to sleep, the
deceased refused
to go with the accused.
8.3 She
was also confronted about paragraph 4 and 5 of her statement in which
it is noted that after the accused
had left her and the deceased at
her house, he came back after a few minutes and knocked at the door
and the deceased shouted and
told him to go to sleep, where-after the
accused broke the window and jumped through the window having a knife
in his hand. It
was put to her that what is noted in the paragraph
differs with her evidence because she did not tell the court that the
accused
knocked at the door. She refuted this proposition and stated
that there is no difference between her statement and her evidence
in
court. Regarding paragraph 6 of her statement, it was put to her that
the reading of this paragraph indicates that the deceased
was stabbed
multiple times as opposed to the evidence that the deceased was
stabbed once. She responded that the incident happened
a while ago
and her evidence in court is the truth of what happened on the day of
the incident.
8.4
Lydia disputed the accused’s version put as follows:
a)
That they were all ‘drunk’.
b)
That the accused had gone to buy beers and
upon his return, he realized that he had been locked out and asked
why he had been locked
out after being sent to go and buy alcohol,
and that he placed the two beers he had bought on the stoep, and an
argument ensued
between him and the deceased because the deceased was
chasing him away.
c)
That the deceased hit him with a pan while
he was outside of the house and the accused had asked the deceased
why she hit him with
a pan. In this regard, Lydia said she is the one
who made use of the pan to ward off the accused.
d)
That when the accused got inside the
kitchen, he took the knife from the deceased and they struggled and
that at that time, she
(Lydia) ran to her room and locked herself in.
e)
That the deceased clutched her teeth to
bite him on the stomach and for her to release the bite, he stabbed
her once behind the
ear with a knife.
[9] Doctor
Kgolane Yvonne Kgoete
also testified on behalf of the State.
She is a Forensic Pathologist at the Forensic science Laboratory in
the Department of Health
in the Northwest Province. On 8 August 2022
she conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of the deceased
marked DR402/2022
and complied a report admitted as
Exhibit B
.
The chief post-mortem findings revealed the following:
a)
The deceased had an incised wound on the
upper neck.
b)
There was a Penetrating injury of the left
common carotid artery and internal jugular vein.
9.1 She
testified that the stab wound on the deceased cut the jugular vein,
which is the main vein on the neck, supplying
blood from the heart to
the brain, and caused extensive haemorrhage. She was unable to
determine the position of the deceased when
the injury was inflicted
on her – ie. Whether she was standing or lying down or facing
the person who stabbed her when the
injury was inflicted on her.
[10]
The last witness for the State was
Mr. David Dodo Mathebula.
He confirmed that Lydia is his girlfriend and that on 6 August 2022,
they were staying together and are neighbours with the accused.
He
testified that on this day, the 6
th
of August 2022 when he
knocked off from work, he went home, and he arrived around 10pm. Upon
his arrival, he found Martha (ie.
The deceased) and Lydia singing
hymns. He told them that he was exhausted and will not be joining
them because he wanted to sleep,
and he went to bed. Late around 12am
Lydia came running into the bedroom and told him that there is a
person in the house who had
broken the window. He woke up, got
dressed and proceeded to the dining room and upon arrival, he found
the deceased lying on the
floor and he then saw John, the deceased’s
boyfriend. John is the accused before court.
10.1 Mr. Mathebula
testified that when he saw the deceased lying on the floor, he said
to the accused: “
what have you done”
. He said he
wanted to know what the deceased was doing on the floor and the
accused did not answer. At the time, the lights were
illuminating in
the house. He noticed blood flowing from the deceased and he focused
his attention on the accused. He asked Lydia
where the keys were, and
she did not respond and appeared to be confused. He decided to break
the door to the house so that he
could call the next-door neighbours
to assist him in apprehending the accused. When he went outside to
call the neighbour Maten-ten,
Lydia ran into the bedroom where he was
sleeping, and the accused was still in the sitting room. Maten-ten
came over for assistance
and he managed to grab and restrain the
accused. The witness said he got the opportunity to go and fetch the
police because they
had already been called. He met the police at the
main gate and they proceeded to his house, and upon arrival, they
found the accused
at the door of his house with Maten-ten, and the
police managed to apprehend the accused and loaded him into the van.
10.2 Mr Mathebula
testified that when he came back with the police, the deceased was
still lying in the house and the police
ordered them to vacate the
house and told them that no one was allowed to enter the house.
Thereafter, a photographer arrived and
took photos and subsequent
thereto a mortuary van arrived. The officials went inside the house,
and he saw them loading something,
and he does not know what they
were loading because he was not standing nearer to the house. He
eventually entered the house after
being told by the police to do so,
and when he entered the house, the deceased was not there.
[11]
Under
cross-examination
, he stated that he is a salesperson at
Dreyers Hardware Ifafi, in Hartbeespoort dam. He confirmed arriving
home from work around
10pm and that he found the deceased and Lydia
singing hymns. When asked about the state of sobriety of Lydia and
the deceased,
he responded that he does not know whether they had
taken liquor, save to say that when he entered the house, he found
them in
a jolly mood. He stated that he did not take any liquor that
day and was exhausted from work.
11.1
Responding to the question whether Lydia had left the bedroom or
stayed there after waking him up, he said Lydia
remained in the
bedroom. He disputed the accused’s version that when he (Mr
Mathebula) arrived from work, he joined the accused,
Lydia and the
deceased, and they all enjoyed liquor and food. He confirmed that he
did not see the accused on the day of the incident
up until when he
was called by Lydia.
[12]
The State closed its case, and the
accused
also took
the witness stand and gave
viva voce
evidence
. He testified that the deceased
had been his girlfriend for a period of 2 years and 8 months and they
resided together. He further
testified that he was invited by the
deceased
to come over at Lydia’s house
because they have cooked, and some of the crockery from his house was
taken over to Lydia’s
house to be used for dishing up. At the
time he was so invited, he was at the tavern next door. He said
at
Lydia’s house, he was seated with Lydia; Mr. Mathebula; and the
deceased, and Mr. Mathebula was having meals with them.
According to
him, they were seated together with Mr. Mathebula from 5pm until
after 2am when the incident occurred. He testified
that at the time
when he went out to buy liquor and came back only to discover that he
had been locked out, he looked inside the
house and he could only see
the deceased and Lydia, and he did not see Mr. Mathebula.
12.1 With
regards to his state of sobriety, he first stated that he
could
not tell or explain his exact state of sobriety, and then changed and
said that he “was drunk”. He continued saying
“
all
of us were drunk”.
Responding to
the question of how much liquor did he consume, he testified that he
was unable to count how many bottles of liquor
he had consumed, but
he was buying 750 ml in 4’s.
12.2 He said
when he came back and found that he had been locked out, the deceased
chased him away and asked him to
go home and sleep. He asked the
deceased why he should leave while she remained behind, and the
deceased started hurling insults
at him. According to him, the
deceased is the one who broke the window when she hit him with a pan
through the window. He explained
that he was closer to the windowpane
and the deceased unleashed a blow against the window pane and it
smashed, and the smithereens
thereof cut him on the forehead and he
sustained cuts and was bleeding.
12.3 He told the
deceased to see how she had injured him and the deceased kept
swearing at him and said he must leave. He
then said to the deceased:
“
I am going to enter this house
”.
The
deceased dared him to enter, and he then entered the house through
the window. He did this by sticking his hand through the
hole of the
broken pane and grabbed the leaver of the window and opened it. After
he entered the house, Lydia darted into her bedroom
and he remained
with the deceased, and a fight ensued between them. He testified that
as they were fighting, the deceased was in
possession of a knife and
as they were struggling over the knife, the deceased managed to
clutch on his stomach with her teeth.
He managed to subdue her and
disarm her of the knife and wanted to scratch the deceased to get her
to loosen her bite. He said
his intention was not to stab her, but to
scratch her to make her to loosen up the bite.
12.4 The accused
said after scratching the deceased with the knife, he threw it away
because the deceased had at this moment
let him loose. He thereafter
pushed the deceased away from him. When asked if he knew what he was
doing was wrong, he first responded
by saying that he did not notice
the realization, and that at the time when the deceased was screaming
for help, he came to a point
of wanting to assist her, but he did
not. The following question was posed to him:
Question
:
“
Did you know what you were doing
at the time you were stabbing the deceased? Can you still recall the
events – that means
in your conscious you knew that this is
happening now, this is the event taking place, or is it that you
can’t recall what
happened?”
Answer
:
“
I was conscious of my actions”.
The accused said he did
not have the intent to kill the deceased. He denied breaking the
window at Lydia’s house and insisted
that it was the deceased
who broke the window.
[13] Under
cross-examination
, the accused was asked what came to his mind
when looking at photo 65 of
exhibit C
depicting the body of
the deceased, and he stated that he was afraid and cringing to look
at this photo because by a mere glance
at the photo, he gets
heartbroken because they loved each other. It was put to him that it
was by his hand that the life of the
deceased was taken away, and he
responded that it was not his intention to end the life of the
deceased. He was then asked the
following questions:
Question
:
“
When you pleaded and the court
asked you how you are pleading, you started off by saying you are
pleading guilty, and your counsel
had to say to the court that you
are not pleading guilty”.
Answer
:
“
Initially when I was pleading
guilty, I was actually admitting to the wrongfulness of my actions”
Question
:
You admit the wrongfulness of your
actions and that you killed the deceased”
Answer
:
“
Yes”.
Question
:
“
Would you agree that a knife is a
dangerous weapon”
Answer
:
“
Yes it is”
Question
:
“
You already conceded that a knife
is a dangerous weapon. Do you agree that using it might cause serious
injury to a person which
might result to death”.
Answer
:
“
Yes, I agree”.
[14]
It was put to him that he was acutely aware that he was
stabbing the deceased, and he responded
that he was not stabbing her
because to his mind, he was telling himself that he was scratching
her. It was further put to him
that he is underplaying the fatal
stabbing of the deceased by calling it a scratch and he repeated his
previous answer. When confronted
with the version put to Lydia that
the deceased hit him with a pan while he was outside, he said his
counsel did not properly put
his instructions to Lydia. He testified
that he did nothing to cause the deceased to act the way she did when
she took the pan
and hit the windowpane, but that there is a
possibility that they could have exchanged chilling words, but
according to his recollection,
he did not say anything to the
deceased. When it was put to him that when he used the leaver to open
the window to gain entry into
Lydia’s house without her
permission, that act constituted an act of housebreaking, he changed
his version and said he first
asked for permission to get inside the
house and was given such permission.
14.1
When pressed on about not having been given permission to gain entry,
he then conceded that he was not given permission to
get inside the
house because he had already said – “
I
am coming in”
– and that is
at the time the deceased had dared him to come in. The accused
testified that he was angry when he got injured
because of the
splinters of the window. He further testified that he went into the
house because his girlfriend was inside the
house, and he wanted to
leave with her. It was put to him that he should not have forced his
way into the house because his girlfriend
had made it clear to him
that he should go, and he responded that he was curious to see what
was in the house which they did not
want him to see when he was told
to leave.
[15] In
respect of count 1 of murder, Mr. Tshabalala on behalf of the State
submitted that the State succeeded
in proving its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, and more particularly, that it has proved that the
murder of the deceased was pre-meditated.
It is the State’s
contention that when the accused entered the house of Lydia, he was
carrying out the words he had uttered
earlier, that he ‘will
kill the deceased right there’ because he was conscious of his
actions and has conceded that
he was aware that a knife is a
dangerous weapon that could potentially cause serious injury or harm
or death if used against another
person.
15.1 The State
argued that although the accused had consumed alcohol, it did not
affect him to the extent that he did not
appreciate the wrongfulness
of his actions or that he could not conduct himself with the
appreciation of that wrongfulness because
he indicated when he
initially pleaded guilty that he was admitting his wrongfulness in
killing the deceased. It was further argued
that to show that the
accused was conscious of his actions, he was able to give a
step-by-step detailed explanation of what transpired
on the day of
the incident. It was submitted that the evidence of Lydia was clear
as regards the stabbing of the deceased in that
it was corroborated
by the accused himself, although he gives a different reason as to
why he stabbed the deceased.
[16]
On the other hand, Ms. Simpson appearing on behalf of the
accused submitted that Lydia was a single witness,
and her evidence
should be treated with the necessary caution because it is not
reliable, and it is false. She insisted that the
evidence of Lydia
can only
be relied upon if it is clear and
satisfactory on all material aspects.
She
argued that the court should take into consideration the
contradictions in
exhibit D
as they relate to Lydia’s evidence in court. In this regard,
Ms. Simpson argues that there was over exaggeration and fabrication
of evidence because Lydia was under the influence of alcohol at the
time of the incident.
16.1 It was
submitted that the court should consider that the accused had
throughout his case stated that “he
did wrong and did not have
the intent to kill the deceased”. It was further submitted that
“
the accused had realised that what he was about to do was
wrong,
but he thought that is how the events unfolded. That
apart from that, it cannot be overlooked that although not a defence,
the accused
was also under the influence of alcohol, and that those
were the decisions that he made when the incident was unfolding”.
[17]
The fundamental principle of our law in criminal trials
is that the burden of proof rests on the prosecution
to prove the
accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden will
rest on the prosecution throughout the trial. The
State must also
discharge an evidential burden by establishing a
prima
facie
case against the accused. Once a
prima
facie
case is established, the evidential burden will shift to the accused
to adduce evidence to escape conviction. However, even if
the accused
does not adduce evidence, he will not be convicted
if
the court is satisfied that the prosecution has not proved guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt
[1]
.
[18]
The defence submission that the evidence of Lydia should
only be relied upon if it
is clear and
satisfactory on all the material aspects should not be elevated as an
absolute rule of law. Section
208 of the
CPA makes it clear that “an accused person may be convicted of
any offence on the
single evidence of
any competent witness
”. The
cautionary
approach applicable to evidence of a single witness has been dealt
with by the courts over the years. O
ur
courts have stressed the fact that the exercise of caution must not
be allowed to displace the exercise of common sense. (Underlining
added for emphasis)
[19]
In
S
v Sauls and Others
[2]
Diemont
JA
explained
how the rule should be applied by trial courts. The learned Judge
said (at 180E):
“
There
is no rule of thumb test or formula to apply when it comes to a
consideration of the credibility of a single witness. The
trial Judge
will weigh his evidence, will consider its merits and demerits and
having done so, will decide whether it is trustworthy
and whether,
despite the fact that there are shortcomings or defects or
contradictions in the testimony, he is satisfied that the
truth has
been told”.
[20]
Determining whether a witness’ evidence is nevertheless
reliable and whether the witness has told the truth
despite any
shortcomings in his/her own evidence, or between his/her evidence and
that of other witnesses, the contradictions in
the witness’
evidence must be weighed holistically.
[21] Considering
the evidence tendered before court, I do not agree with the defence
submission that Lydia’s evidence
was over exaggerated or that
it was a fabrication as it relates to the number of times the
deceased was stabbed because her
viva voce
evidence is
corroborated by the accused himself and the evidence of doctor Kgoete
that the deceased was stabbed only once. In my
view, the statement
which Lydia made to the police is in line with, and similar in
content with the evidence which she gave in
court.
[22]
The fact that Lydia indicated in her statement that the accused
stabbed the deceased on her upper body
and that when she came back
from waking her boyfriend up, the accused was busy stabbing the
deceased, does not in my view, translate
to having said that the
deceased was stabbed multiple times as argued by Ms Simpson because
the statement does not specifically
state the number of times the
deceased was stabbed. At the end of it all, the deceased was stabbed
on the upper part of her body,
which is on the jugular vein located
on the upper neck. On the same token, the argument that Lydia
contradicted herself in as far
as it relates to the question whether
or not the accused knocked first before being told by the deceased to
go home and sleep,
is a nonstarter.
[23]
Mr
Tshabalala arguing for the State and invoking
S
v Mafaladiso en Ander
[3]
submitted,
and correctly so, that the criticism of contradictions levelled
against the evidence of Lydia are trivial and not material.
In
my view, the contradictions were indeed immaterial. They were slight
and peripheral and do not justify a finding or an inference
that
Lydia was exaggerating when she gave her statement to the police.
Neither can it be concluded that she was fabricating her
evidence.
[24]
Contradictions do not necessarily lead to the rejection
of a witness's evidence but must always be
judged within context
because it is not every contradiction or deviation that affects the
credibility of a witness. Having said
that, this court is tasked to
weigh up the witness’ previous statement against the
viva
voce
evidence to consider all the evidence, and to decide whether it is
reliable or not, and whether the truth has been told despite
any
shortcomings
[4]
. In evaluating
possible contradictions in the witness’ evidence, the Appellate
Division in
S
v Mkhohle
[5]
stated
that:
“
In
each case, the trier of fact has to make an evaluation taking into
account such matters as the nature of the contradictions,
their
number and importance, and their bearing on other parts of the
witness’ evidence”.
[25]
In light of the above pronouncement in
Mkhohle
, a
consideration of the evidence before court shows a
prima facie
case having been proven against the accused, which relates to the
fact that the accused failed to dispute the evidence of Lydia
that he
had earlier warned that he will kill the deceased. It is on this
basis that the State submitted that when the accused killed
the
deceased, he was carrying out the action that he had set out to do -
more particularly because he was fully aware that the
knife he used
could potentially cause harm or kill if used against another person.
[26]
Regarding failure of the accused to dispute the evidence that
he had forewarned that he was going to
kill the deceased, Ms Simpson
submitted that - that was an oversight on her part, and that the
accused should not be penalized
for such failure.
On
the other hand, counsel tried to argue a similar point noted at
paragraph 3 of Lydia’s statement which was also not taken
up
with her. To this end, Ms Simpson submitted that even if Lydia would
have been confronted with this version and told that the
accused had
not uttered those words, she would have denied it. Along with this
submission is the argument that the State would
not be prejudiced by
failure to confront Lydia because the accused denied uttering those
words. In my view, if this notion were
to be accepted, it would
completely disregard the rules of evidence and the applicable legal
principles which every legal practitioner
should be acquainted with.
[27]
Ms Simpson stated the following:
“
I
concede that it was never put to Lydia nor denied or disputed that
the accused had not said that he will kill the deceased right
there
at Lydia’s house”.
Surprisingly,
when the accused was asked about this aspect, he had a different
view. The following questions were asked by the State:
Question
:
“
Did you tell your lawyer
about this version that you never said you will kill the deceased
right there, and why was this not put
to Lydia? Why was her evidence
not disputed?”
Answer
:
“No. I was confused. Those words came as a surprised to me and
threw me on a tailspin”.
Question
:
“
So, what do you mean they
threw you on a tailspin, because the most serious charge you are
facing is murder, which has a potential
of seeing you serving a life
sentence – would not cause you any surprise” (sic)
Answer
:
“It will throw me on a tailspin”.
Question
:
“
Your counsel is saying she
did not tell Lydia that you had said that you will kill the deceased
right there. I put it to you that
having followed the evidence of
Lydia, it was upon you to raise that with your lawyer so that this
aspect can be put to Lydia,
and you failed”.
Answer
:
“I thought that after the witnesses have testified, I would
have an opportunity to answer the questions and respond to their
evidence - What they have testified about. I did not know that
I had to tell my counsel about the evidence that is crucial”.
Question
:
“B
ut do you confirm that after
the evidence of Lydia you consulted with your counsel”
Answer
:
“Yes, we did consult”.
Question
:
“S
o, you are saying these
utterances that you said in front of Lydia that you will kill the
deceased == you did not raise with your
counsel because you though
you will be given an opportunity to come and answer questions in
relation to that evidence”.
Answer
:
“Yes”.
Question
:
“
So, it is no longer you
version or evidence that when you heard that, it put you in a
tailspin”
Answer
:
“I don’t know these things - that I had to tell my
counsel”.
[28]
In my view, the defence’ submission
holds no water because throughout the address on closing argument,
counsel repeatedly
said “
my
instructions are
….”.
This shows that it was incumbent upon the accused to inform his
counsel of any version that needed to be put to
Lydia, and that was
not done. It is for this reason that the State argued that
it
was not only the accused’s counsel who had not raised that
aspect with Lydia, but that the accused had a duty to give
instructions to his counsel to do so, rather than saying the evidence
was not disputed because he was taken on a tailspin.
[29]
The right to cross-examine is trite in our criminal justice system.
It follows that the importance and purpose
of cross-examination
cannot be ignored. In
Carroll
v Caroll
[6]
HENOCHSBERG AJ said:
“
The
objects sought to be achieved by cross-examination are to impeach the
accuracy, credibility and general value of the evidence
given in
chief; to sift the facts already stated by the witness, to detect and
expose discrepancies or to elicit suppressed facts
which will support
the case of the cross-examining party”.
[30]
The accused did not challenge the evidence of Lydia
regarding the allegation which in my view is one
of the most
important aspects that should have been put to Lydia during
cross-examination, which relates to the aspect of premeditation.
There is a principle in our law that where the accused does not
challenge any allegations made by a witness, such will be
accepted by
the court as the truth or as the fact which the State has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt against the accused. In
the
absence of the version by the accused or
any
rebuttal thereof
,
I am of the view that the
accused’s
"silence" dispelled any reasonable doubt that he had
threatened to kill the deceased. Put differently,
the
prima
facie
evidence that the accused had uttered the words that he will kill the
deceased became conclusive proof
[7]
.
[31]
According to P.J. Schwikkard
et al
,
4
th
Edition, 2016:-
“
Proof of a fact means that the court
has received probative material with regard to such fact and has
accepted such fact as being
the truth for purposes of the specific
case”
.
[32]
It is important to note that the accused had conceded, during
examination in chief; under cross-examination
and during
clarification by the court that he was conscious of his actions when
he was stabbing the deceased. The inescapable and
undisputed evidence
before court is that the accused told the deceased in the presence of
Lydia that he was going to kill her right
there at Lydia’s
house. By his own admission, when he entered the house of Lydia on
the morning of 7 August 2022, he had
expressly stated that he will
enter the house, even after the deceased had told him to leave. In
his version, he did this by st
icking his
hand through the hole of the broken windowpane and grabbed the leaver
of the window to open it.
[33]
It has been established by our courts that i
n
order to prove premeditation where there is evidence or proven facts,
the State must lead evidence to establish the period of
time between
the accused forming the intent to murder the deceased, and the
carrying out of his intention. The State succeeded
to lead evidence
and prove premeditation. In my view, this intention was formulated at
the time when the accused uttered the words:
“
I
am going to kill you right here”,
and
later carrying out that intention by stabbing the deceased. There is
no doubt in my mind that the accused knew exactly what
he was doing
and how he planned to end the life of the deceased. According to the
evidence of Lydia, it took him five (5) minutes
from the time he
expressed his intention to murder the deceased, to the time of
carrying out his intended action.
[34]
Referring to the case of
S
v Raath
[8]
,
Ms Sampson argued that it could not have been possible for the
accused to have planned to kill the deceased in a period of five
(5)
minutes and submitted that the
State
failed to prove pre-meditation.
I
do not agree with this submission because the requirement in respect
of leading evidence as stated in
S
v Raath
has
been complied with
[9]
.
Furthermore, the requirement relating to the time passed between when
the decision was made to kill the deceased and carrying
it out has
been complied with because
even
a few minutes are enough to carry out a premeditated action.
The
Supreme Court of Appeal in
S
v Kekana
[10]
stated that:
“
It
is not necessary that the appellant should have thought or planned
his action a long period of time in advance before carrying
out his
plan. Time is not the only consideration because even a few minutes
are enough to carry out a premeditated action”.
[35]
It was argued that the accused was
in
an ‘emotional rage’ because his girlfriend did not want
to return home with him, and he wanted to see what they were
hiding
from him when the deceased chased him away. It was further argued
that when the accused was hit with the pan and got injured,
that had
an emotional effect on him. Ms Simpson also argued that the court
should accept the accused’s version that he negligently
caused
the death of the deceased because he did not act reasonably and did
not foresee the consequences of his actions. In this
regard, she
submitted that should the court find that there is no culpable
homicide but the intention to kill, then the court should
consider
intention in the form of
dolus
eventualis.
She further submitted that
the court should take into consideration that the accused was under
the influence of alcohol, although
the degree of intoxication is not
known.
[36]
On the other hand, the State submitted that even though
the accused had indicated that he had consumed
liquor, his state of
intoxication did not prevent him from appreciating his actions and to
act in accordance with such appreciation.
Mr
Tshabalala
further submitted in his heads of argument that
when
accused stabbed the deceased, he had the requisite
mens
rea
in the form of
dolus
directus
because he was fully conscious
of his actions when he returned to Lydia’s house, having warned
that he will kill the deceased
– and indeed carried out the
threat he had made and fatallly stabbed (not scratch) the deceassed.
It is the State’s
submission that the accused directed his
actions wilfully at the deceased who
was
not armed when she was attacked.
[37]
I am inclined to agree with the State’s submission because
the
accused knew exactly what he was doing.
I
say this being mindful of the fact that when the accused testified,
his evidence was in detail as he
gave a
detailed step by step account of what happened the day he fatally
stabbed the deceassed.
I am alive to the
fact that he also stated that he was drunk and cannot remember some
of the things that happened. He then summersaulted
and changed his
evidence to state that he was not that drunk because he was able to
see what was happening around him.
[38]
When clarification was sought by the court to explain what he meant
by saying he was drunk and could not
remember some details while at
the same time giving the details of exactly what happened on the day
of the incident, he responded
that he did not say that there are
things he cannot remember and qualified his response by stating that
he did not hear himself
saying that. His counsel had at this point
stood up to address the court and submitted that she confirms what is
being put or asked
by the court to the accused as the correct version
of what the accused had said. The accused had difficulty answering
questions
posed to him and chose not to respond. He denied saying
that he was conscious of his actions and knew exactly what he was
doing
when testifying in chief. A recording of this part of evidence
was played for the benefit of the accused to capture his response
to
that specific question posed by his counsel. The recording revealed
his response as follows: “
Yes, I was conscious of my
actions
”.
He declined to make any comments about
his recorded response.
[39]
With regards to the submission that the accused was emotional when he
stabbed the deceased because the deceased
did not want to return home
with him, t
here is no evidence before court
to suggest that the accused was emotional. Neither was it his
evidence that he was emotional when
he acted in the manner that he
did. He however indicated under cross-examination that he was angry
when he got injured by the
splinters of the
window. When asked if that was the reason for him to enter Lydia’s
house without permission, he hesitated
and refused to give an answer.
When asked by the court to explain what did he mean when he said he
does not know the reason why
there was a fight between himself and
the deceased, he responded that: “
I
was assuming that when I was still outside the house and the deceased
was inside – when we exchanged words, it could be
that words
were uttered during this altercation did not sit well with either of
us”.
(sic)
[40] Turning
to the question whether it can be concluded that the accused and
Lydia were so intoxicated to the extent
of having diminished capacity
to appreciate what really happened on the day of the incident, an
evaluation of the evidence before
court does not support any
averments that both were under the influence of liquor. There is no
evidence before court regarding
how much liquor was consume by both.
Lydia remained steadfast in her evidence that she was not drunk
because she was able to see
clearly and was fully aware of everything
that was happening around her on the night of the incident. She
testified under cross-examination
that she did not drink that much
and was sharing her drinks with other people.
40.1 She also made
it clear that she did not drink all the time from 5pm until 2am
because they were listening to hymns on
the radio. As for the
accused, when asked about his state of sobriety, he first started by
saying that he cannot tell his exact
state of sobriety, and
thereafter changed his version to say he was drunk. When asked about
the deceased’s state of sobriety,
he replied that they were all
drunk. As already stated above, when the accused was confronted with
the detailed explanation he
gave regarding the events that happened,
he changed his version yet again, and specifically stated that
although he had consumed
alcohol, he was conscious of his actions and
knew exactly what was happening. To be more specific, he was
conscious of his actions
when stabbing the deceased.
40.2 In the
circumstances, I can find no reason or justification to conclude that
both Lydia and the accused were drunk. To
my mind, both were fully
conscious of their surroundings. Similarly, I cannot find any
convincing reasons to conclude that alcohol
had played a role in the
actions taken by the accused on the date of the incident when the
accused repeatedly said he was fully
conscious of his actions when he
was stabbing the deceased.
[41]
The general considerations that are important when a court
weighs and evaluates the evidence at the end of
a trial is to first
weigh the evidence as a whole and not to be selective in determining
what evidence to consider. In essence,
a trier of facts must have
regard to all considerations which reasonably invite clarification.
In doing this, the court should
take the following into
consideration, among others: all probabilities; reliability of the
respective witnesses; the absence of
interest or bias; the intrinsic
merits or demerits of the testimony itself; inconsistencies or
contradictions and corroboration.
Probabilities must be considered in
the light of proven facts, and no proper inference can be drawn
unless there are objective
facts from which to infer the other facts.
(See the following cases regarding the holistic approach required of
a trial court in
examining evidence:
S
v Mdlongwa
[11]
; S v Van der
Meyden
[12]
;
and
S
v Chabalala
[13]
)
[42]
In the process of evaluating all the evidence before
court, I must also determine whether the accused’s
version is
reasonably possibly true, which would entitle him to an
acquittal.
[14]
A conspectus of
the evidence does not support the suggestion that the accused was
negligent in causing the death of the deceased.
Lydia’s
evidence was without a doubt, very clear and to the point. The
indisputable
evidence and
proven
facts
before
court
are
as follows:
42.1
The accused threatened to kill the deceased five (5) minutes before
he carried out his threat into action, by saying
to the deceased:
“
I
will kill you right here”.
42.2
The accused unlawfully entered the house of Lydia after being told by
the deceased to leave and go home. In this regard, he
conceded under
cross-examination that he was not given permission by Lydia to enter
the house and was not supposed to open the
window to enter the house.
There is corroboration on this evidence.
42.3 The accused
planned to kill the deceased
42.4 The deceased
died as a result of the actions of the accused.
42.5 The accused
was fully conscious of his actions when killing the deceased.
[43]
Argument was presented on behalf of the accused was that the
accused admit that he committed culpable
homicide and did not foresee
the consequences of his actions. Ms Simpson advanced the
argument that there is circumstantial
evidence in deciding the issue
of intent and negligence. There is no merit in this argument because
the accused’s evidence
was that he was conscious of his
actions. On the other hand, there can be no question of
circumstantial evidence when there is
direct evidence before court by
both Lydia and the accused which explains what exactly happened on
the day of the incident.
[44] With
regards to the evidence of Mr Mathebula, he corroborated the evidence
of Lydia in all material
respects, save for the aspect relating to
the fact that when he left the bedroom, he left Lydia behind. He did
not hear the words
uttered by the accused and did not witness the
accused stabbing the deceased. In my view, the difference in his
evidence and that
of Lydia in respect of this portion of evidence is
immaterial and will have no bearing on the crucial element which
relates to
the fact that the accused had warned the deceased in the
presence of Lydia and had carried out his warning into action which
ultimately
saw the deceased losing her life.
[45]
On a consideration of the evidence in its totality and in the light
of the probabilities and improbabilities
in this case
,
I am satisfied and of the view that the State succeeded in proving
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder of the deceased
was
pre-meditated. Accordingly, the submission that the accused acted
negligently in killing the deceased cannot stand.
[46]
In respect of State’s duty to lead evidence to establish the
period between the accused forming the
intent to murder and the
carrying out of his intention, Mr Tshabalala submitted, and correctly
so, that the intention to murder
the deceased was formulated at the
time when the accused uttered the words: “
I
am going to kill you right here”.
A
consideration of the totality of the evidence supports a finding that
the accused had the direct intent to kill the deceased.
In
Director
of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius
[15]
the
court stated that: “
In
the case of murder, a person acts with dolus directus if he or she
committed the offence with the object and purpose of killing
the
deceased”.
[47]
Consequently, the aspect of
dolus
eventualis
does
not find application in the circumstances. In my view, the actions of
the accused in executing or carrying out his plan is
in par with what
the court stated in
Taunyane
v
The State
[16]
that:
“…
.Premeditation
refers to something done deliberate after rationally considering the
timing or method of so doing, calculated to
increase the likelihood
of success, while planning refers to “a method of acting,
doing, proceeding or making - which is
developed in advance as a
process, calculated to optimally achieve a goal”
[48]
There is no doubt in my mind that the accused knew exactly what he
was doing and how he was planning to do
it. His conduct on 7 August
2022
indicates that he had thoroughly
thought out his plan to kill the deceased. I say this because even
when he claims to have loved
the deceased, he did not care that the
deceased’s life was ending right before his own eyes. This is
so because he testified
that after stabbing the deceased, the
deceased was
screaming for help, and he
“pushed her away from him” after throwing the knife away.
Ironically, when asked about his
feelings looking at the body of the
deceased, he stated that he was afraid and cringing to look at this
photo because by a mere
glance at the photo, he gets heartbroken
because they loved each other.
One would
have expected him to assist the deceased than leave her lying in a
pool of blood as depicted in
photo 65 of
exhibit C
and
dying right there on the spot, considering the
submission
made by his counsel that the accused had realised that what he was
about to do was wrong. With regards to count 2 of
housebreaking with
intent to murder, I am satisfied that the State managed to prove its
case against the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, given the
concessions made by the accused that he was not given permission to
enter the house and concedes that he was not
supposed to open the
window to gain entry without permission.
[49]
Regarding the demeanour of witnesses, and in particular Lydia, she
presented herself as an impressive witness.
She gave a coherent
explanation of the events of 6 August 2022 leading to the 7
th
of August in a clear manner. She did not hesitate to answer questions
and her evidence was never shaken, even with the toughest
questions
posed to her under cross-examination. This court accepts her evidence
as being honest, credible, and reliable. The accused
on the other
hand was not an impressive witness. Most of the times he hesitated
answering questions and changed his version on
several points to suit
him. He was unable to give a plausible reason or
explaination
as to
why he
entered
the house of Lydia, and when probed for an answer, his explantion was
that he was thinking of the way to phrase his answer
and when he
ultimately answered, he said he was curiuos to see what Lydia and
deceased were hiding from him.
Consequently,
I find that the accused is incapable of telling the truth and his
version is rejected as being false and not reasonably
possibly true.
[50] In the
circumstance, the following order is made:
1. Count 1 (Murder)
: the accused is found guilty of premeditated murder, read with the
provisions of sections 51(1) and Part
I of Schedule 2 of the Act.
2. Count 2
(Housebreaking) : the accused is found guilty of Housebreaking with
intent to murder read with the provisions of
section 262 of the CPA.
PD. PHAHLANE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for the State:
Mr.
V. Tshabalala
Instructed
by:
Director
of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria
Counsel
for the accused:
Ms.
S. Simpson
Instructed
by:
Legal
Aid South Africa
Heard on:
10 -18 May 2023
Date of Judgment:
12
June 2023
[1]
Principles
of Evidence, PJ Schwikkard et al, 4
th
Edition,
2015, at page 602.
[2]
1981
(3) SA 172 (A)
[3]
2003
(1) SACR 583
(SCA)
.
[4]
S
v Mafaladiso
[5]
1990
(1) SACR 95
(A) at 98f-g.
[6]
1947
(4) SA 37
(W) at 40
[7]
In
Ex parte The Minister of Justice: In Re R v Jacobson & Levy
1931
AD 466
at 478-479 the court held that: “In the absence of
further evidence from the other side, the prima facie proof becomes
conclusive proof and the party giving it discharges his onus”.
[8]
2009
(2) SACR 46
(C)
.
[9]
See
also:
S
v Makatu 2006 (2) SACR 582 (SCA).
[10]
[2014]
ZASCA 158
at para 13.
[11]
2010
(2) SACR 419
(SCA) at 11
[12]
1999
(1) SACR 447 (W)
[13]
2003
(1) SACR 134
(SCA) at 15
[14]
S
v Trainor 2003 (1) SACR 35 (SCA).
[15]
(96/2015)
[2015] ZASCA 204
at para 26 (3 December 2015).
[16]
Unreported
Judgment: case number A140/2015, South Gauteng Division (28
September 2016) at para 27
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