Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 725South Africa
Mxathuli v S (A236/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 725 (24 August 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
24 August 2023
Headnotes
(S v Bernardus 1965 (3) SA 287 (A) at 299F). We are at liberty to make any order, if warranted, “as justice may require” (R v Solomons 1959 (2) SA 352 (A) at 360).
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Mxathuli v S (A236/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 725 (24 August 2023)
Mxathuli v S (A236/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 725 (24 August 2023)
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sino date 24 August 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, PRETORIA
APPEAL CASE NO:
A236/2022
TRIAL COURT CASE NO:
SH 67/19
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
2023/08/24
In the matter between:
YONGA MXATHULI
APPELLANT
And
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
JUDGEMENT
Johnson AJ
[1] The Appellant,
an adult male, was charged with a second accused in count 1 with
assault with the intent to cause Alex Sithole
grievous bodily harm,
and in count 2 with the murder of Mnikelo Tini, on 27 October 2018 by
stabbing both with a knife. He was represented
by Mr Ramabula and
pleaded not guilty to both counts. The other accused had passed away.
The appellant denied that he committed any
of the offences.
[2] Despite his plea he
was found guilty on both counts and warned and discharged on count 1,
and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment
on count 2.
[3] It was not in dispute
that the complainant in count 1 was injured by a stab wound, and that
the deceased was killed with a knife.
The identities of the
perpetrators were in dispute.
[4] Of concern to us is
the way in which the court a quo came to its ultimate decision.
[5] The evidence in short
is that the deceased, his girlfriend, and the next-door neighbours
Alex and his brother, went to Fusi’s
Tavern on the day in question
to look for persons whom the deceased alleged robbed him. From the
description he gave, they concluded
that Simpiwe was one of the
robbers.
[6]
They
found Simpiwe at the Tavern and asked him who took the deceased’s
items. The appellant, who worked at the Tavern, approached
them and
he started arguing with Alex. There are contradictions as to
whether Alex was armed and hit the appellant with a panga.
There were
also contradictions regarding the evidence of the alleged attack by
the appellant of the deceased, and the injuries that
were noted on
the post mortem report. The witnesses contradicted each other
as to the total of stab wounds that were inflicted.
Not one of the
witnesses corroborated the amount of stab wounds as reflected in the
report namely 3 in the front part of his body,
one on top of his head
and one at the back of his skull. The deceased had no back wounds,
where he was also allegedly stabbed. It
was dark where the
incident took place, but there were light shining at the tavern. It
is unclear what distance they were from the
shining light, and what
the nature of the visibility was.
[7]
The State also called a witness Siphiwe Klaas who gave evidence
contradictory to other witnesses, and whose evidence did not suit
the
State. Despite objections, the court a quo allowed the state to
cross-examine its own witness without him having been declared
hostile. His evidence was summarily rejected because the court was of
the opinion that he was drunk during the incident.
[8]
The credibility of the witnesses, nor their ability to make a
reliable identification, was considered at all.
[9]
During an application for the discharge of the appellant in terms of
section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51/1977, the court
found in
its judgement that the application was not without merits, but
nevertheless refused the application.
[10]
The court a quo failed to consider whether the evidence of the
appellant was reasonably possibly true, It merely found that:
“The
mere denial of the accused was not confirmed by his witness. We can
then convict him on both counts…” This is a strong
indication
that the court applied the incorrect test, and expected the appellant
to prove his case, rather that considering whether
there was a
reasonable possibility that it was true.
[11] “In criminal
proceedings the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt and that a mere preponderance of
probabilities is not enough.
Equally trite is the observation that, in view of this standard of
proof in a criminal case, a court
does not have to be convinced that
every detail of an accused's version it true. If the accused’s
version is reasonably possibly
true in substance the court must
decide the matter on the acceptance of that version. Of course it is
permissible to test the accused’s
version against the inherent
probabilities. But it cannot be rejected merely because it is
improbable; it can only be rejected on
the basis of inherent
probabilities if it can be said to be so improbable that it cannot
reasonably possibly be true.” (
S v Shackell
2001 (4) SA 1
(SCA) para 30).
[12] The powers of a
court of appeal in terms of section 322 (1) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51/1977, are set out as follows:
(1)
In the case of an appeal against a conviction or of any question of
law
reserved, the court of appeal may –
(a)
allow the appeal if it thinks that
the judgment of the trial court should be set aside on the ground of
a wrong decision of any question
of law or that on any ground there
was a failure of justice; or
(b)
give such judgment as ought to have
been given at the trial or impose such punishment as ought to have
been imposed at the trial;
or
(c)
make such other order as justice may
require……”
[13] The duty of a
presiding officer was described as follows in
S v Thomo
1969 1
SA 385
(A) 394 C-D: “It is of importance first to determine what
conduct was established ... Having thus determined the proper factual
basis, the court can then proceed to consider what crime (if any) has
[been] committed. The former enquiry is one of fact, the latter
essentially one of law. When the presiding officer considers what one
might call, a fact finding phase, it must be shown that the
evidence
was considered and evaluated. This phase forms an important element
of each judgment and must appear as part of the judgment
.”
[14]
If
the trial court commits a misdirection on a point of law, the court
of appeal must nevertheless establish whether the evidence
proves
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is therefore a
possibility that a point of law may be decided in favour
of an
accused, and the conviction still upheld (
S
v Bernardus
1965 (3) SA 287
(A) at
299F).
We are at liberty to make any order, if warranted, “as
justice may require” (
R v Solomons
1959
(2) SA 352
(A) at 360).
[15]
The court a quo did not
consider the direction, as far as
identity is concerned, that was given in
State v
Mthethwa
1972 (3) SA 766
(A) 768A–C:
“
Because of the fallibility of human
observation, evidence of identification is approached by the Courts
with some caution. It is not
enough for the identifying witness to be
honest: the reliability of his observation must also be tested.”
[16] In view of the
shortcomings in the judgement and the approach of the court a quo,
considered in conjunction with the evidence,
we are not in a position
to make any other order as required by justice, but to give the
appellant the benefit of the doubt. As is
evident above, the matter
was not correctly adjudicated and we are in no position to correct
the wrong. The State has conceded that
the conviction and sentence
cannot be sustained.
ORDER
[17]
The appeal in respect of the convictions and sentences are upheld and
set aside.
P.J. JOHNSON A.J.
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION
I agree and it is so
ordered.
P. PHAHLANE J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION
Heard
on:
22
AUGUST 2023
For
the Appellants:
MR.
M. B. KGAGARA
PRETORIA
JUSTICE CENTRE
LOCARNO
HOUSE
317
FRANCIS BAARD STREET
PRETORIA
For
the State :
ADV.
A.P. WILSENACH
THE
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
PRETORIA
Date
of Judgment:
24
AUGUST 2023
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