Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 747South Africa
A.M v H.M and Others (42362/2021) [2023] ZAGPPHC 747 (31 August 2023)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## A.M v H.M and Others (42362/2021) [2023] ZAGPPHC 747 (31 August 2023)
A.M v H.M and Others (42362/2021) [2023] ZAGPPHC 747 (31 August 2023)
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sino date 31 August 2023
SAFLII
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Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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Policy
THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER: 42362/2021
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/
NO
(3)
REVISED:
DATE:
31 August 2023
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
A[...]
M[...]
PLAINTIFF
And
H[...]
M[...]
FIRST DEFENDANT / EXCIPIENT
H[...]
M[...] N.O.
SECOND DEFENDANT / EXCIPIENT
(In
his capacity as trustee of the
Akkedis
Trust: I[...])
A[...]
M[...] N.O.
(In
her capacity as trustee of the
Akkedis
Trust: I[...])
THIRD
DEFENDANT
THE
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA
FOURTH
DEFENDANT
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT
FIFTH
DEFENDANT
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and
authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down
electronically by circulation to
Parties / their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on Case Lines. The date
of the judgment is deemed to
be 31 August 2023.
JUDGMENT
BOKAKO
AJ;
Introduction:
1.
In this case, the excipient brought this application in terms of rule
23 of the Uniform Rules of Court, wherein
it excepts to the
plaintiff's particulars of the claim because they do not disclose a
cause of action and are vague and embarrassing.
The causes of the complaint raised by the first and second
defendants relate to the applicant`s third and fourth claims.
2. The
facts foundational to this case are that the plaintiff and
the first defendant were previously
married, and their marriage was
dissolved on 4 February 2016. The plaintiff, first and
third defendant and
the late Mr. Jan Andreas
Rautenbach who passed away on 5 April 2018 are authorized
trustees of the Akkedis Trust (Trust
Number: I[...]) The
Trust was established on or about 12 July 2007 to hold the
future assets of the plaintiff and
the first defendant. The
Trust is the registered owner of two immovable properties: the
immovable property known as [...] R[...]
Street, stand 1[...],
Mooikloof, Gauteng, referred to as "the Mooikloof
property, and the immovable property described
as Scheme Sawubona
Number 2[...], Unit 8[...], with title deed number S[...], also known
as 1[...] S[...], Zimbali Estate,
referred to as "the
Zimbali property. The plaintiff and the first defendant and
their children are the beneficiaries
of the Trust. The Standard Bank
is the registered bondholder over the Zimbali property.
3.
It is trite that an exception that a pleading does not disclose a
cause of action strikes at the formulation
of the cause of action and
its legal validity. Furthermore, it is trite that exceptions should
be dealt with sensibly since they
provide a valuable mechanism to
weed out cases without legal merit. However, an overly technical
approach should be avoided because
it destroys the usefulness of the
exception procedure. (See Telematrix (Pty) Limited v Advertising
Standards Authority S.A.
2006 1 ALL SA 6
(SCA);
2006 1 SA 461
(SCA)).
4.
In M Ramanna and Associates cc v The Ekurhuleni Development Company
(Pty) Ltd, Case No: 25832/2013 (4 April
2014) ZAGPJHC, this court
stated the following:
"It is a fundamental
principle that particulars of claim should be so phrased that a
defendant may reasonably and fairly be
required to plead to it. This
must be seen against the background of the abolition of the requests
for further particulars of pleading
and the additional requirement
that the object of pleadings is to enable each side to come to trial
prepared to meet the case of
the other and not be taken by surprise.
Pleadings must be lucid, logical, and intelligible, and the cause of
action or defense
must appear clearly from the factual allegations.
The whole purpose of pleadings is to bring clearly to the notice of
the court
and the parties to action the issues upon which reliance is
to be placed, and this fundamental principle can only be achieved
when
each party states his case with precision"
5.
In the recent past, the Supreme Court of Appeal per Ponnan JA
in Luke M Tembani and Others vs President of the Republic of South
Africa and Another (Case no 167/2021)
[2022] ZASCA 70
(20 May 2022)
referring to the authorities quoted above stated the following:"
“
Paragraph 14:
While exceptions provide a useful mechanism to weed out cases without
legal merit, it is nonetheless necessary that
they be dealt with
sensibly. It is where pleadings are so vague that it is impossible to
determine the nature of the claim or where
pleadings are bad in law
because their contents need to support a discernible and legally
recognized cause of action; that exception
is competent. The burden
rests on an excipient, who must establish that on every
interpretation that can reasonably be attached
to it, the pleading is
excipiable. The test is whether, on all possible readings of the
facts, no cause of action may be made out,
it being for the excipient
to satisfy the court that the conclusion of law for which the
plaintiff contends cannot be supported
on every interpretation that
can be put upon the facts."
6.
The causes of the complaint raised by the
defendants only relate to the plaintiff's third and fourth claim. No
alleged causes of
the complaint are levelled at the first two claims
of the plaintiff. The first and second defendants except to the
plaintiff’s
particulars of claim on six grounds, b
efore
proceeding with the discussion, it is helpful to restate the causes
of the complaint of the excipient, which are the subject
of this
exception and which are as follows:
6.1 First complaint
relates to paragraph 7.2 of the plaintiff's particulars of claim,
whereby the plaintiff pleads that on 18 December
2015 at Pretoria,
the plaintiff and the first defendant, both acting personally and in
their capacities as trustees of the Trust,
entered into a written
settlement agreement in full and final settlement of amongst others
all patrimonial and further monetary
claims against each other. In
paragraph 7.3 of the plaintiff's particulars of claim, the plaintiff
annexes a copy of a written
settlement agreement marked Annexure
"Bl", this is a written agreement of settlement between the
Plaintiff and First
Defendant. It is not an agreement between
Plaintiff; First and Second Defendants, first and second defendants
contends that the
Trust is not a party to the agreement. Therefore,
the plaintiff failed to disclose a cause of action against the Trust.
6.1.
The second complaint pertains to clause 14.4.1 of the
plaintiff's particulars of claim, the plaintiff
pleads that a verbal
agreement was concluded between the Trust, represented by its
trustees, that the plaintiff and first defendant
agreed that the
plaintiff and first defendant would be responsible for various
payments in respect of the Trust's property situated
at Zimbali. In
clause 14.410, the plaintiff pleads that the Trust is indebted to the
plaintiff in the amount of R2 625 347,50.
This notwithstanding that
the plaintiff avers that it was verbally agreed that the plaintiff
and first defendant would be responsible
for such payments. The
plaintiff fails to plead the terms of the alleged verbal agreement in
concluding that the plaintiff is entitled
to the total amount of the
likely payments from the Trust or that the alleged terms continue to
apply.
6.2 Third complaint is
that the plaintiff pleads in paragraph 3.4 of the Particulars of
Claim that the late Mr. Jan Andreas Rautenbach
is an authorized
trustee of the Trust. In paragraph 3.6 of the Plaintiff's Particulars
of Claim, the plaintiff relies on letters
of authority issued on 14
August 2007 by the fifth defendant, reflecting Jan Andreas Rautenbach
("Rautenbach") as a trustee.
However, the plaintiff should
have cited Rautenbach as a party to these proceedings, so the Trust
is not properly before the court.
Moreover, the plaintiff pleads in
paragraph 3.5 of the particulars of the claim that Rautenbach passed
away on 5 April 2018
.
6.3 The fourth complaint
relates to paragraph 9.1 of the Plaintiff's Particulars
of Claim, the plaintiff pleads that
she complied with all her
obligations regarding the settlement agreement. In clause 5.6 of the
settlement agreement, the plaintiff
expressly agreed that she would
be liable and responsible for paying the expenses regarding the
immovable properties at Mooikloof
and Zimbali. She would further be
liable for the transfer costs, transfer duty and VAT where
applicable, municipal costs,
imposts, charges, and any capital gains
tax or dividend tax insofar as the same applies. Moreover, a
suspensive condition concerning
the transfer of the Mooikloof and
Zimbali property into the plaintiff's name had to be effected within
three months from the signature
of the written settlement agreement
(18 December 2015). The plaintiff has pleaded no facts which
establish compliance with her
obligations above and fulfilment of the
aforementioned suspensive condition. As such, the agreement relied on
by the plaintiff
does not show a cause of action and is, in fact,
void ab initio for non-fulfilment of the suspensive condition.
6.4 The fifth complaint
is that the plaintiff claims against the Trust regarding a suretyship
agreement annexed marked "l"
to Plaintiff's Particulars of
Claim is a written suretyship agreement in which the first defendant
and plaintiff bound themselves
as surety for the payment of debts of
the Trust in favor of the Standard Bank of South Africa, i.e., the
fourth defendant. The
plaintiff pleads no facts from which it can be
concluded that the fourth defendant demanded her to satisfy any
obligation(s) as
surety. As such, she has no right of action against
the Trust for payment of any amounts alleged to be made by her to the
Trust
in terms of her obligation as the surety.
6.5 The sixth complaint
relates to clause 6.2 of "Bl" to the plaintiff's
particulars of claim, an annexure "KLM"
forms part of the
written agreement relied on by the plaintiff; however, the same is
not attached.
7
I do not intend to deal with all the grounds of the exception but
will mainly focus on the crux of this
relief sought against the
assets owned by the Trust in this application. In order
to seek this relief, the applicant
requires, as a first step, to join
the Trust in this proceedings. The defendants contend
that the applicant has
not made out a sufficient case regarding
the Trust. In fact the applicant has not joined the Trust in these
proceedings.
8
The essence of the respondents contention is that the
plaintiff`s assertions regarding clause
5 of the settlement
agreement expressly deals with the fact that the Trust is the owner
of the Mooikloof property and the Zimbali
property, and with the
obligation accepted by the plaintiff and the first defendant
that they would jointly take a
trust decision that the
Mooikloof property and the Zimbali property will be transferred to
the name of the plaintiff.
9
The plaintiff seeks a first relief claimed in her claim against the
second defendant specific performance
of this obligation upon the
Trust. In the introduction of paragraph 8 of the Particulars of
Claim, the plaintiff relies on express,
alternatively tacit,
alternatively implied terms of the settlement agreement and has
expressly averred in paragraph 7.2 of the
Particulars of Claim that
the deal was reached between the plaintiff and the first defendant,
both acting personally and in their
capacities as trustees of the
Trust.
10 The principle
which belies the issue of joinder is that no court may make a
decision "adverse to any person’s
interests, without that
person first being a party to the proceedings before it."
The court cannot grant relief, ordinarily,
where any other person’s
interests may be directly affected without formal judicial notice of
the proceedings.
11 The plaintiff
intends to seek relief against the Trust. The plaintiff
alleges that if the claim succeeds against
the Trust, it
follows that benefits of the trustees and beneficiaries may be
affected. Respondents contends that the plaintiff
has an
interest in the accounts of the Trust to pursue and enforce her
rights to payment of her share from the trust of-trustees.
12 To join a party
which the law would require to be included in the proceedings, the
test is not premised on the nature of
the subject matter of a
particular suit, but rather the manner in which, and the extent to
which, the relief sought may affect
the interest of a party, in this
case the Trust.
13 The relief
claimed by the plaintiff does affect the Trust substantially and
directly; any contractual relationship
existing between the
plaintiff and the Trust is legally relevant for the purposes of the
plaintiff's claim. The non-joinder is
material and legally
fatal to the claim of the plaintiff .
14 From the
above-mentioned facts it is legally sound that the Trust be
joined to the action being a party with
direct and substantial
interest in the litigation pertaining to the true terms of the
agreement and the monies due and owing.
15 In
Amalgamated
Engineering Union v Minister of Labour
1949 (3) SA 637
(A) at
659, it was said:
'Indeed it seems clear to
me that the Court has consistently refrained from dealing with issues
in which a third party may have
a direct and substantial interest
without either having that party joined in the suit or, if the
circumstances of the case admit
such a course, taking other adequate
steps to ensure that its judgment will not prejudicially affect that
party's interest'.
16
To put matters into perspective, the
plaintiff`s third and fourth claim is centered around the trust which
is not a party to these
proceedings. Having sketched the above
background, the plaintiff`s claim is excipiable.
The order
17
I accordingly grant the following order:
17.1
The first to the sixth ground of exception
are upheld.
17.2
The plaintiff is ordered to pay costs on a
party and party scale, including the fees consequent upon the
employment of Counsel.
T BOKAKO
Acting Judge of the
High Court
Gauteng Local
Division, Pretoria
HEARD
ON:
16
May 2023
JUDGMENT
DATE:
31
August 2023
FOR
THE PLAINTIFF:
Adv.
A. Scott
FOR
THE DEFENDANT:
Adv.
J.A. Klopper
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