Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 1860South Africa
Benecke and Others v Medbond Fund Managers (Pty) Ltd and Another (B1790/2023) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1860 (30 October 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
30 October 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Benecke and Others v Medbond Fund Managers (Pty) Ltd and Another (B1790/2023) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1860 (30 October 2023)
Benecke and Others v Medbond Fund Managers (Pty) Ltd and Another (B1790/2023) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1860 (30 October 2023)
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sino date 30 October 2023
FLYNOTES:
COMPANY – Winding up –
Unlawful
business
–
Licence
and authorisation of financial services provider – In
contravention of legislative provisions, applicants’
live
savings were taken for investment purposes, without having
undergone the strict checks and balances – Company
at least
prima facie conducting unlawful business and demonstrably just and
equitable that the unlawful conduct should be
terminated by way of
a provisional liquidation order – Companies Act 61 of 1973,
s 344(h).
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
Number:
B1790/2023
DELETE
WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE:
30 Oktober 2023
In
the matter between:
ELMARIE
BENECKE
First Applicant
MAARTEN
CORNELIUS BENECKE
Second Applicant
MAARTEN
CORNELIUS BENECKE N.O
Third Applicant
ELMARIE
BENECKE N.O
Fourth Applicant
KARLA
KOCH N.O
Fifth Applicant
HENDRIK
ERATH NEL N.O
Sixth Applicant
MORONE
BOERDERY CC
Seventh Applicant
and
MEDBOND
FUND MANAGERS (PTY) LTD
First
Respondent
FINANCIAL
SECTOR CONDUCT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
JANSE
VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN J:
[1]
The applicants apply for the provisional liquidation of the first
respondent on the grounds that the
first respondent is factually
and/or commercially insolvent,
alternatively
, hat it is just
and equitable, as contemplated in section 344 of the previous
Companies Act, 61 of 1973, to do so.
Parties
[2]
The first and second applicants are cited in their personal
capacities and in their capacities as trustees
of the Maarten Benecke
Trust (“the Trust”).
[3]
The third to sixth respondents are cited in their official capacities
as trustees of the Trust.
[4]
The seventh applicant, Morone Boerdery CC (“the CC”), is
a close corporation situated at
the Farm Gerhard Minne Bron, 139,
Portion 7, North West Province.
[5]
The first respondent, Medbond Fund Managers (Pty) Ltd (“MFM”),
is a company duly incorporated
in terms of the
Companies Act, 71 of
2008
.
[6]
The second respondent, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority
(“FSCA”), was established
in terms of the Financial
Sector Regulation Act, 9 of 2017.
Background
[7]
This application emanates from investments the applicants made in MFM
on advice of their financial advisor,
Jaco Van Heerden (Van Heerden).
The applicants state that the investments are their life savings and
were previously invested with
Discovery and Old Mutual.
[8]
Van Heerden, being their financial advisor for some time, however,
convinced the applicants that MFM,
through active investment
strategies, would be able to obtain a higher investment return than
their current investment platforms.
Van Heerden informed the
applicants that he is the director of the company and that the
company was an authorised financial service
provider with FSP No.
48544. The latter assurance, as will appear
infra
, proved to
be false.
[9]
Thus assured, the first and second applicants and the Trust entered
into written Fixed Term Deposit
- Investment Management Agreements
(“the agreements”) with MFM in terms of which the first
and second applicants paid
an initial deposit of R 3,4 million and
the Trust, an initial deposit of R 6 million. According to the
applicants it was a term
of the agreement between the Trust and MFM
that MFM will pay an amount of R 24 000, 00 to the Trust
in lieu
of a monthly growth withdrawal.
[10]
I pause to mention, that the seventh applicant’s money was
invested in another company, and it is common
cause that the seventh
applicant does not have
locus standi
to apply for the
liquidation of MFM. The remaining applicants will hereinafter be
referred to as such or as the applicants.
[11]
Subsequent to the payment of the deposits, the applicants received
letters from MFM advising them that their monies
had been invested at
Lombard International Life (Ltd) Bermuda, that the funds were managed
by MFM, and that the administrator was
Obit Capital Lichtenstein. The
letters, furthermore, stated that the investments were in compliance
with the Financial Advisory
and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002
(the Act) and that they will on a quarterly basis receive information
on the status of
their investments.
[12]
During 2001 the applicants became concerned about their investments
when MFM failed to provide quarterly updates.
The applicants
endeavoured to address their concerns with Van Heerden, but their
calls went unanswered.
[13]
Van Heerden’s sudden unavailability increased the applicants’
concerns and at the beginning of December
2021 they approached Mr
Scheepers (“Scheepers’), their attorney of record, for
advice. On 3 December 2021 Scheepers
addressed a letter to Van
Heerden in which he
inter alia
recorded the following:
“
17.
Our own search with regard to Medbond has resulted in a press release
from the Financial Sector Conduct Authority
dated 27 August 2021, in
which it is specifically recorded that the license of Medbond Markets
(Pty) Ltd and Medbond Insurance
Brokers (Pty) Ltd have been
provisionally withdrawn.
18.
The FSCA has further advised that Medbond Fund Managers (Pty) Ltd is
not authorised to conduct financial services.”
[14]
In paragraph 21 of the letter Scheepers stated the following:
“…
we
request that you urgently and without delay and by no later than 8
December 2021, provide us with verifiable and concrete proof
of the
manner place and amount of investments made by our clients and with
whom you had invested it, with traceable contact information.”
[15]
On 8 December 2021 Scheepers received a reply from Mr Oosthuizen
(“Oosthuizen), an attorney who stated that
he represents the
Medbond Group of Companies. In response to the request for detailed
information, Oosthuizen referred to
inter alia
clause 2 of the
agreements between the parties, to wit:
“
2.-Authorization
of the Fund Manager: The Customer hereby authorises Medbond Fund
Managers to enter orders on behalf of the Account
for management of
the investment deposit. The Customer agree and confirm to the full
authority of Medbond Fund Managers, authorising
Medbond Fund Managers
to transact in any of the Investment deposit in the Customer’s
Account on the sole discretion of the
Fund Manager. Medbond Fund
Managers shall have discretionary authority to make full investment
and trading decisions for the Account,
without prior consultation
with Customer and without prior notice to or approval
from
Customer with respect to such investment, management and or trading
decision. …”
and
concluded with the following remark:
“
We
respectfully submit that the age-old maxim of pacta sunt servanda is
applicable here.
”
[16]
Needless to say, no information whatsoever was forthcoming to allay
the concerns of the applicants. Notwithstanding
further
correspondences between the parties, the applicants were at the time
when the application was brought still in the dark
as to the
whereabouts of the money they have deposited with MFM.
[17]
Faced with the aforesaid difficulties, the applicants embarked on
further investigations which, according to the
applicants, revealed a
bleak picture. It appeared that MFM is one of twenty companies in the
Medbond Group of Companies. A certain
Jakobus Philip Meyer (“Meyer”)
is the common denominator of the companies and it appeared to the
applicants that the
separate companies were utilised to defraud
investors.
[18]
The results emanating from the applicants’ investigations are
to a large extent confirmed by Soretha De Bruin
(“De Bruin”),
the deponent to the affidavit filed on behalf of the FSCA. De Bruin
stated that she was instructed on
3 March 2021 and on 28 May 2021
respectively to investigate MFM, Medbond Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd,
Medbond Markets (Pty) Ltd,
Masjamplan (Pty) Ltd, Meyer and Van
Heerden. The investigation was finalised on 7 September 2022 and a
copy of De Bruin’s
draft report is attached to her affidavit.
[19]
De Bruin stated that a copy of the draft report was forwarded to MFM
for comment. At the time when De Bruin deposed
to the affidavit, no
response had been received from MFM.
[20]
Lastly, De Bruin confirmed that whilst the investigative phase has
been finalised, the FSCA is still in the process
of finalising
processes relating to the exercise of its regulatory and enforcement
powers.
[21]
In the report, De Bruin discussed her investigations and concluded
that Medbond Insurance Brokers, Medbond Markets,
Masjamplan and Van
Heerden contravened several statutory provisions. In respect of
Meyer, De Bruin expressed the
view
that he misappropriated
client funds and acted fraudulently by making misrepresentations that
certain investment products were issued
by Lombard International.
[22]
De Bruin’s
prima facie
conclusion in respect of MFM
reads as follows:
“
192.
I am of the view that Medbond Fund Managers contravened section 7(1)
of the FAIS Act in that it conducted financial
services as defined in
the FAIS Act whilst not authorised. The agreement between Barrish and
Medbond Fund Managers reflected that
Medbond Fund Managers will
manage funds of Barrish and that Medbond Fund Managers will make
investment decisions on behalf of Barrish.
The funds for Barrish’s
investment were paid into the bank account of Medbond Fund Managers.”
[23]
In the meantime and during 2022, the parties endeavoured to resolve
their differences by entering into so-called
“
buy-back”
agreements.
[24]
During February 2023, it became clear that the buy-back agreements
were not materialising and when MFM failed to
make payments to the
Trust in February and March 2023, the present application was
launched on an urgent basis to be heard in the
urgent court on 25
April 2023.
[25]
The papers filed exceeded the prescribed number of papers for matters
in the urgent court and Bam J, referred the
application to the Deputy
Judge President for the allocation of a date of hearing.
[26]
On 10 May 2023, the Deputy Judge President directed that the matter
be heard by this court as a special motion
on 10 August 2023.
POINT
IN LIMINE: LOCUS STANDI
[27]
In answer to the application, MFM raised a point of lack of
locus
standi
.
[28]
Locus standi
in liquidation applications is dealt with in
section 346 of the Companies Act, 1973 (the previous Companies Act).
The continuous
application of the provisions of the previous
Companies Act in respect of the winding-up and liquidation of
companies, is provided
for in Part 1, Item 9 of Schedule 5 of the
Companies Act, 71 of 2008
.
[29]
Section 346(1)
provides for the class of persons that may apply to
court for the winding-up of a company and in
casu
the
applicants rely on
section 346(1)(b)
that makes provision for the
winding-up of a company by ”
one or more of its creditors
(including contingent or prospective creditors)”
.
[30]
In order to qualify as “
creditors”,
the applicants
rely:
30.1
on monies due and payable in terms of the agreements entered into
with MFM; and
30.2
on the ground that the agreements are void
ab initio
which
entails that all amounts in terms of the agreements are immediately
due and payable.
Monies
due and payable in terms of the agreements
[31]
The agreements were concluded on 19 August 2019 and is for a fixed
term of 5 years. In the result, the monies are
only due and payable
in August 2024 and the first and second applicants do not have
locus
standi
in terms of the agreements.
[32]
The position in respect of the Trust is somewhat different. The
allegation that MFM failed to pay the monthly growth
withdrawal to
the Trust for the months February and March 2023 does bestow
locus
standi
on the Trust for purposes of this application.
[33]
MFM admits the monthly payments to the Trust in the past and confirm
that no payments were made for February and
March 2023.
[34]
MFM, however, denies that it is legally obliged to make these
payments. According to MFM, these payments can at
best be described
as
ex gratia
payments.
[35]
In order to determine whether MFM is legally obliged to make the
payments, one should have regard to the terms
of the agreement
between the Trust and MFM.
[36]
A careful perusal of the terms of the agreement makes it clear that
the agreement does not contain a term that
provides for the payment
by MFM of a “
monthly growth
withdrawal”
to
the Trust. To the contrary, clause 2 of the agreement provides that
the Trust “
will not be authorised or permitted to make any
capital withdrawal for the entire 5 (Five) year period.”
[37]
The Trust does not allege that the terms of the agreement were
amended to provide for the payment of monthly growth
withdrawals and
clause 14 of the agreement, furthermore, provides that “
No
provision of this Agreement may be waived or amended unless the
waiver or amendment is in writing and signed by both Customer
and
MedBond Fund Managers.”
[38]
Consequently, MFM is not legally obliged to make monthly payments to
the Trust and is, in terms of the agreement,
only obliged to repay
the capital amount at the expiry of the 5 year term, to wit in August
2024. This obligation is, furthermore,
qualified by clause 10 which
provides as follows:
“
10.-Term
of Agreement; This Agreement will have a minimum duration of 5 (Five)
years. Either party may terminate this Agreement,
notifying at least
ten days before expiration period……….If no
notification has taken place, this Agreement
will be automatically
extended to another 5 (Five) years without notice and the Customer
agree and confirm that he/she is aware
and understands all of the
contents described herein above.”
[39]
In the result, the Trust is similarly not a creditor of MFM and lacks
the requisite
locus standi
to apply for the liquidation of
MFM.
Agreements
void
ab initio
[40]
In
Hubby’s Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lifetime Properties (Pty)
Ltd
1998 (1) SA 295
W, the court held that an applicant who
effected improvements on the immovable property of an owner (the
respondent) has, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, a claim
for unjustified enrichment which entails that something was owning to
the applicant.
The applicant was therefore a creditor and had the
requisite
locus standi
to apply for the liquidation of the
respondent.
[41]
Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts in
casu
,
something will be owing to the applicants, if the agreements between
the applicants and MFM is void
ab initio
due to a
contravention of section 7(1) of the Financial Advisory and
Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002 (“the Act”).
[42]
Section 7(1) of the Act, provides that a person may not act as a
financial service provider, unless such person
has been provided with
a license under section 8 of the Act. It is common cause that MFM is
not licenced as a financial service
provider.
[43]
MFM, however, maintains that it does not fall within the provisions
of the Act because the applicants’ investments
with MFM is not
a financial product as listed in section 1(1) of the Act.
[44]
Prior to considering the financial products listed in section 1(1) of
the Act, it is apposite to have regard to
the financial product that
forms the subject matter of the agreements between the parties. The
agreements envisage the management
of the applicants’ money for
purposes of investment and in order to achieve the aforesaid object,
clause 1 provides as follows:
“
1.
Customer’s Account. Customer hereby open a fixed
deposit
Investment account as per deposits exceeding 12 months as
defined
under the banks act
for fixed term of
5 (Five) years and the account (“the Account”) will be
with MedBond Fund Mnagers (Pty) Ltd who will
manage the account in
terms of the agreement as the fund and asset manager. ….”
(own emphasis)
[45]
Clause 3 provides that an amount equal to the amount so deposited
will be repaid:
3.
Investment strategy and managing the Account: MedBond Fund Managers
agrees to use its best judgment and efforts for the Customer’s
benefit. However, the parties agree that the Customer shall bear all
risk of gain or loss in the account except for the guaranteed
portion
of the capital after commissions, fees, administration costs and
charges and all expenses of the Account. No assurance
can be given
that either MedBond Fund Managers advice will result in profits or
will not result in losses for the Customer.
[46]
Clause 10 determines that the money will be repaid “
upon
maturity and expiry of the term”
.
[47]
“
Financial product”
is
inter alia
defined
in the Act as:
“
(f)
a deposit as defined in section 1(1) of the Banks Act, 1990 (Act No.
9 1 of 1990);”
[48]
“
Deposit”
is defined in the Banks Act as follows:
“
"deposit",
when used as a noun, means an amount of money paid by one person to
another person subject to an agreement
in terms of which –
(a)
an equal amount or any part thereof will be conditionally or
unconditionally repaid, either by the person to whom the
money has
been so paid or by any other person, with or without a premium, on
demand or at specified or unspecified dates or in
circumstances
agreed to by or on behalf of the person making the payment and the
person receiving it; and
(b)
no interest will be payable on the amount so paid or interest will be
payable thereon at specified intervals or otherwise.”
[49]
Bearing the aforesaid definition in mind, the financial product that
forms the subject matter of the agreements
is, in my view and at
least
prima facie
, deposits as envisaged in section 1(1) of
the Banks Act.
[50]
MFM does not agree and avers that the definition of a “
deposit”
in the Banks Act is not applicable to the agreements because the
agreements do not provide that no interest will be payable. I do
not
agree. The agreements make no mention of any interest payable and in
the absence of such an agreement, it follows logically
that the
parties have agreed that no interest will be payable. The parties
have, furthermore, expressly agreed that the deposits
payable by the
applicants are “
as per deposits exceeding 12 months
as
defined under the banks act
….”
[51]
MFM could not, during its submissions for purposes of opposing the
provisional winding-up order, explain the contradiction
created by
the aforesaid terms and its stance that the agreements do not fall
within a deposit as defined by the Banks Act.
[52]
MFM is, furthermore, of the view that its product falls squarely
within section 2(2)(b)(ii) of the Financial Sector
Regulation Act, 9
of 2017 which reads as follows:
“
(2)
The Regulations may designate as a financial product any facility or
arrangement
that is not regulated in
terms of a specific financial sector law if
—
(b)
the facility or arrangement is one through which, or through the
acquisition of which, a person conducts one or more of the
following
activities:
(ii)
making a financial investment;”
(own
emphasis”)
(own
emphasis)
[53]
It
prima facie
appears that the financial product offered by
MFM falls within the ambit of the Act and section 2(2)(b)(ii) of the
Financial Sector
Regulation Act is therefore not applicable to the
agreements.
[54]
Having found
prima facie
that the financial product that forms
the subject matter of the agreements falls within the meaning of a
financial product as defined
in section 1(1) of the Act, I agree with
the applicants and with De Bruins’s finding that MFM is
conducting financial services
whilst not authorised to do so in
contravention of section 7(1) of the Act. For purposes of a
provisional liquidation order, the
finding remains
prima facie
and
is not binding on a court considering a final liquidation order.
[55]
MFM maintains that, even if its conduct is in contravention of
section 7(1), the agreements are not automatically
void
ab initio
due the provisions of section 7(2), which reads as follows:
“
Subject
to section 40, a transaction concluded on or after the date
contemplated in subsection (1) between a product supplier and
any
client by virtue of any financial service rendered to the client by a
person not authorised as a financial services provider,
or by any
other person acting on behalf of such unauthorised person, is not
unenforceable between the product supplier and the
client merely by
reason of such lack of authority.”
[56]
A ”
product supplier”
is defined in the Act as:
“
any
person who issues a financial product by virtue of an authority,
approval or right granted to such person under any law, including
the
Companies Act. 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973)
;”
[57]
MFM has not indicated under which law it has received authorisation,
approval or obtained a right to enter into
the agreements with the
applicants. Section 7(2) is clearly directed at a third-party product
supplier and was enacted to protect
the rights of an innocent
customer. The section does not apply to an unauthorised financial
service provider such as MFM.
[58]
In order to determine the consequences of MFM’s prohibited
conduct it is first of all incisive to have regard
to the provisions
of the Act. Section 36 of the Act provides that any person that
contravenes section 7(1) is guilty of an offence
and is on conviction
liable to a fine not exceeding R 1 000 000, 00 or to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10
years, or both such fine
and such imprisonment.
[59]
Although the Act imposes a penalty on a person that acts in
contravention of section 7(1), it does not follow that
the agreements
entered into between the parties are void
ab initio
. The
principle has been explained in
Metro Western Cape Pty) Ltd v Ross
1986 (3) SA 181
(A) as follows:
“
As
a general rule a contract impliedly prohibited by statute is void and
unenforceable but this rule is not inflexible or inexorable.
Although
a contract is in violation of a statute it will not be declared void
unless such was the intention of the Legislature
and this is
nonetheless the rule in the case of a contract in violation of a
statute which imposes a criminal sanction. The legislative
intent not
to render void a contract may be inferred from general rules of
interpretation. Each case must be dealt with in the
light of its own
language, scope and object and the consequences in relation to
justice and convenience of adopting one view rather
than the other.
In the case of Standard Bank v Estate Van Rhyn
1925 AD 266
SOLOMON JA
at 274 stated the position as follows:
"what
we have to get at is the intention of the Legislature, and, if we are
satisfied in any case that the Legislature did
not intend to render
the act invalid, we should not be justified in holding that it was.
As Voet (1.3.16) puts it - 'but that which
is done contrary to law is
not ipso jure null and void, where the law is content with a penalty
laid down against those who contravene
it'. Then after giving some
instances in illustration of this principle, he proceeds: 'The reason
of all this I take to be that
in these and the like cases greater
inconveniences and impropriety would result from the rescission of
what was done, than would
follow the act itself done contrary to the
law.'"
[60]
Having regard to the object and structure of the Act, it is clear
that the Act envisages a system regulating the
rendering of financial
services to the benefit and protection of the public at large.
[61]
Chapter II provides for the authorisation of financial service
providers and section 8 requires that detailed information
be
submitted by an applicant to satisfy the registrar that the applicant
complies with the requirements to be a fit and proper
financial
service provider. The information includes, the personal character
qualities of honesty and dignity, the competence and
operational
ability of the applicant to fulfil the responsibilities imposed by
the Act, and the soundness of the applicant’s
financial
affairs.
[62]
I pause to mention, that the applicants’ perception that MFM
lacks the aforementioned qualities and do not
meet the requirements
set out
supra
, is the sole cause for the present application.
[63]
Chapter III of the Act determines the qualifications of
representatives of authorised services providers, Chapter
IV sets out
a code of conduct and Chapter V deals with the duties of authorised
financial services providers, which includes the
appointment of
compliance officers and the keeping of accounting and audited
records.
[64]
The Act is thus structured to ensure a firmly controlled environment
for the rendering of financial services in
order to protect the
trusting public, in as far as possible, against unscrupulous service
providers.
[65]
In layman’s terms, MFM in contravention of section 7(1), took
the applicants’ live savings for investment
purposes, without
having undergone the strict checks and balances in place to ensure
that the applicants’ money will be properly
and safely managed.
Furthermore, and most properly because MFM does not need to comply
with any of the statutory requirements,
the applicants are kept in
the dark as to where their money is. The treatment meted out by MFM
to the applicants, in this respect,
is regrettable to say the least.
[66]
If one allowed the agreements to be enforceable the effect of this
would be to undermine the very purpose of the
Act, to wit to protect
the public from exploitation. [See:
Absa Insurance Brokers (Pty)
Ltd v Luttig and Another NNO
[1997] ZASCA 61
;
1997 (4) SA 229
(SCA)]
[67]
In the result, I am of the
prima facie
view that the
agreements are void
ab initio
.
[68]
This finding, in turn, bestows the requisite
locus standi
on
the applicants to apply for the liquidation of MFM.
GROUNDS
FOR LIQUIDATION:
[69]
I am not satisfied that applicants have made out a case for the
provisional liquidation of MFM on the ground that
it is factually or
commercially insolvent.
[70]
In providing financial services without being authorised to do so,
MFM is, however, at least
prima facie
, conducting an unlawful
business and it is demonstrably just and equitable, in terms of
section 344(h) of the previous
Companies Act, that
the unlawful
conduct should be terminated by way of a provisional liquidation
order. [See:
Cuninghame and Another v First Ready Development 249
(Association Incorporated under
section 21)
2010
(5) SA 325
(SCA)]
[71]
MFM relied on unaudited
interim
financial statements
for purposes of proving its solvency and invoking the provisions of
section 81
of the
Companies Act, 71 of 2008
.
Section 81(1)(c)(ii)
,
provides that a solvent company may be wound-up on application by one
or more of its creditors if it is just and equitable to
do so. MFM
submitted that the test for just and equitable under
section 81
is
narrower than the test under
section 344(h)
of the previous
Companies
Act.
[72
]
Even if a narrower test of just and equitable applies, I am still of
the view that the principle of what constitutes
a just and equitable
ground as defined by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the
Cuninghame
matter
supra
applies to the facts in
casu
.
ORDER
The
following order is made:
1.
The first respondent is placed under provisional
liquidation.
2.
Any person with a legitimate interest in the
first respondent’s affairs is called upon to present reasons on
22 January 2024
(opposed roll), why the provisional order should not
be made final.
3.
The provisional order must be published in the
Government Gazette and the Citizen Newspaper.
4.
The provisional order must be served on the first
respondent’s employees (if any) and on the trade unions
representing them.
5.
Costs of the application is costs in the
liquidation of the first respondent.
N.
JANSE VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATES
HEARD:
10 August 2023
DATE
DELIVERED:
30
October 2023
APPEARANCES
For
the Applicant:
Advocate JD Matthee
Instructed
by:
Scheepers and Aucamp Attorneys
For the 1
st
Respondent:
Advocate PG Cilliers SC
Assisted by:
Advocate WR de Preez
Instructed by:
Couzyn Hertzog and Horak Inc
For the 2
nd
Respondent:
Advocate EL Theron SC
Instructed by:
RW Attorneys
sino noindex
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