Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 2041South Africa
Emo Energy (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others (2023-123792) [2023] ZAGPPHC 2041 (15 December 2023)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Emo Energy (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others (2023-123792) [2023] ZAGPPHC 2041 (15 December 2023)
Emo Energy (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others (2023-123792) [2023] ZAGPPHC 2041 (15 December 2023)
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sino date 15 December 2023
FLYNOTES:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – Interdict –
Review
required
–
Cancellation
of petroleum licence – Selling quantities below prescribed
litre limit per transaction – Business
contending that it
responded with measures to comply – Alleges that Controller
did not adhere to procedure in regulations
regarding notice –
Where applicant seeks court to interfere with exercise of
statutory power – Applicant appears
to erroneously seek
review or dismissal of decision of Controller – Such
approach misaligned with requirements for
interdict –
Application dismissed –
Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977
.
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 2023 -123792
(1)
REPORTABLE
: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: [
Y
/NO]
(3)
REVISED: [
Y
/N]
(4)
SIGNATURE:
DATE:
15/12/2023
In
the matter between:
EMO
ENERGY (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
MINISTER
OF MINERAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY
1st Respondent
THE
CONTROLLER OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS,
2
nd
Respondent
DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF MINERAL
RESOURCES
AND ENERGY
3
rd
Respondent
FUEL
RETAILERS ASSOCIATION
4
TH
Respondent
Civil
Law and procedure - requirements for granting of a final interdict
– where facts show a review application
-application
is dismissed-no order as to costs
JUDGMENT
KHWINANA
AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The intervening party has applied to be joined as the fourth
respondent which application I have considered and they were joined
as such.
[2]
This court has been requested to dispense with forms and services
provided in terms of Rule 6 (12) of the Uniform Rules of Court and
directing that this matter be heard on an urgent basis.
[3]
The application is to suspend the immediate cancellation of
the
Petroleum Product wholesale license number W[...] that was cancelled
on the 02
nd
of June 2023 by the second Respondent.
[4]
That the applicant be granted leave to supplement its papers
for Part
B which will be postponed sine die.
[5]
That the dismissal of the appeal by the second Respondent on
the 04
th
of October 2023 be declared unlawful and have no legal force or
effect.
[6]
That the Second Respondent be ordered to withdraw the cancellation
within a period of 30 thirty days of this order.
[7]
That the First and Second Respondent pay costs of this application
the one paying the other be absolved.
BACKGROUND
[8]
The applicant submits that they run a business which is a going
concern, and the suspension/cancellation of the trading license is
unlawful. The applicant says the unlawful conduct was orchestrated
by
its former employees who have since been fired in compliance with the
act. It is alleged that the applicant has suffered no
harm or no
prejudice as to date they continue to trade and do business without
the requisite licence.
[9]
On the 26
th
day of August 2022, the Second Respondent
caused a notice in terms of section 2A(3) to be served on the
applicant for contravening
the Petroleum Act 120/1977. The applicant
is alleged to be retailing or selling quantities that are below the
prescribed limit
of 1500 litres per transaction. This was confirmed
through a site visit and has been confirmed by the applicant. The
applicant
was given fourteen days to comply with the notice.
[10]
The second notice was given on the 29
th
day of November
2022 again for the applicant to comply with the laws governing the
wholesale license. The applicant received a
notice of intention to
cancel the license during January 2023. On the 25
th
January
2023, the cancellation of the intention to cancel was received by the
applicant. A final notice of contravention was sent
to the applicant
on the 10
th
day of May 2023.
LEGAL MATRIX
[11]
It is imperative to unpack the meaning of the interdict and the
review
taking into account the argument raised by the fourth
respondent in this matter. An
interdict
is
a court order that prohibits a person from performing a specific
action or requires them to perform a specific action. It is
usually
granted when there is a risk of harm or damage to a person or
property. Interdicts can be temporary or permanent,
depending on
the circumstances
[1]
. On the
other hand, a
review
is
a legal process that allows a court to review the decision of an
administrative body or tribunal. The court will examine the
decision
to determine whether it was made lawfully and reasonably. If the
court finds that the decision was unlawful or unreasonable,
it may
set it aside or refer it back to the administrative body for
reconsideration
[2]
.
[12]
In LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality
[3]
as follows:
"Briefly these
requisites are that the Applicant for such temporary relief must show
–
(a) That the right which
is the subject matter of the main action and which he seeks to
protect using interim relief is clear or,
if not clear, is prima
facie established, though open to some doubt;
(b) that, if the right is
only prime facie established, there is a well-grounded apprehension
of irreparable harm to the Applicant
if the interim relief is not
granted and he ultimately succeeds in establishing his right;
(c) that the balance of
convenience favours the granting of interim relief·, and
(d) Section 6(1) provides
that ‘[a]ny person may institute proceedings in a court . . .
for the judicial review of an administrative
action’.
[13]
In terms of PAJA Section 6(2) then codifies the grounds upon which a
court may review administrative
action. The effect is that
administrative actions as defined in the PAJA are subject to review,
in terms of s 6(1), by a court
based on the grounds of review
codified in s 6(2). Section 8 deals with the remedies that may be
awarded when administrative action
is reviewed and found to be either
unlawful, unreasonable or procedurally unfair. Section 8(1) provides
that the ‘court .
. . in proceedings for judicial review in
terms of section 6(1), may grant any order that is just and
equitable’, including
mandatory and prohibitory interdicts, the
setting aside of administrative action, declarators and, in
exceptional circumstances,
substituting or varying administrative
action and even directing the payment of compensation. that the
Applicant has no other satisfactory
remedy."
[4]
[14]
In terms of the “bulk” means 1500 litres or more, per
transaction
of petroleum products;
In terms of Regulation
20(2)
[5]
The Controller may not
suspend or cancel a license unless—
(a) the licensed
wholesaler has been informed in writing of the intention to cancel or
suspend such licence—
(i) setting out the
particulars of the alleged failure or contravention; and
(ii) calling upon the
licensed wholesaler to make the representations to the Controller
that may be necessary within 30 days after
the date of that notice.
(b) The Controller has
considered—
(i) steps taken by the
licensed wholesaler to remedy the alleged failure or contravention
concerned or to prevent any such failure
or contravention from being
repeated; and
(ii) any other relevant
matter submitted by way of the representations contemplated in
paragraph (a)(ii).
21. Termination of
licence
(1) A licence ceases to
be valid if—
(a) the licence is
surrendered to the Controller;
(b) the licence is
cancelled by the Controller in accordance with regulation 20(2); or
(c) the licensed activity
is no longer a going concern.
[15]
In terms of Section 12B was introduced by the
Petroleum Products
Amendment Act 58 of 2003
. As appears from the long title of the
Amendment Act, one of its objectives was “to promote the
transformation of the South
African petroleum and liquid fuels
industry”. Schedule 1 to the Amendment Act introduced an
industry charter “on empowering
historically disadvantaged
South Africans in the petroleum and liquid fuels industry”.
Section 12B also promotes transformation
by protecting small
retailers against unfair and unreasonable treatment at the hands of
powerful wholesalers
[6]
.
[16]
While the transformational objectives of the
Petroleum Products
Amendment Act and
Section 12B
are vital for promoting equity and
inclusivity in the South African petroleum industry, it is equally
crucial to maintain the rule
of law and ensure that all parties
adhere to the established legal and regulatory frameworks. This
balanced approach is essential
for achieving sustainable and
meaningful transformation in the industry.
[17]
In the matter of The Business Zone 1010 CC t/a Emmarentia Convenience
Centre v Engen Petroleum
Limited and Others,
[7]
Mhlantla J held “I am satisfied that the decisions of both the
Controller and Minister amount to administrative action capable
of a
PAJA review. The decisions they were called upon to make, in terms of
the powers conferred on them by the Act, clearly affected
the rights
of the parties to the dispute and had a direct, external legal effect
on the legal relationship between the parties.”
(my emphasis)
[18]
“Wholesale” means the purchase and sale in bulk of
petroleum products by a licensed
wholesaler to or from another
licensed wholesaler, or to or from a licensed manufacturer, or sale
to a licensed retailer or an
end-consumer for own consumption and
“wholesaler” shall be interpreted accordingly;
[19]
In terms of the Constitution section 22 “Every citizen has the
right to choose their trade,
occupation or profession freely. The
practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by
law”. This right should
not be likely taken away.
[20]
The right to choose one's trade, occupation, or profession freely, as
enshrined in Section 22
of the Constitution, represents a fundamental
aspect of personal liberty and autonomy. This constitutional
provision acknowledges
the importance of individual choice in
determining one's professional path, which is integral to personal
development, economic
self-sufficiency, and the fulfilment of human
potential.
[21]
However, the Constitution also wisely allows for the regulation of
these professions by law.
This aspect is crucial for maintaining
standards, ensuring public safety, and protecting the interests of
the community at large.
Such regulation is not intended to unduly
restrict the freedom of choice in professions but to balance
individual rights with the
collective well-being.
[22]
In considering the right to choose one's profession, it is paramount
that any regulatory measures
imposed by law are reasonable,
justifiable, and serve a legitimate public interest. Regulations
should not be arbitrary or excessively
burdensome, as this would
undermine the essence of the freedom granted by the Constitution.
Instead, they should be designed to
enhance the integrity, safety,
and effectiveness of professional practices, ultimately benefiting
both the individuals in the profession
and the society they serve.
[23]
Thus, while the right to choose a profession is a fundamental freedom
that should not be lightly
infringed upon, it is equally important to
acknowledge the role of reasonable and necessary regulations in
ensuring that professional
practices align with broader societal
values and needs. The balance between individual freedom and
regulatory oversight is delicate
and requires constant vigilance to
ensure both are maintained in harmony.Top of Form
ANALYSIS
[24]
It is imperative to mention that I found that the intervening party
had a direct and substantial
interest in the matter and therefore
decided ex tempore that they be joined as the fourth Respondent. I
proceeded to consider the
urgency of the application considering the
rights of the applicant to trade that were cancelled by the first
Respondent. I found
that the application is urgent and should be
heard.
[25]
I am now ceased with deciding whether the application should be
pursued as an interdict or a
review. This application stems from the
Respondent's decision to revoke the applicant's wholesale trading
license due to alleged
non-compliance with regulations related to
product sales. The applicant acknowledges operating in the manner
described but contends
that a contract with a Taxi association, which
maintains an account with them, fulfills the requirement of 1500
litres through
multiple taxis refueling at their facility.
[26]
The applicant acknowledges that there may have been instances where
individuals, not part of
the taxi association, benefited from
wholesale purchases due to actions of former employees, who have
since been dismissed to ensure
compliance with regulations. The basis
of the applicant's case is that the decision to revoke their license
was procedurally flawed.
Specifically, they argue that in May 2023,
they did not receive a notice of intention to suspend the license, a
step that had been
followed in the past and is mandated by the
relevant act.
[27]
The applicant further argues that their expectation of receiving a
new notice of intent to revoke
the license was based on past
instances where such notices were issued and then withdrawn before
any cancellation occurred. This
expectation, they claim, was not met
when their license was abruptly revoked. Additionally, the applicant
emphasizes that they
have actively addressed the non-compliance
issues by terminating the employment of those involved in the
misconduct. This action
is part of their broader argument, which also
includes their operation in line with a contract with a Taxi
association, asserting
that this arrangement meets the 1500-liters
requirement through various taxis refueling at their facility.
[28]
The test was postulated as follows in Webster vs Mitchell
[8]
:
“
In an application
for a temporary interdict, applicant’s right need not be shown
by a balance of probabilities; it is sufficient
if such right is
prima facie established, though open to some doubt. The proper manner
of approach is to take the facts as set
out by the applicant together
with any facts set out by the respondent that the applicant cannot
dispute and to consider whether,
having regard to the inherent
probabilities, the applicant could on those facts obtain final relief
at the trial. The facts set
up in contradiction by the respondent
should then be considered, and if serious doubt is thrown upon the
case of the applicant,
he could not succeed. In considering the harm
involved in the grant or refusal of a temporary interdict, where a
clear right to
relief is not shown, the Court acts on the balance of
convenience. If, though there is prejudice to the respondent, that
prejudice
is less than that of the applicant, the interdict will be
granted. Subject, if possible, to conditions which will protect the
respondent.”
[29]
The applicant must first establish prima facie right to the license,
even if it's subject to
some doubt. Here, the applicant claims a
right to operate under the license, backed by their contract with the
Taxi Association
and efforts to comply with regulations by dismissing
non-compliant employees.
[30]
The next step is to consider the facts presented by both parties,
focusing on those that the
applicant cannot dispute. In this case,
it's acknowledged that the applicant was operating under the license
and took steps to
comply with regulations. The respondent's action of
revoking the license without prior notice, as previously done, is
also a critical
uncontested fact.
[31]
The court must assess whether the applicant could likely succeed in
obtaining final relief at
trial based on these facts and inherent
probabilities. Given the lack of notice and the applicant's attempts
at compliance, there
is a reasonable chance of success in a final
trial.
[32]
Any facts contradicting the applicant's case should be examined. If
these create serious doubt
about the applicant's case, it weakens
their position. In this scenario, the respondent would need to
provide compelling reasons
for revoking the license without notice to
cast doubt on the applicant's case.
[33]
Where a clear right is not established, the court acts on the balance
of convenience. The harm
to both parties is weighed. If the harm to
the applicant from the cancellation of the license outweighs the harm
to the respondent
(and the public interest), a temporary interdict
might be more suitable. In this case, the abrupt cancellation of the
license without
notice could cause significant harm to the applicant,
especially considering their steps toward compliance.
[34]
If an interdict is granted, it may come with conditions to
protect the respondent. This could include ensuring continued
adherence
to regulations or monitoring of the applicant's operations.
[35]
in terms of
(Regulation 20(2)(a))
:The regulation mandates that
before suspending or cancelling a license, the licensed wholesaler
must be informed in writing of
the intent to do so. This notice must
detail the particulars of the alleged failure or contravention and
invite the wholesaler
to make necessary representations within 30
days. In this case, the applicant's primary contention is that such a
notice was not
provided, which is a direct violation of the
regulation's stipulations.
[36]
In terms of
Regulation 20(2)(a)(ii))
: The regulation not only
requires notification but also ensures that the wholesaler has a fair
opportunity to respond to the allegations.
This step is crucial for
due process and allows the licensee to present their case or take
corrective actions. The absence of this
opportunity in the
applicant's case further strengthens their argument for an interdict.
[37]
In terms of
(Regulation 20(2)(b))
: The regulation also
obligates the Controller to consider any steps taken by the
wholesaler to remedy the alleged failure or prevent
its recurrence,
as well as any other relevant matters presented in their
representations. It would seem that the applicant’s
information
or steps taken for compliance (like firing non-compliant employees),
this aspect of procedural fairness was overlooked.
In terms of the
Regulation, it is prudent upon the Controller to consider such
information and steps taken to adhere to compliance.
[38]
Given these regulatory requirements, the applicant's pursuit of an
interdict is grounded in the
argument that the Controller's actions
(or inactions) contravened the established legal procedure. By not
issuing the required
notice and considering the applicant's
subsequent compliance efforts, the Controller denied the applicant
procedural fairness.
[39]
It is the duty of this court, in considering the interdict, to assess
whether the lack of adherence
to the regulatory procedure by the
Controller constitutes a sufficient basis for granting temporary
relief. The court must weigh
the potential harm to the applicant from
the license suspension or cancellation without due process against
any potential harm
to the public interest or the regulatory
objectives of the Controller.
[40]
This court must balance the need to uphold regulatory standards and
procedures against the rights
and interests of the applicant. The
lack of procedural fairness, as alleged by the applicant, tip this
balance in favour of granting
an interdict, particularly because the
applicant shows a willingness and effort to comply with regulatory
requirements.
[41]
Moseneke DCJ in National Treasury and others vs Opposition to Urban
Tolling Alliance and others
[9]
when he stated as follows: “Under the Setlogelo test, the prima
facie right claimant must establish is not merely the right
to
approach a Court to review an administrative decision. It is a right
to which, if not protected by an interdict, irreparable
harm would
ensue. An interdict is meant to prevent future conduct and not
decisions already made. Quite apart from the right to
review and to
set aside impugned decisions, the applicants should have demonstrated
a prima facie right that it threatened by impending
or imminent
irreparable harm. The right to review the impugned decisions did not
require any preservation pendente lite.”
[42]
Where the applicant seeks the Court to interfere with the exercise of
statutory power conferred
on the Minister, the applicant must
demonstrate exceptional circumstances. It is imperative to recognize
that the application at
hand is for an interdict, where the existence
of a clear right is a prerequisite. This differs fundamentally from
situations where
rights have already been stripped away. The nature
of the applicant's approach to this court is flawed; it appears to
erroneously
seek a review or dismissal of a decision of the Second
Respondent. Such an approach is misaligned with the requirements for
an
interdict.
[43]
Therefore, upon careful consideration of the facts and legal
principles applicable, this Court
finds that the application is
ill-conceived and does not meet the established criteria for the
relief sought. Consequently, the
application is dismissed.
COSTS
[38]
In reviewing the circumstances of this case, it is apparent that the
application was not brought
in the correct procedural manner by the
applicant. However, it is equally clear that the second respondent
has not fully adhered
to the relevant regulations. This shared
responsibility for the procedural irregularities and non-compliance
with regulatory requirements
impacts the decision on costs.
[39]
In light of these considerations, this Court could find reasons to
depart from the norm in respect
of the cost order. I find that it
would not be just or equitable to award costs against either party.
The principle of fairness
dictates that when both parties have
contributed to the situation that has necessitated legal proceedings,
neither should be unduly
penalized in terms of costs.
Order
The application is
dismissed, no order as to costs.
KHWINANA ENB
ACTING JUDGE OF
GAUTENG HIGH COURT
Counsel
for Applicant:
ADV
R. BALOYI
Instructed
by:
OMM
ATTORNEYS INC.
Counsel
for 1
st
to 3
rd
Respondent:
ADV
B. NTHAMBELENI/ADV V. MUKWEVHO
Instructed
by:
STATE
ATTORNEY
Counsel
for 4
th
Respondent:
ADV W
WANNENBURG
Instructed
by:
TSHEPO
MOFOKENG ATTORNEYS
DATE OF HEARING:
08
TH
DECEMBER 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
15
TH
DECEMBER 2023
[1]
United Democratic Movement and Another v Lebashe Investment Group
(Pty) Ltd and Others (1032/2019)
[2021] ZASCA 4
(13 January 2021)
[2]
Altech Radio Holdings (Pty) Limited and Others v City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality (1104/2019)
[2020] ZASCA 122
(5 October
2020)
[3]
1969 (2) SA 256 (C) 267
[4]
TMT Services & Supplies (Pty) Ltd t/a Traffic Management
Technologies v MEC: Department of Transport, Province of
KwaZulu-Natal
and Others (Case no. 1059/2020)
[2022] ZASCA 27
(15
March 2022)
[5]
REGULATIONS REGARDING PETROLEUM PRODUCTS WHOLESALE LICENCES [Updated
to 19 December 2012]
[6]
The Business Zone 1010 CC t/a Emmarentia Convenience Centre v Engen
Petroleum Limited and Others [2017] ZACC 2
[7]
[2017]
ZACC
2
[8]
1948 (1) SA 1186 (WLD)
[9]
2012 (6) SA 223
(CC) at para 50
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