Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 8South Africa
Tshavhungwe v Fast Issuer Spy (RF) Ltd (2674/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 8 (10 January 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
10 January 2022
Headnotes
judgment Application. The Applicant should have filed his notice of intention to defend and not fear any further steps
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Tshavhungwe v Fast Issuer Spy (RF) Ltd (2674/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 8 (10 January 2022)
Tshavhungwe v Fast Issuer Spy (RF) Ltd (2674/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 8 (10 January 2022)
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sino date 10 January 2022
SAFLII
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO. 2674/21
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
DATE: 10 JANUARY 2022
SIGNATURE
In the
matter between:
PHATHUTSHEDZO
TSHAVHUNGWE
Applicant
And
FAST ISSUER SPY (RF)
LTD
Respondent
IN RE:
FAST ISSUER SPY (RF)
LTD
Plaintiff
And
PHATHUTSHEDZO
TSHAVHUNGWE
Defendant
JUDGMENT
Delivered: This
judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the
parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 10 January 2022.
MOTHA
AJ
INTRODUCTION
1.
This is an interlocutory application in terms of Rule 30(1)
of the
Uniform Rules of this Court. The Applicant seeks in his notice of
motion to have the service of the summons declared an
irregular step,
incorrectly served and null and void.
2.
The second application is for
de bonis propriis
costs against
the Respondent’s Attorney, Mr. Roland Fabricius. At the outset
of the proceedings the Applicant abandoned its
action against Mr.
Roland Fabricius. Now the shoe is on the other foot, Mr. Fabricius
seeks punitive costs order for having been
dragged to Court.
THE
FACTS
3.
Following a motor vehicle instalment sale agreement entered
on/or
about 7 September 2016, the Respondent issued summons against the
Applicant on 22 January 2021 for his failure to make payment
of the
monthly instalments.
4.
On 26 January 2021, in terms of Rule 4 (1) (a) (iv), summons
was
served at an incorrect
Domicilium citandi et executandi
,
namely: 1[...] K[...], O[...] Avenue, Val de Grace.
5.
With the
dies
to enter appearance to defend having expired, on
13 March 2021 the Respondent applied for Default Judgment. The
Applicant learnt
of the Application on 14 April 2021 when the
Respondent invited him on Caselines. He immediately called the
Respondent’s
Attorneys and alerted them that the summons had
been served at an incorrect
domicilium
.
6.
On 21 April 2021 the Applicant wrote an email to the Respondent’s
Attorneys informing them that the
domicilium
had been changed
way back on 17 July 2019. Seeing that there was no response
forthcoming, on 5 May 2021 the Applicant appointed
Attorneys; who
immediately served the Respondent with the notice in terms of Rule
30(2)(b).
7.
The core of the cause of complaint was the irregular step of
serving
the summons at an incorrect
domicilium
. This will become
decisive later in this judgment.
8.
Rule 30 of the Uniform Rules of Court deals with irregular
proceedings. In short it reads as follows:
“
(1)
A party to a cause in which
an irregular step has been taken by any
other party may apply to court to set it aside.
(2) An application
in terms of subrule (1) shall be on notice to all parties specifying
particulars of the irregularity or
impropriety alleged, and may be
made only if –
(a) the applicant
has not himself taken a further step in the cause with knowledge of
the irregularity;
(b) the applicant
has, within ten days of becoming aware of the step, by written notice
afforded his opponent an opportunity
of removing the cause of
complaint within ten days;
(c)
the
application is delivered within fifteen days after the expiry of the
second period mentioned in paragraph (b) of subrule (2).”
[1]
9.
On 18 May 2021 the Respondent’s Attorneys of record informed
the Applicant that the summons would be re-served at the new
domicilium
and that the application for the default judgment
would be removed from the roll. On 19 May 2021 the Applicant demanded
that the
Respondent should withdraw the action because the re-service
of the summons would amount to a further irregular step.
10.
On 19 May 2021 the Respondent attended to the removal of the cause of
the complaint by inserting on the summons the Applicant’s
correct
domicilium,
namely:1[...] S[...] Avenue, Die Wilgers,
0157, the Registrar’s signature and stamp.
11.
On 24 May 2021 summons was duly served on the Applicant’s new
domicilium.
I am in agreement with Counsel for the Respondent
that this should have been the end of the Rule 30 notice.
12.
The Respondent had, therefore, removed the cause of complaint by
approaching
the Registrar on 19 May 2021 and altered the
domicilium
address. To the extent that this approach is questioned, it is apt to
refer to
Harris v De
Meillon
where the Court held the
following:
“
It
is abundantly clear that the additions to the summons were never
authorised by the signature of the Registrar; and it may be
assumed
that the Registrar if approached would not have sanctioned the
additional claims in the absence of authority for the prosecution
of
these claims in the power of attorney to sue. Rule 15(1) requires the
signature of the Registrar on all civil process. It is
obvious that
any amendment or addition to a summons after issue and before service
must be signed by the Registrar and the plaintiff
or his attorney.
The addition of matter to duly issued process of the Court, without
the authority of the Registrar, constitutes
a grave irregularity; and
process so altered must be regarded as not having been issued at
all’’.
[2]
13.
The
Respondent’s Counsel submitted that the cause of the complaint
was never the default judgment application. As mentioned
in paragraph
7
supra
,
the cause of complaint in terms of the peremptory Rule 30(2)(b) was
the service at an incorrect
domicilium
.
Therefore, it is self- serving to argue during the Rule 30(1)
application that the cause of complaint had not been removed if
the
default judgment had not been dealt with. It is not open to a party
to file Rule 30(2)(b) alleging one cause of complaint and
yet in the
Application rely on a different one.
[3]
14.
Furthermore,
in this Application the Applicant, argued the Respondent’s
Counsel, had not alleged nor proven any prejudice.
The proof of
prejudice is a prerequisite to succeed in an application in terms of
Rule 30(1)
[4]
. I cannot find any
prejudice suffered by the Applicant as a result of the re-service of
the summons. In
Brenners
Service Station and Garage (Pty) Ltd v Mine and Another
the
Court stated the following:
“
I
think it emerges from the passage quoted that in appropriate cases,
the court is entitled to refuse to take heed of technical
irregularity in a procedure which does not cause prejudice to the
other party.”
[5]
15.
However, the Applicant’s Counsel submitted that a notice of
withdrawal
of the Application for default judgment was supposed to be
served before the summons was amended and re-served. An answer was
not
forthcoming from the Applicant’s Counsel as to what
difference it would have made if the entire action was withdrawn and
started afresh and the manner in which the Respondent handled the
matter.
16.
The Court in
Trans-African Insurance Co Ltd v Maluleka
held
the following:
“
Technical
objections to less than perfect procedural steps should not be
permitted, in the absence of prejudice to interfere with
the
expeditious and if possible in expensive decision of cases on their
real merits.”
[6]
17.
At this stage it is important to distinguish between a matter that is
properly
issued and served and this matter which was properly issued
but improperly served . A properly issued and served matter can only
be amended in terms of Rule 28. Since this matter was not properly
served Rule 28 does not apply. In this regard both parties were
in
agreement.
18.
Accordingly, there was never a properly served case before court.
Hence, it
was open to the Respondent to approach the Registrar for
his signature and insert the correct
domicilium.
The default
judgment application was not proceeded with.
19.
When asked why the Applicant did not file the notice of intention to
defend
following the proper service, it is telling that the
Applicant’s Counsel retorted that the Respondent threatened to
bring
a summary judgment Application. The Applicant should have filed
his notice of intention to defend and not fear any further steps
taken by the Respondent.
20.
The Applicant’s submission that the Respondent went about the
incorrect
way in rectifying the irregular step raised in its Rule
30(2)(b) is not sustainable. Accordingly, this Application is without
merit
and falls to be dismissed. The cause of complaint was attended
to and removed.
21.
The Applicant in its replying affidavit indicated that he would seek
de bonis propriis
costs order against Mr. Fabricius. This was
completely unnecessary. Hence, at the beginning of the proceedings
this cause of action
was quickly abandoned. However, this was
tantamount to shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted.
22.
On 26 October 2021 Mr. Fabricius filed his Notice of Intention to
Oppose the
Application for costs
de bonis propriis
and
dispatched an email advising the Applicant that Advocate Dale
Hinrichsen had been briefed. The Applicant did not reply to this
email and only beat a hasty retreat in Court.
23.
Accordingly, the Applicant has made his bed and must lie in it.
COSTS
24.
The well-established
principle on costs was reiterated in the case of Intercontinental
Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles when the Court
held the following:
“
The
basic rule is that, statutory limitations apart, all costs awards are
in the discretion of the court (Kruger Bros & Wasserman
v
Ruskin
1918
AD 63
at
69, a decision which has consistently been followed). The court’s
discretion is a wide, unfettered and equitable one. It
is a facet of
the court’s control over the proceedings before it. It is to be
exercised judicially with due regard to all
relevant considerations.
These would include the nature of the litigation being conducted
before it and the conduct of the parties
(or their representatives).
A court may wish, in certain circumstances, to deprive a party of
costs, or a portion thereof, or order
lesser costs than it might
otherwise have done, as a mark of its displeasure at such party’s
conduct in relation to the litigation.”
[7]
## 25.It
is trite that costsde
bonis propriisare costs ordered to be paid by a representative out of his or
her own pocket as a result of either negligent or improper
conduct.[8]These costs are not
indicated in this matter.
25.
It
is trite that costs
de
bonis propriis
are costs ordered to be paid by a representative out of his or
her own pocket as a result of either negligent or improper
conduct.
[8]
These costs are not
indicated in this matter.
26.
In my view the costs between the Applicant and the Respondent should
be reserved
to be determined in the main Application.
27.
There was no need to threaten the Respondent’s Attorney with
de
bonis propriis
costs order. If the Applicant had responded to the
email dated 26 October 2021 there would have been no need for the
Respondent’s
Attorney to come defend himself in Court;
especially since the Applicant was not proceeding with the
Application.
28.
The tardy way the Applicant handled this matter justifies being
burdened with
costs on a party and party scale from Friday the 5
th
November 2021 to the 8
th
of November 2021 including the
costs of Counsel.
ORDER
In
the result, the following order is made:
1.
The Applicant’s Application is dismissed.
2.
Costs are reserved.
3.
Costs on a party and party scale against the Applicant in favour of
Mr. Fabricius from 5 November
2021 to 8 November 2021 including costs
of Counsel.
MOTHA AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION OF THE
HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
Date
of hearing: 08 November 2021
Date of judgment: 10
January 2022
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Adv.
NW Maodi
Email:wmaodi@rsabar.com
Tel: 072 322 6666
(Instructed by:
Thecla-May Peta)
Email:info@theclainc.co.za
Email:
lesedi@theclainc.co.za
Tel: 076 373 1472
For the Respondent: Adv.
S. Venter
Email:venter.sonja@gkchambers.co.za
Tel:072
205 6660
(Instructed by: Fabricius
Attorneys)
Email:roland@felaw.co.za
For Mr. R. Fabricius:
Adv. D. Hinrichsen
Email:dale@gkchambers.co.za
Tel: 082 467 5258
(Instructed by: Manong
Badenhorst Inc.)
Email:
carmea@mbilaw.co.za
Tel: 067 612 7037
[1]
Erasmus
Superior Court Practice D1-351
[2]
Harris
v De
Meillon
1959 (4) SA 272
(E) at 273
[3]
TJ v TA (Unreported, GJ case no 2019/22224 dated 31 March 2021) at
paragraph [12]
[4]
³SA METROPOLITAN LEWENSVERSEKERINGSMAATSKAPPY Bpk v Louw NO
1981 (4) SA 329(O)
at 333G-334G
[5]
Brenners Service Station and Garage (Pty) Ltd v Mine and Another
1983 (4) SA 233(W)
at 238 G -H
[6]
Trans-African
Insurance Co Ltd v Maluleka
1956 (2) SA 273(A)
at 278F-G
## [7]Intercontinental
Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles (85/98) [1999] ZASCA 15; [1999] 2 All SA
304 (A) (23 March 1999) para 25
[7]
Intercontinental
Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles (85/98) [1999] ZASCA 15; [1999] 2 All SA
304 (A) (23 March 1999) para 25
[8]
Pheko
and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2)
[2015]
ZACC 10
para 51
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