Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 20South Africa
Ngake v S (A136/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 20 (11 January 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
11 January 2022
Headnotes
the exercise of caution must not be allowed to displace the exercise of common sense. The complainant testified that she was dragged by the two men one of them being Accused 1 however, she could only identify Accused 1. The court a quo considered the evidence of her sister in law that the complainant was sober. The court took into account the injuries as appearing on the J88 form which corroborates the complainant’s evidence of bruises on the neck, swelling on the private parts of the complainant.The court in S v Sauls & Others4 stated:
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Ngake v S (A136/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 20 (11 January 2022)
Ngake v S (A136/21) [2022] ZAGPPHC 20 (11 January 2022)
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sino date 11 January 2022
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NUMBER: A136/21
11/1/2022
(1)REPORTABLE:
NO
(2)OF
INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: NO
(3)REVISED
In
the matter between:
FANI
NGAKE
APPELLANT
and
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
BALOYI
AJ
[1.]
This is an appeal against conviction and sentence handed down in the
Regional Court Division of
Bronkhorspruit on 26
th
of June 2013 against the Appellant. The Appellant
together with two co-accused (accused 1 and 2) were charged for
unlawfully and intentionally
committing an act of sexual penetration
with a female person, J[....] N[....] M[....] a 25 year
old by inserting his
penis in her vagina without her consent.
[2.]
They pleaded not guilty to the charge. Formal admissions in terms of
section 220 of the Criminal
Procedure
[1]
were reduced to
writing. The Appellant admitted having consensual sex with the
complainant alleging that she is a prostitute (Magosha).
They were
found guilty of the charge and sentenced to life imprisonment in
terms of section 51 (5) of the minimum sentence Act
[2]
.
The court a
quo
found
that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances place
d
before the court
that the minimum sentence should not be applied.
AD
EVIDENCE
[3.]
N[....] M[....] , the complainant testified that the incident
occurred
on 29/30 September 2012
at Ext. 5 Zithobeni at about 19h00. She was coming from her
sister in-la
w when she
was
grabbed by two males
who
closed
her mouth so that she could not scream. She was forced and dragged by
accused 1
however, s
he
could not identify the other perpetrators. They took her to accused
1’s place
where
Accused
1 put
on
a condom and had
sex with her without her consent. Later two men entered the room and
raped her without a condom. She could not see
them as it was dark.
Accused 1 had sex with her again after the other two were done. They
all had sex with her without her consent.
The two left in the
morning.
[4.]
She left in the early hours of the morning and went to Zithobeni
police station
where s
he
was taken to Bronkhorspruit police station and later to the doctor
for examination. She testified that she took the police to accused
1’s place for arrest. The complainant could not identify the
Appellant a
s
one of the
perpetrators. It was put to her that the Appellant and the co-
accused had sex with her as she agreed to and demanded money
for her
services. They agreed to pay her later as they had used their money
to buy beers. She denied that she agreed to have sex
with them and
never asked for money.
[5.] The second witness was
Sergeant Mahlangu, she testified that she was working at
Bronkhorstspruit police station. On the morning
of 30 September 2012
she was on duty
when
The
complainant came to lay a charge. She testified that she was
confused, hopeless and very tired. She testified that the complainant
did not smell
of
any
alcohol.
●
She reported the matter to
the third state witness Constable Desmond
Nodumiso
Matome
, attached to the
South
African Police Service. On the night of the 29
th
September 2012, he was on duty at Ezithobeni contact
point. They normally receive complaints at their sub-station. He
testified that
around 03h00 30 September 2012 the complainant came to
report a rape. They took her to Bronkhorspruit police station to
report her
case where she was assisted by a female colleague. He
testified that the complainant did not look good, her eye looked
injured.
[6.] The next witness was Emily
Ramollo, she testified that the complainant was her sister-in-law.
She saw her on the 29 September
2012 around 17h00 in the afternoon.
She testified that the complainant was in good condition when she
left her.
APPELLANT’S
TESTIMONY
[7.] The Appellant was at the
tavern with the two co-accused drinking and dancing. Accused 2 went
outside and when he came back he
told them that the complainant is
joining them. They were together and had beers while dancing togethe
r
when they
were advised that the tavern was closing so they
went outside. They suggested going to accused 2’s place of
residence but decided
not to go as it was too far and there was no
electricity. They went to accused 1’s place and upon arrival they
played music. The
complainant told them that she is selling sex, she
is a prostitute. They told her that they do not have money as they
used it to
buy alcohol at the tavern. They offered to pay her later
for sex. Accused 1 was the first one to have sex with the
complainant,
A
ccused 2
followed and he was the last one. During cross examination he denied
that t
h
e complainant was
dragged and strangled. He testified that she went there voluntarily
from the tavern to
A
ccused
1’s place. The complainant left at Accused 1’
s
place
at around 04h00. He denied raping the complainant and
stated that it was voluntarily and they all agree
d
to pay her later. Their version was that they agreed from the
tavern to go with complainant and she offered them sex in exchange
for
money. They all denied raping the complainant.
[8.] The next witness Nomvula
Mashiane
, for the
appellant,
who testified that she knows all the accused. She
saw the three accused arriving at the tavern. She testified that the
complainant
was already drunk when she arrived at the tavern at
23h00. She testified that she was in the company of the three accused
at 02h00
am when they left. N[....] was walking voluntarily and
followed the three accused including the Appellant. She testified
that
A
ccused 2 was the
first one to leave with the complainant, after Accused 1 followed
with
the Appellant and
the tavern closed immediately after they left.
[9.]
The
n
ext witness, Elizabeth Mampa testified that she knew the
accused
as they
were her
customers. She is the owner of cola Park Tavern. She testified that
the complainant arrived at 23h0
0
at the tavern and joined the three accused. She testified
further that they all had alcohol together
moreover,
she observed that the complainant was having alcohol but not
drunk. She testified that the three accused were not violent at the
time
when they were in her presence. She testified that she
did
not see what was happening outside.
ANALYSIS
OF EVIDENCE
[10.] The complainant is a single
witness in the offence of rape. It is trite that the court should
exercise
the
cautionary rule
when considering her evidence.
S
v Artman
and
another
[3]
[4]
it
was held that the exercise of caution must not be allowed to displace
the exercise of common sense.
The
complainant testified that she was dragged by the two men one of them
being
A
ccused
1 however, she could only identify
A
ccused
1. The court
a quo
considered the
evidence of her sister in law that the complainant was sober. The
court took into account the injuries as appearing
on the J88
form
which
corroborates
the complainant’s evidence
of
bruises on the
neck, swelling on the private parts of the complainant.The court in
S
v Sauls & Others
4
stated:
“
There
is no rule of thumb or formula test when it comes to a consideration
of the credibility of the single witness. The trial judge
will weigh
his evidence, will consider its merits and demerits and, having done
so, will decide whether is trustworthy and whether
despite the fact
that there are shortcomings or defect or contradiction in the
testimony, he is satisfied that the truth has been
told. The
cautionary referred to be Dr. Devilliers JP in 1932 may be a guide to
a right decision but it does not mean (the appeal
must succeed if any
criticism, however slander, of the witness evidence were well
founded. “
“
It
is trite that the court of appeal should refrain from lightly
interfering with the credibility findings of a trial court which
presumed to be correct. This is so because the trial court had the
benefit of being steeped in the atmosphere of the trial court
and
observing and hearing the evidence first-hand. The trial court is
therefore “in the best position to determine where the truth
lies.”
[5]
[11.]
Counsel for the Appellant submitted that that the court should look
into the
following:
factors which the court did not consider;
●
The complainant was comfortable
testifying in open court even if it was explained that the case was
of sexual nature in addition,
the complainant was confident to
testify in open court;
●
The street in which the
complainant was dragged is usually busy but on the evening of the
incident there was no one on the street
when the complainant
screamed. He submitted that someone could have noticed and assisted
the complainant.
●
The complainant
s
injuries were not serious despite having been raped four
times.
[12.]
The
submission by the Counsel does not take argument any further in that
if the complainant testified in open court does not mean
she was not
raped, she was brave enough to face her fears and perpetrators. The
court a
quo
found
that she was a credible witness. She testified that she was dragged
and it was already dark during that time, having to suggest
that
there was no one to help
;
the complainant did
not have control over the situation. The fact that the injuries on
her private parts are not serious the argument
does not have basis,
it is common cause that they all had sex with her on the date. The
court i
n
S
v Gentle
[6]
found that: “
It
must be emphasized immediately that by corroboration is meant other
evidence which supports the evidence of the complainant and
which
renders the evidence of the accused less probable, on the issue in
dispute.”
[13.]
It
is my considered view that the complainant’s evidence is
corroborated by J88. The evidence of Mrs Mamba and N[....] does
not assist the Appellant and the co-accused with regard to what
happened after they left the tavern. The court
a quo
was
correct in accepting the evidence of the complainant and not finding
that the Appellant’s version was probable. I therefore
find that
the court
a quo
was correct in convicting the Appellant.
AD
SENTENCE
[14.] The Appellant was sentenced
to life imprisonment in terms of the Minimum Sentence Act
[7]
.
The court
a
quo
did
not find the
Appellant's personal circumstances as compelling to deviate from the
minimum sentence. The Appellant gave his personal
circumstances
,
that he was 22
years old
,
he was employed as
a general labourer
w
here
he earned R 200.00 per month
,
he is single, has
children
and
The Appellant
has
grade 9 education
.
Th
is was
submitted that the following
should be accepted as compelling circumstances.
[15.] Section 51
[8]
(3)(a
A) When imposing a sentence in respect to any offence of rape the
following shall not constitute substantial and compelling
circumstances justifying the
imposition of a lesser sentence:
i.
The complainant’s previous sexual history;
ii.
an apparent lack of physical injury to the
complainant;
iii.
an
accused person’s cultural or religious beliefs about rape; or
iv.
any
relationship between the accused person and the complainant
prior to the offence being
committed.
[16.]
The
court a
quo
considered
the seriousness of the offence. The minimum sentence was placed in
emphasis on how serious the crime is. The
court
a
quo
did
consider Part 1 of Schedule 2 that as a part of the minimum sentence
Act, where rape committed in the circumstances where the
victim was
raped more than once, whether by the accused or any co-perpetrator or
accomplice by more than one person, where such a
person acted in
execution
of furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy
[9]
.
“It was evidence of the complainant that she was
dragged
to
the house by accused 1 and that later on the other people also
entered and had sexual intercourse’.
Our
courts will consider each case on its merits, the circumstances of
the offence and the seriousness. It is clear
from
the conduct of the Appellant and co-accused that they acted in common
purpose in raping the complainant. Snyman elaborates that
[10]
—
“
the
essence of the doctrine is that if two or more people, having a
common purpose to commit a crime, act together in order to achieve
that purpose, the conduct of each of them in the execution of that
purpose is imputed to the others”. These requirements are often
couched in terms which relate to consequence crimes such as murder.
The liability requirements of a joint criminal enterprise fall
into
two categories. The first arises where there is a prior agreement,
express or implied, to commit a common offence. In the second
category, no such prior agreement exists or is proved. In the latter
instance the liability arises from an active association and
participation in a common criminal design with the requisite
blameworthy state of mind. It is trite that a prior agreement may not
necessarily be express but may be inferred from surrounding
circumstances. The facts constituting the surrounding circumstances
from
which the inferences are sought to be drawn must nevertheless be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. A prior agreement to commit a crime
may invoke the imputation of conduct, committed by one of the parties
to the agreement which falls within their common design, to
all the
other contracting parties. Subject to proof of the other definitional
elements of the crime, such as unlawfulness and fault,
criminal
liability may in these circumstances be established
.
[11]
“
[17.]
The
court in
Baba and
Others v S
[12]
[13]
held that “
One
can never leave out of account, as the SCA
recently
emphasised again in S v Hewitt
2017
(1)
SACR
309
(SCA)
at para 9, that rape is “a horrifying crime” and “a cruel and
selfish act in which the aggressor treats with utter contempt
the
dignity and feelings of [the] victim”, and as “a very serious
offence” which is “a humiliating, degrading and brutal
invasion
of the privacy, the dignity and the person of the victim”. In the
present instance one is dealing with gang rape, which
is one of the
most horrific crimes imaginable and one for which the legislature has
dictated that a sentence of life imprisonment
must be imposed unless
there is substantial and compelling reasons to do otherwise.
[18.] I therefore find that the
court was correct in not finding that there are substantial and
compelling reasons in respect of the
Appellant to deviate from the
minimum sentence.
[19.]
The Court in Ndlovu v S
13
held that
in
order for the minimum sentencing provisions to be triggered, there
must be an actual conviction of rape of the co-perpetrator/s.
A
trial court is obliged to sentence an accused who appears
before
it on the basis of the facts which it found to have been proven when
convicting the accused. The
Mahlase
dictum, however, gives
rise, with respect, to the illogical situation that a trial court,
having found beyond reasonable doubt that
the complainant was raped
more than once by two men and having convicted the accused
accordingly, must, for purposes of the Act,
disregard that finding
and proceed to sentence the accused on the basis that it was not in
fact proven that she was raped more than
once; that the provisions of
the Act relating to the imposition of the prescribed minimum sentence
of life imprisonment are therefore
not applicable; and that the
minimum sentence applicable in terms of the Act is one of only ten
years
imprisonment.
[20.]
The
Constitutional Court in
Tshabalala
[14]
(
has
now conclusively put paid to the instrumentality argument. Mathopo AJ
held as follows on this point:
The
instrumentality argument has no place in our modern society founded
upon the Bill of Rights. It is obsolete and must be discarded
because
its foundation is embedded in a system of patriarchy where women are
treated as mere chattels. It ignores the fact that rape
can be
committed by more than one person for as long as the others have the
intention of exerting power and dominance over the women,
just by
their presence in the room. The perpetrators overpowered their
victims by intimidation and assault. The manner in which the
applicants and the other co-accused moved from one household to the
other indicates meticulous prior planning and preparation. They
made
sure that any attempt to escape would not be possible.
[21.] The court a
qou
found
the Appellant and his co-accused guilty of rape. They gang raped the
complainant and do not show remorse by stating that she
was
a prostitute.
[22.] I make
the following order;
●
Appeal
on conviction and sentence is dismissed.
BALOYI-MBEMBELE
(ACTING
JUDGE OF HIGH COURT)
I
agree,
TLHAPI
VV
(JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT)
MATTER
HEARD ON
: 14
OCTOBER 2021
JUDGMENT
VRESERVED ON
: 14
OCTOBER 2021
ATTORNEYS
FOR THE APPELLANTS :
LEGAL-AID OF SA
ATTORNEYS
FOR THE RESPONDENTS :
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
[1]
51 of 1977
[2]
section
51(2) (a)(i) of the Act 105 of 1997
[3]
1968(3) SA 340 at page 341(B-C).
[4]
981 (3) at page 180 – para D to F.
[5]
Mvana and Another v S 2018 ZAECGHC18 at para 13
[6]
2005 ZASCA 26.
[7]
Act 105 of 1997.
[8]
Minimum sentence Act 105 0of 1997
[9]
Page 173 of the record.
[10]
Snyman Criminal law 5 ed (LexisNexis, Durban 2008 at 265.
[11]
S v Tshabalala and Another
2020 (2) SACR 38
(CC) at para 46 to 49.
[12]
[2019] ZAWCHC 40
para 40 and 41.
[13]
All SA 556(GJ) para 35.
[14]
At para 80.
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