Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 87South Africa
Ngwenya v S (A144/2018) [2022] ZAGPPHC 87 (10 February 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
10 February 2022
Headnotes
an identity parade in respect of Mr Magoo who according to him had pointed out the appellant.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Ngwenya v S (A144/2018) [2022] ZAGPPHC 87 (10 February 2022)
Ngwenya v S (A144/2018) [2022] ZAGPPHC 87 (10 February 2022)
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sino date 10 February 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISON, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO.: A144/2018
In
the matter between:
SIPHO
NGWENYA
Appellant
And
THE
STATE
Respondent
JUDGEMENT
NQUMSE AJ
[1] The appellant was convicted
in the Gauteng regional court on the following charges:
I.
One count of robbery
with aggravating circumstances;
II.
One count of murder and
III.
Two counts of attempted
murder.
[2] Following his conviction, he
was sentenced to 15 years in respect of the robbery charge; life
imprisonment
in respect of the murder charge the attempted murder on
the life of Vera Magoo and 4 years in respect in respect of the
attempted
murder on the life of Pradeep Magoo.
[3] He now appeals with the
leave of the court against his conviction and sentence.
[4] The evidence tendered by the
prosecution revealed that all the charges arose from an incident that
allegedly
took place at the shoe repair shop of Mr Magoo, the
deceased. The shop also renders service to cut keys.
[5] Mrs Vera Magoo who testified
through a CCTV facility stated that on 15 March 2016 she and her
husband
were seated in their shop in front of the counter, when two
males entered and one of them needed a key in his possession to be
cut.
She took the key and gave it to her husband to cut it.
[6] The man who had a key
followed her husband behind the counter whilst the other one stood at
the door inside
the shop. Whilst waiting for her husband who had gone
to cut the key, the man at the door was facing her and made a sign to
her to
give him money by rubbing his two fingers against each other
at the same time he instructed her at the same time he instructed her
with a gun to get behind the counter. She tried to establish how far
her husband was with the cutting of the key. She heard a number
of
shots being fired. Whilst not certain on the direction where the
gunshots came from, one of the shots was from the direction of
the
man who was at the door.
[7] She testified that she was
hit by the shots as a result of which she suffered a scar on the
nose, she
also lost part of her tongue as a result of a bullet that
struck her and got lodged behind the left jaw, and her jaw was
cracked
in three different places. And as a result of this injury a
steel plate was inserted in her jaw, she also sustained a bullet
wound
on her left forefinger as well as an injury above her breast.
During the shooting she fell on the bench she was sitted on before
the man entered the shop. According to her, she lost consciousness
for two seconds, she thereafter walked out of the shop.
[8] When she looked again she
saw both men running down the street and they were still firing shots
indiscriminately
towards the direction of the shop. As the two men
were running, they were chased by her son, Pradeep. She therefore sat
down over
caved by shock.
[9] She was later taken by her
son, Pradeep and other family members to hospital where she was
admitted for
two months.
[10] Upon her return from hospital, she was
taken to an identity parade where she pointed out one of her
assailants.
[11] During her testimony she was invited to
point out in court the person she had pointed out at identity parade
and
she pointed out the accused who was sitted in the dock.
[12] Under cross examination, she stated
that she could identify one of her assailants because of a distinct
feature of
a lump on his cheek.
[13] Pradeep Magoo the son Mrs Vera Magoo
testified confirmed that whilst at his shop which is two stores away
from his
parent’s shop, he heard gun shots close to his father’s
shop. He ran towards his father’s shop. When nearer to the shop he
saw two black males who were running out of the shop. One of them was
taller than the other and the shorter one was carrying a firearm.
[14] He later attended an identity parade in
which he pointed out both men. He learned that the shorter one who
was called
Shorty died in a shootout with the police and the other
one is the accused before court.
[15] On the fateful day of his father’s
killing, it was about 14H00 when he saw the accused and Shorty
running out of
his father’s shop. He gave chase. He was in
possession of a firearm. He took this firearm from one of his patrons
from his shop/tavern.
Whilst busy chasing them, they turned their
faces towards him and they started to fire shots at him. He managed
to avoid the bullets
that were directed at him by hiding behind a
stationery vehicle on the street.
[16] He stopped a minibus that was
travelling on the road. He got into it and asked the driver to give
chase. Whilst giving
chase with the minibus the two men turned again
towards them and fired shots towards them and thereafter disappeared
into the squatter
camp underneath a bridge.
[17] They went back to his father’s shop
where he found his mother full of blood sitting on a chair
half-slumped and
his father was lying on his stomach in a pool of
blood. His mother was taken to hospital.
[18] He further stated that when the
appellant and Shorty turned towards him, that gave him the
opportunity to see their
faces at a distance of between ten to
fifteen meters. When he was asked by the prosecutor to mention any
distinct features of the
accused and Shorty that were identifiable on
them, he said Shorty appeared to have Chinese eyes and the nose of
the appellant was
distinctive. He was however not asked to explain in
what way was it distinctive. He further said the appellant’s head
was egg shaped.
[19] Under cross examination he said he does
not know the appellant personally but he may have seen his face at
his tavern.
He was pressed further to confirm if he had seen the face
of the appellant before the incident. He responded in the affirmative
and
further gave an explanation that he could have seen him at his
tavern or around Actonville or Wattville which is a very small place.
When asked if he had informed the police that one of his father’s
killers is someone he had seen before, he said he probably may
not
have told the police. He also does not remember mentioning it in his
statement that was taken down by the police.
[20] He further confirmed that when he was
at the identity parade, he knew he had seen the face of the appellant
before
the incident. When it was put to him that the appellant knew
him before the incident of the shooting, he said that was possible
because
he was a famous person. It was further put to him that he
could have told the police before the identity parade that he had
seen
the face of the appellant before the incident. He said he is not
sure if he had told them or not neither can he confirm remembering
that he had seen the face of the appellant at that stage. He gave a
dubious answer when asked whether it dawned in him at the identity
parade that he had seen the face of the perpetrator before the
incident. His reply was that he truly cannot say when, the only
comfort
he had is to know that the perpetrator is behind bars,
because at some point the appellant and his companion escaped from
court and
that caused them to live in fear. The incident of their
escape was reported on newspapers. He denied that the appellant tried
to
sell him a radio nor borrowed money from him as alleged by the
appellant.
[22] The magistrate asked him when the
appellant and Shorty turned around to face him, and whilst firing
shots at him,
for how long did they face him. He said it was probably
for a duration of 10 to 15 seconds. The court further asked him when
he was
in the kombi or minibus chasing the appellant and his
companion and when Shorty turned to fire shots at them, for how long
did it
take and what was the distance between them. He said when he
heard the shots, he estimates their duration to have been 10 - 15
seconds
and they were at a distance of about 10 meters away from each
other and the chase was over a distance of about 50 meters. It took
about half a minute.
[23] The evidence of warrant officer is to
the effect that he held an identity parade in respect of Mr Magoo who
according
to him had pointed out the appellant.
[24] Captain Motshegwa testified with regard
to an identity parade she held in respect of Pradeep Magoo who had
pointed
out both the appellant and Siphamandla Dlamini albeit
protested by both accused on the basis that the witness did not want
to touch
them physically and that the witness knew both of them very
well.
[25] Constable Mashabela, who was the
investigator of the case stated that both the appellant and
Siphamandla were incarcerated
in Boksburg in respect of another
matter. On 15 April he proceeded to Boksburg police station in
order to charge both of them.
Of importance is the description he had
received from both Mrs Magoo and Pradeep which caused him to charge
the appellant and Siphamandla.
[26] According to Mashabela he denies taking
photographs of the accused whilst they were in custody, however, he
cannot
dispute it if they may have been taken by the crime
intelligence unit. He was asked by the prosecutor to explain the
description
he had been given which linked the accused to the crime.
He said both Mrs Magoo and Pradeep said the following and I quote ‘
he
is tall and slender, and he is dark, he is a little bit fair in
complexion
.’
[27] It has to be borne in mind that the
witness was not required to explain further as to who was tall and
dark, slander
and fair. He just gave a general description and that
was all. The prosecution also asked Mashabela whether he had a
suspect in mind
as a result of the description he had been given. His
response was, he did not have a suspect in mind. What led him to the
suspects
is as a result of another matter in which they were suspects
and according to him he noticed the same modus operandi in the
commission
of the crime, which is the use of guns during the robbery.
[28] Warrant Makane testified that he
assisted Mashabela in charging the accused and there were no
photographs of the
accused taken during that time.
[29] At the close of the state case, the
appellant testified in his favor that on the date of the incident he
was at his
home. Whilst there a certain Thabiso came to buy
cigarettes from him and informed him about the incident that happened
at the Magoo
family. He knew Pradeep from his tavern. Pradeep was
also used to visit him at his place. Pradeep visited him when he was
selling
a radio to him but they could not agree on the price thereof.
The second instance Pradeep joined him and his friends and sister at
his home was when they were consuming beer. The third time is when he
had gone to Pradeep’s tavern to pawn his vacuum cleaner for
a loan
of R100. Pradeep became interested in the vacuum cleaner and
instructed him to bring it to his tavern.
[30] He further testified that he was
arrested and kept at the Boksburg police station for an unrelated
matter when he
got a visit from the investigator who informed him of
the incident that happened at Benoni and was linking him to that
incident.
As a result pictures of him were taken using their
cellphones. Subsequently, the investigating officer returned the
following day
and charged him with 9 offences and was thereafter
taken to an identity parade.
[31] At the identity parade he was pointed
out by Pradeep. He thinks that he was pointed out by both Pradeep and
Mrs Magoo
as a result of his pictures that were taken by the police
and which they may have seen. He denies any involvement in the
killing
of Mr Magoo and the robbery that happened at his shop.
[32] In clarification questions by the
court, he confirmed having a lump on his left cheekbone which would
have been there
and on 15 March 2016.
[33] Anna Ngwenya, a sister of the appellant
testified that on 15 March 2016 she was at her home together with the
appellant
when at about 16H00, Thabiso came to their place to buy
cigarettes. Whilst he was there, he related to the appellant the
incident
that happened at the Magoo’s.
[34] She further testified that she knows
Pradeep from his tavern and he had visited her home on two occasions.
The first
time is when she was from Vosloorus and found him consuming
alcohol with the appellant with six others whose names are Sipho,
Phindele,
Thomas and Mahlatsi at her home. The second occasion is
when she saw Pradeep inside her yard with the appellant.
[35] During cross examination she conceded
that she was in court during the testimony of some of the witnesses
of the
state, however, she was told to wait outside when the
appellant testified. She was subjected to a long drawn questioning
from the
prosecutor for insisting that that she did not hear the
testimony of other witnesses despite having been in court. Most of
the other
questions from the prosecutor were of little assistance in
the matter and were consequential to the issues which are germane.
[36]
In clarification by the court which was made about the distance from
the Magoo’s shoe repair shop and the tavern
of Pradeep. The witness
said she estimates the distance to be 200 meters whilst the
magistrate and the prosecutor agreed that according
to Pradeep they
were two doors away from each other. This is however contrary to the
evidence of Pradeep who said that his store
is two stores away from
that of his parents
[1]
.
[37] It is on the basis of the above facts
that the magistrate convicted the appellant.
[38]
Both counsel for the appellant and for the respondent submitted
comprehensive heads of argument for which we are
indebted. It is
trite that the state bears the onus to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt (see Phallo and Others
[2]
).
This long standing principle of proof on the state was propounded in
R v Difford
[3]
almost a century ago thus:
“
It is equally clear that no
onus rests on the accused to convince the court of any explanation if
he gives an explanation, even if
that explanation be improbable, the
court is not entitled to convict unless it is satisfied, not only
that the explanation is improbable,
but that beyond any reasonable
doubt it is false. If there is any reasonable possibility of his
explanation being true, then he is
entitled to his acquittal.”
[39]
Dealing with proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
S
v Clegg
[4]
which was referred to by counsel for the defendant, the court said:
“
proof beyond
reasonable doubt
cannot be precisely
defined, but it can well be said that it is a doubt which exists
because of probabilities which can be regarded
as reasonable on the
ground of generally accepted human knowledge and experience. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt cannot be put on
the same level as proof
beyond the slightest doubt, because the onus of adducing proof as
high as that would in practice lead to
defeating the ends of justice
”
[40] What emerges as being central to this
appeal is the issue of identification. The appellant’s counsel
argued that
it has not been established by the prosecution how long
the robbery took place and therefore no indication that the Magoo’s
had
sufficient time to observe the assailants. It was further
submitted that Mr Magoo, could not have had sufficient time to
observe
the attackers given the circumstances under which he had to
observe them and the limited time he had.
[41] It was further submitted on behalf of
the appellant that both Mrs Magoo and the son were not certain about
the description
of their assailants. The respondent is further
criticized on its reliance on the evidence of common purpose which
was never indicated
in the charge sheet when it was put to the
appellant nor was there any evidence led before court which relates
to the planning of
the attack and robbery by the assailants or their
state of mind before entering the shop to carry out their attack.
[42]
Counsel for the respondent replying ostensibly on
S
v Mlambo
[5]
and
S v Ntsele
[6]
submitted that the circumstantial evidence links the appellant
directly to the commission of the crime and it was further argued
that the evidence of the two complainants, Mrs and Mr Magoo pointed
to the guilt of the appellant.
[43]
As a departure point in dealing with the evidence of identification,
it is instructive to consider the approach as
propounded in
S
v Mthethwa
[7]
where the court held:
“
Because of the fallibility of
human observation, evidence of identification is approached by the
courts with some caution. It is not
enough for the identifying
witness to be honest: The reliability of his observation must also be
tested. This depends on various
factors, such as lighting,
visibility, eyesight, the proximity of the witness, his opportunity
for observation, both as to time and
situation; the extent of his
prior knowledge of the accused, mobility of the scene; corroboration;
suggestibility; the accused’s
face, voice, built, gait, and dress,
the results of the identification parades of any, and of course, the
evidence by or on behalf
of the accused. The list is not exhaustive.
These factors, or such of them as are applicable in a particular
case, are not individually
decisive, but must be weighed one against
the other, in the light of the totality of the evidence and the
probabilities; see cases
such as R v Masemang,
1950 (2) SA 488
(AD);
R v Dladla and others 1962 (1) 301 (AD) at page 310; S v Mehlape
1963(2) SA 29 (AD)”.
[44] In this matter the learned magistrate
has to a large extent relied on the identification of the appellant
by both
complainants and their credibility which the court found to
be impressive. This is borne out in the findings of the learned
magistrate
as follows:
“
On a conspectus of the evidence
as a whole, the evidence of the Magoo’s has satisfied the court
that the necessary degree of reliability
that has been demanded in
the authorities. They were certain of the identification and had
given good reasons for their certainty,
they had more than adequate
opportunity in good lighting of seing their attacker and had been
face to face with him at close quarter
[8]
.”
(Sic)
[45] In the following paragraphs of his
judgment, the learned magistrate recorded his findings as follows:
“
Dlamini shot at the Magoo’s
repeatedly and the deceased sustained a gunshot wound to the skull.
Both of them fled from the shop
and ran together down the street when
Dlamini and the accused turned around and Pradeep Magoo. Dlamini shot
three time at Pradeep
Magoo while the deceased looked on
.”
[9]
(Sic)
[46] The findings of the learned magistrate
are problematic since they lack support from the evidence that is
recorded
in the following respects.
[47] Pradeep Magoo starts his evidence by
saying he saw two men in his father’s shop. Shorty (whose real
names are Siphamandla
Dlamini) had a firearm in his hand and did not
see anything in the hands of the appellant. He gave chase to these
men during which
they both turned the corner. Whilst the two men were
running, they turned around and Siphamandla Dlamini started shooting.
What can
be ascertained without any difficulty is that the person who
carried a firearm and who fired shots is Dlamini not the appellant.
[48]
Whereas Mrs Magoo’s testimony, contrary to Pradeep’s says ‘
the
one I pointed walked behind my husband behind the counter, as he was
going to cut the key and as I was approaching the door, the
one at
the door had his hands against the waist and his stomach, he had a
firearm.
[10]
She further said, ‘
she
is not able to tell Shorty fired the shots but one was from somewhere
from the one that was at the door’
.
The evidence on record show that when she was required by the
prosecutor to give certainty as to who had shot her, she said ‘
I
can’t really say which one shot, but I just heard shots’
[11]
.
[49] Later on in her evidence she was asked
by the prosecutor if she can be able to point out the person she had
pointed
out at the identity parade, she was asked to leave the CCTV
room from where she gave her testimony to come in to the court room
where
she was invited to point at that person. I find it necessary to
quote the question by the prosecutor which says “
you now see the
few people here, can you just please look around and tell us who the
person you pointed at is, just look around”.
She point out the
accused. Her dock identification must be considered in light of what
she had earlier said, that the one she had
pointed out at the
identity parade is the one who walked behind her husband not the
appellant who remained at the door.
[50]
In cross examination Mrs Magoo was asked the following question:
‘
There is no
distinct features about him, you just know that he is the one who
gave you the key
’;
her response is that ‘
well
he has a distinct mark on the cheek. And besides that, I looked at
him because I took the key from him
’
[12]
.
This response contradicts her earlier version in examination in chief
when she was led by the prosecution as follows:
‘
Alright,
who is the one who that you assisted, the one who had a key
?
His response was: ‘
The
one I pointed out
’.
She confirmed and I referred earlier in this judgement where she said
the one I pointed walked behind my husband. Surely if she
took the
key from the one who walked behind her husband whilst the appellant
was left standing at the door, her response on an examination
that
‘she took the key from the one who had a lump on the cheek, who
happens to be the appellant should cast doubt on the
certainty
of her observations.
[51] What complicates the matter further, is
the State’s case in the evidence of Pradeep who says, he saw the
two men
in his father’s shop and the one who carried a firearm and
who fired shots is not the appellant, who accordingly to Mrs Magoo
was
carrying a firearm but it was Siphamandla Dlamini.
[52] Of great concern related to
identification parade is the generalization in the evidence of
Mashabela regarding the
description of the assailants which he had
been given by the witnesses. It is necessary to refer to the record
in this appeal regard.
[53]
Mashabela was asked by the prosecutor as follows: ‘
Mr
Mashabela, tell me before I conclude how we would connect the accused
before the 5
th
of April meaning the date of arrest, how do we link him to the
present case?
The
response is ‘
we
link the accused and his co-accused with their description that we
got from the witnesses
[13]
[54]
In the following paragraph the question is ‘
Alright
the descriptions from whom? If you say witnesses can you be specific?
Yes, the witnesses are also here, Mr Magoo was one of
the witnesses
who gave me the description of the accused
’.
The next question was who else? The response is ‘
And
Mrs Magoo
’.
Significantly and most importantly, is the question that follows:
‘
What description
is that, that was given to you
’?
Reply, ‘
they gave
me how the accused looked and his height’
.
The prosecutor further asked ‘
Okay,
are you able to be specific as to the height and the looks? If you
are able to do so?
The response is ‘
Ja
,
they told me that he
is tall and slender and he is dark, he is a little bit fair in
complexion
[14]
’
[55] Pradeep’s description of Dlamini and
the appellant which according to the learned magistrate was
satisfactory and
sufficient gives a total different picture. He said
Dlamini had slit eyes and the appellant’s head was egg shaped with
a distinct
nose. He was not required to explain what was distinct
about his nose, nor did the learned magistrate note on the record any
distinct
feature of his nose as it did with the lump on his cheek.
Neither was there any record made on the head that was alleged to be
egg
shaped. There is no recording confirming the description by
Pradeep. Nor was Mrs Magoo tested in evidence if she noticed anything
peculiar with the nose of the appellant or his head.
[56] What I also find curious is that none
of these feature were mentioned by Mrs Magoo who also claim to have
been in
a position to observe the appellant and Dlamini.
[57] Counsel for the State conceded that the
prosecution as well as the court, regrettably failed to pay attention
on
the aspects above, instead according to her, they were left
‘hanging’ which resulted in gaps in the description of the
robbers.
I agree fully with the submission. She however, submitted
that Pradeep appears to have had sufficient time to observe the
assailants
albeit with the minimal time of seconds and less than a
minute he had to observe them and despite his circumstances of having
to
observe them whilst they were firing shots at him. When counsel
was invited to explain the contradictions between the evidence of
complainants on who carried the firearm, she submitted that the court
should be mindful that Mrs Magoo was a 74 years old faced with
her
ordeal, she further argued that a possibility exists that the firearm
might have exchanged hands between the robbers. This proposition
is
not sustained by evidence and it is speculative. Equally, I find the
invitation that the court should consider Mrs Magoo’s age
as an
explanation for deficiencies in her evidence to be self-destructive
for the state and in fact serves to discount any reliability
on Mrs
Magoo’s ability to properly observe the attackers.
[58] The final point that needs to be made
is the description given by Pradeep on the identification features
that he
gave in his evidence in court which were not recorded
anywhere in his police statement nor were they confirmed by the
investigating
officer during his testimony in court. This becomes
important since it is on the basis of the description given to the
police that
the appellant was linked to the crime. It is in this
context that Mashabela said the robbers were linked only through
their modus
operandi which could have also not have been sufficient
to prove the identity of the appellant and Dlamini without any
further information.
[59]
The learned magistrate has found correctly that Mrs Magoo was a
single witness which requires her evidence to be
treated with
caution
[15]
.
In this regard he referred to the applicable authorities to assist
the court in the assessment of such evidence
[16]
[60]
As propounded in Dhlumayo above. If there was no misdirection of
facts by the trial court, the point of departure
is that its
conclusion was correct. This long standing principle of our law has
been recently restated in
Makate
v Vodacom
[17]
when Jafta J stated as follows:
“
[38] In our system, as in many
similar systems of appeal, the cold record placed before the appeal
court does not capture all that
occurred at the trial. The
disadvantage is that the appeal court is denied the opportunity of
observing witnesses testify and
drawing its own inferences from their
demeanor and body language. On the contrary, this is the
advantage enjoyed by every trial
court. Hence an appeal court
must defer to the trial court when it comes to factual findings.”
However in the subsequent paragraph
the court said:
“
But even in the appeal, the
deference afforded to a trial court’s credibility findings must not
be overstated. If it emerges
from the record that the trial
court misdirected itself on the facts or that it came to a wrong
conclusion, the appellate court is
duty-bound to overrule factual
findings of the trial court so as to do justice to the case
”
.
The court referred to its decision in
Bernet
[18]
where it stressed that the principle that the court will not
ordinarily interfere, with a factual finding by a trial court is not
an inflexible rule. The rule should not be used to tie the hands of
the appellate court. Thus when there is a misdirection on the
facts
by the trial court the appellate court is entitled to disregard the
findings on facts and come to its own conclusion on the
facts as they
appear on the record similarly where the appellate court is convinced
that the conclusion reached by the trial court
is clearly wrong, it
will reserve it
”.
[61]
It is trite that circumstantial evidence is premised on two cardinal
rules as propounded in
R
v Blom
[19]
as follows:
a)
The inference to
be drawn must be consistent with all the proven facts, If it is not,
then the inference cannot be drawn;
b)
The proved facts
should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from them
save the are sought to be drawn. If they do
not exclude other
reasonable inferences, then there must be doubt whether the
inferences sought to be drawn is correct.
[62] I found myself constrained to agree
with the submissions by the appellant’s counsel that the
circumstantial evidence
alone in this matter does not prove the guilt
of the appellant or his involvement in the crime committed it is not
the only reasonable
inference that can be drawn from all the proven
facts.
[63] The appellant’s version that he was
at home is supported by his alibi witness. The rejection of his alibi
witness
without a credibility finding that her evidence is false, but
only on her uncertainty as to when Thabiso had arrived at her home
and why she did not inform the police that she was at home with
appellant absent, such an enquiry is not justified.
[64] Given the totality of the evidence I do
not find a proper bases for the rejection of the appellant’s
version as
not reasonably possibly true. Instead I find that the
prosecution’s case was not adequately presented in many respects
which are
apparent and referred to above. The deficiencies
highlighted are adverse to the case of the prosecution. The
consequence of which
the learned magistrate could not have found the
that the state has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
[65] In conclusion I find it necessary to
make this remark. Whilst acknowledging the painstaking judgment of
the learned
magistrate, the state has failed to prove that the
appellant was one of the robbers that killed the deceased and shot
the complainants.
[66] In light of the findings of the court,
this obviates the need to deal with other aspects that were raised,
such as
a common purpose.
[67] As I conclude, I am reminded of the
remarks by Plasket J (as he there was) when he said:
“
When a court finds that the
guilt of an accused has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
that accused is entitled to an acquittal
even if there may be a
suspicion that he was indeed the perpetrator of the crime in
question. That is an inevitable sequence of living
in a society in
which the freedom and dignity of the individual are properly
protected and respected”
[20]
[68] In the result the appeal is upheld.
Order
1.
The conviction in
respect of all the counts as well as the consequent sentences are
hereby set aside.
2.
The accused is found
not guilty and is therefore discharged.
M NQUMSE
AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree
H DEVOS
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
It is so ordered
For the Appellants
: M G Botha
Instructed by
: Legal Aid South Africa
For the Respondent
: S D Ngobeni
Instructed by
: National Director of Public Prosecution
Heard on
: 27 January 2022
Judgement handed down o : 10 February 2022
[1]
Transcribed record Vol 1 page 11 at line 10
[2]
1999 (2) SACR 558 (SCA)
[3]
1937 AD 370
at 373
[4]
1973 (1) SA 34
(A) at pg 34 para H
[5]
1957 (4) SA 277
(AD) at pg 727 E – F
[6]
1998 (2 SACR 178
(SCA) at pg 180 para a - e
[7]
…
..
[8]
Transcribed record vol 2 pg 296 – 297 lines 20 and 10
[9]
Transcribed record Vol 2 page 298 line 10
[10]
Transcribed record vol 1 pg 46 line 10
[11]
Transcribed record vol 1 pg 52 line 10
[12]
Transcribed record vol 1 pg 73 line 20
[13]
Transcribed record vol 1 pg 127 line 20
[14]
Transcribed record vol 1 pg 128 line 10
[15]
Section 208 of Act 51 of 1977 (Criminal Procedure Act)
[16]
S v Sauls and Other 1981 (3) SA
[17]
2016 (6) BCLR 709
(CC),
2016 (4) SA 121
(cc) @6 April 2016
[18]
2020 ZACC 28
,
2011 (3) SA 92
(cc);
2011 (4) BCLR 329
(cc)
[19]
1939 AD 188
at 202 - 203
[20]
(unreported judgment dated 15 October 2004 Case no. CA R163/04 ECD)
at par 37
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