Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 97South Africa
Waco Africa (Pty) Limited t/a Form Scaff v Phakama Scaffolding (Pty) Ltd (34165/20) [2022] ZAGPPHC 97 (11 February 2022)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Waco Africa (Pty) Limited t/a Form Scaff v Phakama Scaffolding (Pty) Ltd (34165/20) [2022] ZAGPPHC 97 (11 February 2022)
Waco Africa (Pty) Limited t/a Form Scaff v Phakama Scaffolding (Pty) Ltd (34165/20) [2022] ZAGPPHC 97 (11 February 2022)
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sino date 11 February 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER: 34165/20
DATE:
11 February 2022
WACO
AFRICA (PTY) LTD t/a FORM
SCAFF
Applicant
(Reg.
No: 2012/000665/07)
V
PHAKAMA
SCAFFOLDING (PTY)
LTD
Respondent
(Reg.
No: 2014/066618/07)
JUDGMENT
KOOVERJIE
A
J
[1]
This application has been instituted in terms of section 345 of the
Companies Act, Act
61 of 1973 (“the former Companies Act”).
[2]
The applicant seeks the winding up of the respondent. The
respondent disputed
the winding up application on the basis that
material disputes of fact exist. Such disputes of fact pertain
to the applicant’s
entire claim and are
bona fide
and
reasonable. In addition, the respondent raised various points
in limine
.
[3]
It was alleged that the indebtedness amounted to R2,254,934.01 and
such indebtedness
was based on the written agreement (credit
facility) entered into between the applicant and the respondent.
The applicant’s
claim was based on a statement and a certificate of
balance.
[4]
It is the applicant’s case that the liquidation is just and
equitable and to the advantage
of the creditors if the respondent is
placed under winding up. The respondent is currently trading
under insolvent circumstances.
[5]
The respondent disputed the amount of indebtedness. It was
argued that the applicant’s
attempt to liquidate the respondent was
nothing more than a misguided attempt to enforce payment of a debt
which is disputed by the
respondent on
bona
fide
and reasonable
grounds.
[6]
Section 344 of the Companies Act states,
inter alia
, that:
“
A
company may be wound up by the Court if the company is unable to pay
its debts as described in S 345”
;
[7]
Section 345(1) of the Companies Act
inter alia
makes provision
that a company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if a
creditor to whom the company is indebted, in the
sum of not less than
R100.00, has served on such company a demand requiring the company to
pay the sum due.
[8]
The applicant submitted that it had satisfied the jurisdictional
factors for its winding
up namely that: there was a demand, and the
application for winding up was delivered at the company’s
registered office
[1]
.
Consequently, the delivery of the statutory demand triggers the
deeming provision of an inability to pay. The inability
to pay
debts becomes a ground for the winding up
[2]
.
[9]
The applicant persisted with its argument that no disputes of fact
existed and the legal
points raised have no merit.
Consequently, the applicant is entitled to an order in terms of
section 345 of the Companies Act.
[10]
The nexus between the parties emanates from an agreement whereby the
respondent was hiring certain
scaffolding equipment from the
applicant. It remained the applicant’s case that the
relationship between the parties was
regulated by a written master
agreement concluded between the parties on 24 October 2018 (“the
master agreement”).
[11]
The applicant conducts business in the construction industry.
The applicant is a designer,
manufacturer, hirer and supplier of
formwork systems, support systems, access systems and safety
equipment. The parties entered
into an agreement on 24 October
2018. The respondent was represented by John Honeywell
Warwick. By virtue of the agreement
the respondent applied for
credit facilities subject to the applicant’s standard terms and
conditions on the sale and lease of
goods. The applicant was
represented by Darryn Jacobs and Lizette Strydom.
[12]
On the papers, the respondent opposed this application primarily in
respect of the amount of indebtedness
as well as the nature of the
agreement between the parties.
[13]
It was further contended that the relationship between the parties
was regulated by various oral
agreements since December 2018.
The respondent would hire scaffolding from the applicant on
consignment and upon completion
of the projects the respondent would
return the scaffolding to the applicant. Payment for the hiring
was based on agreed fees
in respect of each hire.
[14]
The respondent’s contention is not that the moneys are not due and
owing to the applicant but
rather there is a dispute in respect of
the amount due and payable. The respondent made reference to
the debtors list and submitted
that on payment from its debtors, it
would be able to settle the debt towards the applicant (Annexure
“
PM3
”) to the answering affidavit.
[15]
The respondent argued that it had already made payments in the amount
of R733,286.55 which was
not taken into account by the applicant.
In its affidavit per Annexure “
PM4
”, it attached various
proof of payments claiming that these payments were not taken into
consideration by the applicant.
[16]
It was pointed out that the master agreement made reference that each
hire of equipment shall constitute
a separate contract governed by
such terms (clause 3.1 stipulates that each hire shall be a separate
contract governed by these items);
the changes for the hiring of
equipment commenced from the date of delivery and the master
agreement was silent on the quantity of
goods hired on each order;
the precise description of goods hired; the amount payable for hire
of goods; and the date of delivery
of the goods.
[17]
Consequently the quantity, description and amounts payable and
delivery date for the goods hired
were therefore only agreed on by a
case-by-case basis in terms of the separate oral agreements.
These terms were not regulated
by the master agreement. The
applicant was therefore required to plead the terms of the individual
hire contracts.
[18]
In essence the dispute centred on whether the contract between the
parties emanates from the master
agreement or in terms of each
specific oral contract between the parties. It was argued that
the goods were hired in accordance
with the separate oral
agreements. Such agreements were material and constituted the
contracts between the parties. Such
agreements set out
inter
alia
: the amounts
charged by the applicant, the nature and quantity of the hired goods
(the scaffolding).
[19]
The respondent relied on the Badenhorst principle
[3]
and submitted that the liquidation proceedings cannot proceed where
the claims are
bona
fide
and reasonably disputed. This court could therefore not
entertain factual disputes in application proceedings. Oral
evidence
was necessary in order to properly adjudicate the factual
disputes raised.
[20]
An application for liquidation will fail if the alleged liability to
pay is disputed on
bona fide
and reasonable grounds.
This principle was endorsed in
One Stop Financial Services (Pty)
Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd and Another
2015 (4) SA 623
(WCC) at 627 F-H
.
[21]
It is trite that a court will not ordinarily grant a provisional
winding up order if the company
on
bona
fide
and reasonable grounds disputes its indebtedness to the creditor
[4]
.
[22]
The rationale for the said principle is that the procedure for
winding up is not designed for the
resolution of disputes concerning
whether or not a debt exists. A party should therefore not
resort to the procedure as a means
of putting pressure on a company
to pay the debt which the company genuinely disputes on reasonable
grounds.
[23]
At this stage in the proceedings I take cognisance of the fact that
it is not necessary for the
respondent to adduce actual evidence on
affidavit on which it would rely on when the issues are properly
ventilated via oral evidence.
An alleged debtor need not prove
that its defence to the claim will succeed at trial. All it has
to prove is that it disputes
the alleged indebtedness on grounds that
are both reasonable and
bona
fide
[5]
.
[24]
Having considered the papers and argument before me, it is evident
that a dispute exists in respect
of the actual amount owing to the
applicant. Only through oral evidence would these issues be
properly ventilated and resolved.
The amount reflected in the
certificate of balance is contested by the respondent. However,
the respondent presented as per
Annexure “
PM4”
evidence
that substantial payments were already made. A further dispute
exists in respect of what constitutes the agreement
between the
parties.
[25]
A further dispute exists in respect of the nature of the agreement
between the parties. The respondent’s
core argument was that
although the master agreement is valid, it was necessary to have
taken into account the separate hiring agreements.
The
applicant was required to illustrate the nature of the goods hired
and the amounts in respect of the separate contracts.
[26]
The applicant’s argument is that the relevant terms of the
agreement,
inter alia
,
were that:
26.1
The respondent would place an order with the applicant to lease
certain goods
alternatively
the applicant would quote the
respondent on the lease of certain goods;
26.2
The basis upon which the applicant would pay the rental as set out in
the terms and conditions of the
agreement must be read with the
applicant’s written quotation and/or acceptance of all the
documents;
26.3
The respondent would lease certain goods from the applicant on a
weekly basis on the terms and conditions
set out in the applicant’s
standard terms and conditions read with the applicant’s written
quotation and/or acceptance of all
the documents;
26.4
Whilst the rental would be calculated on a weekly basis the applicant
would prepare invoices on a monthly
basis and rental would be payable
in cash to the applicant within 30 days from the date of the monthly
statement.
26.5
The applicant would continue charging rental which would be payable
after termination of the lease until
the goods so leased are restored
to the applicant’s possession.
26.6
In the event that the respondent failed to pay the amount the
applicant would be entitled, without notice
to the respondent, to
cancel the agreement and to demand return of the goods by the
respondent at the respondent’s own cost.
26.7
A certificate signed by the applicant setting out the particular
amount due and payable will constitute
prima facie proof of the
contents thereof.
[27]
I have particularly considered the relevant clauses pertaining to the
issues in dispute between
the parties and I reiterate the respective
terms that appear in the master agreement namely:
“
1.
The terms hereof shall form part of and apply to all contracts
entered into unless specifically excluded or amended
by the parties …
2.
Unless otherwise specifically stipulated in writing to the contrary
by Form-Scaff, the terms hereof shall supercede
and prevail over any
terms and conditions contained in any document submitted by the
Customer.
3.
The following specific provisions apply in the event that the
transaction entered into between Form-Scaff and
the customer is the
hire of goods namely:
3.1
Each hire shall be a separate contract governed by these terms …
3.10
Should the Customer default in the punctual payment on due date of
any amount payable in respect of the hire of goods
or default in a
punctual observance or performance of any of its other obligations or
undertakings hereunder commit an act of insolvency
as defined in the
Insolvency Act, then Form-Scaff shall have the right and without
notice immediately cancel this contract in respect
of the hire of
goods and to demand that the customer forthwith return, at its own
expense, any goods delivered to the customer failing
which Form-Scaff
shall have the right to take whatever action it deems necessary to
enforce its rights in terms thereof …”
[28]
It is noted that the applicant proceeded to claim the amount due and
payable in terms of the aforesaid
clause.
[29]
Clause 4 further stipulated:
“
4.
The following specific provisions shall apply in the event that a
transaction entered into between Form-Scaff and the
customer is a
sale of goods namely:
4.1
Each sale shall be a separate contract governed by its terms.
4.2
Unless otherwise stated, the prices quoted are ex works and the
Customer shall take delivery of the goods as
soon as they are placed
at the Customer’s disposal at Form-Scaff’s premises and shall
bear and be liable for all charges and
risks in and to and in respect
of the goods from the time when they have been so placed at the
Customer’s disposal provided that
the goods have been clearly set
aside or otherwise identified as the contract goods.”
[30]
I have noted the outstanding amount as set out in Annexure “
W4
”,
the customer statement sets out in detail the respective amounts
owing to the applicant from February 2018 to April 2020.
The
certificate of balance setting out such amount appears at Annexure
“
W5
”. As alluded to above, the respondent disputed
the amount and expressed same in Annexure “
W10
”.
[31]
Ultimately this court has a discretion to refuse a winding up order
or to grant the order in the
applicant’s favour. Such
discretion has to be exercised in terms of having regard to the
jurisdictional factors in set out
in section 345. This further
includes a determination as to whether the respondent has
demonstrated that it is not insolvent.
[32]
It is evident therefore that disputes of fact exist not only in
relation to the amount of indebtedness
but in relation to the
agreement between the parties. In my view I find that the
disputes raised are material and goes to the
root of the merits of
the liquidation application.
[33]
I therefore find that factual disputes exist on the said issues which
cannot be resolved on the
papers insofar as it relates to the
respondent’s commercial insolvency.
[34]
Insofar as costs are concerned, the normal principle is that costs
follow the result. I find
no reason to deviate from this
principle.
[35]
The following order is made:
The
application is dismissed with costs
.
H
KOOVERJIE
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
:
Counsel
for the
Applicant
:
Adv M Jacobs
Instructed
by:
D Paleologu Attorneys
Pretoria
Counsel
for the
Respondent
:
Adv
M Cajee
Instructed
by:
Ka-Mbonane Cooper
Johannesburg
Date
heard:
19 October
20
21
Date
of Judgment:
11 February 202
2
[1]
BP &
JM Investment (Pty) Ltd v Hard Road (Pty) Ltd
1978 (2) SA 481
T
[2]
Absa
Bank Ltd v Tamsui Empire Park 1 CC (11151/2013
[2013] ZAWCHC 187
at
par 13
[3]
Badenhorst
v Northern Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1956(2) SA 346 at 347H
– 348C
[4]
Kalil
v Decotex (Pty) Ltd and Another
1988 (1) SA 943
(A) at 980 A-H
[5]
Freshvest
Investments v Marabeng (Pty) Ltd (1030.2015)
[2016] ZASCA 168
(Freshvest matter)
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