Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 171South Africa
Acting Municipal Manager and Another v Madibeng Black Business Chamber and Others (11527/22) [2022] ZAGPPHC 171 (25 March 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
25 March 2022
Headnotes
on 23 February 2022.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Acting Municipal Manager and Another v Madibeng Black Business Chamber and Others (11527/22) [2022] ZAGPPHC 171 (25 March 2022)
Acting Municipal Manager and Another v Madibeng Black Business Chamber and Others (11527/22) [2022] ZAGPPHC 171 (25 March 2022)
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sino date 25 March 2022
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
25
MARCH 2022
CASE
NUMBER: 11527/22
In
the matter between:
THE
ACTING MUNICIPAL MANAGER
FIRST APPLICANT
MADIBENG
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
SECOND APPLICANT
And
MADIBENG
BLACK BUSINESS CHAMBER
FIRST RESPONDENT
JUDAH
MALEPE
SECOND RESPONDENT
GABY
TSHEOLA
THIRD RESPONDENT
ANNAH
MOSIDI
FOURTH RESPONDENT
ELIAS
BUDA
FIFTH RESPONDENT
SELLO
MONNAPULE
SIXTH RESPONDENT
THABISO
RAMALEPA
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
T
MMEBE
EIGHTH RESPONDENT
ALL
PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH OR
NINTH RESPONDENT
MEMBERS
OF THE MADIBENG BLACK
BUSINESS CHAMBER
JUDGMENT
TLHAPI
J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The applicants approached this court on urgency in terms of Rule 6
(12) of the Uniforms
Rules of Court. The application was dismissed
with costs the order is filed on CaseLines and these are my reasons.
[2]
The applicants sought the following relief:
“
2. That the
first to the ninth respondent be, and are interdicted and restrained
from directly or indirectly:
a.
Entering to partake in, instigate disruption or riots or violent
behaviour resulting in damage to property,
infringement of rights pf
assault of applicants’ employees;
b.
Obstructing entry and exiting of any person vehicle to and from the
premises and buildings set out in prayer
3 below;
c.
Committing any act that is prejudicial to the effective operations
conducted by the applicants;
d.
Disrupting or entering with normal activities at the premises and
buildings set out in prayer 3 below;
e.
Participating in calling for support, encouraging or inciting
unlawful behaviour, violence, causing damage
to the premises and
buildings set out in prayer 3 below and to the applicants’
employee;
f.
Intimidating, threatening, harassing or harming applicants’
employees, contract workers, service
providers &/or members of
the public;
g.
Carrying firearms or dangerous weapons or knives or other sharp
objects, sticks at or near entrances at
the premises and buildings
set out in prayer 3 below;
h.
Vandalizing property or illegally occupying any building or portion
of the premises and buildings set out
in prayer 3 below;
3.
That the interdict operates at the second applicant’s municipal
premises including
the following:
a. Civic
Centre, 53 Van Velden Street, Brits,
b.
Licensing Department (DLTC);
c.
Magasyn Building
d.
Community Service Building;
e. Cosmos
Hartebees Building;”
[3]
The relief in respect of prayers 4 to 14 relates to compliance,
assistance by the
South
African Police, notice of opposition and costs.
[4]
The application was opposed by the first to the eighth respondents
and counsel for the
parties also prepared heads of argument which
addressed both merits and points
in limine
raised.
BACKGROUND
[5]
The first applicant is the acting municipal manager of the second
applicant who brings
the application in her official capacity as the
first applicant and such having being appointed in terms of section
54A (1) of the
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (The Systems Act) and
having being authorised to depose to the founding affidavit on behalf
of the
second applicant in terms of her delegation of authority which
is attached to the founding papers as annexure “MM1”.
[6]
The first applicant contends that the conduct of the respondents on
21 February 2022
caused the offices of the second applicant to be
closed, which also resulted in the office and employees of the second
applicant
not being able to render services to the public. The
purpose of the order that was being sought was to return the said
offices and
its employees to normal operation free of a climate of
fear and intimidation by the respondents, mainly a grouping of the
Madibeng
Black Business Chamber, (the MBBC).
[7]
The first applicant outlined the following chronology of events:
1)
On 31 January 2022 30 members of the MBBC
requested a meeting with the Mayor, Mr Maimane, to address grievances
against the chief
financial officer, Mr Molahlehi for bullying them
and not providing them with work and denying them opportunities for
business, his
removal from office was demanded.
2)
Mr Maimane promised to investigate the
allegations and scheduled a follow up meeting for the 14 February
2022. The first applicant
and Mr Maimane were not available. The MBBC
members were dissatisfied at their unavailability and threats were
levelled against the
employees at the Civic Centre. A new date for
the meeting 21 February 2022 was proposed.
3)
On 20 February 2022 Mr Maimane communicated his
unavailability on 21 February 2022 and proposed that the meeting be
held on 23 February
2022.
4)
On 21, 22 and 23 February 2022 the MBBC arrived
at the Civic Centre, the DLTC, the Magasyn Building, Community
Service Building and
the Cosmos Hartebees Building and engaged in
conduct, which is described in the relief sought and which threatened
the smooth running
of the business to the Municipality.
5)
On 21 February 2003 the Municipality had to
engage additional security and the SAPS had to be called to deal with
the situation as
MBBC members were brandishing weapons such as
firearms, pangas and knives. Some members of the MBBC also sought to
disrupt other
meetings attended by the mayor.
[8]
The first applicant contended that the conduct of the respondents
posed a threat to
the employees, members of the public who attended
the offices of the municipality and to the buildings of the
municipality. The MBBC
has persisted in such unjustified disruptive
conduct despite warning from the Municipality. The urgency in seeking
an interdict against
the respondent is, besides the continued threats
to the public and employees, and this has resulted in the inability
of the applicants
carry on its business and to render and to deliver
effective service to the public.
[9]
The respondents raised the lack of
locus standi
of the first
applicant to act on behalf of the second applicant and to launch the
application, that there was no letter attached
to supporting the
first applicant’s capacity and furthermore, that there was no
council resolution by the second applicant which
authorised the first
applicant to act on behalf of the second applicant.
[10]
The respondent’s contended that the matter was not urgent. They
deny that they were engaged in disruptive
violent conduct or that the
police were called to quell the alleged disruptive conduct. They
alleged that they were allowed to engage
in a peaceful march by the
applicants, on 28 February 2022 as depicted in annexures FA3 and FA4
to the answering affidavit. The application
for the strike was made
on 24 February 2022 and this application was launched the following
day, on 25 February 2022, the same day
it gave approval for the
strike to be staged,
[11]
At the first meeting held with the applicant, the second to the
eighth respondent denied that there was
any violent or disruptive
conduct at such meeting and that on 21 February 2022 the offices of
the second respondent were closed due
to presence of a covid 19 case
hence a request to have the meeting rescheduled. No meeting was
scheduled for 22 February 2022. It
was contended that when the
respondents arrived for the meeting of 23 February 2022 there were
community members from Segwaelane
who had staged a strike against the
Mayor Maimane. The members of the MBBC had not foreseen that they
would have encountered the
strike and it is contended that the
additional security that was engaged had nothing to do with the
purpose of the meeting they had
intended holding with the mayor.
[12]
The respondents contended that most of them were contracted by the
second respondent to render services
to the communities, being the
supply of water and waste removal. The issue of concern and what was
intended to be addressed with
the mayor was the allegation that since
the mayor came into office, payments to the contractors was delayed
and sometimes they were
not addressed at all.
[13]
In reply the first applicant annexed her letter of appointment. It
was also contended that the police
were summoned to the premises of
the respondent on each day that they made appearance which included
the 24
th
and 26 and 28 of February 2022. It was not their
attendance at the premises of the applicant which were objected to,
but their conduct
which continued to pose a threat to the employees,
the public and affected service delivery. The first applicant
conceded that permission
had been granted for a strike on 28 February
2022 but complained that the respondents’ conduct continued after
such date.
THE LAW
[14]
The respondents raised two points
in limine
one on urgency and
the other on
locus standi
. I gave a preliminary view that the
nature of the complaint raised against the respondents could raise
issues of urgency and that
consideration would be given thereto on
condition the applicant also satisfying the court on the issue of
locus standi
. The other problem regarding the merits in my
view was that on the day the application was launched permission was
given that the
respondents hold a march. On 28 February 2022. The
applicants in reply had not addressed the lack of Municipal Council’s
resolution
to institute and prosecute this application. Mr Maserumule
for the applicants had also not addressed the issue of
locus
standi
in his heads of argument.
[15]
An opportunity was given to Mr Maserumule to address the issue and
several cases were initially referred
to by him being:(
Magodongo v
khara Hais Municipality and Others
(2018) 39 ILJ 406 (LC) (14
November 2017
); Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality
(2011) 32 ILJ 581 (SCA) para 25;
Kouga Municipality v SA Local
Government Bargaining Council
(2010) 31 ILJ
1211
(LC) para
23. Further cases were referred to after judgment was reserved,
although objected to by respondents’ counsel, I allowed
their
inclusion being,
Unlawful Occupiers of the School Site v City of
Johannesburg
case number 36/2004 SCA para 11-16
and
Ganes and Another v Telecom Namibia Ltd
[2004] 2 All SA609
(SCA) para 19
[16]
It is contended for the applicants that the first applicant was duly
appointed in terms of section 54A
(1) of the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, (the Municipal Systems Act) and
that her authority to depose to the
affidavit launching the
application on behalf of the second applicant was based on her
delegated authority attached to the papers
as Annexure “MM1”.
[17]
It was contended for the respondents that the first applicant had not
attached a letter supporting her
capacity with the second applicant
and further that there was no council resolution which authorized the
first applicant to act on
behalf of second applicant, (reference to
the second applicant as second respondent in the answering affidavit
is in my view a typing
error).
[18]
My understanding on the point
in limine
raised on behalf of
the respondents’ is not a challenge to the first applicant’s
authority to depose to the founding affidavit,
either on her behalf
or on behalf of the second applicant, but it first dealt with the
absence of a letter confirming the first applicant’s
capacity at
the second applicant and, going to the heart of the application was
the authorisation to institute and to prosecute the
application in
her capacity as acting municipal manager being the first applicant
and on behalf of the second applicant. In this
regard the respondents
contended that a resolution of council was necessary.
[19]
The facts in
Ganes
supra
are distinguishable to the
present in that there it had to deal with the appointment of a firm
of attorneys to represent the respondent.
As at paragraph 19 it was
stated that the authority to depose to an affidavit was not a
requirement in motion proceedings, however,
there had to be authority
by the applicant to institute and prosecute the proceedings. Further,
the court stated that where the authority
of an attorney to launch
proceedings was challenged, Rule 7(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court
provided a procedure to be followed
by a respondent who wishes to
‘challenge the authority of a person allegedly acting on behalf of
the purported applicant”. When
one goes to the specific Rule 7(1)
which comes under the title Power of Attorney, the subrule stipulates
that a power of attorney
to act subject to sub rules 2 and 3 need not
be filed, but that the authority to act on behalf of any party may be
challenged within
10 days of coming to such knowledge or with leave
of the court on good cause shown.
[20]
In
Unlawful Occupiers of the School Site
supra
, Brand
JA touches on the procedure in Rule 7(1) afforded to a respondent who
challenges authority of any person to launch proceedings
which was a
procedure which was less costly. The distinguishing factor in my
view, is that here one was dealing with urgency and
a less costly
method would have been for the municipal manager to produce the
resolution. It is my further view that the procedure
in Rule 7(1) if
insisted upon by the applicant would have rendered the application
moot in that the urgency claimed would have been
removed and, given
the time limitations, the procedure was definitely not available to
the respondents. As at paragraph 8 of Brand
JA’s judgment is stated
that the PIE Act in as far as eviction applications were concerned in
terms of section 6 thereof, authorised
a municipality which was an
organ of state with jurisdiction over a particular area, to bring
eviction applications. Further as at
paragraph 12 Mr Lefatola stated
that he had delegated power to bring the application and to depose to
the affidavit on behalf of
the municipality and in “
reply,
Lefatola produced a resolution of the municipal council which
authorised him to launch proceedings of the present kind on behalf
of
the municipality”.
Another criticism was that the challenge by
the Unlawful Occupiers caused the Municipality to file pages and
pages of resolutions
in a supplementary affidavit, followed by
lengthy technical argument. (my emphasis)
[21]
It is common cause that there is no evidence that a resolution was
passed by the Madibeng Council authorizing
the municipal manager to
institute and prosecute this application.
In ANC Umvoti Council
Caucus and Others v Umvoti Municipality
2010 (3) SA 31
(KZN) the
court stated:
“
The
court was satisfied that since section 151(2) of the Constitution
vested the executive and legislative authority in its municipality
council, it was necessary for the council to have delegated the power
to institute legal proceedings, such a delegation must be in
writing,
absent which a council resolution was required to empower an official
to institute court proceedings on its behalf.”
Again, in
Kouga
Municipality
supra
, the application was dismissed due to
lack of evidence establishing authorisation to an employee to
institute and to prosecute proceedings
on behalf of the municipality.
[22]
The authority relied upon by the first applicant is according to her,
derived from delegated authority
and in my view such delegated
authority is such authority accorded to a municipal manager who is
answerable for the administration
and is accountable to a municipal
council in Local Government. Such delegated authority in my view, is
not equivalent to that in
a power of attorney envisaged in Rule7 (1).
Despite the challenge to
locus standi
of the first applicant,
no case was made out in reply to provide evidence that there existed
authority to institute and prosecute
the present application in the
form of a municipal council resolution.
[23]
It is trite that a Municipal Manager heads the administration of a
municipality and is its accounting
officer. A municipal manager
functions according to delegated power which is of varied source.
Delegated power is derived from section
55 of Municipal Systems Act
which subjects the municipal manager to policy direction of the
municipal council; delegated power is
derived from the Municipal
Council (except for those powers excluded by the Constitution), the
Municipal Council which in terms of
the Constitution section 151 is
the primary executive and legislative body in governance of a
Municipality; delegated power is also
derived from section 82 of the
Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998; delegated power is derived from
sections 60, 61 and 62 of the
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of
2003. Finally, it is required that such delegated power be in
writing.
[24]
It is therefore appropriate to examine annexure “MM1” relied upon
by the first applicant. The document
is one that depicts the
delegations assigned to the municipal manager by the Madibeng Local
Authority to name but a few, delegations
are given in terms of the
Municipal Structures Act 117of 1998, the Municipal Systems Act 32 of
2000; the Municipal Finance Management
Act 56 of 2003; the Disaster
Management Act 57 of 2000; the
Magistrate’s Courts Act 32 of 1944
;
the
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993
; etc. No delegation
is given that the municipal manager is authorised to institute and
prosecute legal proceedings in her capacity
and on behalf of the
Madibeng Municipality, hence the dismissal of the application with
costs.
TLHAPI
V V
(JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT)
APPEARANCES
MATTER
HEARD AND RESERVED ON
:
11 MARCH 2022
JUDGMENT
HANDED DOWN ON
:
25 MARCH 2022
COUNSEL
FOR THE APPLICANT
:
ADV K MASERUMULA
INSTRUCTED BY
:
MATLALA VON METZINGER
ATTORNEYS
COUNSEL
FOR THE RESPONDENT
:
ADV F JOUBERT
INSTRUCTED BY
:
NDABENZIMA ATTORNEYS
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