Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 224South Africa
Siqalo Foods (Pty) Ltd v Clover SA (Pty) Ltd (12130/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 224 (18 April 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
18 April 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Siqalo Foods (Pty) Ltd v Clover SA (Pty) Ltd (12130/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 224 (18 April 2022)
Siqalo Foods (Pty) Ltd v Clover SA (Pty) Ltd (12130/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 224 (18 April 2022)
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sino date 18 April 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 12130/2
021
·
REPORTABLE: NO
·
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
·
REVISED
Heard
on: 29 March 2022
Delivered
on: 18 April 2022
In the matter
between:
SIQALO FOODS (PTY)
LTD
Applicant
and
CLOVER SA (PTY)
LTD
Respondent
In re
CLOVER SA (PTY)
LTD
Applicant
and
SIQALO FOODS (PTY)
LTD
Respondent
JUDGMENT
VUMA,
AJ
[1]
Siqalo Foods (Pty) Ltd (“the applicant”) seeks leave to
appeal to the Full bench of the Gauteng
Division, Pretoria,
alternatively
the Supreme Court of Appeal against the whole
judgment and order delivered by me on 12 November 2021, on the
grounds that I erred
both in fact and in law and in one or more of
the respects to appear below-herein.
[2]
The applicant contends that the appeal would have a reasonable
prospect of success as contemplated
by section 17(1)(a)(i) of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (“the Act”). The applicant further
contends that there are other
compelling reasons why the appeal
should be heard as contemplated by section 17(1)(a)(ii) of the Act.
[3]
It is trite that an application
for leave to appeal a
decision from a single Judge of the High Court is regulated by Rule
49 of the Uniform Rules of Court. The substantive
law pertaining to
application for leave to appeal is dealt with in
section 17
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
.
[4]
The grounds of appeal are
found in the applicant’s Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal.
[5]
Of note the applicant argues,
inter
alia
, the
following points:
5.1
That the Court erred by granting the relief not sought by the
respondent;
5.2.
That the Court erred in rejecting the ordinary meaning of “trade
name” and ultimately finding that “STORK
BUTTER SPREAD” does
not constitute a trade name for purpose of
Regulation 26(7)(a)
, more
particularly in circumstances where the Court failed to make a
finding on what the meaning or definition of “trade name”
is;
5.3.
That the Court erred in relying on
Discovery
Holdings Ltd v Sanlam Ltd and Others
2014
BIP 210 (WCC) at par 67
since that
decision does not deal with the regulations that find application in
this matter and is not authority for the proposition
that a trade
name as envisaged in
Regulation 26(7)(a)
must be vested with a
reputation before reliance can be placed on that Regulation;
5.4 That
the Court erred in its factual finding in paragraph 4.3 of the
judgment that it is common cause “
that
stork butter spread or butter
is
not a trade name
of the
respondent, although the respondent has alleged in its supplementary
answering affidavit that it is
currently
in the process of having it registered as trade name
”
;
5.5.
That the Court erred in finding that the “
overamplified
word ‘butter’
”
creates or is
likely to create a false or misleading impression that STORK BUTTER
SPREAD is “
pure
butter or butter
”
;
5.6.
That the Court erred in rejecting the applicant’s market survey
absent any cogent reasons and absent any
critique in its methodology,
credibility or findings;
5.7.
That the Court erred in rejecting the alternate remedy available to
the respondent and granting it interdictory
relief.
[6]
In regard to the argument why leave should be granted to appeal to
the Supreme court of Appeal,
the applicant submits the
following reasons:
6.1.
There is no other case (other than the present) that has interpreted
the Sections and Regulations of the Act
that are the subject of the
dispute;
6.2.
There is no other case (other than the present) that has assessed the
compliance of the Sections of the Act
and Regulations that are the
subject of the dispute;
6.3.
This application involves novel issues of the law that should be
considered and pronounced upon by the Supreme Court
of Appeal.
[7]
The respondent opposes the application, arguing that the applicant’s
leave to appeal should refused
for,
inter alia
, the following
reasons:
7.1
That the applicant has failed to point out that the bar for
these applications have been raised in that, now,
the use of the word
“
would
”
indicates a
measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court
whose judgment is sought to be appealed against;
7.2
There is nothing untoward about the court granting its order in terms
of sections 3 and 6 of the APSA, as read with
Regulations 3, 17 and
27 given that the impugned Order clearly gives effect to the court’s
true intention when regard is had to
the judgment holistically which
does not by any means alter the sense and substance of the order
given that the Judge sought to contextualise
her order within the
matrix of the Regulations as a whole;
7.3
In regard to the “trade name argument”, the respondent
argues, inter alia, that the court did make a finding
on the meaning
of the term “trade name”.
7.4
It is clear from the applicant’s answering affidavit
and supplementary affidavit that it itself approbated
and reprobated
on whether STORK BUTTER CPREAD constituted a trade name or trade
mark, arguing further that the applicant also admits
in par 22.2 of
its Heads of argument that that a “trade name” is “in truth”,
a synonym for “trade mark” and even refers
to the definition in
the Trade Marks Act.
[8]
The principles governing the question whether leave to appeal should
be granted are well established in
our law. Such principles have
their origin in the common law and they entail a determination as to
whether reasonable prospects of
success exist that another court,
considering the same facts and the law, may arrive to a different
conclusion to that of the court
whose judgment is being impugned. The
principles now find expression in section 17 of the Superior Court
Act 10 of 2013
[9]
It has also been generally accepted that the use of the word "would"
in section 17 of the Act
added a further consideration that the bar
for the test had been raised with regard to the merits of the
proposed leave to appeal
before relief can be granted. The Act
widened the scope in which leave to appeal may be granted to include
a determination of whether
"there is some compelling reason why
the appeal should be heard."
[10]
In my view, considering both parties’
arguments and the impugned judgment and the order, the applicant has
succeeded to make out
a case for leave to appeal. I am of the further
view that there are compelling reasons why leave to appeal should be
granted to the
Supreme Court of Appeal.
[11]
In the premises I make the following order:
ORDER
:
1.
Leave to appeal is granted.
2.
Leave is granted to appeal to the Supreme court of
Appeal.
3.
The costs of this application are costs in the appeal.
Livhuwani Vuma
Acting Judge
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
ALA Heard on: 29
March 2022
ALA Judgment handed
down on: 18 April 2022
Appearances
For Applicant:
Adv.
R Michau SC
Assisted
by: Adv. L. Harilal
Instructed
by: Kisch Africa Inc.
For Respondent: Adv.
P. Eilers
Instructed by:
Hahn
and Hahn Attorneys
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