Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 354South Africa
Lepadi N.O v Steinmuller (2018/19617) [2022] ZAGPPHC 354 (23 May 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
23 May 2022
Headnotes
Summary: cancellation of sale agreement – retainment of deposit by Sheriff – costs of application in favour of Applicant – no report justifying the Applicant to retain deposit
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Lepadi N.O v Steinmuller (2018/19617) [2022] ZAGPPHC 354 (23 May 2022)
Lepadi N.O v Steinmuller (2018/19617) [2022] ZAGPPHC 354 (23 May 2022)
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sino date 23 May 2022
SAFLII
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Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
No: 2018/19617
REPORTABLE:
YES/NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
REVISED
23/05/2022
In
the matter between:
MMATHOTO
LEAH LEPADI N.O.
Applicant
(In
her capacity as the Sheriff of the
High
Court Randburg South West)
and
STEINMULLER;
ANNO
Respondent
In
re:
FIRSTRAND
BANK LIMITED
Plaintiff
and
KRIEL,
MORNE
Defendant
Summary: cancellation
of sale agreement – retainment of deposit by Sheriff –
costs of application in favour of
Applicant – no report
justifying the Applicant to retain deposit
JUDGMENT
PHOOKO
AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an
application brought by
the Applicant in terms of Uniform Rule 46(11) for the cancellation of
a sale in execution of immovable property
described as
Section
No. 36 as shown and more fully described on the Sectional Plan No.
SS43/2005 in the scheme known as Libanon, in respect
of the land and
building or buildings situate at Sonneglans Extension 23 Township, in
the area of the Johannesburg Metropolitian
Municipality, of which
Section the Floor Area, according to the said Sectional Plan, is 71
Square Metres, and an undivided share
in the common property in the
scheme apportioned to the said Section in accordance with the
participation quota as endorsed on
the said Sectional Plan, held by
Deed of Transfer no. ST[....] (“the Property”). The
sale
in execution was held on 25 July 2019 (the Sale in Execution). The
Applicant seeks the cancellation of the Sale in Execution
and an
order authorising a new sale in execution.
[2]
The Applicant further seeks an
order for the deposit paid by the Respondent towards the purchase
price of the Property in the Sale
in Execution be retained by the
Applicant in trust until damages have been quantified after the
completion of any subsequent sale
envisaged in Uniform Rule
46(11). In addition, the Applicant seeks that the Respondent be
ordered to pay the costs of the
present application.
THE
PARTIES
[3]
The Applicant is
the Sheriff of the
High Court, for the District of Randburg, South West.
[4]
The Respondent is Arno Steinmuller, an adult businessman who had
sought to purchase the Property in the Sale in Execution.
# JURISDICTION
JURISDICTION
[5]
The property in question is situated within the jurisdiction of this
Court. Therefore, this Court has the power to adjudicate this case.
# THE ISSUES
THE ISSUES
[6]
At the beginning of proceedings before the Court, the issues to be
decided were:
(a)
Whether the Respondent’s application for the postponement of
this Rule 46(11) application
brought by the Applicant should be
granted?
(b)
Whether the Respondent’s Application to supplement his
pleadings should be granted?
(c)
Whether the Applicant is entitled to retain the deposit paid by
the
Respondent, and to recover the costs of this application?
[7]
Following concessions made by the Respondent during the hearing of
this matter, the issues to be decided by this Court remained points
(b) and (c) above.
# THE FACTS
THE FACTS
[8]
On
25 July 2019 the Sale in Execution of the Property took place for the
amount of R450 000.00. The property was purchased
by the
Respondent in accordance with the terms of the sale agreement.
[1]
[9]
The Respondent paid a deposit
towards the purchase price in the amount of R45 000.00 including
an amount of R17 250.00
in respect of the auctioneer’s
commission.
[10]
According to Clause 4.3 of the sale agreement, the Respondent was
required to furnish
a guarantee within 21 days of the Sale in
Execution. However, the Respondent failed to comply with the
aforesaid condition within
this timeframe, and within an additional 5
days extension period.
[11]
Aggrieved by the Respondent’s default in furnishing the
guarantee timeously,
the Applicant instituted the present Application
for the cancellation of the sale agreement and for an order to resell
the property.
APPLICABLE
LAW
[12]
The
overall guidance to this Court in determining applications brought
under Rule 46
(11)
is the need to expedite proceedings in the interests of the judgment
creditor and other interested parties. In
the
matter between the
Sheriff
of the High Court, Johannesburg East v Chetty and Others; InRe:
Firstrand Bank Limited T/A FNB Home Loans
(Formerly First National Bank of Southern Africa Limited
)
v Chetty and Another
,
[2]
Mbongwe AJ explicitly stated that:
“
the
purpose and intention of the provisions of Rule 46(11) … are
to expedite the sale of attached immovable property primarily
for the
benefit of the judgment creditor and other interested parties.”
[13]
Considering the above, it is evident that all the information
relevant to the cancellation
of the sale agreement should be placed
before the Court so as not to cause prejudice to the judgment
creditor and/or any other
interested party.
[14]
Taking this into account, I now deal with the submissions of the
parties in relation
to the application to supplement pleadings,
retainment of the deposit by the Applicant and costs of this
application.
RESPONDENT’S
APPLICATION TO SUPPLEMENT PLEADINGS
[15]
The Applicant contended that the Respondent agreed to the terms of
the sale agreement.
However, the Respondent is resorting to delaying
tactics through the late filing of his answering affidavit, and later
an application
to supplement his pleadings.
[16]
The Applicant contended that the Respondent’s application to
supplement his
pleadings was not properly before the Court.
Consequently, the Applicant argued that this application should not
be heard by the
Court.
[17]
All in all, the Applicant argued that the Respondent’s
supplementary affidavit
completely creates a new case to the extent
that it does not even refer to the answering affidavit. Consequently,
the Applicant
objected to the introduction of the supplementary
affidavit.
[18]
In his supplementary answering affidavit, the Respondent to a large
extent explained
that the delays that were associated with the
furnishing of bank guarantees were not his fault.
[19]
The Respondent further argued that he did not introduce new facts in
the supplementary
affidavit but rather sought to address the new
amounts that made it difficult to comply with the conditions of the
sale agreement.
[20]
In my view, it is in the interest of justice for this Court to accept
the Respondent’s
supplementary affidavit to furnish this Court
with a complete picture regarding the delays that eventually resulted
in the application
to cancel the sale agreement of the property. I,
therefore, grant the Respondent leave to supplement his pleadings.
[21]
I now address whether the Applicant is entitled to retain the deposit
paid by the
Respondent and whether the Applicant is entitled to
recover the costs of this application.
RETENTION
OF DEPOSIT AND ENTITLEMENT BY THE APPLICANT TO COSTS
APPLICANT’S
SUBMISSIONS
[22]
The Applicant argued that this matter has been going on for almost
two years since
the Sale in Execution took place on 15 July 2019.
However, by 15 August 2019 and 20 August 2019 respectively, the
Respondent
had not furnished any guarantees.
[23]
The Applicant’s main contention is that the Respondent has
failed to furnish
the guarantees as per their undertaking in terms of
the sale agreement.
[24]
Despite the demand for guarantees, the Applicant further argued that
the Respondent
failed to furnish the guarantees within the
permissible time as per the conditions of the sale agreement
including the grace period
that was afforded to him. Instead, the
Respondent only filed the bank guarantee on 13 October 2020.
[25]
The Applicant further contended that the Respondent initially opposed
the present
application but only agreed to the cancellation of the
sale agreement in their heads of argument.
[26]
According to the Applicant, when the Respondent finally filed his
answering affidavit
on 13 October 2020, he mainly opposed the
requirement to furnish the agreed bank guarantee with interest that
had since accrued.
[27]
The Applicant further argued that on 7 April 2021, the Respondent
filed the supplementary
affidavit that was the subject of the
application to supplement his pleadings. To this end, the Applicant
argued that the Respondent’s
heads of argument are based on the
supplementary affidavit, something that was not properly before the
court.
[28]
The Applicant further argued that she was entitled to retain the
Respondent’s
deposit until the property has been sold to a
third party and damages have been quantified.
[29]
Based on the aforesaid submissions, the Applicant argued that the
costs of this application
should be awarded because although the
Respondent has eventually consented to the cancellation of the sale
agreement, he opposed
the matter from the beginning and, in various
ways listed above, contributed to the undue delay in the progression
of and finalisation
of the matter.
RESPONDENT’S
SUBMISSIONS
[30]
The Respondent consented to cancellation of
the sale agreement in his heads of argument. Consequently, the
Respondent mainly opposed
the relief sought by the Applicant in so
far as it relates to retaining the deposit and the costs of this
application.
[31]
The Respondent argued that there should be
no cost order against him.
He argued that he acted
bona
fide
in these proceedings. According to
the Respondent, it was the Applicant who,
inter
alia
, failed to execute her “duties
correctly or in totality” including failure to provide
the necessary information
such as the Sheriff’s report before
this Court.
[32]
According to the Respondent, there was no
basis in law for the Applicant to retain the deposit because no
information was placed
before the Court to show the loss suffered by
the Applicant.
[33]
In
addition, the Respondent argued that the Applicant was seeking
prospective damages but failed to make a case for such damages.
To
this end, the Respondent argued that “the purchaser must be
given a notice of the Sheriff’s submission of the report”
[3]
but
none was done in this case.
[34]
Ultimately, the Respondent argued that in
the absence of a written report by Sheriff before this court as per
the requirements of
Rule 46(11)(b), the Applicant is not entitled to
retain the deposit including the costs of this application.
EVALUATION
OF SUBMISSIONS ON RETENTION OF DEPOSIT
[35]
About the
retainment of the deposit by the Applicant, I am not entirely
convinced that the Applicant is entitled to retain the deposit
pending the until such time that damages have been quantified. I
agree with the Respondent’s submissions that the
Applicant failed to place information before this Court indicating
the justification to withhold the Respondent’s deposit.
In
addition, there was no report presented before this Court showing the
loss (if any) sustained by the Applicant.
[4]
[36]
Accordingly, there is no basis in law to justify the retainment of
the Respondent’s
deposit.
[37]
I deal with the issue of costs below.
EVALUATION
OF SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS
[38]
Even though the Respondent had agreed to the cancellation of the sale
agreement,
I deemed it necessary to include the submissions related
to the lapse of the agreement.
[39]
A simple reading of the pleadings,
in particular the conditions of the sale agreement, reveals that the
bank guarantees were due
latest on
20 August 2019. This is a
factor that was not disputed by the Respondent. To the contrary, the
Respondent consented to the cancellation
of the sale agreement.
[40]
The breach arose solely as a result of the Respondent’s failure
to secure the
guarantees within the stipulated time frames. Had the
Respondent timeously provided the bank guarantees, the sale agreement
would
have been finalised. Instead, the Respondent advances several
reasons, ranging from becoming aware of the Applicant’s
application
to this Court late, the COVID-19 pandemic, as also having
contributed to the delay in obtaining the guarantees.
[41]
I need to
emphasise that the Respondent vigorously opposed this application for
the cancellation of the sale agreement from its
inception and only
consented to the cancellation of it in the heads of arguments. This
is long after the drafting and exchange
of several sets of pleadings
had taken place. At some stage, the Applicant also had to prepare an
application to compel the Respondent
to file his heads of arguments.
I view the circumstances as different from the matter between the
Sheriff
of the High Court, Roodepoort v Magwaza; In re: Standard Bank of
South Africa v Sebola and Another
[5]
where it was said that “
in
the absence of an opposition to report for cancellation and
resale,
there will be no need to make an order for costs”.
[42]
In the
matter between the
Sheriff
of the High Court, Witbank v Wessels; In re: First National Bank, a
Division of Firstrand Bank Ltd v Smal and Another
[6]
said by Teffo J said:
“
The
respondent breached the conditions of sale by failure to provide the
guarantees as required of her in terms of clause 4.4. She
had taken
the risk of the property after the fall of the hammer, the signing of
the conditions of sale and payment of the initial
deposit….”
[43]
The terms of the contract were clear and not contested. The breach,
in this case,
was committed by the Respondent through his failure to
timeously provide bank guarantees as per the sale agreement. In light
of
the above, I do not see any justification as to why the Applicant
should be out of pocket for the costs of this application when
it was
the Respondent who failed to honour the terms of the sale agreement.
[44]
Save for my
determination on the entitlement to retain the deposit, I am of the
view that the Applicant has been a successful party
in these
proceedings. Accordingly, the Applicant is entitled to the costs of
this application.
[7]
CONCLUSION
[45]
After reading through the papers, hearing counsel for the Applicant,
and counsel
on behalf of the Respondent, I grant judgment in favour
of the Applicant as follows:
(1)
That the sale in execution held on 25 July 2019 in respect of the
immovable property referred
to in paragraph 2 below is set aside;
(2)
Subject to prayers 3 and 4 below, the applicant is authorised to
again sell in execution
the immovable property, known as:
SECTION NO. 36 AS SHOWN
AND MORE FULLY DESCRIBED ON THE SECTIONAL PLAN NO. SS43/2005 IN THE
SCHEME KNOWN AS LIBANON, IN RESPECT
OF THE LAND AND BUILDING OR
BUILDINGS SITUATE AT SONNEGLANS EXTENSION 23 TOWNSHIP, IN THE ARE OF
THE JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITIAN
MUNICIPALITY, OF WHICH SECTION THE
FLOOR AREA, ACCORDING TO THE SAID SECTIONAL PLAN, IS 71 SQUARE
METRES, AND AN UNDIVIDED SHARE
IN THE COMMON PROPERTY IN THE SCHEME
APPORTIONED TO THE SAID SECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PARTICIPATION
QUOTA AS ENDROSED ON
THE SAID SECTIONAL PLAN, HELD BY DEED OF
TRANSFER NO. ST[....] (“the property”) for the reserve
price of
R376 000.00.
(3)
A copy of this order is to be served personally on the Judgment
Debtor, as soon as is practicable
after the order is granted, but
prior to any future sale in execution.
(4)
The Judgment Debtor is advised that, as a result of the order
referred to in paragraph 1,
the provisions of section 129(3) and (4)
of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the “NCA”) APPLY
TO THE JUDGMENT GRANTED
IN FAVOUR OF THE Judgment Creditor. The
Judgment Debtor may prevent the sale of the property referred to in
paragraph 2 above if
he pays to the Judgment Creditor together with
all enforcement costs and default charges, prior to the property
being sold in execution.
(5)
That the Respondent pays the costs of this application, to be taxed.
M
R PHOOKO AJ
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT,
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Delivered:
This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 23 May 2022.
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Excipient:
Adv. D. Strydom
Instructed
by:
Bezuidenhout V and Zyl Attorneys
Counsel
for the Respondent:
Adv. B Bhabha
Instructed
by :
Vermaak, Marshall, MB Wellbeloved Attorneys
Date
of Hearing:
14 March 2022
Date
of Judgment:
23 May 2022
[1]
Sale
agreement available on CaseLines.
## [2](2009/3673)
[2014] ZAGPJHC 352 (27 March 2014)para
3.
[2]
(2009/3673)
[2014] ZAGPJHC 352 (27 March 2014)
para
3.
[3]
Respondent’s
heads of argument para 49.5.
## [4]Sheriff
of the High Court Benoni v Lombard obo Yellow Dot Property and
Another(15685/09)
[2015] ZAGPPHC 722 (15 October 2015)para
18.
[4]
Sheriff
of the High Court Benoni v Lombard obo Yellow Dot Property and
Another
(15685/09)
[2015] ZAGPPHC 722 (15 October 2015)
para
18.
[5]
(13644/13)
[2015] ZAGPPHC 721 (15 October 2015) para 9.
[6]
(49144/2010) [2016] ZAGPPHC 189 (5 April 2016).
## [7]Speaker
of the National Assembly v Public Protector and Others; Democratic
Alliance v Public Protector
and Others[2022]
ZACC 1 para 112.
[7]
Speaker
of the National Assembly v Public Protector and Others; Democratic
Alliance v Public Protector
and Others
[2022]
ZACC 1 para 112.
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