Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 684South Africa
Mkhatshwa v Ndlovu and Others (37983/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 684 (12 September 2022)
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2022
>>
[2022] ZAGPPHC 684
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## Mkhatshwa v Ndlovu and Others (37983/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 684 (12 September 2022)
Mkhatshwa v Ndlovu and Others (37983/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 684 (12 September 2022)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2022_684.html
sino date 12 September 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case
Number: 37983/2021
REPORTABLE:
NO.
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO.
REVISED.
2022-09-12
In
the matter between:
GLADSTONE
REASON MKHATSHWA
Applicant
And
KENNETH
MOHULE NDLOVU
First
Respondent
PHUMATRA
TRANSPORT ENTERPRISE
(PTY)
LTD
(REG.
NO.:
2006/063964/23) Second
Respondent
AMOGELANG
TRANSPORT SERVICES
(PTY)
LTD (In business
rescue)
Third
Respondent
(REG.
NO.: 2000/018818/07)
LOUISA
PULANE MKHATSHWA
Fourth
Respondent
PULENG
NCHOKE NDLOVU
Fifth
Respondent
PHILLIP
LESSING
N.O.
Sixth
Respondent
LINCOLN
PHAHLANE MKHOMBO N.O.
Seventh
Respondent
THE
COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
COMMISSION
Eighth
Respondent
AMOGELANG
LOGISTICS CC
Ninth
Respondent
(REG.
NO.: 2008/044614/23)
JUDGMENT
POTTERILL
J
Background
[1]
Kenneth Mohule Ndlovu [Kenneth], the First Respondent, started a
highly successful
transport empire culminating in certain entities
being formed
inter alia
a close corporation and two companies.
This matter in the main revolved around Phumatra Transport Enterprise
(Pty) (Ltd) [Phumatra],
the Second Respondent and the Third
Respondent Amogeleng Transport Service (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue)
[Amogoleng] and Amogelang
Logistics CC, the Ninth Respondent. These
businesses generated great wealth and there is no countenance to the
fact that the success
of the companies can be solely attributed to
Kenneth.
[2]
Kenneth offered both Reason Mkhatshwa [Reason], the Applicant, his
son in law married
to the Fourth Respondent, Louisa Phulane Mkhwatswa
[Louisa], Kenneth’s daughter, shareholding in the two companies
without
them having to pay anything towards becoming shareholders. In
Phumatra Reason acquired 20 % shareholding and Louisa acquired 9 %.
Her brother Phuleng Nchoke Ndlovu [Puleng], the Fifth Respondent,
acquired 10 % with Kenneth retaining 51 % of the shareholding.
In
Amogelang Reason acquired 20 % shareholding, Phuleng 9 %, Phuleng 20
% and Kenneth retained 51 %. Kenneth thus remained the
majority
shareholder in both the entities. Reason was appointed as director in
both Phumatra and Amogelang.
[3]
Lincoln Phahlane Mkhombo, the business rescue practitioner of
Amogelang, [the BRP]
the Seventh Respondent filed an affidavit
neither opposing nor supporting the application, the facts he did set
out will be referred
to later in the judgment. None of the other
respondents filed opposing affidavits. Reason and Kenneth are
referred to by name with
no disrespect intended, and were also
referred to as such in the papers. Kenneth’s wife, to whom he
was married in community
of property, passed away and the executor of
the estate is cited as the Sixth Respondent [Lessing N.O.]
[4]
True to the proverb; “
eat and drink with family, do business
with strangers”
, the business relationship went sour and
Reason is applying as a director and shareholder in terms of
s162(5)
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
[the Act] to declare Kenneth a
delinquent director of both Phumatra and Amogelang.
[5]
In the answering affidavit only a point
in limine
was raised
with purposefully no answer to the merits. In argument on behalf of
Kenneth the point
in limine
was argued, as well as the merits
with counsel for Kenneth arguing only on the founding affidavit of
Reason as not satisfying the
jurisdictional requirements for a
delinquency order as set out in the Act.
Did
Reason have
locus standi
as a shareholder and director to
bring the application?
[6]
The first issue raised was the lack of
locus standi
of Reason
to bring this application as he was not a shareholder of Phumatra and
Amogelang. I need not decide this issue; when argument
on behalf of
Kenneth was commenced counsel conceded that Reason was indeed a
shareholder of both these entities.
[7]
The only issue left to decide pertaining to
locus standi
was
whether Reason was still a director of the two entities. It was
common cause that he was a director of Amogelang and Phumatra,
but
was removed as director of the Companies. Pursuant to Kenneth filing
an objection to the Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission
[CIPC], the Eight Respondent, he was reinstated by the CIPC as a
director.
[8]
It is common cause that Kenneth, purporting to act as a shareholder,
sent a notice
to Reason on 14 June 2021 to attend a shareholders
meeting on 28 June 2021 at 11:00 in respect of Phumatra and 13:00 in
respect
of Amogelang. These notices were issued by Kenneth in
his personal capacity as a majority shareholder. It was submitted by
Reason that Kenneth had contended that the shares of Amogelang were
in fact vested in the Pheko Development Trust [the Trust] and
if that
was so, the notice was to be given by the Trust and not Kenneth
pertaining to the Amogelang meeting. It was also contended
that since
Kenneth was married in community of property the executor had to act
jointly with Kenneth pertaining to Amogelang and
Phumatra.
Accordingly, Reason did not attend these meetings due to the
incorrect procedure followed and the lack of cogent
grounds for his
removal.
[9]
Kenneth averred that Reason was removed because Reason fraudulently
filed a COR168
Form on behalf of Phumatra. He also averred that
Reason acted as a delinquent director by applying for the companies’
liquidations
and sought the rescission of the business rescue
proceedings. He also withdrew R119 000 from Phumatra’s
bank account.
[10]
Reason denied that he filed a COR168 pursuant to the June 2021
events, but did so as a result
of the April 2021 events. He had the
authority to file an objection by means of COR168. He acted in good
faith to only, as an alternative
to his main prayer, seek liquidation
with his main aim with the previous application to prevent the
plundering of the companies.
He had the right to withdraw the
R119 000 from the bank account as his salary that was owed.
[11]
In oral argument it was argued that Reason had followed the incorrect
process to be reinstated
as a director. He should have utilised
s71(5)
of the Act; he should have approached a Court and not the CIPC
to have him reinstated. Reason was accordingly correctly removed
as a
director and with no lawful setting aside of the removal as director
Reason had no
locus standi
to bring this application.
[12]
Section 71
of the Act reads as follows:
“
71.
Removal of directors
(1)
Despite anything to the contrary
in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, or any
agreement between a company and
a director, or between any
shareholders and a director, a director may be removed by an ordinary
resolution adopted at a shareholders
meeting by the persons entitled
to exercise voting rights in an election of that director, subject to
subsection (2).
(2)
Before the shareholders of a
company may consider a resolution contemplated in subsection (1) –
(a)
the director concerned must be
given notice of the meeting and the resolution, at least equivalent
to that which a shareholder is
entitled to receive, irrespective of
whether or not the director is a shareholder of the company;
and
(b)
the director must be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to make a presentation, in person or through a
representative, to the meeting,
before the resolution is put to a
vote.
(3)
If a company has more than two
directors, and a shareholder or director has alleged that a director
of the company –
(a)
has become –
(i)
ineligible or disqualified in
terms of
section 69
, other than on the grounds contemplated in
section 69(8)(a)
; or
(ii)
incapacitated to the extent that
the director is unable to perform the functions of a director, and is
unlikely to regain that capacity
within a reasonable time; or
(b)
has neglected, or been derelict
in the performance of, the functions of director,
the
board, other than the director concerned, must determine the matter
by resolution, and may remove a director whom it has determined
to be
ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, or negligent or derelict,
as the case may be.
(4)
Before the board of a company may
consider a resolution contemplated in subsection (3), the director
concerned must be given –
(a)
notice of the meeting, including
a copy of the proposed resolution and a statement setting out reasons
for the resolution, with
sufficient specificity to reasonably permit
the director to prepare and present a response; and
(b)
a reasonable opportunity to make
a presentation, in person or through a representative, to the meeting
before the resolution is
put to a vote.
(5)
If, in terms of subsection (3),
the board of a company has determined that a director is ineligible
or disqualified, incapacitated,
or has been negligent or derelict, as
the case may be, the director concerned, or a person who appointed
that director as contemplated
in
section 66(4)(a)(i)
, if applicable,
may apply within 20 business days to a court to review the
determination of the board.
(6)
If, in terms of subsection (3),
the board of a company has determined that a director is not
ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated,
or has not been negligent
or derelict, as the case may be –
(a)
any director who voted otherwise
on the resolution, or any holder of voting rights entitled to be
exercised in the election of that
director, may apply to a court to
review the determination of the board; and……”
[13]
It is common cause that the removal of Reason is not reflected at the
CIPC and factually he is
a director. I cannot find that the actions
of the CIPC reinstating Reason as director, pursuant to his objection
to his removal,
was unlawful because it was the incorrect procedure
followed.
Section 71(5)
is required when a director was removed in
terms of
s71(3)
, the purported removal of Reason was done in terms of
s71(1)
, as a majority vote and
s71(5)
is not applicable. Reason is
accordingly
de facto
and
de jure
a director and had
locus standi
to bring this application. But, in any event the
procedure followed by Kenneth to remove Reason was invalid.
Must
Kenneth be declared to be delinquent director?
[14]
In terms of
Section 162(5)
of the
Act “A court must make an
order declaring a person to be a delinquent director if the person –
(a)
…
(b)
…
(c)
while a director –
(i)
grossly abused the position of director;
(ii)
took personal advantage of information or an opportunity, contrary to
section 76(2)(a)
;
(i)
intentionally, or be gross
negligence, inflicted harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the
company, contrary to
section 76(2)(a)
;
(ii)
acted in a manner –
(aa)
that amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of
trust in relation to the performance of the director’s
functions within, and duties to, the company; or
(bb)
contemplated in
section 77(3)(a)
, (b) or (c);
(a)
has repeatedly been personally
subject to a compliance notice or similar enforcement mechanism, for
substantially similar conduct,
in terms of any legislation.”
[15]
Perhaps a good starting point is what the BRP has uncovered since the
business rescue proceedings
have commenced. He has addressed letters,
flowing from his report, to the South African Revenue Services
because of tax returns
that were not submitted or incorrect returns
that were submitted. A letter was sent to the South African Police
Services due to
financial impropriety allegedly committed prior to
the commencement of the business rescue proceedings. The Independent
Regulatory
Board for Auditors was informed that annual financial
statements of which some were audited contained incorrect or
unverifiable
financial information. The CIPC was informed that assets
belonging from one entity had been transferred to another entity
without
board resolutions. In his report he confirmed that the grants
received by the companies from the Department of Transport were not
exclusively used for the companies and some R4 million was
transferred to the Trust, which is a personal Trust of Kenneth,
without
any board resolution approving such transfer. The auditor
confirmed that the averment that the trust has 100 % shares is false;
in fact, the Trust had no shares in the companies. The BRP further
reported that the directors received loans and the company issued
loans to related companies without adhering to the provisions of the
Act. On 11 April 2017 and 11 April 2017 amounts of R9.7 million
and
R300 000 were again from payments from the Department granted as
“
temporary relief”
to Amogelang, paid over to the
personal Trust without any legitimate authorisation from Amogelang.
[16]
It is not denied that Kenneth withdrew substantial amounts from
Phumatra’s bank accounts
in the period prior to the end of 2017
and transferred those funds to Ntshole Trading and Projects (Pty)
Ltd, a business owned
by Kenneth’s girlfriend, Mrs Deliwe
Buthelezi. Funds from Phumatra were used to buy a townhouse, Unit 11
Trevonia Mews, Garsfontein
for Mrs Buthelezi with no such resolutions
being taken.
[17]
Phumatra paid R1.6 million cash for a specially outfitted luxurious
Range Rover for Kenneth.
No resolution was adopted by Phumatra for
this purchase. The vehicle was later sold for R1.1 million cash but
the proceeds did
not go back to Phumatra but instead to the personal
Trust.
[18]
Phumatra also paid for a Porche Carrera 911 4 S in the amount of
R1 435 029.00. The
car was sold but the proceeds did not
flow back to Phumatra.
[19]
Amogelang did not timeously submit and pay ENP201 monthly returns for
the financial year 2017
resulting in SARS levying penalties and
interest amounting to R142 266.
[20]
SNG Grant Thornton (SNG) reported concern to the BRP about the audit
opinion for 2015 and 2016
financial statements and accuracy of the
books of the company and reported that Amogelang and Phumatra issued
loans and the directors
received loans without adhering to the
Companies Act. The
Companies failed to maintain proper accounting
records.
[21]
I do not find it necessary to refer to any other facts set out as
grounds in support of the application
for delinquency simply because
the facts set out above are undisputed and sufficient to make a
finding. The facts tell a sad story
of a success story rapidly
deteriorating to a disaster. The Act requires a director of limited
liability companies to fulfil his
duties and functions in good faith
and for a proper purpose and in the best interests of the companies.
Company monies simply cannot
be siphoned off without proper purpose,
without resolutions and with no accounting. Even though a director
has built up a company
he or she cannot utilise the company funds as
his own; the correct procedures and bookkeeping procedures must be
followed and monies
must be utilised for the companies’
benefit. As so aptly penned by
Ngcobo
J :
“
Limitations
on the right to freely choose a profession are not to be lightly
tolerated. But we live in a modern and industrial world
of human
interdependence and mutual responsibility. Indeed we are caught in an
inescapable network of mutuality. Provided it is
in the public
interest and not arbitrary or capricious, regulation of vocational
activity for the protection both of the persons
involved in it and of
the community at large affected by it is to be both expected and
welcomed.”
[1]
[22]
In
Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Ltd
and Others
2017
(2) SA 337
(SCA) the Court found that s162 has a protective service:
“
Its
aim is to ensure that those who invest in companies, big or small,
are protected against directors who engage in serious misconduct
of
the type described in these sections. That is conduct that breaches
the bond of trust that shareholders have in the people they
appoint
to the board of directors. Directors who show themselves unworthy of
that trust are declared delinquent and excluded from
the office of
director. It protects those who deal with companies by seeking to
ensure that the management of those companies is
in fit hands. And it
is required in the public interest that those who enjoy the benefits
of incorporation and limited liability
should not abuse their
position.”
[2]
[23]
The
facts in this matter do not constitute trivial misdemeanours. On
these facts it is clear that Kenneth was grossly abusing his
position
as director, recklessly so, and in breach of trust of his functions
and duties as a director by instead of protecting
the company he
stripped the company of assets.
[3]
Kenneth must accordingly be declared delinquent.
[24]
In terms of s162(7) a declaration of delinquency is for a period of 7
years, but a court has
the power to relax the period after three
years and then probation can take effect.
[4]
No submissions were made seeking a shorter period of delinquency or
reasons why that should be appropriate. I accept that
the Legislature
had sound reasons as to why the period of seven years was seen as
fit. The only argument was that Kenneth did in
fact act in good faith
by seeking Amogelang’s business rescue. The business rescue
application was in fact a kneejerk reaction
to an application brought
by Reason and Amogelang could barely be described as being in
financial distress. This fact on its own
cannot sway me to deviate
from the period of 7 years.
[25]
The fact that there was no reply to the merits of this application,
the factual inaccuracies
in the answering affidavit and the conduct
of Kenneth renders the punitive costs order appropriate.
[26]
I accordingly make the following order:
[26.1]
The First Respondent is declared a delinquent director;
[26.2]
The delinquency declaration is unconditional and will subsist
for
seven years from the date of the order;
[26.3]
The CIPC is directed to act in accordance with this order
and remove
the First Respondent from the directorship of the Second and Third
Respondents and the Ninth Respondent if applicable.
[26.4]
The First Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the
application
on an attorney and client scale.
S.
POTTERILL
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
CASE
NUMBER: 37983/2021
HEARD
ON: 19
July 2022
FOR
THE APPLICANT: ADV.
M.P. VAN DER MERWE SC
INSTRUCTED
BY: Barnard
& Patel Inc.
FOR
THE 1
st
RESPONDENT: ADV.
W.R. MOKHARE SC
ADV.
T.B. HUTAMO
INSTRUCTED
BY: Rams
Inc.
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 12
September 2022
[1]
Affordable
Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others
[2005]
ZACC 3
;
2006 (3) SA 247
(CC) para [60]
[2]
Para
[144]
[3]
S162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Act
[4]
s162(11)
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
Ndlovu and Another v S (A99/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 995 (10 November 2022)
[2022] ZAGPPHC 995High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
Mkhwanazi v S (A190/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 862 (7 November 2022)
[2022] ZAGPPHC 862High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
Ndlovu v S (A150/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 941 (1 December 2022)
[2022] ZAGPPHC 941High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
Ndlovu v Sekuba and Others (27945/22) [2024] ZAGPPHC 163 (30 January 2024)
[2024] ZAGPPHC 163High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
Ndlangamandla v S [2023] ZAGPPHC 418; A145/2022 (24 April 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 418High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar