Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 764South Africa
Acire Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Banzi Trade 31 (Pty) Ltd t/a Brickit (38683/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 764 (30 September 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
30 September 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Acire Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Banzi Trade 31 (Pty) Ltd t/a Brickit (38683/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 764 (30 September 2022)
Acire Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Banzi Trade 31 (Pty) Ltd t/a Brickit (38683/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 764 (30 September 2022)
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sino date 30 September 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO
: 38683/2022
DATE
:
2022-09-30
REPORTABLE:
NO.
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO.
REVISED
In
the matter between
ACIRE
PROPERTY HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
BANZI
TRADE 31 (PTY) LTD t/a BRICKIT
Respondent
J
U D G M E N T
DAVIS
J
:
Introduction
[1]
The applicant in this urgent application
which came before the court yesterday is the landlord of the
respondent who trades as Brickit.
The premises is a brick-making
factory situated in Chloorkop in Gauteng, to which I shall refer to
as “the property”.
The termination of the lease
agreement, which has been operating on a month-to-month basis since
June 2020 is imminent. Brickit
is in the process of relocating its
five brickmaking plants situated on the property to new premises.
The Dispute
[2]
The dispute between the parties is whether
Brickit is permitted to remove all of the structures erected by it
over the years on
the property or not. The ownership of the
structures is in dispute and forms the subject matter of a pending
action in this court
in case number 2022-018758.
[3]
There is no dispute from the applicant’s
side that Brickit may remove all its machinery, moveable equipment,
including all
the machines and equipment referred to in valuation
reports of one Alex Kiolos, dated 8 June 2018 and 13 October 2018,
but excluding
its annexure dated 1 February 2022. The items to be
removed include gantries and silos.
[4]
From the papers there is also no dispute
that the curing chambers of plants 3, 4 and 5, identified as such on
Annexure HC2 to the
affidavit of one Henry Cockcroft, may be removed.
These consist of thermal insulation panels. The racking installed
inside these
chambers consist of a steel structure bolted together
and further bolted to the floor. The thermal panels are interlocked
and can
easily be dismantled and removed, together with the internal
racking.
[5]
The dispute is therefore whether Brickit
may dismantle, deconstruct or demolish and remove the structures that
make up the remainder
of plants 3, 4 and 5. These consist of two
warehouse-like steel and mortar buildings per plant, i.e. six in
total.
The terms of the
agreement
[6]
The relevant terms of the lease
agreement are clauses 10.1 and 10.2. They read as follows:
“
10.1
The lessee shall be entitled to erect and install and retain in the
inside of the premises
such said structures, fixtures, installations
and equipment as the lessee may reasonably require for its business,
provided that
plans and specifications thereof shall first be
submitted to the lessor for its approval, which are not unreasonably
withheld.
In particular it is stipulated that no structures or
fixtures shall be erected less than 10 metres from any boundary of
the premises.
10.2
The lessee shall be entitled and obliged to remove such installations
and equipment on termination of the lease, subject thereto
that any
damage occasioned by such removal shall be made good by the lessee on
demand
.”
The Contentions of the
Parties
[7]
The
applicant contends that there are four types of items listed in
clause 10.1. Those are structures, fixtures, installations and
equipment. In respect of structures or fixtures as opposed to the
remainder, these may not be erected less than 10 metres from
any
boundary of the premises. The applicant contends that these clearly
referred to buildings and when it comes to removal of items,
the
applicant contends that clause 10.2 distinguishes from this list of
four of items, only two items, namely equipment and installations,
which may be removed. The implication of this distinction is that the
remaining two items namely the structures and fixtures may
not be
removed. They are to remain fixed to the property and becomes the
property of the landlord.
[8]
Brickit,
on the other hand, relies on the affidavit of Cockcroft already
referred to above. He is the general manager of the Concrete
Manufacturers Association of South Africa and has done extensive
studies in industrial installations, as appears from his
curriculum
vitae
.
He has inspected the plant and he explained that plants 3, 4 and 5,
representing the more modern manner of brick manufacturing,
consist
of installations in the form of purpose built designed enclosures to
promote the capacity of manufacture of precast concrete
units. He
refers to these plants as “bubbles” or “symbiotic
environments” in which each component thereof
is interdependent
on the rest, making it possible for Brickit’s business and
employees to, in his words, “flourish”.
Plants 3, 4 and 5
are described as advanced production units with intricate control
systems and measures. The recommended designs
of such plants and the
functionality thereof as a complete unit is done to aid the
protection afforded by the protective structures
which create the
essential “outer shell” of the “bubble” which
he had described. Part of the “bubble”
also includes the
curing chambers referred to earlier, which allows for the curing
process of the concrete to occur. He then referred
to and described
in an affidavit how this curing process involves a crystallisation
process, with an exothermic reaction.
[9]
Cockcroft
then concludes that the structure, that is now the outside or
protective shell creating the bubble surrounding the precast
concrete
product plants, are not mere buildings housing occupants and
equipment, but they form a “
symbiosis
of structure and plant operation in an essential close
interdependence
”.
Cockcroft then explains in his affidavit that he has been advised
that the short question arising from the facts is whether
the outside
housing or protective shell of plants 3, 4 and 5, i.e. the structures
which create and sustain the bubble, form part
of the land or rather
form part of the plant. He then expressed an opinion which he called
a “firm” opinion that the
housing or protective shells
form part of the three plants. So far his affidavit.
[10]
It
appears that Brickit interprets Cockcroft’s opinion as meaning
that once an outer shell or housing forms part of a plant,
then it
remains the property of Brickit and therefore does not form part of
the land.
Evaluation
[11]
Firstly,
Cockcroft is not an expert and neither is he a lawyer and of course
the question of law is for the court and not for an
expert. Secondly,
whatever Cockcroft might explain as to what forms part of a plant or
not does
ipso
facto
answer the question of whether a part of a plant forms part of the
land once it was constructed thereon or not. Cockcroft’s
conclusion is simply based on the fact that the outer shells or
buildings contribute to creating bubbles or internal areas which
provide for a seamless production of the concrete products until they
are placed in the curing chambers for curing. There is a
manifestly
different method of construction and construction material utilised
in the outer shells than that used in the curing
chambers. The “outer
shells” consist of standard concrete slabs, upright metal or
iron I-bars bolted to the floor and
thereafter built into overhead
metal structures and covered by a roof, as well as side coverings and
partial walls constructed
of bricks and mortar. On the other hand, as
already explained earlier, the curing chambers are something
completely different and
comprises of interlocking and removable
isopanels for the walls and the roof coverings, as well as the bolted
internal metal racking.
There are fundamental differences of
construction between the two, and as the valuator explained,
last-mentioned can easily be
removed.
[12]
Although
the iron uprights and roofs can notionally also be removed, their
different nature must be considered. Counsel for Brickit
referred to
numerous case law citing English law, wherein extensive examples of
decisions of what constitutes a “plant”
feature and
judgments were pronounced on what may or may not in certain
circumstances constitute an integral part of a lessee’s
operation and whether he may therefore remove it or not. These
examples range from swimming pools to the basins of dry-docks.
However, despite what these English examples may indicate, the
starting point will be the facts of the specific case, and in this
instance in particular the terms of the agreement between the
parties. The case law dealing with interpretation of such terms are,
inter alia on
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) 593
(SCA)
and the long line of subsequent cases, applying in particular
paragraph 8 of that judgment, the most notable recent decision being
Minister
of Finance v Afribusiness NPC 2022 (4) SA362 (CC).
[13]
Applying
the principles of interpretation set out in these cases, it is
apparent that there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant
may
be correct that the parties had, irrespective of whether the
structures formed part of the “bubble” referred to
by
Cockcroft and required for a modern brickmaking process or not,
intended to make a distinction between structures on the one
hand, in
respect of which ownership will vest with the landlord, whether
through the application of the common law principles of
accessio
or through contract, and equipment and machinery on the other hand,
which may be removed and relocated by the tenant. This court
need not
finally determine that issue, particularly as it forms the subject
matter of a pending action. For purposes of the interim
relief sought
by the applicant, is sufficient if the applicant has indicated a
prima
facie
right, even if open to some doubt. I find that the applicant has
established such a right.
[14]
I
shall now briefly deal with the remainder of the requirements for an
interim interdict. The argument was made that the applicant
will not
receive substantial redress if the application was heard in normal
course and that the applicant has a clear right to
preserve that
which constitutes the subject matter of a triable issue in the
action. This can only be alone by preventing Brickit
from demolishing
the structures referred to above. The applicant contends that if the
interdict is not granted the applicant will
suffer irreparable harm
as ownership of the disputed subject matter of the action would have
been rendered moot by the removal
and destruction of that over which
ownership is claimed in the action. The dispute would then become
largely academic. The applicant
further says it will in the interim
lose the benefit of a substantial improvement to its property and
therefore in the meantime
suffer irreparable harm. This irreparable
harm is linked of course to the issue of the balance of convenience.
[15]
As
the Constitutional Court has indicated, one should adopt a
common-sense and practical approach to assessment of the factual
issues
[1]
. Objectively, should
these structures in question be removed, that is the upright steel
structures, the roofs, the roof covering
and the wall panels and
should the concrete portions of the walls be reduced to rubble, then
the applicant will be left for the
foreseeable future, and until such
time as an action may one day in due course be resolved, with an open
piece of land but with
cement slabs or concrete slabs thereon,
without any structures. Not only will the removal thereof result in a
loss of the value
of the structures, but the property will
conceivably be much more difficult to re-let in the interim.
[16]
Brickit
tried to counter this obvious consequence by arguing that the
applicant can simply erect new warehouse-type structures.
On the
other hand Brickit says that the structures were purpose-built for it
and would cost it approximately R3 million each. Even
if the last
mentioned assessment is correct and even if the total then thereof
might be R12 million, the amount thereof largely
pales in
significance when compared to the total value of that which Brickit
seeks to remove and relocate, being no less than R65
million on
Kiolos’s own valuation. The additional cost for Brickit to
replace these purpose-built structures, in my view,
compares
unfavourably and is outweighed by the practical loss for the
applicant. I therefore find that the applicant has indicated
a
sufficient reasonable apprehension of an imminent and irreparable
loss and that the extent thereof, outweighs the inconvenience
which
Brickit might suffer, if it may not remove those structures and have
to replace it.
[17]
Brickit’s
last counter to the effect that the applicant should furnish
guarantees in the amount of R138 million within a scant
number of
days should it wish to retain the structures, is unreasonable and
constitutes a grossly overstated position. I am convinced
that the
exception of imposing such a security measure is not applicable in
this case.
[18]
I
am satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the relief sought and
insofar as the dispute has been narrowed as to what may or
may not be
removed, it is appropriate to insert in the order that which the
applicant concedes may be removed by Brickit.
[19]
As
to the issue of costs, this is one of those cases where a court,
after having heard evidence regarding ownership, and having
made a
finding in respect thereof, would be in a better position than this
court to determine whether the applicant had an actual
right which it
had been entitled to protect by way of this application, urgent or
otherwise, and whether it had been justified
in bringing the
application. Apart from the general principle of costs that it should
follow the event, the more overriding principle
of costs orders and
the exercise of a court’s discretion in respect thereof is that
it should be fair to both parties. For
these reasons I find that it
would be fair to both parties if the issue of costs is reserved for
determination by the court hearing
the action.
[20]
ORDER
1.
The
respondent is interdicted from removing the buildings indicated on
Annexure X by the letter ‘P’ or any roof or wall
or any
similar part or component or element of such buildings, which are
referred to as “the buildings”, but excluding
any
machinery or moveable equipment and excluding the curing chambers of
plants 3, 4 and 5 as depicted on Annexure HC2 in the papers,
the
silos, gantries and equipment and the machinery referred to in
Annexure S4, being the valuation prepared for Standard Bank
on 13
October 2021, from the applicant’s property situated at Portion
7 of the farm Mooifontein 14, registration division
IR, street
address 7 Marsala Road, Chloorkop, Kempton Park, pending the
finalisation of the action instituted by the applicant
against the
respondent on 26 August 2022 under case number 2022-018758, wherein a
declaratory order regarding the ownership of
the buildings and
related ancillary relief is being sought.
2.
The
order contained in paragraph 1 above will operate as an interim order
with immediate effect.
3.
The
respondent is ordered to, within three days from date of this order,
allow the applicant or its duly appointed professional
advisor access
to the property and to the buildings for purposes of an inspection.
4.
The
costs of this application are reserved for determination in the
action mentioned in paragraph 1 above.
DAVIS
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATE
ON WHICH JUDGMENT WAS
HANDED
DOWN
: 30 SEPTEMBER 2022
[1]
See
for example
National
Treasury v Outa
2012 (6) SA 223
(CC) and
Tshwane
City v Afriforum
2016 (6) SA 279
(CC) at para 56
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