Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 747South Africa
Sarah v Mohononi and Others (22258/2015) [2022] ZAGPPHC 747 (4 October 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
4 October 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Sarah v Mohononi and Others (22258/2015) [2022] ZAGPPHC 747 (4 October 2022)
Sarah v Mohononi and Others (22258/2015) [2022] ZAGPPHC 747 (4 October 2022)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
No: 22258/2015
REPORTABLE:
YES/NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
REVISED
04/10/2022
In
the matter between:
RAMATHOKA
MOLATELO SARAH
Applicant
and
MAILA ELIAS
MOHONONI
First Respondent
MOLOI
DOREEN MOHONONI
Second Respondent
THE
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
PHOOKO
AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1]
Decades ago, spouses under a customary marriage enjoyed no legal
protection
in South Africa. This did not affect the status of the
marriage and/or the proprietary consequences arising from such
marriage
if the parties eternally lived together as husband and wife.
[2]
The problem arose only when the commitment of either party to a
customary
law ended and the other party opted to pursue a different
future with another person. For various reasons, things in life
happen
to change and each individual takes a completely new route in
terms of whom they want to be with, committed to, and/or share their
lives with for the remainder of their stay on earth. Consequently, it
would occur that one party to a customary marriage enters
into a
civil marriage with someone else without the knowledge of their
customary law spouse.
[3]
The
consequences of a subsequent civil marriage by either party with
another person were dire, as customary marriages were not legally
recognised. The effect of such civil marriage on the customary
marriage was that it dissolved the customary marriage.
[1]
However, this is no longer the position. The Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (“the Customary Marriages
Act”)
has brought about a legal framework for the recognition of customary
marriages.
[4]
This case is about a customary marriage that was concluded between
the
Applicant and the First Respondent. The Applicant and the First
Respondent to date have not registered their customary marriage
with
the Department of Home Affairs.
[5]
After the customary marriage between the Applicant and the First
Respondent,
the First Respondent secretly entered into a civil
marriage with the Second Respondent.
[6]
Aggrieved by the First Respondent’s move to enter into a civil
marriage
while the customary marriage subsists, the Applicant
approached this Court inter alia seeking a relief declaring the civil
marriage
between the First Respondent and the Second Respondent null
and void
ab initio
.
THE
PARTIES
[7]
The Applicant is Molatelo Sarah Ramathoka an adult female person
residing
in Mohlabeng village in Bolobedu, Limpopo Province.
[8]
The First Respondent
Maila Elias Mohononi, an
adult male who also resides at Mohlabaneng village, Limpopo Province.
[9]
The Second Respondent is Moloi Doreen
Mohononi, an adult female residing at Mohlabeng village, Limpopo
Province.
[10]
The Third Respondent is the Minister of
Home Affairs, the executive authority of the Department of Home
Affairs who is
inter alia
responsible for the registration of marriages and
whose address for the purpose of these proceedings is that of the
State Attorney,
8
th
Floor Bothongo Heights, 176 Andries Street, Pretoria.
JURISDICTION
[11]
The Third Respondent is
inter
alia
responsible for the registration
of civil marriages and has their address of service for these
proceedings within the jurisdiction
of this Court. Therefore, this
Court has the power and competency to adjudicate this matter.
THE
ISSUE
[12]
The issue to be determined by this Court is whether the First
Respondent’s civil marriage to the Second Respondent is void
ab
initio
.
# THE FACTS
THE FACTS
[13]
On or about the 1
st
of January 1973, the Applicant and the
First Respondent entered into a customary law marriage at Mohlabaneng
Village, in Limpopo
Province.
[14]
Around 2016, the First Respondent occasionally started to live with
the Second Respondent
also in Mohlabaneng Village. When the Applicant
enquired about the First Respondent’s affair with the Second
Respondent,
the First Respondent advised the Applicant not to worry
because he loved her and that he would not leave her. The Applicant
believed
the First Respondent’s assurances of his commitment to
her as he lived with her in the house for most of his time.
[15]
On January 2015, the Applicant’s son,
Peter, asked the Applicant for her identity document for insurance
purposes. The Applicant
instructed Peter to look for the identity
document in her blue bag from her bedroom.
[16]
On arrival in the Applicant’s
bedroom, Peter inadvertently opened his father’s bag and saw a
marriage certificate between
the First Respondent and the Second
Respondent. Consequently, Peter explained the contents of the civil
marriage certificate to
the Applicant, as the Applicant is
illiterate.
[17]
Armed with the knowledge about what civil
marriage entailed; the Applicant questioned the First Respondent
about his civil marriage
to the Second Respondent. The First
Respondent confirmed its existence and thereafter apologized to the
Applicant.
[18]
According to the Applicant, the First
Respondent advised her to keep the civil marriage certificate pending
his communication with
the Second Respondent in an attempt to find a
solution. Such a solution was to be communicated to the Applicant at
the end of February
2015 but nothing has materialized. Instead, when
the Applicant enquires from the First Respondent about the update as
per his promise,
the First Respondent gets irritated.
[19]
The Applicant indicated that she has been
advised about the repercussions of the existence of the civil
marriage between the First
and Second Respondents especially as far
as the estate is concerned between the Applicant and the First
Respondent.
[20]
According
to the Applicant, the marriage between the First Respondent and the
Second Respondent was done without her “knowledge
and
consent”.
[2]
Furthermore,
the Applicant alleges that she has been advised that the First
Respondent cannot enter into a civil marriage during
the subsistence
of a customary marriage.
[21]
In light of the foregoing, the Applicant
approached this Court seeking an order
inter
alia
declaring that the civil marriage
entered into between the First and the Second Respondent is null and
void
ab initio
.
[22]
On 7 March 2022, the Third Respondent
entered a notice of intention to defend but later did not participate
in the proceedings.
This matter was therefore on the unopposed motion
roll.
APPLICABLE
LAW
[23]
The
Customary Marriages Act is the key legal framework that contains
most, if not all, of the answers to the present matter. A marriage
that is valid and existing in terms of customary law at the
commencement of the Customary Marriages Act is recognised as a
marriage.
[3]
[24]
For a
customary marriage to be valid, prospective parties to the customary
marriage must both be over the age of 18 years, and consent
to be
married to each other under customary law.
[4]
Further, the marriage must be negotiated and entered into or
celebrated in accordance with customary law.
[5]
[25]
The
Customary Marriages Act further provides that “
no
spouse in a customary marriage shall be competent to enter into a
marriage under the Marriage Act, 1961 during the subsistence
of such
customary marriage”
.
[6]
[26]
Section
8(1)
of the
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act further
provides
that “…a customary marriage may only be dissolved by a
court of a decree of divorce on the ground of the
irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage”. This requirement has been confirmed
in various judicial precedents.
[7]
[27]
In addition, section 10(1) of the Customary Marriages Act
provides that spouses to a customary marriage “are competent to
contract a marriage with each other under the Marriage Act, 1961 (Act
25 of 1961) if neither of them is a spouse in a subsisting
customary
marriage with any other person”.
[28]
Finally,
the Customary Marriages Act places an obligation on either spouse to
a customary marriage to ensure that their marriage
is registered.
[8]
A
customary marriage that was not registered under any law had to be
registered within 12 months of entry into force of the Customary
Marriages Act or at any further prescribed time as may be provided
for by notice in the
Gazette
.
[9]
APPLICANT’S
SUBMISSIONS
[29]
The Applicant’s submissions were
brief and straight to the point.
[30]
Counsel
inter
alia
argued
that a customary marriage exists between the Applicant and the First
Respondent. To this end, counsel for the Applicant directed
this
court to a letter from the local headman stating that the Applicant
and the First Respondent got married on 1 January 1973
in accordance
with black culture and tradition.
[10]
Further,
the letter from the headman confirms that the First Respondent paid
an amount of R120.00 as lobolo for the Applicant.
[11]
Finally,
both family representatives of the Applicant and the First Respondent
signed the letter.
[31]
Counsel further contended that the
subsequent civil marriage by the First Respondent to the Second
Respondent during the subsistence
of a customary marriage between the
Applicant and the First Respondent is contrary to various provisions
of the Customary Marriages
Act and therefore had to be declared void
ab initio
.
[32]
When asked by this Court as to why the
Applicant did not register the marriage on her own, the counsel’s
response was that
the Applicant lives in deep rural areas and is
illiterate.
[33]
Concerning costs, the Applicant sought no
costs against the Respondents.
EVALUATION
OF EVIDENCE AND SUBMISSIONS
[34]
With regards to the requirements, for the conclusion of the customary
marriage, there is
no doubt that such marriage exists as per the
letter from the headman that confirms payment of lobolo, marriage in
terms of black
culture and tradition, and signatures of family
representatives from the Applicant and the First Respondent’s
side. In addition,
there was proper service of the notice of motion
and the First Respondent and/or Respondents had an opportunity to
dispute the
existence and/or the non-existence thereof of the said
customary marriage. There is therefore no dispute about the validity
of
the customary marriage between the Applicant and the First
Respondent.
[35]
Concerning
the absence of consent from the Applicant about the First
Respondent’s unilateral decision to enter into a subsequent
civil marriage to the Second Respondent, the Constitutional Court
dealt with the matter albeit in a legal dispute regarding a husband’s
decision to enter into a subsequent customary marriage without the
consent of his first wife. It was in
Mayelane
v Ngwenyama and Another
[12]
where the Constitutional Court said:
Second, where subsequent
customary marriages are entered into without the knowledge or consent
of the first wife, she is unable
to consider or protect her own
position. She cannot take an informed decision on her personal life,
her sexual or reproductive
health, or on the possibly adverse
proprietary consequences of a subsequent customary marriage. Any
notion of the first wife’s
equality with her husband would be
completely undermined if he were able to introduce a new marriage
partner to their domestic
life without her consent.
[13]
Third, the right to
dignity includes the right-bearer’s entitlement to make choices
and to take decisions that affect his
or her life – the more
significant the decision, the greater the entitlement. Autonomy and
control over one’s personal
circumstances is a fundamental
aspect of human dignity. However, a wife has no effective autonomy
over her family life if her husband
is entitled to take a second wife
without her consent. Respect for human dignity requires that her
husband be obliged to seek her
consent and that she be entitled to
engage in the cultural and family processes regarding the undertaking
of a second marriage.
Given that marriage is a
highly personal and private contract, it would be a blatant intrusion
on the dignity of one partner to
introduce a new member to that union
without obtaining that partner’s consent (footnoted omitted).
[36]
Even though the aforesaid decision involved a matter that was purely
related to a subsequent
customary marriage, I find it applicable to
the present case where the First Respondent unilaterally decided to
enter into a subsequent
civil marriage to the Second Respondent
without the Applicant’s consent and/or consultation in matters
that fundamentally
affects her dignity, sex life, and personal life.
A mere consultation would have sufficed especially entering into a
civil marriage
with someone who resides in the same village as the
Applicant.
[37]
Section
8(1)
of the
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act further
provides
that “…a customary marriage may only be dissolved by a
court by a decree of divorce on the ground of the
irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage”. This requirement has been confirmed
in various judicial precedents.
[14]
It is common cause that neither the Applicant and/or the First
Respondent has taken this step. This also confirms that the customary
marriage between the Applicant and the First Respondent remains
valid.
[38]
Regarding
why the Applicant did not register her customary marriage, this Court
is persuaded by counsel that the Applicant is an
elder woman who is
illiterate and comes from a rural area. Even though the Customary
Marriages Act places a duty on her to register
the marriage, this is
something that she probably took lightly.
In
any event, section 4(9) of the Customary Marriages Act provides “that
failure to register a customary marriage does
not affect the validity
of that marriage”. In my view, this is also not an issue to
dwell on because it was not disputed
that a valid customary marriage
was concluded. Similarly, in
Thembisile
and Another v Thembisile and Another, the
court
there did not deem it necessary to deal with the issue of whether the
customary marriage was properly registered as it was
not disputed
that the deceased had entered into a valid customary union with the
first applicant.
[15]
[39]
The law, in
particular,
section
4(3)(a) of the Customary Marriages Act affords the Applicant to still
register her customary marriage. I say so because
about three years
ago, the Minister of Home Affairs
extended
the period for registration of customary marriages entered into
before, on, or after the commencement of the Customary
Marriages Act
up to 30 June 2024.
[16]
[40]
Regarding
the First Respondent’s decision to enter into a civil marriage
with the Second Respondent
during the subsistence of a customary marriage to the Applicant,
the
Customary Marriages Act is clear in that “no spouse in a
customary marriage shall be competent to enter into a marriage
under
the Marriage Act, 1961 during the subsistence of such customary
marriage”.
[17]
This
settles the legal issue.
[41]
Furthermore,
the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal per my brother Petse AJA
(as he was then) with members of the court concurring
in
Netshituka
v Netshituka and Others
[18]
cited
the pronouncement in
Thembisile
v Thembisile
[19]
with
approval and said:
“
Bertelsmann J held
that
a civil marriage contracted while the man was a partner in an
existing customary union with another woman was a nullity. It
was not argued in this court that Thembisile was wrongly
decided. It follows that the civil marriage between the deceased
and
the first respondent, having been contracted while the deceased was a
partner in existing customary unions with Tshinakaho
and Diana, was a
nullity
” (Own emphasis added).
[42]
In light of the above, I find myself persuaded and bound by the above
decision. Consequently,
I conclude that the First Respondent’s
civil marriage to the Second Respondent during the existence of his
customary marriage
to the Applicant is null and void
ab initio
.
COSTS
[43]
The Applicant did not ask for any cost order
against the Respondents. Even though the Third Respondent initially
intended to oppose
the application, nothing was done thereafter.
[44]
The matter
proceeded on the unopposed motion roll. The Respondents did not waste
the court’s time. In my view, this Court
is justified to depart
from the general rule in that the costs should follow the
results.
[20]
ORDER
[45]
I, therefore, make
the following order:
(a)
The civil marriage between the First and Second Respondent is
declared void
ab initio
.
(b)
Should the First Respondent wish to remain in the customary marriage
with the Applicant,
he is to attend, together with the Applicant, to
the registration of the customary marriage between them within 60
days of the
service of this order.
(c)
The Third Respondent is authorised to register the customary marriage
on application by
the Applicant, in the absence of the First
Respondent, after the lapse of a period of 60 days from the date of
service of this
order.
(d)
Should the First Respondent no longer wish to remain customarily
married to the Applicant,
he is to exercise the right to institute
divorce proceedings within 90 days of service of this order.
(e)
There is no order as to costs.
M
R PHOOKO AJ
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 04 October 2022.
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv Mpho Victoria Botomane
Instructed
by:
Vele Attorneys c/o Mabote Inc
Counsel
for the Respondent:
n/a
Instructed
by:
State Attorney Pretoria
Date
of Hearing:
10 August 2022
Date
of Judgment:
04 October 2022
[1]
Nkambula
v Linda
1951
(1) SA 377
(A).
[2]
Para
9 Plaintiff’s Particulars of Claims.
[3]
Section
2(1) of the Customary Marriages Act.
[4]
Ibid
3(1)(a)
(i) and (ii).
[5]
Ibid
section
3(1)(b).
[6]
Ibid
section 3(2).
## [7]Monyepao
v Ledwaba and Others(1368/18)
[2020] ZASCA 54 (27 May 2020) para 18.
[7]
Monyepao
v Ledwaba and Others
(1368/18)
[2020] ZASCA 54 (27 May 2020) para 18.
[8]
Supra
fn
2, section 4(1).
[9]
Supra
fn
2, section 4(3)(a).
[10]
Applicant’s
Founding Affidavit 001-18.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
[13]
Paras
72-74.
## [14]See
for example;Monyepao
v Ledwaba and Others(1368/18)
[2020] ZASCA 54 (27 May 2020) para 18.
[14]
See
for example;
Monyepao
v Ledwaba and Others
(1368/18)
[2020] ZASCA 54 (27 May 2020) para 18.
[15]
2002
(2) SA 209 (T).
[16]
Government
Notice No.1045 of 2019 (GN1045
GG
42622/8-8-2019).
[17]
Supra fn 2, section 3(2).
## [18]2011
(5) SA 453 (SCA) at para 15.
[18]
2011
(5) SA 453 (SCA) at para 15.
[19]
2002
(2) SA 209(T).
[20]
President
of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Gauteng Lions Rugby
Union & Another
2002
(2) SA 64
(CC) at para 15.
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