Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 778South Africa
Nelson Mandela Bay Business Chambers NPC and Another v National Energy Regulator and Others (63393/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 778 (20 October 2022)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Nelson Mandela Bay Business Chambers NPC and Another v National Energy Regulator and Others (63393/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 778 (20 October 2022)
Nelson Mandela Bay Business Chambers NPC and Another v National Energy Regulator and Others (63393/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 778 (20 October 2022)
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sino date 20 October 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case
Number
: 63393/2021
REPORTABLE:
YES
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
DATE:
20 OCTOBER 2022
In
the matter between:
NELSON
MANDELA BAY BUSINESS CHAMBBERS
NPC
FIRST
APPLICANT
THE
PIETERMARITZBURG & MIDLANDS
CHAMBER
OF BUSINESS NPC
SECOND
APPLICANT
and
THE
NATIONAL ENERGY REGULATOR
FIRST
RESPONDENT
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ASSOCIATION
SECOND
RESPONDENT
ESKOM
HOLDINGS SOC LIMITED
THIRD
RESPONDENT
PIETERMARITZBURG
& MIDLANDS CHAMBER
OF
BUSINESS
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
And
the further Municipalities listed in Annexure A to the notice of
motion, as the Fifth to further Respondents.
JUDGMENT
KUBUSHI
J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This case concerns the fundamental principles for electricity price
regulation in
South Africa, as set out in the Electricity Regulation
Act (“the ERA”).
[1]
The crux is whether the method used by the First Respondent, the
National Energy Regulator (“NERSA”), for the approval
of
municipal electricity tariffs, is unlawful and invalid. The method
complained of, relates in particular, to one of NERSA’s
regulatory functions of approving electricity tariffs for
municipalities licensed by NERSA, to operate electricity reticulation
and supply undertakings (“the municipalities”). The
method is referred to in the papers as the Guideline and Benchmarking
Method (“the Method or Methodology”).
[2]
In these proceedings, the First Applicant, and the Second Applicant,
who for convenience,
are referred to herein, collectively, as the
Applicants, applied for two substantive orders.
[3]
In the first place, the Applicants sought an order, contained in
Prayer 2 of the Notice
of Motion, to declare unlawful and invalid,
the Guideline and Benchmarking Method, used by NERSA, when approving
municipal electricity
tariffs, as set out in the record of decision
issued by NERSA and entitled ‘Determination of the Municipal
Tariff Guideline
and Revision of Municipal Tariff Benchmarks for the
2021/2022 financial year’ (Annexure FA1 to the Applicants’
founding
affidavit) and explained in the written reasons therefore
(Annexure FA2 to that affidavit).
[4]
In addition, the Applicants, sought an order as stated in Prayer 3 of
the Notice of
Motion, to prohibit NERSA from applying the said
Method, when considering and approving municipal electricity tariffs
for the 2022/2023
municipal financial year. As will appear more fully
hereunder, the Applicants were, at the commencement of the hearing,
granted
an amendment of this prayer. The upshot of the amendment was
for the interdict prohibiting NERSA from applying the Method and for
the interdict to be with effect from 2023/2024 municipal financial
year, instead of prohibiting NERSA from applying the Method
during
the 2022/2023 municipal financial year, as initially applied for.
[5]
In essence, the Applicants are, in these proceedings challenging the
lawfulness of
the Methodology, used by NERSA when approving annual
increases in municipal electricity tariffs. The Applicants submit
that the
Method is unlawful for the reason that it is inconsistent
with the principles prescribed for electricity tariffs in section
15(1)
of the ERA.
[6]
This application is supported by the Third Respondent, ESKOM Holdings
Soc Limited
(“ESKOM”), and it is opposed by NERSA and the
46
th
Respondent, the City of Johannesburg through its electricity utility,
City Power. City Power, is the energy services company wholly
owned
by the City of Johannesburg and tasked with the distribution of a
reliable electricity supply to the residents of the City
of
Johannesburg. The two entities are referred to collectively in this
judgment as City Power. For ease of reference, NERSA and
City Power
shall be referred to herein, collectively, as the Respondents and
individually as NERSA or City Power.
[7]
ESKOM agrees with the Applicants that the Guideline and Benchmarking
Method is unlawful
and also contends that it is irrational, hence its
support of the relief sought by the Applicants in these proceedings.
[8]
NERSA and City Power have, in addition, raised numerous technical
points in opposition
to the application, as well as, a number of
defences on the merits, on the ground that this application is
incompetent. They contend
in the main that the Methodology used by
NERSA is not unlawful and does not violate the provisions of section
15(1) of the ERA.
In that regard, they seek the dismissal of the
Applicants’ application, as supported by ESKOM.
THE
PARTIES
[9]
The Applicants, are not for profit Business Chambers. The Applicants,
have collectively,
approximately 1 200 members, who are carrying
on businesses in the areas of Nelson Mandela Bay, Pietermaritzburg
and KwaZulu-Natal
Midlands. Most of these businesses are
energy-intensive businesses for which electricity costs are a major
component. These businesses
operate within the areas supplied
electricity by the municipalities.
[10]
The Applicants have instituted these proceedings as
per
the
mandate of their members in order to protect their members’
interest, as well as in the public interest. The Applicants
submit in
their papers that there are millions of municipal electricity
consumers in South Africa, most of whom do not have the
means and
capability to bring proceedings challenging the lawfulness of the
methodology used by NERSA, when approving annual increases
in
municipal electricity tariffs, hence the Applicants’ stance to
act in the public interest herein.
[11]
NERSA, on the other hand, is a regulatory authority established in
terms of section 3 of the
National Energy Regulator Act,
[2]
to, amongst others, regulate electricity in accordance with the
provisions of the ERA. Its regulatory functions and duties as
prescribed and described in various pieces of legislation, include,
amongst others, the oversight and enforcement of the regulation
of
the generation, transmission, distribution, importation, exportation
and trading in electricity; and issuing of licences for
the lawful
conduct of these activities. These proceedings involve the method
used by NERSA in one of its regulatory functions,
that of approving
electricity tariffs for municipalities.
[12]
The Second to Fourth Respondents are cited in these papers because of
any interest they may have
in these proceedings. No specific relief
is sought against them, (save for costs if any one of them may
unsuccessfully oppose these
proceedings). However, as earlier
indicated, ESKOM has entered the fray in support of the Applicants.
[13]
The Fifth and further Respondents are all municipalities in South
Africa that operate electricity
reticulation and supply undertakings,
and are licensed by NERSA, to do so. The Applicants do not seek any
relief against the respondent
municipalities (save for costs against
any municipality that unsuccessfully opposes these proceedings). They
are merely cited as
respondents because of the interest they have in
these proceedings.
[14]
Except for City of Johannesburg, all the other municipalities are not
taking part in these proceedings,
some of them have filed notices to
abide the decision of the Court.
BACKGROUND
FACTS
[15]
The ERA, regulates the functions of NERSA in relation to the approval
of electricity tariffs,
including and not limited to municipal
electricity tariffs.
[16]
It, also, regulates the approval by NERSA of ESKOM's electricity
tariffs, both the bulk tariff
that it charges to municipalities, as
well as, the retail tariff that it charges to consumers in those
areas that are not supplied
by municipalities but by ESKOM.
Some of the supply by ESKOM is obviously also to bulk users of
electricity, and that too
is regulated.
[17]
All the municipalities that reticulate electricity have to apply
annually, to NERSA for its approval,
to charge electricity tariffs.
In order to facilitate the application process, NERSA has developed a
method, the Guideline and
Benchmarking Method, which it applies when
considering the applications. It is this Method that the Applicants
are challenging
in these proceedings, contending that the Method
violates the provisions of section 15(1) of the ERA. The Applicants
allege in
their papers that section 15(1) of the ERA requires NERSA
to use a method that is cost reflective which they refer to as a cost
of supply method (“the COS”).
[18]
In accordance with section 15(2) of the ERA, licensees are only
permitted to charge their customers
the tariffs which NERSA has
approved as part of their licensing conditions. So
municipalities are limited when it comes to
tariffs, to charging the
ones that NERSA has approved. NERSA approved tariffs are then taken
to Council so that they may be imposed.
PRELIMINARY
ISSUES
[19]
At the commencement of the hearing of this application, there were
preliminary issues that required
determination before the merits are
dealt with. The preliminary issues consisted of interlocutory
applications instituted by the
Applicants, and the special defences
raised by the Respondents. The preliminary issues are dealt with
hereunder, in turn, starting
first with the interlocutory
applications.
The
Interlocutory Applications Raised by the Applicants:
[20]
The interlocutory applications consisted of
20.1
the Applicants’ notice of application for leave to amend the
original relief;
20.2.
the Applicants’ further application, for the admission of a
short affidavit placing before the Court, NERSA's recently
published
'Determination of the Municipal Tariff Guideline and the Revision of
Municipal Tariff Benchmarks for the 2022/23 financial
year' and its
recently published reasons for that decision; and leave to amend
Prayer 2 of their Notice of Motion to include a
reference to those
documents in the declaratory relief they are seeking; and
20.3.
the Applicants’ contingent application for a referral of
limited issues to oral evidence.
[21]
The interlocutory applications are dealt with hereunder, in turn.
The
Application for the Amendment of Prayer 3 of the Notice of Motion.
[22]
In response to the concerns raised by the Respondents, pertaining to
the practical timing related
problems that would arise if the
interdictory relief was granted starting from 1 July 2022, the
Applicants, together with their
heads of argument, filed a Notice of
Application to amend the interdictory relief in Prayer 3 of the
Notice of Motion, which application
was not opposed by the
Respondents and was, thus, accordingly granted.
[23]
The effect of the granted amendment was that, should the Method be
found to be unlawful, NERSA
would be prohibited from, ordinarily,
applying the Method when considering municipal electricity tariffs,
with effect from the
2023/2024 municipal financial year, that is,
from 1 July 2023. In essence, should the Methodology be found to be
unlawful, NERSA
would no longer have to use that Method when
considering the approval of municipal electricity tariffs.
The
Application for the Admission of the Supplementary Affidavit
[24]
In addition, the Applicants’ filed a further application, for
the admission of a short
affidavit placing before the Court, NERSA's
recently published 'Determination of the Municipal Tariff Guideline
and the Revision
of Municipal Tariff Benchmarks for the 2022/23
financial year' and its recently published reasons for that decision;
and leave
to amend the Notice of Motion to include a reference of the
documents in the declaratory relief they sought in Prayer 2 of the
Notice of Motion.
[25]
Due to some unforeseen logistical challenges that might have
occasioned the postponement of the
main application, the Applicants
ended up not proceeding with this application, and opted, instead, to
deal with the matter on
the papers as they stood after the heads of
argument were filed.
The
Conditional Application for a Referral of the Matter to Oral Evidence
[26]
Regarding one of the issues for determination by this Court, that is,
whether the Method followed
by NERSA when it approves municipal
electricity tariffs complies with the legal requirements, it is the
Applicants' primary submission
that this issue can be decided in
their favour on the papers. The submission is that the Court can
find, on the papers, that NERSA's
Method does not comply with the
applicable legal requirements, whilst it is the Respondents’
submission that this issue cannot
be decided on the papers as they
stand, thus, raising a dispute of fact.
[27]
Consequently, together with their reply to NERSA's answering
affidavit, the Applicants delivered
a contingent application for
referral to oral evidence of limited factual issues relevant to
NERSA's Method. The application was
said to be contingent because it
was only if the Court would find that the Applicants were not
entitled to relief on the papers,
that the Applicants sought a
referral to oral evidence.
[28]
This Court opts not to deal with this point at this stage of the
proceedings, as its determination,
will be covered when this Court
considers the issue of whether the Methodology
adopted by NERSA, to
use when it approves municipal electricity tariffs, complies with the
legal requirements of the ERA, is considered.
[29]
This Court will then, deal next with the special defences raised by
the Respondents.
The
Special Defences Raised by the Respondents
[30]
The Respondents, in opposing the Applicants’ and ESKOM’s
case, have raised six special
defences, which this Court shall deal
with first, before determining the merits of the application, as they
may be dispositive
of the matter. The said special defences are:
30.1.
Firstly, NERSA in its heads of argument challenged the Applicants’
standing to institute these proceedings.
30.2.
Secondly, NERSA and City Power took issue with the legal nature of
the Method NERSA uses when considering and approving municipal
electricity tariffs, and the implications thereof.
30.3.
The third special defence raised by NERSA is that this Court is not
entitled to exercise the discretion conferred on it by
section
21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act,
[3]
against engaging with the issue of the validity of the Method, as it
is hypothetical and abstract.
30.4.
The fourth special defence is City Power’s contention that the
principle of the separation of powers militates against
the granting
of the substantive relief sought by the Applicants.
30.5.
The fifth special defence is raised by both NERSA and City Power,
that the interdict the Applicants seek should not be granted
because
it will not be practically possible for NERSA and most municipalities
to comply with it.
30.5.
The Last special defence is that of urgency raised by NERSA and City
Power. It is NERSA and City Power’s contention
that the present
matter is not urgent.
[31]
The following special defences were settled at the commencement of
the hearing of the application,
and this Court will, therefore, not
deal with same in this judgment:
31.1.
The special defence on standing of the Applicants, raised by NERSA,
was summarily abandoned.
31.2.
The special defence raised by NERSA and City Power about the
impracticality of NERSA and most municipalities to comply with
the
interdictory relief requested in Prayer 3 of the Notice of Motion,
was settled by the amendment of Prayer 3 of the Notice of
Motion. As
a result, NERSA and the municipal licensees will have ample time
within which to comply with the order, if granted by
the Court.
31.3.
The issue of urgency was, in this Court’s view, settled when
the Deputy Judge
President (“the DJP”), having considered the matter and
all prevailing circumstances, directed that
the matter be enrolled
for hearing on the special roll. In so doing, it was safe for this
Court to conclude that the DJP made a
decision that the matter was
urgent and required to be specially and urgently enrolled for
hearing.
[32]
Before this Court deals with the remaining special defences, it is
imperative that it first deals
with the preliminary points raised in
oral argument by NERSA, which City Power had, actually, raised in its
answering affidavit,
in response to the effect occasioned by the
Applicants’ abandonment of their application for leave to file
a supplementary
affidavit as stated in paragraph [25] of this
judgment and the consequent abandonment to amend Prayer 2 of the
Notice of Motion;
as well as, the amendment of Prayer 3 of the Notice
of Motion.
[33]
The submission made by NERSA is
that
the relief which the Applicants
are seeking in these proceedings have been overtaken by serious
material events. Therefore, NERSA
argues that the application and the
prayers as they are currently structured and formulated, are not
capable of being
enforced, and that, this Court
cannot make an order pertaining to a relief which has since been
overtaken by material events.
[34]
The Court will, sequentially, deal with the said preliminary points
hereunder.
The
Relief Sought in Prayer 2 of the Notice of Motion
[35]
The relief sought in Prayer 2 of the Notice of Motion reads as
follows:
“
2.
Declaring unlawful and invalid the guideline and benchmarking method
for the approval of municipal electricity
tariffs, as set out in the
record of decision issued by the First Respondent ('NERSA') and
entitled 'Determination of the Municipal
Tariff Guideline and the
Revision of Municipal Tariff Benchmarks for the 2021/2022 financial
year (Annexure FA 1 to the Applicants'
founding affidavit) and
explained in the written reasons therefor (Annexure FA 2 to that
affidavit) ('the Guideline and Benchmarking
Method').”
[36]
NERSA’s argument is that the Applicants sought the relief
declaring unlawful
the Method for
approval of municipal electricity tariff as set out in the record of
decision issued
by
NERSA, and entitled determination
of the municipal tariff guideline and the revision of municipal
tariff be
nchmark,
importantly for 2021/2022 financial year; and that
what
constitutes that decision and its
reasons
is
contained
in A
nnexure FA1 and
Annexure
FA2.
[37]
Furthermore, NERSA argues that
A
nnexures
FA1
and
FA2
,
which were applicable during the 2021/2022 municipal financial year
have been overtaken by material ev
ents
and are no longer in existe
nce
,
legally and/or factually
,
in that NERSA has now issued a new decision and reasons thereto for
the 2022/2023 municipal financial year
.
In addition
, as such,
this
C
ourt
cannot declare unlawful, a non-existing decision and/or methodology
and/or guideline which had since been overtaken by the
introduction
by NERSA of the new decision and reasons
.
In support of this argument by NERSA, City Power contends that the
Municipal Tariff Guideline increases and Benchmark Tariffs
for the
financial year 2021/2022, were designated for the purpose of
determining a municipal tariff increase for a particular financial
year and are not meant to be used again for any other financial year.
[38]
In response to this argument, the Applicants deny that this Court
cannot grant them the remedy
they seek in these proceedings. This,
they contend, is so because what they are challenging in these
proceedings is the Methodology
used by NERSA when determining the
municipal electricity tariffs and not the decision NERSA takes when
determining the electricity
tariffs. They contend, therefore, that
even if the decision contained in Annexure FA1 and the reasons
thereto contained in Annexure
FA2, are no longer in existence because
NERSA has issued a new decision and the reasons thereto for the
period 2022/2023 financial
year, the Method that NERSA applied during
the 2021/2022 financial year was made applicable in the period
2022/2023 financial period.
[39]
In support of this submission, the Applicants referred to the
contents of the aforesaid Annexures.
Paragraph 5.1 of Annexure FA1
and paragraph 12.1 of Annexure FA2, which states that “
This
approach will be applicable for 22/23 tariffs
”
.
It follows, therefore, that the approach and/or method that was
adopted by NERSA in the 2021/2022 financial year was perpetuated
to
apply in the 2022/2023 financial year, which is the current financial
year.
[40]
Therefore, whether Annexures FA1 and FA2, are no longer in existence,
makes no difference to
the Applicants’ case. The essence of the
present proceedings, as also conceded by NERSA in its papers, is to
target the underlying
methodology: specifically, the Method NERSA
uses to consider and approve municipal tariffs. The Method that was
adopted by NERSA
in the 2021/2022 financial year, as earlier
indicated, was extended to apply in the 2022/2023 financial year.
[41]
The result is that, the contention by NERSA that the annexures have
been overtaken, legally and
factually, by material events, has no
adverse bearing on the Applicants’ case.
[42]
Furthermore, this Court is inclined to agree with the Applicants’
proposition that there
are strong public interest considerations in
favour of this Court determining the lawfulness or otherwise of the
Method, in question.
The Applicants’ arguments are valid,
in this regard, that it is not disputed that NERSA has applied this
method for over
a decade, and that the resulting tariffs have been
the subject of several court challenges. And, for as long as the
lawfulness
of the Method remains unresolved, municipal tariff
approvals will remain contentious. It is in the interests of all
those affected
that this issue be determined. Those affected include
NERSA; the municipalities which reticulate electricity; municipal
customers
generally; and high-energy user customers specifically (who
complain - as the Applicants' members do - that they bear the
financial
brunt of the tariffs that result from the Method they
consider unlawful).
[43]
NERSA, itself, appears to be in agreement with the need to move to a
COS-based approach, but
it has, as yet, not set out any concrete plan
to replace the guideline and benchmarking approach with a COS-based
approach or any
other method which it considers appropriate in the
circumstances. The indications are it will continue using the
guideline and
benchmarking approach.
[44]
Consequently, it is this Court’s view that a challenge to the
Method is competent, the
present matter is an appropriate case for
the Court to grant or refuse on its merits the declaratory relief
sought by the Applicants
and to lay the matter to rest once and for
all.
The
Relief Sought in Prayer 3 of the Notice of Motion
[45]
In relation to the effect occasioned by the amendment of Prayer 3 of
the Notice of Motion, NERSA’s
proposition is that the interdict
sought, has been overtaken by events or that the Method for the
2023/2024 municipal financial
year had not been determined when the
application was heard. This proposition is, in this Court’s
view, without merit.
[46]
NERSA took the amendment simply as the replacement in Prayer 3 of the
2022/2023 municipal financial
year with the 2023/2024 municipal
financial year. By simply stating it like that, NERSA was in
substance correct, however, the
effect of the amendment is not as
simple as that. When the two prayers are compared, it can easily and
clearly, be determined that
the amendment was not the replacement of
one Municipal financial year with another.
[47]
The initial prayer was couched as follows:
“
PLEASE
TAKE NOTICE that the Applicants intend applying to this Honourable
Court, on a date and at a time to be arranged with the
Judge
President, or Deputy Judge President or Registrar of this Honourable
Court, for orders in the following terms, namely orders…
3.
Prohibiting Nersa from applying the guideline and benchmarking method
when considering and
approving municipal electricity tariffs for the
2022/2023 municipal financial year.”
[48]
The amended prayer that was granted, on the other hand, reads as
follows:
“
TAKE
NOTICE that the Applicants intend, at the hearing of this application
on 9 and 10 June 2022, applying to amend their notice
of motion by
replacing paragraph 3 thereof with the following:
'Prohibiting
Nersa from applying the guideline and benchmarking method when
considering and approving municipal electricity tariffs,
such
interdict to take effect in respect of municipal electricity tariffs
to be charged by municipalities during the 2023/2024
municipal
financial year commencing 1 July 2023.’”
[49]
There is, thus, a fundamental difference between the two prayers. The
objective of the interdict
in the amended Prayer 3 is to prohibit
NERSA from applying the Method, when considering and approving
municipal electricity tariffs,
in general, starting from the
2023/2024 municipal financial year. It is not meant to proscribe the
application of the Method only
when considering and approving
municipal electricity tariffs during the 2023/2024 municipal
financial year, as the initial Prayer
3 sought to do. The difference
in the two prayers is manifest, and is not just the replacement of
one municipal financial year
with another, as NERSA wants to argue.
[50]
The further argument by NERSA that there is no evidence on record to
substantiate the relief
sought by the Applicant because of the
amended prayer, is without merit.
[51]
The Applicants, in their replying affidavit to NERSA’s
answering affidavit proposes that
if the Method is indeed unlawful,
then they are entitled to relief preventing NERSA from continuing to
apply that Method. This
proposition by the Applicant does not apply
to any specific period of time, and does, in that sense, encompasses
the 2023/2024
municipal financial year period. Should it be found
that the Method is indeed unlawful, with the amendment of Prayer 3
having been
granted, an interdict, worded as such, is the only
ordinary and obvious way of the Court providing a sensible remedy for
the Applicants.
The effect of the interdict as phrased in the amended
Prayer 3, would be to prevent NERSA from continuing to carry out its
legislative
mandate unlawfully.
[52]
Besides, there is ample evidence on record that indicates that NERSA
will continue to use this
Method going forward. As an example, it is
stated in NERSA’s Determination of the Municipal Tariff
Guideline and the Revision
of Municipal Tariff Benchmarks for the
2021/22 financial year: Reasons for Decision (RFD), that is, Annexure
FA2, that –
“
5.4.
This meant that an approach was needed that would somehow translate
municipalities' cost requirements to tariffs. The
Energy Regulator,
in addressing the above predicament recommends a Cost of Supply (COS)
approach in the long term. The guideline
increase and benchmarks be
used in the interim.”
[53]
Such evidence is enough to support the Applicants’ contention
that NERSA will continue
to use the Method even beyond the 2023/2024
financial year period if nothing is done to stop it.
[54]
The remaining special defences are dealt with hereunder,
consecutively.
The
Legal Nature of the Guideline and Benchmarking Method and the
Implications thereof.
[55]
Based on different reasons, the Respondents contend that the
Applicants should have approached
the Court in terms of the
provisions of section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act (“PAJA”),
[4]
and not sought a declaratory or interdictory remedy, as they did in
these proceedings; and that, having not done so, the Applicants’
claim is incompetent and ought to be dismissed.
[56]
City Power, in its papers and in argument before this Court, regards
the determination of the
municipal tariff guideline and the revision
of municipal tariff benchmarks as the decision of NERSA, which the
Applicants should
have taken on review in terms of PAJA. City Power
bases its contention that the decision that should be at issue is the
determination
of the municipal tariff guideline, on the ground that
PAJA regards a determination as a decision.
[5]
City Power, contends, also, that a methodology cannot be attacked
separate from its decision.
[57]
According to City Power, the determination of the municipal tariff
guideline, is "administrative
action" as contemplated by
Section 1 of the PAJA,
[6]
in that it is a decision by an organ of state performing a public
function in terms of the empowering provisions of the ERA read
together with the National Energy Regulator Act;
[7]
and has a direct external legal effect in that it affects
municipalities and obviously ultimately affects the municipalities’
consumers of electricity.
[58]
In support of its stance, that the Applicants in this matter are
dealing with administrative
action which is reviewable in terms of
PAJA, City Power relied on the Constitutional Court judgment in
National
Energy Regulator of South Africa and Another v PG Group (Pty) Ltd and
Others,
[8]
wherein that Court held in the separate concurrence of Jafta J,
that if PAJA is applicable, the applicants are bound to rely
on the
grounds listed in section 6 of PAJA and not go the legality route.
Accordingly, so City Power argues, even in this matter
PAJA is
applicable and the Applicants ought to have approached Court in terms
thereof. Having failed to do so, renders their claim
incompetent.
[59]
Unlike City Power, NERSA agrees with the Applicants that the
provisions of PAJA finds no application
in these proceedings. NERSA
concedes as well that what the Applicants are challenging is the
underlying methodology adopted by
NERSA when determining the
municipal electricity tariff. NERSA, however, differs with the
Applicants, in relation to the subject
matter of what ought to be
before the Court for determination. NERSA’s approach is that
what the Applicants ought to have
brought to Court is a decision
which is reviewable under PAJA, and in this instance, the tariff
approval decision would have been
the appropriate decision to bring
to Court. Thus, even though NERSA concedes that what the Applicants
are challenging in these
proceedings is the underlying Methodology,
its case is, however, that the Applicants have brought a wrong
challenge to Court.
[60]
NERSA’s thesis, in this regard, is founded on two grounds. The
first ground is that, the
Methodology it uses when considering and
approving the municipal electricity tariffs, is not a final step in
the municipal electricity
tariff determination process, but, only one
of the multiple preparatory steps towards assessing and determining a
municipal electricity
tariff. Accordingly, so NERSA submits, it
cannot be decided or determined with certainty, without first
implementing the
Method, together with other pieces of documents
constituting the regulatory framework, that the use of the Method
will offend the
provisions of the ERA.
[61]
Based on this argument, NERSA contends, further, that these
proceedings are in fact, premature.
The Applicants, according to
NERSA, ought to have waited for NERSA to apply the Method to approve
a particular municipality's tariffs
and then taken that tariff
approval decision, which is common cause would be an administrative
action, on review under PAJA. It
is on these contestations that NERSA
opines that the Applicants’ application is incompetent.
[62]
In support of its argument that the Applicants should have taken a
tariff approval decision on
review under PAJA, NERSA relied on the
Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in
PG
Group & others v NERSA
,
[9]
wherein that Court when dealing with the methodology (the Maximum
Price Methodology) and the decision to fix the price (the Maximum
Price Decision) in the Gas Act, made the following remarks:
"...administrative
action in general terms involves the conduct of the bureaucracy
having 'direct and immediate consequences
for individuals or groups
of individuals'. NERSA's determination of the methodology to be used
did not have consequences of that
nature. It could only have had such
an impact once it had determined what Sasol Gas's maximum prices
should be. Until then, it
did not bind any party and, in my view, did
not constitute administrative action.”
[63]
NERSA’s second ground in this regard is that the use of the
methodology does not have an
external effect, and for this reason it
does not meet the requirements of an administrative action as set out
in section 1 of PAJA.
[64]
The aforementioned allegations of the Respondents are all denied by
the Applicants. Their submission
is that they did not approach this
Court seeking a review remedy in accordance with PAJA. They contend
that they are in these proceedings,
not dealing with a decision taken
by NERSA. The allegation is that they are before this Court
challenging the Method adopted by
NERSA, which NERSA uses when
considering and approving municipal electricity tariffs. In essence,
they say what they are contending
for in these proceedings, is not
the unlawfulness of a decision taken by NERSA, but the unlawfulness
of a guide or method NERSA
uses when determining municipal
electricity tariffs.
[65]
And, to the extent that it might be said that what is before the
Court is a decision taken by
NERSA, as argued by City Power, the
Applicants contend that such a decision, is not reviewable in terms
of PAJA, in that it is
not a decision taken in terms of any
legislation, nor does it have a direct external legal effect, to
qualify as an administrative
action.
[66]
For the reasons that follow hereunder, it is this Court’s view
that the decision contended
for by City Power, in these proceedings,
is not a decision reviewable under PAJA on the basis of the grounds
raised by the Applicants.
The said grounds shall be dealt with
hereunder,
ad seriatim
.
[67]
The starting point, as it has been correctly argued, is section 1(1)
of PAJA, more specifically,
the relevant definition of administrative
action, which provides that an administrative action means any
decision taken by an organ
of state when, exercising a public power
or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, and
which adversely affects
the rights of any person, and has a direct
external legal effect.
[68]
It follows, therefore, that, in this matter, the determination of the
Method, which City Power
contends is a decision, to be regarded as an
administrative action, NERSA, as an organ of state, must have
determined the Method
whilst exercising a public power or performing
a public function in terms of the ERA. The decision must have
adversely affected
the rights of any person, and had a direct
external legal effect.
[69]
It is common cause that NERSA as an organ of state makes decisions in
the exercise of public
power or in the performance of public
functions. The question that arises at this point, is whether the
determination of the Method
was taken whilst exercising public power
or performing a public function in terms of any legislation and
whether such a determination
had a direct external legal effect.
Was
the Decision taken in terms of any legislation?
[70]
As already stated, the ERA regulates the functions of NERSA in
relation to the approval of municipal
electricity tariffs. Therefore,
in this matter it must be determined whether the determination of the
Method was taken in terms
of the ERA.
[71]
It has already been established during argument before this Court
that sections 14(1)(e)
[10]
and 35(1)
[11]
of the ERA are
the legislative provisions in terms of which NERSA may have actually
made the Guideline and Benchmarking Methodology.
NERSA
could have done so in terms of section 14(1)(e) of the ERA by
embodying the Guideline and Benchmarking Method as a licence
condition in the licences of the municipal licensees, or in terms of
section 35(1) of the ERA by publication of the Guideline and
Benchmarking Method in the
Gazette.
[72]
It is not in dispute that the Guideline and Benchmarking Method as
contained in Annexures FA1
and FA2 is not a licence condition of any
of the licences of the municipal licensees. In other words, for the
Methodology to be
considered a licence condition, it should have been
embodied in the licences of all the municipal licensees.
[73]
A point was taken, orally, on behalf of the Applicants that this
could have been a good point
to take as an additional basis upon
which NERSA’s Guideline and Benchmarking Method may be found to
be unlawful and invalid,
if it was challenged on that ground in the
founding papers. Counsel for the Applicants was quick to concede,
correctly so, that
the Applicants do not advance such an argument.
[74]
Therefore, section 14(1)(e) of the ERA, which provides that a
Regulator may make any licence
subject to conditions relating to the
methodology to be used in the determination of rates and tariffs
which must be imposed by
licensees, is not the authority for what
NERSA did when determining the Guideline and Benchmarking
Methodology, because it did
not embody the methodology as a licence
condition in the licences of municipal licensees. It, thus, leaves
section 35(1) of the
ERA as the alternative legislative provision in
terms of which NERSA may actually have made the Guideline and
Benchmarking Method.
[75]
City Power’s contention is that the Guideline and Benchmarking
Method having been publicised
in the
Gazette
, as required by
section 35(1) of the ERA, qualified to have been made under a
legislative provision. That is, publication in the
Gazette
qualified the Guideline and Benchmarking Method as something which
was done by an organ of state in terms of legislation. In that
sense,
the ‘in terms of legislation’ requirement would then have
been satisfied.
[76]
The Applicants in their oral argument, whilst conceding that section
35(1) of the ERA is an empowering
provision under which a guideline
could be made by publication in the
Gazette
, they,
simultaneously, submitted that it does not alter the fact that being
a guideline and not a set of rules, the methodology
is not a PAJA
administrative action. They contended, further, that even if it can
be found that the ‘in terms of legislation’
requirement
of the definition of administration action has been satisfied, what
would still not be satisfied would be, the component
that ‘it
would have to be something which has direct external legal effect’.
[77]
It is the view of this Court that the words 'by notice in the
Gazette'
qualify both the making of guidelines and the making
of rules for publication and not just the making of rules. When the
clause
is read literally, it is this Court’s view that the
comma in the last part of that clause incorporates both the making of
guidelines and rules for publication. The result of which is that the
‘in terms of legislation’ component of the definition
of
administration action is satisfied.
[78]
However, this is not the end of the matter, the Applicants have
raised two further issues, which
should be dealt with, namely the
satisfaction of the ‘direct external legal effect’
component of the definition of
administration of action; and the
question whether the guideline made in terms of legislation is an
administrative action subject
to PAJA or not.
Does
the decision have a direct external effect?
[79]
The second ground the Applicants rely on that City Power’s
decision is not reviewable in
terms of PAJA, is that the
determination of the methodology contended for by City Power does not
have a direct external legal effect,
but an indirect external legal
effect.
[80]
This Court agrees with the submissions of the Applicants that
confirms that the decision contended
for by City Power does not have
direct external legal effect. It is indirect, because the determined
guideline is only a policy
which relates to the exercise of the
statutory authority conferred on NERSA, under section 15(1) of the
ERA, to consider and determine
conditions relating to the setting or
approval of prices, and tariffs and the regulation of revenues.
When the policy is
applied in the taking of that decision, it has an
indirect external effect in that it will eventually affect other
people outside
of NERSA and the municipalities. The effect of the
determination of a policy or guideline does not have direct and
immediate consequences
for individuals or group of individuals,
outside of NERSA and the municipalities, it would have such impact
once NERSA applies
the guideline and determines a municipal tariff
that is to be imposed by the municipalities.
[81]
City Power’s contention that the Applicants’ by being in
court have been adversely
affected by the determination of the
guideline, and as such shows the direct external legal effect of such
determination, is meritless.
The Applicants as they have continually
stated are not before the Court because they have been adversely
affected by the determination
by NERSA of the Guideline and
Benchmarking Method. They say they are before this Court because the
Guideline and Benchmarking Method
is unlawful and should be declared
invalid and would eventually, if applied adversely affect them. The
Guideline, as it has been
stated will only affect them if it is
applied by NERSA in the determination of a municipal electricity
tariff. However, at the
moment they have still not been affected.
What will affect the Applicants directly, is the approval by NERSA of
the municipal electricity
tariff.
[82]
The reliance by City Power in the case of
Economic
Freedom Fighters Students Command v Minister of Higher Education,
Science and Technology and Others
,
[12]
as support that the determination of the Methodology, in the matter
before this Court, has the potential of an external legal effect,
is
not apposite in the circumstances of this matter. The Court in that
judgment when holding that ‘
it
is enough that the action has capacity to affect legal rights
’,
it was on the basis that such rights would directly impact the
students who it was meant to affect. In that case, the decision
taken
by the Minister, although it did not immediately affect the students,
it had the potential or capacity to affect them in
future, and it
would affect them directly. This is not the same as in this matter.
The determination of the guideline in this matter
would not in any
way directly affect any other individuals outside of NERSA and the
municipalities. The potentiality and/or capacity
in this matter will
only be mediated through another decision, namely, the determination
of a municipal electricity tariff.
[83]
The Applicants, in oral argument before this Court, explained it
clearly in their submission
that they are in these proceedings
dealing with a guideline, which is something that does not have
direct external legal effect.
According to the Applicants the
guideline does not have direct external legal effect because it is an
internal policy that guides
municipalities in making their
applications to NERSA for the approval of their tariffs. And,
it also guides NERSA in assessing
the applications made by the
municipalities. It is in other words, NERSA's published policy
as to the manner in which it
will exercise the discretion to approve
municipal tariffs, which is conferred on it by section 15(1)(a) of
the ERA. And, in this
Court’s view the Applicants are correct.
The determination of the Methodology, contended for by City Power,
will also have
a similar effect.
[84]
The guideline because is a policy as explained above, it works
indirectly to achieve the ultimate
outcome. Therefore, it does not
have the direct legal effect which PAJA requires.
Should
the Applicants have taken a Tariff Approval Decision on review under
PAJA?
[85]
NERSA’s submission, as earlier stated, is that the declaratory
order sought by the
Applicants is incompetent based on the
ground that the Methodology cannot be considered an administrative
action in terms of PAJA
for requirement of direct external legal
effect, since it is only a final decision on the tariff that would
have such an effect.
[13]
NERSA argues, consequently, that the Applicants’ application is
premature, and that the Applicants ought to have waited for
NERSA to
take a decision pertaining to an electricity tariff of a specific
municipality and then challenged such decision.
[86]
Additionally, NERSA submits that
a guideline and a
method considered by NERSA do not constitute a decision, but are mere
tools considered amongst other factors when
arriving at a decision
captured in Annexure FA1 read with Annexure FA2. The contention being
that the Applicants ought to have
challenged the entire decision and
to interrogate the reason upon which such a decision is premised.
[87]
Conversely, the Applicants contend that, contrary to NERSA’s
argument in this regard, they
are entitled, under the principle of
legality, to seek a declaratory order of invalidity under the ambit
of section 172(1)(a) of
the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”).
[14]
According to the Applicants, the methodology applied by NERSA when it
approves the municipal electricity tariffs, is a policy or
guideline,
and, as such, it may be attacked on the grounds of unlawfulness and
invalidity in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the
Constitution, on the
basis that such policy or guideline is inconsistent with the
principle of legality and, thus, invalid.
[88]
The question of whether a methodology is an administrative action in
terms of PAJA was left open
by the Constitutional Court in
PG
Group
.
[15]
However, that Court, in its majority judgment, took a view that a
methodology is not law, but rather a guideline.
[16]
Similarly, the Methodology in this matter is a guideline made in
accordance with empowering legislation.
[17]
[89]
In
City
of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties
39 Pty Ltd and Another,
[18]
the Constitutional Court brought a policy within the ambit of section
172(1)(a) of the Constitution, when considering the housing
policy
adopted by the Johannesburg Municipality, by declaring such policy
unconstitutional. It follows, therefore, that a methodology
as a
policy or guideline can be declared unlawful and invalid to the
extent of its unconstitutionality, in terms of section 172(1)(a)
of
the Constitution.
[90]
NERSA in oral argument before this Court argued that
Blue
Moonlighting
was
different from the current challenge of a methodology.
According to NERSA, in that case, a policy which was in a form
of a
Code, was being challenged as it was not in line with the enabling
legislation which is far from a guideline or a methodology
which is
being challenged in these proceedings. The argument by NERSA is not
sustainable. It has been shown that a methodology
or guideline is a
policy. Thus, even though the facts of the two cases in
question might not be the same, of importance is
the principle
enunciated in
Blue
Moonlighting
,
which brought a policy within the purview of section 172(1)(a) of the
Constitution and renders it susceptible to a declaration
of
invalidity.
[91]
ESKOM supports the Applicants’ argument that NERSA’s
complaint, that the Applicants’
claim should not be entertained
due to the reason that there is no challenge to an individual tariff
approval, in these proceedings,
does not get off the ground. The
reason provided by ESKOM in support of this argument, slightly
different from that of the Applicants,
is that NERSA is confusing
issues of the reviewability of a policy or a guideline on the one
hand, and the separate question, of
whether or not the policy or
guideline amounts to administrative action. In reinforcement of its
argument, ESKOM submitted, correctly
so, that whether or not the
guideline is administrative action is neither here nor there, because
in this matter, the guideline,
is exercised pursuant to a statutory
power and hence it is reviewable under the legality principle.
[92]
As argued, correctly so, by ESKOM, there is settled law that emanates
from a long line of cases
which held that any exercise of statutory
power is reviewable under the legality principle. NERSA, in this
matter, derives the
statutory power to make guidelines, from the
provisions of section 35(1) of the ERA, as this Court has also found,
which stipulate
that the regulator (NERSA) may, after consultation
with licensees, municipalities that reticulate electricity and such
other interested
persons as may be necessary, make guidelines and
publish codes of conduct and practice or make rules by notice in the
Gazette
.
[93]
NERSA, in this Court’s view, also failed to appreciate that the
Methodology and the decision
to apply that Methodology, can be
challenged separately, without any dependence on each other.
[94]
The decision in
PG
Group
is instructive in this regard. The Court in that judgment, held
distinctively so, in its majority judgment
per
Khampepe J, that decisions of this nature are two separate decisions
which can be separately challenged. In
PG
Group
[19]
,
the Court expressed itself, as follows:
“
In
any event, even if the Maximum Pricing Methodology did constitute a
reviewable decision in terms of PAJA, it is not the decision
that is
being reviewed and it does not preclude the Maximum Price Decision,
which is an administrative action in terms of PAJA,
from being
reviewed. The implementation of the Maximum Pricing Methodology
in deciding the maximum gas prices was a separate,
substantive
administrative decision, capable of being independently
reviewed. Counsel for the respondents agreed with this
proposition in oral argument. Nevertheless, even where the
Maximum Pricing Methodology was found to be lawful, the substantive
validity alone of the methodology could not validate a decision taken
in terms of it. It must therefore follow that the Maximum
Price
Decision, when implemented, is capable of independent review.
Any other approach would be incorrect.”
[95]
The above quotation lays emphasis on what was previously stated that
the methodology and the
decision to apply that methodology, are two
separate decisions, each of which can be challenged separately,
without any dependence
on the other.
[96]
Importantly, sight should not be lost of the fact that the
application before this Court is for
a declaratory order of
invalidity against the methodology, the Guideline and Benchmarking
Method, that NERSA applies when approving
the municipal electricity
tariffs. This is what is being challenged, not NERSA’s decision
to approve the municipal electricity
tariffs. Thus, it is this
Court’s finding that the correct challenge is before this
Court.
The
Court’s Discretion Conferred in terms of Section 21(1)(c) of
the Superior Courts Act.
[97]
NERSA contends, on this point, that the declaratory remedy sought in
this application, is abstract,
academic or hypothetical. This is so,
according to NERSA, because the municipal tariff guidelines and
benchmark is a preparatory
step towards the final determination of
municipal tariffs and thus not a final step in the municipal tariff
review process. Importantly,
so NERSA argues, no finality has
actually been reached on how municipal tariffs would be assessed and
determined for the year 2022/2023.
As such, NERSA submits that
the Applicants cannot find redress through the application for a
declaratory order because the Applicants
are in effect asking the
court to express an opinion.
[98]
Relying on the provisions of section 21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts
Act, which vests the Court
with discretionary power to grant a
declarator where it would be an appropriate relief, NERSA opines that
since the remedy sought
by the Applicants is abstract, academic and
hypothetical as indicated above, this Court cannot exercise its
discretion in favour
of granting the said remedy. In support of this
contention, NERSA referred to the judgments in
Cordiant
Trading CC v Daimler- Chrysler Financial Services,
[20]
and
Trinity
Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v Investec Bank.
[21]
[99]
To the contrary, the Applicants submit that they claim in this
application, both a declaration
of invalidity under section 172(1)(a)
of the Constitution, as well as, a consequential interdict. They
proceed to state that Courts
have no discretion to refuse to make a
declaration of invalidity once they have found that an exercise of
public power is unlawful,
and as such, this case is not a case where
this Court can be asked to exercise the discretion conferred on it by
section 21(1)(c)
of the Superior Courts Act.
[100]
In accordance with section 21(1)(c) of Superior Courts Act, this
Court has the power
"...in
its discretion, and at the instance of any interested person, to
enquire into and determine any existing, future, or
contingent right
or obligation, notwithstanding that such person cannot claim any
relief consequential upon the determination
".
[101]
The provisions of this section, confers on the Court the discretion
to grant declaratory orders.
[102]
Both the Applicants and NERSA are in agreement, based on different
grounds, that section 21(1)(c) of the Superior
Courts Act, does not
find application in the circumstances of this application. NERSA’s
reason is that this Court cannot
exercise its discretion in terms of
section 21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act to grant the Applicants
the order they seek in
the application because a declaratory order is
a discretionary remedy which can assist in clarifying a legal and
constitutional
obligation in a manner that promotes the Constitution
and its values. This, however, according to NERSA is not the
case in
the remedy sought by the Applicants. The remedy the
Applicants seek, so NERSA contends is abstract, academic or
hypothetical and
will not assist in clarifying a legal and
constitutional obligation in a manner that promotes the Constitution
and its values.
This Court, can therefore, not exercise its
discretionary power as envisaged in section 21(1)(c) of the Superior
Courts Act, to
grant an order the remedy of which is abstract,
academic or hypothetical.
[103]
The Applicants reason, on the other hand, is that the relief they are
claiming for in this application, is in
the form of a prohibitory
interdict which is consequential upon the declaration of invalidity.
The claim as they say, is in terms
of section 172(1)(a) of the
Constitution, the effect of which is for the Court to make a
declaration of invalidity once it finds
that an exercise of public
power is unlawful. This, according to the Applicants, does not
require the exercise of a Court’s
discretion in terms of
section 21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act, as argued by NERSA.
[104]
It is noteworthy that, in its argument, NERSA wrongly classifies the
Guideline and Benchmarking Method which the
Applicants seek to
declare unlawful, as a preparatory step towards the approval of the
tariff that renders the application premature,
and therefore, as
abstract, academic or hypothetical. It is this Court’s
view that the Applicants’ claim is neither
abstract, academic
or hypothetical. The Guideline and Benchmarking Method of NERSA
is a guide or a policy that NERSA has adopted
and uses it, when
determining the municipal electricity tariffs; and if found to be
unlawful, this Court must, in terms of section
172(1)(a) of the
Constitution, declare it unconstitutional and invalid to the extent
of its inconsistency. As a result, section
21(1)(c) of the Superior
Courts Act does not find application, in such a case.
The
Principle of the Separation of Powers
[105]
City Power argues that the principle of the separation of powers
militates against the granting of the substantive
relief of the
declaration of invalidity sought in paragraph 2, as well as the
prohibitory interdict sought in paragraph 3 of the
Notice of Motion.
[106]
The submission by City Power is that while section 15 of the ERA sets
out the broad tariff principles that NERSA
must follow in its
regulation of electricity prices and tariffs, there is no statutory
provision which prescribes a methodology
to do so. The legislature
left the development of the methodology to the discretion of NERSA.
Requiring that this Court interfere
in NERSA's lawful exercise of its
discretion offends against the established principle of the doctrine
of separation of powers,
so argues City Power.
[107]
What the Applicants seek to do, according to City Power, is to have
the Court interfere with the statutory discretionary
powers which
NERSA has, to select and determine the methodology. The Court does
not have the expertise, nor the power to decide
for NERSA what
methodology to use. Therefore, to require the Court to interfere in
NERSA’s lawful exercise of its mandate
and discretion would
offend against the doctrine of separation of powers.
[108]
In support of the above argument, City Power, referred this Court to
the recently decided case of the Supreme
Court of Appeal in
National
Lotteries Board v South African Education
[22]
,
which held that –
"Indeed,
because the grant or refusal of an application involves the exercise
of a discretion, our courts have recognised that
it is prudent for
decision-makers to apply guidelines or general criteria to assist
them with this task. And, provided that these
criteria are compatible
with the enabling legislation, the only constraint is that they may
not be applied rigidly or inflexibly
in a particular case. For if
they are applied in this manner the decision-maker elevates the
guideline to an immutable rule and
thereby fetters its discretion,
which it may not do."
[109]
In response to City Power’s argument, the Applicants submit
that the argument is without substance. The
Applicants’ reason
being that the principle of the separation of powers does not
preclude a Court upon which the Constitution
has conferred the
necessary power, as section 169(1), thereof does, in relation to the
High Court, from deciding whether any law
or conduct is inconsistent
with the Constitution, and if it is, to declare it invalid to the
extent of its inconsistency.
[110]
The principle of the separation of powers, according to the
Applicants, finds operation in circumstances where,
put generally,
the merits of a decision are brought under review. In terms of
the principle of separation of powers, Courts
have been cautioned not
to become a kind of an appellate authority in relation to decisions
taken by parliament or the executive.
The Courts’ powers,
as contended for by the Applicants, are focussed primarily on
legality, which includes the principle
of rationality or the
requirement of rationality, and when dealing with administrative
actions provided for in section 6(2) of
PAJA for valid administrative
decision making.
[111]
But, with a legality challenge, like in this matter, the
Constitution, which is the foundation for any valid exercise
of
public authority by organs of state, like NERSA, provides that they
may not exercise any power which is not conferred on them
by
legislation and including the Constitution itself. That, as
argued by the Applicants, is the very essence of the principle
of
legality, which is founded on the rule of law.
[112]
In support of their argument, the Applicants referred to the recent
Constitutional Court judgment in
Premier
Gauteng v The Democratic Alliance
,
[23]
wherein that Court restated the principle of legality and its
implications. The Constitutional Court in that case, confirmed the
long held decision that in a legality challenge, there is no question
of the Court making a decision, which has been reserved by
the
Constitution for or within the domain of another branch of
government, here being NERSA.
[113]
ESKOM, supporting the Applicants on this point, argues that City
Power’s contention that if this Court were
to decide this case,
it would violate the separation of powers, is simply wrong.
According to ESKOM, under the separation
of powers, questions of
legality are reserved for the judiciary.
[114]
The contention is that, if a policy is unlawful, because it mandates
an unlawful approach to the determination
of municipal tariffs, the
Court is not only entitled to declare it unconstitutional and
invalid, it is in fact the judicial duty
of the Court under section
172(1) of the Constitution. Thus, performing that duty does not
infringe the separation of powers,
the Court is merely performing a
duty reserved for the judiciary under the separation of powers.
[115]
The Applicants’ submission that, the Court is not being asked
to interfere with the functions of a specialist
regulator, as City
Power seeks to suggest, is correct. The Applicants as they say,
are not asking the Court to tell the regulator
what to do, or to
prescribe to NERSA what Methodology to employ when determining the
municipal electricity tariffs. There is nowhere
in their papers,
where they seek an order directing NERSA to apply the Cost of Supply
Method or any other particular methodology.
[116]
The Applicants are only, challenging the legality of the Method
currently used by NERSA, on the ground that it
is inconsistent with
section 15(1)(a) of the ERA, and that it should, consequently, be
declared unlawful and invalid. This,
as the Applicants, rightly
so argue, is a legality challenge, the adjudication of which falls
squarely within the heartland of
the judicial authority, which is
conferred on the Court by section 165(1) of the Constitution.
It is the Court's primary
function to ensure in public law matters
that organs of state act lawfully, within the confines of legality.
[117]
Whilst it is correct that no statutory provision prescribes the
methodology to regulate electricity prices and
tariffs, and that the
legislature left the development thereof to NERSA, it is, however,
not correct that by interfering with the
lawfulness of the Method
employed by NERSA, would be to interfere with NERSA’s
discretion. In terms of section 172(1)(a)
of the Constitution, this
Court is empowered to declare any law or conduct that is inconsistent
with the Constitution invalid to
the extent of its invalidity.
[118]
The Constitutional Court in
PG
Group
held that a methodology is not law but rather a guideline. And in
Blue
Moonlight Properties
,
a guideline or policy was brought within the purview of section
172(1)(a) of the Constitution, and has been made, susceptible
to the
declaration of invalidity.
[24]
Therefore, it is the view of this Court that, declaring the
Methodology employed by NERSA in determining the municipal
electricity
tariffs, which is also a policy, unlawful and invalid
will not offend against the principle of the doctrine of separation
of powers.
Disputes
of Fact
[119]
Whilst the Applicants concedes that there may be disputes of fact on
the papers, they, however, submit that there
are no real genuine and
bona fide
disputes of fact,
raised specifically by NERSA, and that a final order can be granted
on the papers. However, in the event that
the Court rules against
them on that submission, their alternative submission is that this is
an appropriate case why the Court
should then refer the matter to
oral evidence. In other words, should the Court find that there
are material disputes of
fact, about what the Guideline and
Benchmarking Method entails, then the matter should be referred to
oral evidence.
[120]
For the decision that this Court comes to on the merits of this
matter, it is this Court’s view that there
are no material
disputes of fact warranting that the matter not to be decided on the
papers as they stand. As a result, it is this
Court’s finding
that a final order can be granted on the papers as they stand.
[121]
Having rejected all the special defences raised by NERSA and City
Power, this Court will now entertain the merits
of the application.
WHETHER
THE METHODOLOGY VIOLATES THE TARIFF PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN SECTION
15(1) OF THE ERA
.
[122]
The Applicants thesis, as supported by ESKOM, in this regard is that
the Guideline and Benchmarking Method that
NERSA applies when
considering and approving municipal electricity tariffs, is unlawful
for the reason that it is inconsistent
with the principles prescribed
for electricity tariffs in section 15(1) of the ERA and for other
reasons dealt with hereunder.
[123]
The Applicants’ complaint, further, that the tariffs set by
NERSA’s Guideline and Benchmarking Method
for an individual
municipality are tariff -reflective: they reflect average levels of
tariffs charged by all municipalities. They
do not reflect the costs
that an individual municipality incurs in separate customer
categories, nor are they representative of
the allowable revenue
appropriate to recover that municipality’s efficient costs.
[124]
NERSA, on the other hand, asserts that the Applicants have failed to
show the discrepancy from the usage of the
Guideline and Benchmarking
Method from the requisites of section 15(1) of the ERA and the Policy
Positions 24 to 34 of the EPP.
[125]
In particular, City Power denies that the Guideline and Benchmarking
Method is inconsistent with the principles
prescribed for electricity
tariffs in section 15 of the ERA. The contention is that if a
specific municipality overcharges its
customers, blame should not be
placed at the door of NERSA, as it is the function of individual
municipalities to set tariffs in
line with their individual and
localised conditions. Furthermore, whilst, City Power, does concede
that the COS study is a requirement,
in line with the EPP, it
contends that COS does not in and on itself constitute a tariff
determination methodology.
The
Methodology adopted by NERSA when determining Municipal Electricity
Tariffs:
[126]
On an annual basis, NERSA issues a municipal tariff guideline which
approves a percentage guideline increase for
municipally charged
electricity tariffs, and, reviews the municipal tariff benchmarks.
The municipal guideline tariff increase,
is said to, assists
municipalities in preparing their budget while the revised benchmarks
are used to evaluate municipal tariff
applications.
[127]
The municipal guideline tariff increase is based on the approved
increase in the bulk price of electricity supplied
by ESKOM to
municipalities. Only once the municipal guideline tariff increase has
been published, can municipalities finalise and
apply for their
proposed tariff increases.
[128]
In preparation for the 2021/22 municipal financial year tariff
determination process, NERSA is said to have published
a consultation
paper titled the “Municipal Tariff Guideline Increase,
Benchmarks and Proposed Timelines for Municipal Tariff
Approval
Process for the 2021/22 Financial Year’ (“the
Consultation Paper”) and invited comments from stakeholders.
[129]
The Consultation Paper referred in the ‘Background Section”
thereto, to:
129.1
NERSA’s ‘historical’ use of the benchmarking
approach, ‘
which sought to ensure that tariffs do not vary
vastly among the various electricity distributors
’.
129.2
‘
[S]takeholders’ pleas with NERSA to move towards a
cost-based approach when setting tariffs for municipalities’
[130]
The Consultation Paper went on to propose two ‘
Alternative
Regulation Approaches’.
The first required municipalities
‘
to set their tariffs based on a comprehensive cost of
supply studies’
, and the second was a ‘
hybrid
approach requiring municipalities to indicate their revenue forecast
translated into tariffs’.
The hybrid approach described in
the Consultation Paper is said to be essentially the Guideline and
Benchmarking Method NERSA has
been applying for years.
[131]
Resulting from the Consultation Paper, NERSA issued a documents
titled the Tariff Methodology Determination, reflected
in Annexure
FA1. The Tariff Methodology Determination, read with the
Determination Reasons thereto, Annexure FA2, adopted two different,
alternative methods, namely –
131.1
The first method is the cost of supply (COS) method which
states that
‘
[l]icensees are required to migrate to the COS
[method]’.
131.2
The second method is the benchmarking approach that, it is
alleged,
NERSA has been applying for over a decade.
The
Tariff Methodology Determination and Reasons, make it clear this is
the approach NERSA will apply until licensees ‘
migrate’
to the COS method: while the COS method is recommended in the
long term, the guideline increase and benchmarks will be used in the
interim.
The
General Process for Setting Municipal Electricity Tariffs
[132]
The process for setting municipality electricity tariffs, as stated
hereunder is common cause, and takes place
in stages:
132.1
In the implementation of the ERA and the EPP, NERSA starts
by issuing
the periodic Multi-Year Tariff Determination (“the MYPD”)
that determines the revenue which ESKOM is permitted
to recover
during the relevant MYPD cycle. These determinations typically extend
over three to five-year periods. They set, amongst
other things,
(a)
the wholesale
price at which ESKOM sells electricity to the municipalities, and
(b)
the tariff at
which ESKOM’s distribution division sells electricity to ESKOM
customers.
The
reason ESKOM’s MYPD is the starting point for municipal
electricity tariffs is that ESKOM wholesale price is a major
component of the cost to municipalities of supplying electricity to
their customers.
132.2
In the second step, NERSA issues a consultation paper setting
out its
proposed methodology for determining municipal electricity tariffs
and invites comments from stakeholders. NERSA then considers
the
written comments, and in some years, public hearings are held.
Emanating from the consultation process, NERSA issues a municipal
electricity tariff document, containing NERSA’s decision on –
132.2.1
the guideline increase, stated as a percentage to be applied to the
current
years’ tariffs to yield the following year’s
tariffs; and
132.2.2
the benchmark tariffs for various categories of customers (domestic,
commercial,
industrial, agricultural).
[133]
The Guideline and Benchmarking Methodology is said to be premised on
there being an existing set of benchmark
tariffs. The current year’s
benchmark tariffs are determined by taking last year’s
benchmark tariffs, and then increase
them by applying the guideline
increase percentage. It means that the benchmark tariffs are not
calculated from scratch every year.
The previous year’s
benchmark tariffs are increased by the current year’s guideline
increase percentage to yield the
current year’s benchmark
tariffs.
[134]
NERSA asserts that for the Methodology in question, relevant
considerations were taken into account as follows:
a guideline
increase of 14,59% based on bulk purchases increases in line with
ESKOM’s tariff increase to municipalities;
salary and wage
increase in line with the Bureau of Economic Research consumer price
index; finance costs in line with the announcement
by the Reserve
Bank that the repo rate will be kept unchanged; repairs and
maintenance, and other expenses (including depreciation)
increased in
line with the CPI.
[135]
After the municipal electricity tariff document containing NERSA’s
decisions on the guideline increase and
the benchmark tariffs has
been issued in a particular year, each municipality must submit its
tariff application for the following
year to NERSA.
[136]
Once a municipality’s proposed tariffs have been approved by
NERSA, they are incorporated into the municipality’s
annual
budget, to be approved by the municipal council.
The
Regulatory Framework
[137]
The regulatory framework directly relevant to this point is the
framework governing the setting of electricity
tariffs by NERSA, that
is, the ERA, together with conditions attached to licences issued by
NERSA in terms of the ERA, and the
South African Electricity Supply
Industry: Electricity Pricing Policy ('the EPP').
[25]
[138]
In addition, when it comes to electricity tariffs that municipalities
charge their customers, another suite of
legislation applies too:
namely, the local government-related legislation and the
Constitution, namely -
138.1
the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (“the Systems
Act”),
[26]
which governs
how municipalities charge for services they provide; and
138.2
section 229(1)(a) of the Constitution and the Municipal
Fiscal
Powers and Functions Act (“the Municipal Fiscal Powers
Act”),
[27]
that permits
municipalities to add a surcharge to the fees they charge for
services.
[139]
The aforementioned statutes are dealt with hereunder:
The
Electricity Regulation Act
[140]
One of the aims of the ERA is to establish a national regulatory
framework for the electricity supply industry. The
relevant
provisions of the ERA for the purposes of this judgment are:
140.1
Section 4, which sets out the powers and duties of
NERSA, that
include the duty of NERSA to regulate prices and tariffs, that is,
charges for electricity;
[28]
and to enforce performance and compliance, and to take appropriate
steps in the case of non-performance.
[29]
140.2
Section 7(1) which empowers NERSA to issue licences for operators
of
electricity undertakings (including municipalities that operate
electricity undertakings).
140.3
Section 14(1) that allows NERSA to attach conditions to licences
on a
range of matters, including (i) the furnishing of information;
[30]
(ii) the setting and approval of prices, charges, rates and
tariffs;
[31]
(iii) the
methodology to be used in the determination of rates and tariffs;
[32]
and (iv) the regulation of the revenues of licensees.
[33]
140.4
Section 15 headed 'Tariff Principles':
140.4.1
Sub-section 15(1) is the provision that sets out the fundamental
principles
of electricity price regulation in South Africa. It sets
out the legal requirements with which NERSA must comply when
approving
the electricity tariffs its licensees may charge their
customers. It provides that licence conditions relating to the
setting or
approval of tariffs and the regulation of revenues—
(a)
must enable an efficient licensee to recover the full cost of its
licensed activities, including
a reasonable margin or return;
[34]
(b)
must provide for or prescribe incentives for continued improvement of
the technical and economic
efficiency with which services are to be
provided;
[35]
(c)
must give end users proper information regarding the costs that their
consumption imposes on the
licensee's business;
[36]
(d)
must avoid undue discrimination between customer categories;
[37]
and
(e)
may permit the cross-subsidy of tariffs to certain classes of
customers.
[38]
140.4.2
In terms of subsection 15(2), licensees are only permitted to charge
their
customers NERSA-approved tariffs as part of their licensing
conditions.
140.5
Section 16(1)(a) which empowers NERSA to vary any licensing
condition
(including the approved tariffs) on application by the licensee.
140.6
Section 27(i) which requires municipalities to keep separate
financial statements, including a balance sheet of the reticulation
business.
The
Electricity Pricing Policy
[141]
The EPP articulates national government's policy on electricity
pricing in South Africa. It describes itself as
providing 'direction
and principles for the formulation of electricity prices in South
Africa'. It sets out guidelines in the form
of a series of 'Policy
Positions' in electricity pricing, and, thus, reinforces and explains
the pricing principles prescribed
in the ERA. The EPP explains that
'the key principle for distribution pricing is that tariffs would be
cost reflective, and that
the relevant policy positions 'are in
support of cost reflectivity.
[142]
The relevant Policy Positions, for purposes of this judgment are:
142.1
Policy Positions 1, and 2 that apply generally across the
electricity
supply industry, and provides as set out hereunder:
142.1.1
Policy Position 1, provides that the revenue requirement or a related
license
must be set at a level which covers the full cost of
production including a reasonable risk adjusted margin or return on
appropriate
asset values.
142.1.2
Policy Position 2, provides that 'All tariffs should become
cost-reflective
over the next five years, subject to specific
cross-subsidies as provided for in section 9. And, that the average
level of all
the tariffs must be set to recover the approved revenue
requirement. The tariff structures must be set to recover costs
as
follows: the energy cost for a particular customer category; the
network usage cost for a particular consumer category; and service
costs associated therewith.
142.2
Policy Positions 23 to 43 that apply specifically to the
distribution
sector and, therefore, to electricity tariffs charged by municipal
licensees (as well as by ESKOM's distribution division).
In
particular, the following Policy Positions 23 and 27, are applicable:
142.2.1
Policy Position 23 provides that the industry's Cost of Supply (COS)
methodology
and some models to calculate these costs have existed for
more than ten years. It has nevertheless only been applied by a few
utilities,
thus leaving the extent of cross-subsidies largely
unknown.
And
further provides that Electricity distributors shall undertake COS
studies at least every five years but at least when significant
licensee structure changes occur such as in customer base,
relationships between cost components and sales volumes. This must be
done according to the approved NERSA standard to reflect changing
costs and customer behaviour. The cost of service methodology
used to
derive tariffs must accompany applications to the regulator for
changes to tariff structures.
142.2.2
Policy Position 27 which sets out the cost components that should
ideally
be included in addressing cost reflective tariffs, to reflect
the costs accurately.
[143]
In as far as the local government legislation is concerned, the
following relevant provisions are applicable:
143.1
Section 74 of the Systems Act that requires municipalities
to adopt
and implement tariff policies on the levying of fees for municipal
services. The policies must reflect the following principles:
(a)
The amount individual users pay for a service should generally be in
proportion to their use of
the service.
[39]
(b)
Tariffs must reflect the costs reasonably associated with rendering
the service, including capital,
operating, maintenance,
administration and replacement costs, and interest charges.
[40]
(c)
The economical, efficient and effective use of resources must be
encouraged.
[41]
143.2
Section 229(1)(a) of the Constitution (headed Municipal fiscal
powers
and functions') which authorises municipalities to impose surcharges
on fees for services they provide. This is essentially
a taxing
power.
143.3
The Municipal Fiscal Powers Act that authorises the Minister
of
Finance to prescribe norms and standards relating to municipal
surcharges. And, is the framework legislation which regulates
the
process to be followed by municipalities when imposing and publishing
surcharges.
[42]
Discussion
[144]
The most pertinent provision, and the fulcrum on which the matter
turns is section 15(1) of the ERA read with
the relevant Policy
Positions of the EPP. The tariff principle and relevant Policy
Positions are dealt hereunder, in turn.
Requirements
of Section 15(1)(a) of the ERA
[145]
Section 15(1)(a) of the ERA provides that licence conditions relating
to the setting or approval of tariffs and
the regulation of revenues
must enable an efficient licensee to recover the full cost of its
licenced activities, including a reasonable
margin or return. The EPP
on the other hand, makes it clear that NERSA must investigate a
licensee’s cost of supply, and
the said price levels which, on
an overall level, are reflective of the licensee’s overall cost
of supplying the licence
service, including the reasonable rate of
return on capital. Section 15(1)(a) of the ERA must be read in
conjunction with section
14(1)(d),
[43]
of the ERA. The subsection deals with conditions of licence that
relates to section 15(1)(a) of the ERA.
[146]
Section 14(1)(d) of the ERA is the precursor to section 15(1)(a) of
the ERA as it sets out the licence conditions
relating to the setting
and approval of prices, charges, rates and tariffs. Therefore, for
such a licence condition to apply it
must be embodied in the licence
in which NERSA wants the condition to be applicable. For example, for
purposes of this judgment,
NERSA has made municipal electricity
distribution licences subject to a condition that, it (NERSA), shall
determine tariffs at
which the licensees shall supply electricity to
its customers. This licence condition is embodied in all municipal
electricity
distribution licences.
[147]
The Applicants, supported by ESKOM, denounce the Guideline and
Benchmarking Method as unlawful because it does
not provide for
consideration of the actual electricity supply costs for a particular
licensee for the year in question, nor does
the Method involve any
determination of a reasonable margin or return for that particular
year. They assert that the Guideline
and Benchmarking Method is based
on averages and generic norms which are applied to all municipalities
regardless of their costs
and efficiencies. This results, in
municipalities charging tariffs that are much higher than the cost of
supplying the electricity
efficiently.
[148]
This is denied by NERSA. NERSA opines firstly that, there is no
requirement that the Guideline and Benchmarking
Method must comply
with the requirements of section 15(1)(a) of the ERA and EPP. The
said section is alleged to merely set out
requirements for the
determination of electricity tariffs. Secondly, the Methodology does
take into account costs component and
contain performance indicators
that are used to assess tariff application. The assessment process
is, thus, not mechanical, according
to NERSA.
[149]
This Court is persuaded by the Applicants’ submissions on this
point. As correctly argued by the Applicants,
the key principles,
reflected in the ERA and the EPP and consistent with accepted
economic regulatory practice, is that the revenue
generated from
electricity distribution must reflect the cost of providing the
distribution service. The total revenue requirement,
that is, the
starting-point for the tariff determination — must be set at a
level that allows an electricity undertaking
to recover the full cost
of its regulated activities, including a reasonable margin or return.
This is reflected in the tariff-setting
principles outlined above and
principally set out in section 15(1)(a) of the ERA, which provides
that licence conditions relating
to the setting or approval of
tariffs and the regulation of revenues must enable an efficient
licensee to recover the full cost
of its licensed activities
including a reasonable margin or return.
[150]
Furthermore, as an indication that individual licensee’s costs
are not considered during the approval process,
the evidence shows
that if the municipality’s proposed tariffs fall within the
parameters of the guideline document, NERSA
will approve them without
an assessment of that municipality’s cost of supply or
inefficiencies, and without determining
what would be reasonable
margin or rate of return for the municipality. Those matters are
considered only if a municipality’s
proposed tariffs are higher
than the upper parameters in the guideline document. There is no
public participation element to the
individual municipal tariff
approval process, as contended by NERSA.
[151]
The evidence show that a municipality applying for a tariff increase
is not required to substantiate its application
with reference to its
actual costs of supply; it does not need to demonstrate the
relationship between its actual costs and the
tariffs it is applying
for, or the benchmark tariffs generally. It merely has to bring
itself within the benchmarks for its application
to be approved.
[152]
The analogy used by City Power’s counsel when he wanted to show
how impossible it is to describe an efficient
licensee, is apposite
in showing that the Methodology adopted by NERSA is unlawful as it
does not cater for the needs of individual
municipalities. Counsel
indicated that there are 180 municipalities in South Africa, located
in different parts of the country,
some of which are in rural areas
whilst others, like City of Johannesburg, are in highly urbanised
areas. Counsel, conceded, correctly
so, in his oral argument that
these different municipalities cannot have one size fits all. It is
this Court’s view, as well,
that all these municipalities, as
alluded to by counsel, cannot be painted with the same brush.
[153]
Additionally, section 27(i) of the ERA requires municipalities to
keep separate financial statements, including
a balance sheet of the
reticulation business. The reason for that requirement links
back to the tariff principles in section
15(1) of the ERA, because
the primary determinant of a particular licensee's tariffs and
revenues is the particular licensee's
total electricity-related
costs. NERSA needs accurate and sufficient information about the
costs of the licensee's electricity-related
activities. However,
since municipalities carry out a wide range of functions and
activities, of which the supply of electricity
is only one, section
27(i) of the ERA has been enacted to ensure that municipalities keep
separate, or ring-fenced, financial records
of their electricity
undertakings so that NERSA can, easily and readily, verify their
electricity-related costs. Those costs will
also allow NERSA to
determine a reasonable margin; and the balance sheet of their
reticulation businesses will allow NERSA to determine
a reasonable
rate of return on the value of their capital investment in that
business.
[154]
There is, however, no evidence on record that indicates that the
Methodology used by NERSA enables it to ascertain
that municipalities
do comply with the requirement of section 27(i) of the ERA.
Consequently, it cannot be said that the Methodology
entails the
determination of the recovery by the municipality of a reasonable
margin or return for that particular licensee, in
the year in
question, as envisaged by section 15(1)(a) of the ERA.
[155]
In any event, NERSA concedes that the Method is tariff reflective
instead of cost reflective, which according,
to this Court, is an
indication of failure to comply with one of the tariff principles
required by section 15(1) of the ERA.
Requirements
of Section 15(1)(c) of the ERA
[156]
In terms of section 15(1)(c) of the ERA, licence conditions relating
to the setting or approval of tariffs and
the regulation of revenues
must give end users proper information regarding the costs that their
consumption imposes on the licensee’s
business.
[157]
NERSA’s submission is that such information is provided as all
electricity distribution licensees are ordinarily
required to
complete the electricity distribution forms (D-Forms) per financial
year to provide proper information. NERSA contends
that it is
imperative that the information provided to NERSA in the D-Forms be
accurate and a true reflection of the electricity
distribution
business. The D-Forms are accompanied by supporting documents like
annual financial statements, ESKOM invoices of
all points of supply
to confirm purchases, the billing reports to confirm units sold, the
trial balance to assess the credit and
debit balances of the
electricity, the asset register for the electricity department to
assess the asset values, an energy losses
report to indicate the
cause of high energy losses including the plan to curb the loss, and
any other relevant information used
during the completion of the
D-Forms. The supporting documents are said to serve as a D- Forms
validation process and confirmation
of the accuracy of the D-Forms
before acceptance by NERSA.
[158]
It is, indeed so, that municipalities do submit certain information,
including financial information, to NERSA
via standard forms known as
D-forms, which are meant to be accompanied by supporting
documentation. However, as the evidence show,
the accuracy and
completeness of the information in the D-Forms leaves much to be
desired. NERSA in its evidence fails also to
confirm the accuracy and
completeness of these forms. It provides evidence as to what ought to
be done by the municipalities when
completing the forms and
furnishing the supporting document. What NERSA fails to say, is what
actually happens practically after
the forms have been submitted.
[159]
In any way, the evidence shows that NERSA does not use the
municipality's D-Forms information to test that respective
municipality's proposed tariffs for compliance with section 15(1)(a)
of the ERA. Instead, NERSA uses some municipalities' D-Forms
information to feed into its calculation of the so-called tariff
guideline increase, which is an increase rate expressed as a
percentage and applied to the year's tariffs to determine next year's
tariffs. Essentially, NERSA combines a sample of municipalities'
D-Forms information and averages it out as part of the tariff
guideline increase calculation. NERSA's Guideline and Benchmarking
Method, thus, does not preserve a link between (i) an individual
municipality's D-Forms information and (ii) NERSA's determination
of,
specifically, that municipality's tariffs. The information used for
the calculation, is from a sample of the D-Forms submitted
and not
from all of them. At the time the information is collated from the
sample, it would already be outdated.
[160]
NERSA, in its evidence, does not claim that it does anything tariff
related with the D-Forms information, other
than to use it in the
calculation of the guideline increase percentage. It does not, even,
claim that when it receives the ‘within
guideline’
application from a municipality, it uses that municipality’s
D-Forms to assess that municipality’s
actual efficient costs.
The evidence does not provide an explanation of whether, and if so
how, NERSA determines that the municipalities’
cost of the
licences activities of an efficient licensee in the specific
municipality’s position.
Requirements
of Section 15(1)(d) and (e)
[161]
The provisions of section 15(1)(d) and (e), provides respectively,
that licence conditions relating to the setting
and approval of
tariffs and the regulation of revenues: (d) must avoid undue
discrimination between the customer categories; and
(e) may permit
the cross-subsidy of tariffs to certain classes of customers. In
addition, the EPP makes it clear that, in relation
to specific
customer pricing categories, the tariffs must be reflective of the
costs of supplying that customer category, subject
only to deliberate
and specifically quantified cross subsidisation between customer
categories of the sort permitted by section
15(1) of the ERA.
[44]
[162]
The essence is that licence conditions relating to prices and tariffs
must avoid undue discrimination between
customer categories and not
permit cross-subsidy of tariffs to certain classes of customers. The
subsections, require tariffs not
just to be cost reflective in
relation to the total cost of supplying the service, but, also,
require an investigation into the
cost reflectivity of tariffs by
customer category. It requires that if one category of customers is
going to cross-subsidise another
category of customers, the extent of
that cross subsidisation be identified and investigated before that
cross subsidisation can
take place. It means that such
cross-subsidisation must be deliberate.
[163]
Subsection 15(1)(d) of the ERA, further, stipulates that there should
be no unreasonable discrimination between
customer categories. The
discrimination, if any, can only be known if the costs by customer
category is determined. Without such
determination, it can never be
known that because of the application of the Method there is
unreasonable discrimination or not,
between customer categories.
[45]
The end result is that NERSA can provide for cross–subsidisation
between customer categories, but such cross-subsidisation
must avoid
any undue discrimination.
[164]
Even though NERSA wants to argue that the assessment of the
individual licensees is not mechanical, there is no
evidence on
record that indicates that in using the Method when determining the
electricity tariffs, NERSA has any regard to the
cost of supply of
particular customer categories, so that it could consider what
cross-subsidy, if any, there was between customer
categories supplied
by the individual municipalities, and whether that
cross-subsidisation was deliberate and justified. Moreover,
the
D-Forms, that are submitted by the municipalities with the tariff
applications do not ask for information that would allow
NERSA to
investigate cost of supply within specific customer categories.
Other
Reasons
[165]
The unlawfulness of the Method is alleged to be compounded further by
the addition of surcharges on the previous
tariffs. The contention by
ESKOM is that the Method in terms of which the approved tariffs are
assessed against an approved guideline
increase and benchmark range
does not exclude the surcharge that was applied to the previous
year’s tariffs. This, according
to ESKOM results in higher
tariffs being approved by NERSA.
[166]
It is not in dispute that it is only via the power to levy
surcharges, conferred by the Constitution and regulated
by the
Municipal Fiscal Powers Act read with the Systems Act, that a
municipality may charge its electricity customers amounts
which are
greater than the tariffs approved by NERSA. However, there is no
evidence on record that indicates that when the Method
is used,
consideration is taken that the previous year’s tariffs the
municipalities charged their customers, included the
surcharge for
that previous year and that before the tariffs are increased, such
surcharge is disregarded. In this sense, the tariffs
will continue to
increase higher than the municipality costs of supply, which is
against the requirements of the tariff principles.
[167]
Reading from the Consultation Paper referred to in paragraph [128] of
this judgment, the move to COS approach
is evidently an issue that
has been raised by numerous stakeholders, who are desirous to migrate
to that approach. And, the Consultation
Paper makes it clear that the
practical consequence for customers of NERSA’s failure to set
cost-reflective tariffs, is that,
tariffs are increasingly
unaffordable.
[168]
The Tariff Methodology Determination makes it clear that NERSA wants
municipalities to base their tariff-approval
applications for
2022/2023 on the COS method. In argument, NERSA actually admits that
the Guideline and Benchmarking Method does
not take a municipality’s
cost of supply as its starting point. The Method, on NERSA’s
own version, is used as an alternative
to a cost of supply approach,
in the interim, until municipal licenses migrate to a cost of supply
approach. The aim, as such,
is to move towards the COS approach and
continue with the current Method, while an attempt is made to move
the entire municipal
distribution industry to the COS approach.
[169]
NERSA admits that municipalities are in the process of migrating to
the COS-based tariff method. It has, already,
recommended such
migration of in the long term, even though it has not as yet
prescribed any timeframe or deadline for the migration.
This is
indication enough that the Method NERSA uses has material challenges
which renders it unlawful as contended for by the
Applicants.
[170]
From as far back as the 2021/22 municipal financial year, those
municipalities that wished to apply for tariff
approval using the COS
method, were given the latitude to do so, with the proviso that the
submission of their applications be
before 15 September of the
financial year preceding the year for which the tariffs are applied.
Many of the municipalities missed
the deadline of 15 September 2021
and an extension was granted for the COS tariff-approval applications
for the 2023/2024 municipal
financial year.
[171]
In support of the EPP, that is, Policy Position 23 that states that
electricity distributors shall undertake COS
studies at least every
five years, NERSA developed a COS Framework to be used by all
licenced electricity distributors in South
Africa. The framework is
to be used as a guideline to licensees when developing their COS
studies. Municipalities are currently
reporting on the information
required in the COS studies in the D-Forms submissions, it is thus
anticipated that compliance in
this regard will not be a hurdle.
Conclusion
[172]
For all the reasons stated above, it is evident that the Guideline
and Benchmarking Methodology adopted by NERSA
in approving municipal
electricity increases, is unlawful. The evidence does not establish
any material disputes of fact, as such,
final relief as prayed for in
the notice of motion, can be granted on the papers as they stand.
APPROPRIATE
RELIEF
[173]
Following on a finding of unlawfulness in the impugned Methodology,
this Court has a wide discretion to consider
appropriate relief which
is just and equitable - pursuant to section 172 (1) of the
Constitution. In this regard, ESKOM in oral
argument, proposed that
the declaration of invalidity be suspended in order to give certainty
to the time within which NERSA should
adopt a cost reflective
methodology. This Court is of the view that, indeed, the order of
invalidity should be suspended to give
certainty to the time within
which NERSA should adopt a cost reflective methodology. Such an order
of suspension will also take
into account the issues of
impracticality raised by NERSA, in coming up with a cost reflective
method within the timeframe suggested
by the Applicants. It will also
give credence that this Court did consider the alleged cumbersome
process that NERSA has to follow,
to eventually adopt a cost
reflective method. Hence, this Court’s view is that the
timeframe ought to be extended and the
prohibition to be with effect
from 2024/2025 municipal financial year.
COSTS
[174]
As regards costs, the Applicants submit that the engagement of two
counsel, including a senior counsel was a reasonable
precaution,
given the importance and relative complexity of this matter, and if
the Applicants are successful the submission is
that there is no
reason why cost should not follow the result.
[175]
The Applicants pray for an order for costs of suit, including the
cost of one senior and one junior counsel to
be paid by NERSA.
[176]
This Court is, similarly of the view that this case is important and
relatively complex and, thus, required the
employ of two counsel, one
senior and one junior. The Applicants are substantially successful in
their case, consequently, costs
should follow the result.
[177]
The Applicants sought an order of costs only against NERSA. An order
of costs is, thus, to be awarded against
NERSA only.
ORDER
[178]
In the circumstances, the following order is made:
1.
The Guideline and Benchmarking Method, used by the National Energy
Regulator of South Africa,
when approving municipal electricity
tariffs, as set out in the record of decision issued by the National
Energy Regulator of South
Africa and entitled ‘Determination of
the Municipal Tariff Guideline and Revision of Municipal Tariff
Benchmarks for the
2021/2022 financial year’, and as extended
to the 2022/2023 municipal financial year, is hereby declared
unlawful, invalid
and of no force and effect.
2.
The
declaration of invalidity is suspended for a period of twelve (12)
months, from the date of this order, to allow
the
National Energy Regulator of South Africa
an opportunity to
correct the defect.
3.
The National
Energy Regulator of South Africa is prohibited from applying the
Guideline and Benchmarking Method when considering
and approving
municipal electricity tariffs with effect from the 2024/2025
municipal financial year.
4.
The National Energy Regulator of South Africa is ordered to pay the
First Applicant and the
Second Applicant the costs of this
application, such costs to include costs of two counsel – one
senior and one junior.
E.M
KUBUSHI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e-mail.
The date and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 10h00 on 20 OCTOBER 2022.
APPEARANCES:
APPLICANTS’
COUNSEL:
ADV.
A BREITENBACH SC
ADV.
K REYNOLDS
APPLICANTS’
ATTORNEYS:
M.C
BOTHA ATTORNEYS
FIRST
RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL:
ADV.
P MOKOENA SC
ADV.
S DLAMINI
FIRST
RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEYS:
MATHOPO MOSHIMANE
MULANGAPHUMA
INC.
THIRD
RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL:
ADV.
M CHAKALSON SC
ADV.
A FRIEDMAN
THIRD
RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEYS: GILDENHUYS
MALATHI INC
FOURTH
SIXTH RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL: ADV.
F NALANE SC
ADV.
L MAKAPELA.
FOURTH
SIXTH RESPONDNETS’
ATTORNEYS:
MNCEDICI
NDLOVU &
SEDUMEDI
ATTORNEYS
[1]
Act
4 of 2006.
[2]
Act
No. 40 of 2004.
[3]
Act
10 of 2013.
[4]
Act 3 of 2000.
[5]
In terms of section 1 of PAJA “decision” means any
decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be
made, or
required to be made, as the case may be, under an empowering
provision, including a decision relating to- (a) making,
suspending,
revoking or refusing to make an order, award or determination.
[6]
Act 3 of 2000.
[7]
See fn. 2.
[8]
2020(1) SA 450 (CC) para 112.
[9]
2018 (5) SA 150
(SCA) at para 35.
[10]
14. Conditions of licence
(1) The Regulator may
make any licence subject to conditions relating to—
…
(e) the
methodology to be used in the determination of rates and tariffs
which must be imposed by licensees;
[11]
35. Regulations, rules, guidelines, directives and
codes of conduct and practice
(1) The Regulator may,
after consultation with—
(a) licensees;
(b) municipalities that
reticulate electricity; and
(c) such other
interested persons as may be necessary,
make
guidelines and publish codes of conduct and practice, or make rules
by notice in the Gazette.
[12]
The unreported judgment of the Gauteng High Court Case Number
7641/21 [2021] dated 11 March 2021.
[13]
This point has already been dealt with in paragraph 65 of this
judgment, where it was found that a decision that lacks
direct
external legal effect, does not fall within the purview of an
administration action, as defined in section 1(1) of PAJA.
[14]
In terms of section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, when deciding a
constitutional matter within its power, a Court must
declare that
any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.
[15]
Para 31.
[16]
Para 33.
[17]
Section 35(1) of the ERA.
[18]
2012 (2) SA 104
(CC) para 104(e)(iii).
[19]
Para 36.
[20]
2005 (6) SA 205
(SCA) at 212H.
[21]
2007 (5) SA 564
(W) para 25.
[22]
2012 (4) SA 504
(SCA) para 9.
[23]
2022 (1) SA 16
(CC) at para 65 to 67.
[24]
Para 33. See also Arun Property Development v Cape Town City
2015 (2) SA 584
(CC) para 47.
[25]
Published
by the then Department of Minerals and Energy in December 2008.
[26]
Act
32
of 2000.
[27]
Act
12
of 2007.
[28]
Section
4(a)(ii) of the ERA.
[29]
Section
4(a)(vii) of the ERA.
[30]
Subsection
(1)(b).
[31]
Subsection
(1)(d).
[32]
Subsection
(1)(e).
[33]
Subsection
(1)(g).
[34]
Subsection
(1)(a).
[35]
Subsection
(1)(b).
[36]
Subsection
(1)(c).
[37]
Subsection
(1)(d).
[38]
Subsection
(1)(e).
[39]
Section
74(2)(b).
[40]
Section
74(2)(d).
[41]
Section
74(2)(h).
[42]
Section
9(2) read with section 75A(2), (3) and (4) of the Systems Act.
[43]
Section
14(1)(d) of the ERA deals with the licence conditions pertaining to
th
e
settling and approval of prices, charges, rates and tariffs charged
by licensees.
[44]
Policy
Position 2.
[45]
Policy
Position 4.
sino noindex
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