Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 822South Africa
Greater Tshwaneumkhonto We Sizwe Military Veterans and Others v Public Investment Co-operation SOC Ltd and Others (19080/2020) [2022] ZAGPPHC 822 (4 November 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
24 March 2020
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Greater Tshwaneumkhonto We Sizwe Military Veterans and Others v Public Investment Co-operation SOC Ltd and Others (19080/2020) [2022] ZAGPPHC 822 (4 November 2022)
Greater Tshwaneumkhonto We Sizwe Military Veterans and Others v Public Investment Co-operation SOC Ltd and Others (19080/2020) [2022] ZAGPPHC 822 (4 November 2022)
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sino date 4 November 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
no: 19080/2020
REPORTABLE:
YES / NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
REVISED.
04
Nov 2022
In
the matter between:
GREATER
TSHWANEUMKHONTO WE SIZWE
MILITARY
VETERANS
1
st
Applicant
MAFIKA
MAHLANGU
2
nd
Applicant
WILLY
SIBANDE
3
rd
Applicant
EDWARD
KOMATI
4
th
Applicant
and
PUBLIC
INVESTMENT CO-ORPERATION SOC LTD
1
st
Respondent
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND
2
nd
Respondent
MOFFAT
SITHOLE
3
rd
Respondent
In
re:
PUBLIC
INVESTMENT CO-ORPERATION SOC LTD
1
st
Applicant
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND
2
nd
Applicant
and
GREATER
TSHWANEUMKHONTO WE SIZWE
MILITARY
VETERANS
1
st
Respondent
MAFIKA
MAHLANGU
2
nd
Respondent
WILLY
SIBANDE
3
rd
Respondent
EDWARD
KOMATI
4
th
Respondent
J
U D G M E N T
MNGQIBISA-THUSI
J
:
[1]
The applicants
seeks an order holding the respondents to be in contempt of an order
handed down by Holland-Muter AJ on 24 March
2020 and the committal of
the third respondent to imprisonment. The relief sought by the
applicants in their notice of motion
dated 14 December 2020 reads as
follows:
1.1
Holding and
declaring the first and second respondents in contempt of the order
of Holland-Muter AJ handed down on 24 March 2020
(“the order”).
1.2
Ordering the
third respondent to forthwith complete the process and all other acts
of compliance with the order.
1.3
Personally
committing the third respondent to prison for a period of 90 days
should he fail to comply with paragraph 2 of the order,
which arrest
and imprisonment are to take place 48 days of the order.
1.4
The first and
third respondents to pay the costs of this application on an attorney
and client basis.
[2]
The first
applicant, the Greater Tshwane Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans,
is an association established in terms of the Military
Veterans Act.
The second applicant, Mafika Mahlangu, is a member of the first
applicant. The third applicant, Willy
Sibande, is the first
applicant’s Head of Business. The fourth applicant,
Edward Komati, is a representative of the
Local Business Forum.
The first respondent, the Public Investment Corporation SOC Limited,
is an asset management company
wholly owned by the Government.
The second respondent, the Government Employees Pension Fund, is a
pension fund responsible
for managing and administering, inter alia,
pensions of Government employees. The third respondent is the
Chief Executive
Officer of the first respondent.
[3]
The
respondents are opposing the relief claimed and have filed an
answering affidavit and have also instituted a counter-application
seeking a cost order on an attorney and own client in respect of the
reserved costs of the urgent application. However, at
the time
of the hearing of this application, the applicants had not filed
their replying affidavit.
[4]
On 20 March
2020, the first and second respondents brought an urgent application
seeking an order interdicting and restraining the
applicants from
interfering with construction work the first respondent was engaged
in at the Kingsley Centre, Arcadia and from
engaging in harmful and
violent conduct at the site.
[5]
On 24 March
2020 the granted an order, by consent of the parties, on the
following terms:
“
1.
That the Respondents and/or any other persons and/or institutions are
interdicted and restrained from:
1.1
Intimidating, threatening and assaulting employees, contractors
and/or sub-contractors of the Applicants in the performance
of their
duties in the redevelopment and construction work at Kingsley Centre
situated in Arcadia, Pretoria CBD at the corner of
Steve Biko Street
and Stanza Bopape Street, in Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (“the
Property”);
1.2
Interfering with, threatening, harassing, instructing or intimidating
the employees, contractors and/or subcontractors
of the Applicants
causing such employees, contractor and/or subcontractors to cease
their duties in the redevelopment and construction
work at the
Property;
1.3
Being physically situated within 50 meters of the Property, unless
with the prior consent of the Applicants;
1.4
Causing, directing, inciting or permitting other persons to conduct
themselves as set out in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.3 (
sic
);
2.
That the First to Third Respondents and/or any other persons and/or
institutions are interdicted
and restrained from:
2.1
Interfering with, threatening, harassing, instructing or intimidating
in any manner the employees of the first applicant
at its main place
of business situated at Menlyn Maine Central Square, Corner Aramist
Avenue & Corobay Avenue, Waterkloof Glen
Extension 2, Pretoria
(“main place of business”);
2.2
Illegally entering without authorisation, the First Applicant’s
main place of business.
3.
The South African Police Service is ordered to take all steps
reasonably necessary given
its available resources to give effect to
this order., contractors and/or subcontractors of the Applicants
causing such employees,
contractor and/or subcontractors to cease
their duties in the redevelopment and construction work at the
Property;
4.
Within 45 days after expiry of the National Lock-Down due to the
Covid-19 Virus, the parties
are to hold a meeting and negotiate in
good faith to the local community participation in the redevelopment
of the Property, and
resolving all outstanding issues in this regard.
5.
The costs of this application are reserved.”
[6]
From the
papers filed it appears that on 17 August 2020 the first respondent
appointed an independent mediator to facilitate a process
in
accordance with paragraph 4 of Holland-Muter AJ’s order of 24
March 2020. The mediation process started on 17 August
2020,
where the respondents’ employees and the legal representatives
of both the applicants and the respondents were present.
[7]
It appears
that during the negotiations an impasse was reached when the first
and second respondents refused to accede to certain
demands made by
the applicants, in particular, the demand by the applicants that the
respondents preferentially appoint the first
applicant as a
sub-contractor without a competitive bidding process. As a
result, the meeting was adjourned.
[8]
The demands
made to the respondents by the applicants include,
inter
alia
,
that:
8.1
in terms of regulation 4 of the regulations under the
Preferential
Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000
, it is entitled to a 5%
stake in the 30% stake of subcontractors.
8.2
ring-fence the 5% stake in future subcontracting projects of the
first respondent and that the remaining 25%
stake should be isolated
for the remaining group of Previously Disadvantaged Individuals
(“PDIs”) on whose mandate
the first applicant has to act
on its behalf;
8.3
the respondents to provide the applicants with historical and up to
date quantities and values of the first
respondent’s projects;
and
8.4
the respondents provided the applicants with the scope of work done
and still to be done and bills of quantities(historical
and future)
of the first respondent’s project in order to quantify the
first applicant’
s 30%
entitlement for the works.
[9]
On 27 August
2020 the applicants through their attorneys sent a letter to the
respondents’ attorneys informing them that the
first applicant
had a mandate to represent the disadvantaged group called the Tshwane
Concerned Citizens.
[10]
On 16
September 2020 the respondents’ attorneys wrote a letter to the
applicants’ attorneys informing them, inter alia,
that:
10.1
the applicants did not have the mandate and authority to engage with
the respondents in formal discussions with respect
to the applicants’
participation in re-development projects of the first respondent;
10.2
the PPPFA and its regulations do not give State owned entities the
discretion of who to select from the designated groups
as
sub-contractors; and
10.3
the court did not order the mediator to provide it with a report of
the outcome of the negotiations.
10.4
the respondents would no longer further participate in the mediation
process due to reasons that it would offend the
principles contained
in section 217 of the Constitution. Further that paragraph 4 of
Holland-muter AJ’s order was strictly
unenforceable as it did
not provide for a deadlock breaking mechanism and that the court did
not require a report back by the mediator.
[11]
On 22
September 2020, the applicants’ attorneys sent a letter
indicating that the first applicant had proof of second applicant’s
membership to first applicant.
[12]
The primary
objectives of contempt proceedings are to vindicate the authority of
the court and to force litigants into complying
with court orders.
[13]
In
contempt proceedings, the applicant bears the onus of proving, beyond
a reasonable doubt that the respondent is in contempt of
a court
order. The test for whether disobedience of a court order
amounts to contempt is whether the breach was committed
deliberately
and
mala
fide
.
In
Tasima
(Pty) Ltd and Others v Department of Transport and Others
[1]
,
the court held that:
“
[18]
Civil contempt is the wilful and
mala
fide
refusal or failure to comply with
an order of court. This was confirmed in
Fakie
NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA
326
(SCA) para 9.
Fakie
also held that whenever committal to prison is sought, the criminal
standard of proof applies (para 19). A declarator of
contempt
(without imprisonment) and a mandatory order can however be made on
the civil standard (see
Fakie
para 42). The applicant for a committal order must establish
(a) the order; (b) service or notice of the order; (c)
non-compliance with the terms of the order and (d) wilfulness and
mala fides
,
beyond a reasonable doubt. But, once the applicant has proved
(a), (b) and (c), the respondent bears the evidentiary burden
in
relation to (d) (
Fakie
para 42). Should the respondent therefore fail to advance
evidence that establishes a reasonable doubt as to whether his
or her
non-compliance was wilful and
mala fide
,
the applicant would have proved contempt beyond a reasonable doubt
(
Fakie
paras 22-24)”.
[14]
It is common
cause that an order was made on 24 March 2020 in terms of which the
parties had to comply with. Further that
the parties did meet
and engage in negotiations with regard to the issues in dispute.
However, when it became clear that
a resolution pertaining to the
issues could not be achieved, the negotiations stopped and the
meeting was stopped. It is
also common cause that the
respondents had informed the applicants of their intention not to
further engage in the negotiations
because of the impasse.
[15]
It is the
applicants’ contention that taking into account that a court
had ordered the parties to engage in negotiations in
order to resolve
their issues, and taking into account that when the meeting was
adjourned because a stalemate had been reached,
it was not open for
the respondents to abandon the negotiations and to refuse to
participate further. It is the respondents’
contention
that since the parties were engaged in negotiations, there was no
obligation on either party to be forced to agree to
terms demanded by
the other party and that once a stalemate was reached as the
respondents’ were not in a position to accede
to the
applicants’ demands which would render them guilty of
contravening the Constitution, they were entitled to not to
further
participate in the negotiations.
[16]
In line with
the court’s directive to the parties to hold a meeting and
negotiate the issues in dispute, the first respondent
appointed a
third party to assist in facilitating in the resolution of the
disputes.
[17]
In
participating in the negotiations proceeding, neither party was under
any obligation to accede to the demands of the other.
The first
and second respondents were not obliged to agree to the applicants’
demands which would result in the contravention
of the Constitution,
in particular, section 217. The respondents participated in the
negotiations in the same way as the
applicants, with the aim that a
resolution would be achieved. In negotiations, no one can be
forced to reach a settlement
if such settlement would not be in its
own interest. The fact that the negotiations were court
ordered, does not change the
nature of what negotiations are.
[18]
I am of the
view that, by willingly engaging a third party to assist the parties
in their negotiations and the respondents actively
participating in
the process, the respondents have proven that they complied with the
court order. Their subsequent reticence
at further
participation in negotiations with the applicants and proffering a
plausible explanation for their action, does not
render their conduct
to have been wilful and mala fide. The fact that the agreement
between the parties to negotiate on issues
which led to the launching
of the urgent application, does not change the nature of the process
they were engaged in.
[19]
I am satisfied
that the respondents have rebutted the inference of deliberate and
mala fide non-compliance with the court order
of 24 March 2020 and
that the applicants have not shown sufficient cause that the
respondents, by not further participating in
negotiations with the
applicants, are in contempt of the order of 24 March 2020.
[20]
In
their counter-application, the respondents are seeking an order for
the costs reserved in the urgent application, on a punitive
scale.
It is the respondents’ submission that the conduct of the
applicants in endangering lives and the economic harm
caused by the
applicants’ conduct warrants a cost order on a scale of
attorney and own client scale. It is further
the respondents’
contention that with regard to this application, since they had
warned the applicants that should they bring
these contempt
proceedings since they were not in contempt of the order, they would
seek a punitive cost order if successful, they
were entitled to such
order.
[21]
On behalf of
the applicants it was submitted that should the applicants be
unsuccessful in this application, the Baywatch principle
should apply
as they were only vindicating their constitutional right of access to
court.
[22]
It is trite
that the issue of costs is within the discretion of the court, which
discretion must be exercised judicially.
It is a general rule
that costs follow the results. Therefore, the successful party
is entitled to costs unless there are
good reasons to depart from
such rule.
[23]
Inasmuch as
the respondents seek punitive cost orders on an attorney and own
client basis in this application and the urgent application,
I am not
convinced that such an order is warranted under the circumstances.
I am also not convinced that the circumstances
of this case fall
under the conditions under which the Baywatch principle is
applicable. However, since the applicants sought
costs on an
attorney and client scale if successful, there is no reason why the
respondents, as the successful parties, cannot
be granted a punitive
cost order on an attorney and own client scale.
[24]
In the result
the following order is made:
1.
The
application is dismissed with costs on an attorney and client scale.
2.
With regard to
the urgent application, the respondents are to pay the costs of the
urgent application on an attorney and client
scale.
NP
MNGQIBISA-THUSI
Judge
of the High Court
Date
of hearing: 09
March 2022
Date
of judgment: 11
November 2022
Appearances
For
Applicants: Adv
P Makhambeni
instructed
by Nkome
Attorneys Inc
For
Respondents: Adv
V Qithi (Mngadi Attorneys Inc)
[1]
[2016]
1 All SA 465
(SCA).
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