Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 870South Africa
Bastincept (Pty) Ltd t/a Basti Security Services v JCB Gearvest (Pty) Ltd and Another (20243/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 870 (15 November 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
15 November 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Bastincept (Pty) Ltd t/a Basti Security Services v JCB Gearvest (Pty) Ltd and Another (20243/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 870 (15 November 2022)
Bastincept (Pty) Ltd t/a Basti Security Services v JCB Gearvest (Pty) Ltd and Another (20243/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 870 (15 November 2022)
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sino date 15 November 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO.: 20243/2022
REPORTABLE:
YES
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
REVISED:
15
NOVEMBER 2022
In
the matter between:
BASTINCEPT
(PTY) LTD t/a
BASTI
SECURITY SERVICES
APPLICANT
and
JCB
GEARVEST (PTY) LTD FIRST
RESPONDENT
(Registration
Number: 2004/032539/07)
LEYTON
INVEST (PTY) LTD SECOND
RESPONDENT
(Registration
Number: 2015/202608/07)
JUDGMENT
MANAMELA
AJ
# INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
[1.]
This is an opposed application for
specific performance of a contract.
[2.]
The Applicant is mainly seeking a
declaratory order that (a) the termination of the written agreement
for the provision of security
services concluded on 24 March 2021 is
declared unlawful and in breach of the agreement; and (b) that the
first respondent be ordered
to perform its contractual obligations,
namely by allowing the employees of the Applicant to return to site
immediately and paying
all amounts due in accordance with Annexure A
of the agreement.
[3.]
The remainder of the prayers set-out in
the notice of motion are of ancillary nature, namely, the referral to
trial or oral evidence
and interim interdict pending adjudication of
trial or oral evidence.
[4.]
This application commenced in the urgent
court on 20 April 2022, before van der Westhuizen J and was dismissed
for lack of urgency
and the costs were reserved.
# FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
[5.]
The Applicant and the Respondent
concluded a service level agreement for the provision of security
services, the relevant terms
of which are that –
4.3.1.
The
First Respondent entered into an agreement with the Applicant to
secure and safeguard personnel, assets and buildings through
the
provision of 24-hour security on a monthly basis (clause 1.1.2).
4.3.2.
The
First Respondent appointed the Applicant to provide security services
at its territory in Limpopo (clause 1.1 and 3.1).
4.3.3.
The
First Respondent would pay a monthly fee for the security services
(clause 4.1).
4.3.4.
The
scope of the work in set out in annexure A to the agreement (clause
4.2).
4.3.5.
The
security teams would report to and fall under the client’s
operational manager and would be paid for completed and active
monthly service only (clause 4.4).
4.3.6.
The
Service Level Agreement was entered into for a fixed term of 36
months from the date of signature of the written agreement,
and in
the event of no-compliance, the client will have the right cancel the
agreement based on the suspensive conditions according
to section 8
of the agreement (clause 5).
4.3.7.
Section
8 of the agreement is merely a restraint of trade and does not
contain a suspensive condition (clause 8).
4.3.8.
Clause
11 of the agreement states that if any party breaches any provision
of the agreement and remains in breach for seven days
after receipt
of a written notice from the other party requiting the defaulting
party to rectify the breach, or if any party repudiates
this
agreement, the other party will be entitled to cancel this agreement
fully within twenty for hours (clause 11.1).
4.3.9.
The
agreement contained all the express provisions agreed to by the
parties about the subject matter of the agreement and the parties
waive the right to reply on any alleged express provision not
contained in the agreement (clause 20.4).
4.3.10.
No
contract varying, adding to, deleting from or cancelling the
agreement and not waiver of any right under this agreement, shall
be
effective unless reduces to writing and signed by or on behalf of the
parties (clause 20.6).
4.3.11.
According
to the operational plan, the First Respondent was to pay the
Applicant 24-hour security services to be rendered by two
Grade C
security guards at R11 900 per month, and three Grade C night
guards also at R11 900 per month of whom two must
be qualified
dog handlers and with one patrol dog, for a total of R59 500 per
month with yearly escalations (Annexure A read
with clause 22).”
[1]
[6.]
The terms of
the agreement are common cause between the Applicant and the
Respondent in so far as it has been recited from the agreement,
except for the interpretation of clause 8 of the agreement as set-out
in clause 4.3.7 above. Furthermore, the parties are not in
agreement
in so far as to whether the agreement is subject to a suspensive
condition.
[7.]
The Applicant
was served with a termination letter dated 9 March 2022, which states
that ‘
Due
to failure to uphold your service Level Agreement with JCB Gearvest
(Pty) Ltd. Please note that in writing the services of Basticept
(Pty) Ltd T/A Basti Security Service will be terminated, the last
working day will be Thursday, 31
st
March 2022”
.
[8.]
The First
Respondent did not serve any breach notice as contemplated in clause
11 of the Agreement, in terms of which the Respondent
had to give 7
days’ notice to the Applicant to remedy any breach.
[9.]
The nature of
breach is not mentioned, and the Applicant’s through its
attorneys addressed a letter requesting the First Respondent
to
retract its defective notice of termination, which they refused to
do.
[10.]
The Applicant
was aggrieved and demonstrated, in its founding affidavit, the extent
of financial loss resulting from this termination,
estimated to be
around R54,800.00 per month, but still tendered its services to the
First Respondent.
[11.]
On the other
hand, the Respondent contents that the termination notice is valid.
The Respondent contents that the Applicant was
aware of the numerous
complaints and concerns raised, and that the Respondent had a right
to cancel the agreement ‘
due
to the breach by the application in the form of persistent and
unremedied defective performance
’.
[12.]
The first
Respondent’s counsel argues that the termination was effected
pursuant to clause 5.1 of the agreement and not clause
11. The
relevant part of clause 5.1, is that ‘
In
neglecting or non-fulfilment of the expected performance levels the
client has the right to cancel the agreement based on the
suspensive
conditions of this agreement according to section 8 of this
agreement
’.
The provision of section 8 relates to restraint and makes no mention
of suspensive conditions.
[13.]
The is no
clear basis for the Respondent to reply on clause 5.1.
[14.]
The Respondent
further denies that the services were rendered as quoted for by the
Applicant; and that there was never a complaint
of breach. The
Respondent further contends that there was any oral arrangement
regarding the provision of the patrol dogs, and
that the contract
contains no suspensive conditions.
ISSUES
FOR DETERMINATION
[15.]
Whether the Applicant
is entitled to specific performance of the contract; whether the
matter should be referred to trial or oral
evidence and whether
interim interdict should be granted if matter is referred to trial /
oral evidence.
LEGAL
PRINCIPLES
[16.]
It
is trite that specific performance is a primary remedy for breach of
contract available for the aggrieved party, enforcing the
performance
of contractual obligations
[2]
. A
plaintiff has a common law right to demand specific performance of a
contract, but the court has a discretion to deny it
[3]
.
The court has a discretion to grant or decline the order of specific
performance. The discretion must be exercised judicially
and does not
confine on rigid rules.
[17.]
Courts
decide each case according to its own facts and circumstances.
Generally, the aggrieved party has a right of election whether
to
claim specific performance or a claim for damages for breach of
contract. The election to either claim specific performance
or
damages is only available to the aggrieved party and the wrong party
does not enjoy any choice in this regard. It is important
to note
that the innocent party remains entitled to rather seek an order of
execution of the contract even where the guilty party
is unwilling to
accept the counter-performance tendered by the innocent party
[4]
.
Specific
performance as remedy for breach
[18.]
Christie’s
Law
of Contract in South Africa
7
ed at 616 states:
‘
The
remedies available for a breach or, in some cases, a threatened
breach of contract are five in number. Specific performance,
interdict, declaration of rights, cancellation, damages. The first
three may be regarded as methods of enforcement and the last
two as
recompenses for non-performance. The choice among these remedies
rests primarily with the injured party, the plaintiff,
who may choose
more than one of them, either in the alternative or together, subject
to the overriding principles that the plaintiff
must not claim
inconsistent remedies and must not be overcompensated.
[19.]
In contract of services, specific
performance is generally not often awarded. However, recent
developments have demonstrated that
specific performance will usually
be granted in employment contracts if there is equality of bargaining
power among contracting
parties and such order will not produce undue
hardship to the defaulting party.
[20.]
In
Basson
and Others v Hanna
[5]
the
court held that –
[41]
A creditor’s right to demand performance from the debtor cannot
be at the debtor’s mercy. The exercise of that
right cannot
depend on what the debtor chooses to do with the asset to which the
creditor’s right relates. To say that a
claim for damages as a
surrogate for specific performance is not recognised in law, would
deprive the creditor of the right, where
it has elected to enforce
the contract, to be put as much as possible, in the position that it
would have been in if the performance
was made in forma
specifica.
[42]
The respondent is entitled to the relief that he seeks. He has
established that he concluded a valid agreement with Basson;
that
Basson repudiated the agreement; that he was willing to carry out his
obligation under the agreement; and that he had elected
to hold
Basson to the terms of the agreement. Because of Basson’s
conduct, which rendered specific performance impossible
the
respondent amended his particulars of claim so as to introduce a
claim for damages in lieu of specific performance. The parties
have
agreed on the quantum and the mora interest rate to be awarded should
the appeal fail. This means that the judgment of the
court below
should be corrected to the extent proposed by the parties. As regards
the question of costs, there is no reason to
deprive the respondent
of his costs.
[21.]
Public policy generally favours the
utmost freedom of contract and requires that parties should respect
or honour their contractual
obligations in commercial transactions.
Public policy is rooted in the constitution and can sparingly be used
to strike down contracts.
[22.]
Specific performance should not continue
to be a primary remedy for breach of contract. Contracting parties
should be allowed to
resile from the contract and use damages as a
remedy for breach of contract.
# DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
[23.]
In the
Founding Affidavit, the Applicant based its claim for specific
performance on repudiation from the agreement, resulting from
the
termination without notice.
The
respondent alleged that it had a right to cancel the agreement due to
breach by the applicant in the form of persistent and
unremedied
defective performance, whilst the Applicant claims that the
termination constitutes repudiation from the agreement.
[24.]
The
extent to which a court may refuse to enforce valid contractual terms
on the basis that it considers that enforcement would
be unfair,
unreasonable or unduly harsh is a burning issue in the law of
contract in our new constitutional era.
[6]
[25.]
The Applicant
illustrates that,
shortly
after conclusion of the agreement, the First Respondent indicated
through Mr. Otto, its representative, that it did not
want the patrol
dog anymore, as it would cause health and safety issues at the site.
This discussion started as we were erecting
the dog kennels, at the
beginning April.
[26.]
The Applicant
indicated that this was not a problem, and the dog was not taken on
site. In lieu of provision of the guard dog, the
Applicant agreed to
provide two extra guards, without changing the price. The Applicant
ended up providing 9 guards on fixed term
employment.
[27.]
The
explanation given by the Applicant appears to be a speculation of
what could be the reason for termination of the agreement.
[28.]
In the
exercise of the discretion of the court, regard is had to the impact
of termination on the employment agreement between the
Applicant and
its employees, which automatically terminates on “expiry”
of the employer’s agreement with the
Respondent, any summary
termination would obviously have direct impact on the employees, and
such cannot be cured by any other
remedy than specific performance.
The doctrine of public policy favours the enforcement of the
contract by way of specific
performance.
# COSTS
COSTS
[29.]
It is inevitable that the First
Respondent should bear the cost of this application including the
reserved costs of the urgent application,
as this matter could have
been resolved. After a warning letter from the Applicant’s
Attorneys, I do not see why the First
Respondent should be excused
from paying costs at a punitive scale.
# CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
I
agree with the Applicant that the Respondent’s refusal to
remedy the defective termination when given an opportunity to
do so,
constitutes repudiation from the agreement.
# ORDER
ORDER
In
the result, the following order is made –
1.
The termination of the written agreement
for the provision of security services concluded between the
Applicant and the First Respondent
on the 24th of March 2021 is
unlawful.
2.
The First Respondent is in
breach of the agreement; and is ordered to comply its contractual
obligations, namely by
allowing the employees of the Applicant to
return to site immediately and paying all amounts due in accordance
with Annexure A
of the agreement.
3.
The Respondent is liable to pay the
costs of this application on attorney and client scale.
4.
The Applicant is to bear the reserved
costs on a party and party scale.
P
N MANAMELA
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Date
of hearing:
23
August 2022
Judgment
delivered:
15
November 2022
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv. AC
Diamond
Attorneys
for the Applicant:
Everton
Dankuru Attorneys
Counsel
for the Respondents:
Adv. GR
Ergan
Attorneys
for the Respondents:
Kriek
Wassener & Venter Inc
[1]
Founding Affidavit
## [2]Basson and Others v Hanna (37/2016) [2016] ZASCA 198,
[2]
Basson and Others v Hanna (37/2016) [2016] ZASCA 198,
[3]
Jones & Buckle, The Civil Practice of the Magistrates’
Court in South Africa, van Loggerenberg, (10th edition (loose
leave
edition) vol 1 at act 306
[4]
Heinrich Schulze, General Principles of Commercial Law, 8
th
edition, at 134
[5]
(37/2016)
[2016] ZASCA 198
;
[2017] 1 All SA 669
(SCA);
2017 (3) SA 22
(SCA) (6
December 2016)
,
[6]
Beadica 231 CC and Others v Trustees for the time being of the
Oregon Trust and Others (CCT109/19)
[2020] ZACC 13
;
2020 (5) SA 247
(CC).
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