Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 170South Africa
Adcock Ingram Limited and Others v Cipla Medpro (Pty) Limited (10455/2023) [2025] ZAWCHC 170 (17 April 2025)
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Adcock Ingram Limited and Others v Cipla Medpro (Pty) Limited (10455/2023) [2025] ZAWCHC 170 (17 April 2025)
Adcock Ingram Limited and Others v Cipla Medpro (Pty) Limited (10455/2023) [2025] ZAWCHC 170 (17 April 2025)
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FLYNOTES:
INTELLECTUAL
– Trade mark –
Pharmaceuticals
–
Competitors
within pharmaceutical industry – URIZONE versus FURIZOME
marks – Both marks were invented words –
Minor
differences in their prefixes and suffixes – Dominant
elements were strikingly similar – Creating a risk
of
confusion – Identical goods and conditions treated –
Respondent’s use infringed applicants’ trade
mark
rights – Constituted passing-off and unlawful competition –
Interdict granted –
Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993
,
s 34(1)(a).
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
Case No:
10455/2023
In
the matter between:
ADCOCK
INGRAM
LIMITED
First Applicant
ADCOCK
INGRAM HEALTHCARE (PTY) LTD
Second Applicant
ZAMBON
S.P.A
Third Applicant
and
CIPLA
MEDPRO (PTY) LIMITED
Respondent
Heard: 12 February 2025
Delivered Electronically
on: 17 April 2025
JUDGMENT
LEKHULENI
J
Introduction
[1]
This is an application in which the applicants seek an interdict
against the respondent
in terms of s 34(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act
194 of 1993
(“the
Trade Marks Act&rdquo
;)
from
infringing the third applicant’s registered trade mark,
registration number 1995/00309 URIZONE in class 5, and from
using, in
relation to a pharmaceutical product, the trade mark FURIZOME or any
other trade mark that closely resemble the third
applicant’s
aforementioned registered trade mark, which may likely deceive or
cause confusion. In addition, the applicants
seek an order that the
respondent be interdicted and restrained from passing-off its
pharmaceutical products as those of the applicants
and/or associated
with the pharmaceutical product of the applicants by using in any
manner or form, the trade mark FURIZOME or
any confusingly similar
trade mark or name.
[2]
The applicants and the respondent are competitors within the
pharmaceutical industry.
The applicants manufacture, market and
supply URIZONE. URIZONE is an innovator medicine of the third
applicant, with the
patent having expired some time ago.
[1]
Products for which patents have lapsed or expired may be legally
reproduced by other manufacturers, subject to registration with
the
South African Health Products Regulatory Authority
(“SAHPRA”)
,
a public entity of the National Department of Health, in terms of the
Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965
(“the
Medicines Act”)
.
SAHPRA is tasked with the regulation of all health products.
[2]
[3]
The applicants allege that the respondent’s use of the trade
mark FURIZOME,
associated with its broad-spectrum antibiotics
containing the active ingredient Fosfomycin for treating urinary
tract infections
(UTI’s), is confusingly and or deceptively
similar to the applicants’ URIZONE trade mark. Accordingly, the
applicants
seek an order that the respondent be interdicted and
restrained from unlawfully competing with them by using the trademark
FURIZOME
or any confusingly similar trademark. This court is called
upon to determine whether URIZONE and FURIZOME trade marks are
confusingly
or deceptively similar.
The
Parties
[4]
The first applicant is Adcock Ingram limited, a company duly
registered and incorporated
with limited liability in accordance with
the company laws of the Republic of South Africa. It is a member of
the Adcock Ingram
Group of Companies and is the company that
historically entered into license and supply agreement with the third
applicant concerning
the pharmaceutical product URIZONE, which is the
subject matter of these proceedings. The second applicant is Adcock
Ingram Healthcare
(Pty) Ltd. It is also part of the Adcock Ingram
Group of Companies. Through its consumer division, over the counter
division
(“OTC”)
and prescription division, it
manufactures and distributes both OTC and prescription and generic
pharmaceutical products, as well
as products such as energy
supplements, vitamins and sun care products. The URIZONE product that
is the subject matter of this
litigation is marketed and distributed
by the prescription division of the second applicant.
[5]
The third applicant Zambon S.P.A is a company incorporated under the
laws of Italy.
It is the registered proprietor of the trade mark
URIZONE, which forms the subject matter of these proceedings. It has
entered
into a licence and supply agreement with the first applicant
regarding the marketing and distribution of the third applicant’s
URIZONE product in South Africa. The first and the second applicant
are licensed to use the third applicant’s registered
URIZONE
trade marks in South Africa.
[6]
The respondent is Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd a company, registered and
incorporated in
South Africa in 1995 and falls within the Cipla South
Africa Group of Companies. It is the third largest pharmaceutical
manufacturer
in South Africa with a product portfolio spanning from
complex generics to pharmaceuticals. It also manufactures generic
medicines,
defined as a pharmaceutical product that is intended to be
interchangeable with an innovator product. One such product is
FURIZOME,
a broad-spectrum antibiotic with the active ingredient
Fosfomycin.
The
Applicants’ Case
[7]
The applicants manufacture and distribute medicine under the trade
mark URIZONE for
the treatment of urinary tract infections and have
done so for many years. The third applicant is the registered
proprietor of
trademark registration numbers 1995/00309 URIZONE and
1995/00513 URIZONE (special form) in class 5. The URIZONE
pharmaceutical
product is a broad and medium spectrum antibiotic used
for treatment of urinary tract infections. The URIZONE product is
sold as
a single dose in a 3-gram sachet. The active ingredient of
the product is Fosfomycin. The third applicant launched the URIZONE
medicine in 1988. The applicants aver that this medicine is currently
available in 78 countries, albeit in many of these countries
the
product is sold under different trademarks.
[8]
The URIZONE medicine was launched in South Africa in 1993 by the
first and the second
applicants’ predecessor in title, Adcock
Ingram Pharmaceutical Limited, in terms of a license and supply
agreement concluded
at the time with the third applicant. The current
distribution and marketing of the URIZONE product in South Africa is
regulated
in terms of a license and supply agreement between the
first, second and third applicant dated 14 December 2016. The URIZONE
product
is registered with SAHPRA. The second applicant is
responsible for marketing and distributing the URIZONE product. The
second applicant
is authorized by the third applicant to use the
URIZONE trade mark.
[9]
The applicants assert that 3446 138 sachets of the URIZONE product
have been sold
over the period 2011 to 2023. The first and second
applicants invested approximately R5 million in total on advertising
and promoting
the URIZONE product over the period 2018 to 2022. Part
of the applicants’ marketing efforts consists of distributing
pamphlets
and educational literature of their URIZONE products to
doctors, medical practitioners and pharmacists. The applicants state
that
until approximately a year ago, URIZONE was in fact the only
product of its kind on the South African market. For almost 8 years
the URIZONE product had no generic alternative on the South African
market.
[10]
In February 2023, the second applicant became aware that the
respondent had adopted and launched
an interchangeable multi source
medicine (generic) containing the active ingredient Fosfomycin in 3g
sachets under the trademark
FURIZOME. The applicants asserted that
the respondent was undoubtedly aware of the applicants’ URIZONE
product and trademark
when it opted to adopt and use the FURIZOME
trade mark. The applicants challenged the respondent to take this
court into its confidence
and explain the rationale for its decision
to adopt the FURIZOME trademark. The other generic medicines to the
applicants’
URIZONE medicine in South Africa with the active
ingredient Fosfomycin include Actizone from Actor Pharma, Tractinfect
of Aspen
Pharmacare and Fomnos of Sadoz.
[11]
The applicants aver that none of the pharmaceutical companies
aforementioned saw any need to
adopt URIZONE trademark for their
generic medicine. These products have all been launched over the past
12 to 18 months. The applicants
asserted that the trade marks used in
respect of these products illustrate that the reason for the
respondent adopting the FURIZOME
trademark was evidently intended to
capitalise and to take advantage of the reputation and goodwill
attached to the applicants’
URIZONE trademark.
[12]
The applicants also pointed out that from the respondent’s
brochure it is clear that the
respondent’s FURIZOME product is
a generic medicine and, similar to the applicants’ URIZONE
product, is used for the
treatment of acute, uncomplicated lower
urinary tract infections caused by sensitive e-coli in women. It is
also used for prophylaxis
in diagnostic and surgical transurethral
procedures in adult men. FURIZOME is sold in a 3-gram sachet, similar
to the applicants’
URIZONE product.
[13]
On 10 March 2023, and on becoming aware of the respondent’s
FURIZOME product and the respondent's
use of the applicants’
URIZONE product, and because it would result in deception or
confusion, the applicant instructed its
attorneys of record to send a
letter of demand to the respondent. The respondent was informed in
the letter of demand, that the
respondent’s use of the FURIZOME
trademark was unauthorised in the course of trade as a trade mark and
in respect of goods
covered by the specification of the applicants’
URIZONE trade mark. The applicants demanded that the respondent cease
all
and any use whatsoever of the trade mark FURIZOME or any
confusingly similar trade mark. The applicants also demanded that the
respondent cease all and any use of the applicants’ URIZONE
trade mark complained of.
[14]
On 06 April 2023, through its attorneys of record, the respondent
rebuffed the applicants’
claim and contended that the trade
marks, when viewed as wholes, are clearly and sufficiently dissimilar
from a phonetic, conceptual,
and visual perspective. The respondent
denied that its FURIZOME trade mark so nearly resembles the URIZONE
trade mark as to be
likely to deceive or cause confusion. The
respondent also refuted the claim that its conduct constituted trade
mark infringement,
or a violation of the Advertising Regulatory Board
(“ARB”)
Code, or unlawful competition. The
respondent reserved its rights in full and stated that it would not
comply with the applicants’
demand.
[15]
The applicants asserted that there is a danger of deception or
confusion between the trade mark
URIZONE and FURIZONE, especially
having regard to the oral, visual and conceptual similarities between
the two trade marks URIZONE
and FURIZOME. The applicants alleges that
the respondent is unlawfully using the URIZONE trade mark in its
brochure and further
alleges that this use is tantamount to an
infringement under
s 34(1)(a)
of the
Trade Marks Act, as
well as a
contravention of the SAHPRA Guidelines for Advertisement of Medicines
and Health Products, the Marketing Code Authority,
and the Code of
Conduct of the ARB.
[16]
The applicants pointed out that the respondent’s FURIZOME
trademark bears a confusing resemblance
to the third applicant’s
registered URIZONE trademark. The applicants seek an interdict in
terms of
s 34(1)(a)
of the
Trade Marks Act to
prevent the respondent
from infringing upon the third applicant’s registered trade
mark. The applicants assert that the URIZONE
trademark has acquired a
reputation and goodwill, and that the use of the FURIZOME trademark
by the respondent will result in consumer
deception and/or confusion.
The applicants also seek an order interdicting the respondent from
passing-off its FURIZOME product
as being that of, or associated
with, the applicants and their URIZONE product.
The
Respondent’s Case
[17]
The respondent assert that it is the third largest pharmaceutical
manufacturer in South Africa,
holding a 7,5% overall market share. It
produces world class medicines at affordable prices for the public
and private sectors,
thereby advancing healthcare for all South
Africans. Their strategy emphasises agile and sustainable growth,
complex generics,
and a commitment to continuously enhancing its
portfolio while adhering to good manufacturing and laboratory
practices. The respondent
asserted that it offers a diverse portfolio
of generic medicines that includes both acute and chronic therapies
for patients across
multiple age groups. Their strong presence is in,
inter alia
, anti-infectives, respiratory care,
cardio-metabolic treatments, pain and fever management, as well as
vitamins and supplements,
amongst others, to name a few. The purpose
of the respondent’s generic offerings is to make essential
medicines readily accessible
to all patients. The respondent stated
that both the applicants’ URIZONE product and the respondent’s
FURIZOME product
are classified as scheduled 4 medication which can
only be dispensed upon prescription by a doctor.
[18]
On 21 February 2023, the respondent introduced a scheduled generic
medication containing the
active ingredient Fosfomycin, marketed
under the trademark FURIZOME. The FURIZOME product is a broad and
medium spectrum antibiotic
used for the treatment of urinary tract
infections and is also available in a 1 x 3g sachet dosage. The
respondent assert that,
generally, brand names for pharmaceutical
products are chosen or derived by taking into account the Active
Pharmaceutical Ingredient,
as well as the mode of action or treatment
area. In the case of the respondent, the marketing team would provide
the suggested
names to the Internal Regulatory Affairs team, who then
review the proposed name and make a final submission to SAHPRA. Final
approval
of the brand name is then communicated to the Internal
Regulatory Affairs team.
The respondent notes
further that according to the prevailing practice, all product
packaging and product names must receive approval
from SAHPRA prior
to registration taking place. The Respondent provided two
alternatives to SAHPRA for the product name, being
FURIZOME and
Fosfomycin 3g Cipla. Both names were accepted and officially
registered
with SAHPRA on 27 September 2022.
[19]
The respondent stated that the brand name and trade mark FURIZOME,
adopted by the respondent,
is an invented word with no meaning in the
English language. The prefix “Uri” alludes to the
intended use of the FURIZOME
product, which is intended for the
treatment of urinary tract infections and the letter ‘F’
alluding to the active
compound of the FURIZOME product, specifically
Fosfomycin. As part of the respondent’s launch of the FURIZOME
product, the
respondent distributed an informational brochure for
purposes of marketing and advertising the newly launched product to
doctors
and pharmacists specifically. The FURIZOME brochure was
circulated during February 2023, in line with the general
regulations
45(2)(b)
of the Regulations promulgated under the
Medicines and
Related Substances Act 101 of 1965
, as amended.
[3]
[20]
The respondent further asserted that the FURIZOME trade mark is not
so similar to the URIZONE
trade mark, such that its use in the
FURIZOME brochure on the packaging of the respondent’s product
is unlikely to result
in confusion or deception among consumers. The
respondent opines that the FURIZOME brochure contains nothing that
could possibly
be deemed to cause confusion and does not unfairly
benefit from the URIZONE trademark or any reputation vesting therein.
Furthermore,
the respondent stated that it does not require the
permission of the applicant to refer to the URIZONE product name in
this comparative
advertising since such advertising is permitted by
intellectual property and the common law.
[21]
The respondent postulated four scenarios and contended that there
exists no possibility of confusion
or deception on the part of
patients between the URIZONE of the applicants and the FURIZOME of
the respondent. In the first scenario,
the respondent asserted that a
medical doctor may prescribe the innovator (the original) product to
the patient. In this instance,
and in terms of s 22F of the Medicines
Act, the pharmacist is obliged to inform the patient that a generic
substitution exists.
It is only after the patient is informed by the
pharmacist that a generic option exist will the patient decide which
pharmaceutical
product to use. The respondent asserted that there
exists no likelihood of confusion or deception since the patient is
presented
with two different options.
[22]
In the second scenario, the respondent proposed a situation where the
medical doctor prescribes
the innovator product and endorse on the
prescription “no substitution”. In this instance, the
respondent asserted
that the pharmacist is not obliged to and will in
fact not inform the patient that a generic substitution exists.
According to
the respondent, there can be no likelihood of confusion
or deception on the part of the patient in such scenario, since the
patient
is only ever presented with one pharmaceutical product. In
the third scenario the respondent postulated a situation where the
medical
doctor prescribes the generic product. In this instance, the
respondent stated that the pharmacist is not obliged to and will in
fact not inform the patient that an innovator product exists. The
respondent contended that in such a case, there is no likelihood
of
confusion or deception on the part of the patient since the patient
is only ever presented with one pharmaceutical product.
[23]
In the fourth scenario the respondent postulated a situation where a
patient walks into a doctor's
rooms and requests a particular
medication for a perceived illness or medical condition. In this
scenario however, the respondent
states that the doctor is still
obliged to examine or consult with the patient and only after the
examination will the doctor either
prescribe the requested medicine
or engage in a dialogue with the patient as to why a different
medication will be prescribed.
According to the respondent, the
doctor knows exactly which medicine he or she is prescribing and why.
The respondent further asserted
that in this scenario there is no
risk of confusion or deception on the part of the patient as the
patient is already aware of
the pharmaceutical product. The doctor
informs the patient of a possible alternative pharmaceutical product
to the one the patient
is already aware of.
[24]
The respondent stated that the FURIZOME brochure does not include any
content that could be deemed
to cause confusion and does not take
unfair advantage of the URIZONE trade mark (or any reputation vesting
therein). Additionally,
there is nothing contained in the FURIZOME
brochure which discredits, degenerates, or disparages the URIZONE
product. According
to the respondent, all comparisons made are
factual, truthful, substantiated, and are not left open to
interpretation. The respondent
emphasised that it is using the
FURIZOME trade mark in the FURIZOME brochure to promote its own newly
launched product. The Respondent
uses the FURIZOME trade mark on the
packaging of its own genuine product, and this is reflected in the
FURIZOME brochure. To this
end, the respondent implored the court to
dismiss the applicants’ application with costs, including the
costs of two counsels.
Submissions
by the parties
[25]
The applicant’s counsel, Mr Michau SC, submitted that the
applicants have accused the respondent
of deliberately copying its
trade mark. Mr Michau argued that this is not the first instance in
which a member of the Adcock Group
of Companies has been at
loggerheads with the respondent over its use of a trade mark which
resembles a successful product of the
Adcock Group of companies.
Counsel referred the court to the Supreme Court of Appeal
(“the
SCA”)
case
of
Adcock
Ingram v Cipla Medpro
,
[4]
where the SCA ordered the registrar of trade marks to cancel a
registered trademark ZEMAX because it would infringe the registered
trade mark ZETOMAX, both of which were being used on a prescription
drug. Mr Michau submitted that a review of that case demonstrates
that the same unsuccessful defences raised by the respondent in that
matter are yet again being raised in the present matter. The
essence
of this defence raised by the respondent is that because it is a
prescription drug, the prospect of confusion is reduced.
Counsel
stated that the ZETOMAX case dispelled that notion.
[26]
Mr Michau submitted that in the years gone by the law insofar as
prescription drugs was concerned
was always that because the products
are prescribed by medical doctors and dispensing pharmacists, greater
care would be taken
and therefore the marks had to be even closer
together before infringement could be found than was ordinarily the
case. The ZETOMAX
case, according to counsel, altered that. The SCA
concluded that the patient, and thus the average member of the
public, now participates
in choosing his or her medication and is no
longer a passive bystander in the purchasing process as a result of
the introduction
of generic medications and the provisions of
s 22(F)
of the
Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965
. The
applicants’ counsel submitted that the respective trade marks,
URIZONE and FURIZOME are confusingly similar, and he
implored the
court to grant the relief sought in the notice of application.
[27]
Mr Puckcrin SC, the respondent’s counsel, submitted that the
question of confusing and/or
deceptive similarity in relation to
medicines, must naturally take into account the nature of the
medication and the ailment it
is intended to treat, and is an
important factor to consider in determining how involved members of
the public actually are in
deciding upon his or her medication, which
has a bearing on whether there is a likelihood of deception or
confusion between the
respective medications.
[28]
Counsel argued that, since the URIZONE and FURIZOME products are
classified as schedule 4 products,
the involvement of medical
professionals, being the prescribing doctor and the dispensing
pharmacist in this case, cannot be discounted.
Mr Puckrin pointed out
that the applicants’ URIZONE product and the respondent’s
FURIZOME product are classified as
Schedule 4 medicines.
Consequently, there exist several safeguards in place that regulate
the supply, prescription, dispensing
and sale of schedule 4
prescription medications aimed at protecting consumers (particularly
patients), against the likelihood of
confusion or deception arising
from the names of prescription medications.
[29]
Counsel for the respondent submitted that the supply and sale of
medicines in South Africa is
governed by s 22A of the Medicines
Act.
[5]
Significantly, schedule
4 substances may not be directly advertised to the public. They may
only be sold by pharmacists (or pharmacist’s
interns or
assistants under supervision), or manufacturers/wholesalers to
individuals licensed to lawfully possess the schedule
4 substance.
[6]
In counsel’s view, the relevant “customer” for
purposes of the comparison comprises medical practitioners,
pharmacists,
and patients.
[7]
In
Counsel’s view, the prescribing doctor and the dispensing
pharmacist will be a safeguard against potential confusion between
the product names. Mr Puckrin implored the Court to dismiss the
applicants’ application.
Issue
to be decided
[30]
The key issue this court must consider is whether the URIZONE and
FURIZOME trade marks are confusingly
or deceptively similar. This
question is relevant to the relief sought in terms of the
Trade Marks
Act and
also the common law.
Applicable
Legal Principles and Discussion
[31]
The
Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993
defines a trade mark principally in
terms of its purpose to distinguish in that a trade mark means:
‘
a mark used or
proposed to be used by a person in relation to goods or services for
the purpose of distinguishing the goods or services
in relation to
which the markets used or proposed to be used from the same kind of
goods or services connected in the course of
trade with any other
person.’
[32]
In terms of s 9(1) of the Act, in order to be registrable, a trade
mark shall be capable of distinguishing
the goods or services of a
person in respect of which it is registered from the goods or
services of another person either generally
or, where the trademark
is registered or proposed to be registered subject to limitations, in
relation to use within those limitations.
Section 9 establishes the
foundational requirement for a trade mark to qualify for protection.
On the other hand,
s 34(1)(a)
of the
Trade Marks Act prohibits
the
use of a mark that is identical to the registered mark or one that
closely resembles it to the extent that it is likely to
deceive or
cause confusion. The applicants herein rely on
s 34(1)(a)
of the
Trade Marks Act. For
completeness, the relevant parts of
s 34(1)(a)
and (b) of the
Trade Marks Act provide
as follows:
‘
34 (1) The
rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be infringed by
—
(a)
the
unauthorized use in the course of trade in relation to goods or
services in respect of which the trade mark is registered, of
an
identical mark or of a mark so nearly resembling it as to be likely
to deceive or cause confusion;
(b)
the
unauthorized use of a mark which is identical or similar to the trade
mark registered, in the course of trade
in relation to goods or
services which are so similar to the goods or services in respect of
which the trade mark is registered,
that in such use there exists the
likelihood of deception or confusion…’
[33]
In an infringement action, the onus rests upon the plaintiff to
prove, on a balance of probabilities,
that the mark used by the
defendant so nearly resembles the plaintiff’s trademark to the
extent so as to likely deceive or
cause confusion. Section 34(3) of
the Act provides that where a trade mark in terms of this Act has
been infringed, a High Court
having jurisdiction may grant the
proprietor certain relief. The relief envisaged by s 34(3) includes
an interdict, an order for
removal of the infringing mark from all
material, damages, and in lieu of damages, at the option of the
proprietor, a reasonable
royalty which would have been payable by a
licensee for the use of the trade mark concerned.
[34]
Assessing the similarity of marks, to ascertain whether they are
confusingly similar is an important
part of the process of
determining possible infringement of a mark. Three general tests are
employed.
[8]
First, marks could
be similar on a phonetic basis. Second, marks can be similar
conceptually.
[9]
A third test
involves whether the marks are similar from a visual perspective.
[10]
In considering whether the use of the respondent’s trade mark
is likely to deceive or cause confusion, the SCA in
Cowbell
AG v ICS Holdings Ltd,
[11]
held that the essential function of the trade mark is to indicate the
origin of the goods in connection with which it is used.
The decision
whether the use of both marks in relation to both goods and services
would likely to deceive or cause confusion involves
a value judgment.
The ultimate test is whether on a comparison of the two marks it can
properly be said that there exists a reasonable
likelihood of
confusion if both are to be used together in a normal and fair
manner, in the ordinary course of business.
[12]
[35]
The test to determine whether the two marks are confusingly similar
is well established in our
law and was set out by the SCA in
Plascon-
Evans Paints (Pty) Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd,
[13]
along with subsequent cases that have further elaborated these
principles.
[14]
The test
requires the court to evaluate the visual, aural and conceptual
similarities between the two marks, based on the overall
impression
and any dominant features. A court should assess the impact the marks
would have on the average consumer in the marketplace,
who is
reasonably well-informed and observant, taking account the nature of
the products and the manner in which they are marketed.
The ordinary
consumer may not encounter the goods bearing the marks at the same
time and place, and an allowance should be made
for the consumer’s
imperfect recollection of the marks. The marks should be viewed side
by side as well as separately. The
degree of similarity of the goods
should be considered in relation to the degree of similarity of the
marks. The greater the similarity
of the goods the more it may offset
some differences in the marks, just as the greater distinctiveness of
the goods may require
greater similarity of the marks in order to
justify a finding of the likelihood of confusion.
[15]
[36]
In
Century
City Apartments Property Services CC and Another v Century City
Property Owners’ Association,
[16]
the
SCA referred with approval to what was stated in
Compass
Publishing BV v Compass Logistics Ltd,
[17]
that:
‘
The likelihood of
confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all
relevant factors. It must be judged through the
eyes of the average
consumer of the goods or services in question. That customer is to be
taken to be reasonably well informed
and reasonably circumspect and
observant, but he may have to rely upon an imperfect picture or
recollection of the marks. The court
should factor in the recognition
that the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and
does not analyse its various
details. The visual, aural and
conceptual similarities of the marks must be assessed by reference to
the overall impressions created
by the marks bearing in mind their
distinctive and dominant components. Furthermore, if the association
between the marks causes
the public to wrongly believe that the
respective goods come from the same or economically linked
undertakings, there is a likelihood
of confusion.’
[18]
[37]
It is against this background that I now turn to determine whether
the respondent’s FURIZOME
trade mark is likely to cause
confusion or deception to the public. However, before I do so, I must
mention that this matter involves
an alleged infringement on a trade
mark concerning the sale of pharmaceutical products. It must be
stressed from the outset that
there are stringent rules and
regulations promulgated in terms of the
Medicines and Related
Substances Act 101 of 1965
and the
Pharmacy Act 53 of 1974
applicable
to the marketing and retailing of pharmaceutical products. These
include the physical handling and storage, promotion
and advertising
and labelling and display of product, as well as the prescribing and
dispensing thereof.
[19]
[38]
All pharmaceutical products intended for sale in South Africa must be
registered with SAHPRA
in accordance with the Medicines Act prior to
their launch in the South African market.
[20]
The URIZONE and FURIZOME products have been registered with SAHPRA
and have been designated as scheduled 4 products in terms of
the
Medicines Act. Scheduled 4 products can only be sold by pharmacists,
a pharmacist intern or a pharmacist assistant acting under
the
personal supervision of the pharmacist to individuals on
prescription, written or verbal, from a medical doctor.
[21]
Schedule 4 products cannot be bought over the counter or off the
shelf. Medicines which contain a substance listed as schedule
2,
schedule 3, schedule 4, schedule 5 or schedule 6 may be advertised
only for the information of pharmacists, medical practitioners,
dentists, veterinarians, practitioners and other authorized
prescribers.
[22]
[39]
In terms of s 22F of the Medicines Act, a pharmacist, with certain
exceptions is obliged to inform
members of the public who visit his
or her pharmacy with a prescription from a doctor of the benefits of
the substitution of an
original medicine with a generic product. The
pharmacist is furthermore obliged to dispense the generic instead of
the innovator
medicine (the brand name medicine) prescribed by the
medical practitioner unless the patient insists on the prescribed
medicine.
Section 22F acknowledges that a patient to whom medicine is
prescribed and dispensed has the right of choice between the products
available on the market to cure his or her condition.
[23]
A patient is entitled to be informed of the available options and to
make a choice regarding the pharmaceutical product he wishes
to use.
[40]
In the present matter, the applicants seek to prevent the respondent,
by way of an interdict,
from using the trade mark FURIZOME in
relation to a pharmaceutical product that is intended to treat
urinary tract infections.
The respondent’s product contains the
active ingredient Fosfomycin a Schedule 4 prescription product. The
applicants seek
an interdict based on
s 34(1)(a)
of the
Trade Marks
Act
>,
for passing off as well as under the broader aegis of
unlawful competition. The success or failure of the applicants’
application
depends upon a finding as to whether or not the trade
mark FURIZOME can be said to be confusingly similar to the trade mark
URIZONE,
which is the subject of a valid registration in class 5 for
a broad specification of goods that includes pharmaceutical
preparations.
[41]
The URIZONE trade mark is widely recognised as being associated with
the same goods that the
Respondent markets under the FURIZOME name,
which is essentially a generic alternative to the applicants' URIZONE
product. It is
also acknowledged that the goods associated with the
respondent’s FURIZOME product falls within the specification of
goods
in respect of which the URIZONE trademarks are registered and
that it is used in the course of trade.
[42]
In order to establish infringement in terms of
s 34(1)(a)
of the
Trade Marks Act it
is necessary for the plaintiff to show:
[24]
(a) use of the
registered mark or of a mark so nearly resembling it as to be likely
to deceive or cause confusion;
(b) that the use is
in relation to the goods or services in respect of which the trade
mark is registered;
(c) that the use is
in the course of trade;
(d) that the use is
unauthorised; and
(e) that the use is
trade mark use.
[43]
In the present matter, the applicants’ cause of complaint is
about the respondent’s
use of the FURIZOME trade mark.
According to the applicants, the respondent is making such use of
FURIZOME in the course of trade
as envisaged in s 34(1) of the Act.
Furthermore, the respondent is making use of the trade mark in
relation to goods in respect
of which the third applicant’s
registered URIZONE trade marks are registered. The applicants assert
that the respondent is
making use of FURIZOME as a trade mark, a mark
so virtually resembling the applicants’ registered URIZONE
trade mark which
is likely to deceive or cause confusion. In the
applicants’ opinion, there is a real danger of deception or
confusion between
the trade marks URIZONE and FURIZOME having regard
to the real, visual and conceptual similarities between the two trade
marks.
[44]
As previously stated, the key issue for this court to determine is
whether the URIZONE and the
FURIZOME trademarks are confusingly or
deceptively similar. In an infringement application, as in the
current case, the
onus
is
on the applicant to show the probability or likelihood of deception
or confusion. It is not incumbent upon the applicants to
show that
every person interested or concerned (usually as customer) in the
class of goods for which his trade mark has been
registered
would probably be deceived or confused. It is sufficient if the
probabilities demonstrate that a substantial number
of individuals
will be deceived or confused.
[25]
The determination of what constitutes a substantial number is a
matter of fact.
[26]
[45]
The question of the likelihood of confusion or deception is a matter
of first impression and
entails an objective test.
[27]
The meaning of the expression ‘to be likely to deceive or cause
confusion’ has been held to mean that there is an onus
on the
plaintiff to show the probability or likelihood or deception or
confusion.
[28]
In evaluating
whether this onus has been discharged, the concept of ‘global
appreciation’ should be applied.
This means that a global
appreciation of the visual, oral or conceptual similarity of the two
marks in question, must be based
on the overall impression given by
the marks, bearing in mind, particularly, their distinctive and
dominant components. Therefore,
the general impression of the two
marks (URIZONE and FURIZOME) should be considered. The inquiry is not
whether there are differences,
but whether the general appearance is
such that a person looking casually at the marks (with an imperfect
recollection) would be
deceived, or misled. The infringing party is
not permitted to rely on a matter that is extraneous to the mark to
negate the likelihood
of deception or confusion.
[29]
[46]
It is common cause that the URIZONE trademark is used for the same
types of goods as those associated
with the Respondent’s
FURIZOME product. Furthermore, the FURIZOME product is, in fact, a
generic substitute for the URIZONE
product offered by the applicants.
It is also common cause that the third Applicant owns the trademark
for the URIZONE pharmaceutical
product. Additionally, there is no
question that the respondent's FURIZOME product is utilised in the
course of business and that
falls within the specifications of the
commodities for which the URIZONE trademarks are registered. The
dispute lies in whether
the respective trade marks are confusingly
similar.
[47]
It is incontestable that the URIZONE trademark has acquired a
reputation and goodwill in South
Africa. It is renowned to
individuals interested in the product or services associated with the
mark. The URIZONE trade mark was
launched in South Africa in 1993 and
is currently available in over 2000 pharmacies throughout South
Africa, including all the
pharmaceutical chains, wholesalers, and
industrial clinics. The URIZONE trademark had been in use in South
Africa to such an extent
that it enjoyed a considerable reputation
and goodwill. It is recognised as a well-known trade mark. It is a
well-recognised pharmaceutical
product in South Africa and has been
widely prescribed and dispensed throughout the country over the past
thirty years by thousands
of medical practitioners.
[48]
On the other hand, the respondent’s FURIZOME product is
classified as a generic medicine.
Similar to the applicant’s
URIZONE product, it is used for the treatment of acute, uncomplicated
lower urinary tract infections
caused by sensitive e-coli in women,
as well as for prophylaxis in diagnostics and surgical transurethral
procedures in adult men.
The FURIZONE product, similar to the
applicant’s URIZONE, is sold as a single dose in 3 grams
sachets. On a conspectus of
all the facts placed before the court, I
am of the view that when the respondent adopted the FURIZOME trade
mark it was clearly
aware of the applicant’s URIZONE and the
respondent took advantage of the reputation and goodwill associated
with the URIZONE
trade mark of the applicant.
[49]
It is important to emphasise that both URIZONE and FURIZOME are terms
that have been invented.
Both trade marks are aurally similar and are
used to treat urinary infection. Since both pharmaceuticals are
designed to treat
the same condition and are packaged in 3-gram
sachets, the potential and risk for confusion between the two is
considerable. The
two words (trade marks) are markedly similar,
confusingly so. In my view, there is genuine and real danger of
deception or confusion
between the trade marks URIZONE and FURIZOME,
especially having regard particularly to the oral, visual and
conceptual similarities
that connect the two trade marks.
[50]
Evidently, the only distinction between the trade marks FURIZOME and
URIZONE is that the respondent’s
FURIZOME trade mark starts
with the letter ‘F’, while the ‘N’ in the
applicants’ URIZONE trade mark
has been substituted with the
letter ‘M’ in the respondent’s trade mark. These
differences, in my view, are insignificant.
The dominant element of
both marks bears substantial resemblance and creates a lasting impact
on consumer’s minds. Interestingly,
when the respondent sought
to obtain approval for the name from SAHPRA to be used in respect of
this particular product, it submitted
two names; namely, FURIZOME on
the one hand; and FOSFOMYCIN 3g CIPLA. Both names were accepted. As
Mr Michau correctly pointed
out, the rationale behind the submission
of the two names remain unexplained, but it’s clear that the
respondent had concerns
about the approval of its "FURIZOME"
name.
[51]
The respondent’s FURIZOME trademark in essence consists of
letter “F” followed
by “Uri”, which alludes
to the intended use of the medicine, followed by the word with no
meaning, namely “
zome”
, that is F-URI-ZOME. The
applicants’ URIZONE trademark on the other hand, in essence
consists of the word ‘Uri’
which alludes to the intended
use of the medicine followed by ‘
zone’
which means
inter alia
‘region’ or ‘area’. The
combination of the trademark URI-ZONE is obviously not a known word.
However, it
is distinctive and imaginative. A detailed comparison of
the two trade marks reveals their evident and concerning
similarities,
which may lead to confusion and deception among
consumers. In my view, the two trade marks reveal striking
similarities that pose
a risk of confusion and deception among
consumers.
[52]
In addition, the overlapping characteristics between the two trade
marks may mislead the public,
blurring the lines between the distinct
identities that each trademark is intended to present and convey. To
my mind, the overall
impression conveyed by the marks as wholes
closely resemble each other, both in appearance and sound. The
respondent’s trade
mark bears a resemblance to the applicant’s
trade mark and is likely to deceive or to cause confusion.
Furthermore, the essential
feature of the applicant’s mark Uri
and Zone had been incorporated in the respondent’s FURIZOME
trade mark. Clearly,
the substitution of the letter ‘N’
with an ‘M’ on the suffixes of the two marks is
inconsequential. Accordingly,
there is clearly a likelihood of
deception and confusion in the two marks.
[53]
When comparing the two trade marks, it should be borne in mind that
the letters ‘N’
and ‘M’ look and sound very
similar. Both suffixes “
zone”
and “
zome”
look and sound virtually identical. The letters ‘M’
and ‘N’ are virtually indistinguishable in pronunciation.
As correctly pointed out by the applicant’s expert Stephan
Muhr, the ‘N’ and ‘M’ sounds are often
interchangeable and can be confused in the middle of words. The
letters ‘N’ and ‘M’ are somewhat unique
in
English pronunciation as they are both classified as nasal
consonants. Nasal consonants are consonants that are formed through
air escaping through the nose and not the mouth. This means that the
articulation of the two sounds is very similar, which can
lead to
confusion or interchangeability. In addition, the prefixes ‘
uri’
and ‘
furi’
are, both visually and phonetically
virtually indistinguishable. Considering the principles of imperfect
recollection and deception,
it can never be said that, at the very
least there would not be transitory confusion
.
[54]
There is no doubt that potential patients (consumers) will most
likely be confused between the
trademarks URIZONE and FURIZOME when
confronted with these trademarks and when the product is prescribed
or dispensed by a pharmacist.
I am mindful of the argument made by Mr
Puckrin and the evidence of Ms Haigh, the respondent’s expert
witness who confirms
how medicines are dispensed to the public and
that there are numerous safeguards against confusion between
medicines. However,
I believe doctors are not infallible, and do not
possess a perfect recollection or perception of even all medicines
they prescribe.
They too make mistakes.
[55]
In my view, pharmacists and doctors are human and are not immune to
factors such as imperfect
recollection and mispronunciation. They too
can be confused or deceived. Even a doctor advising a pharmacist
telephonically which
drug to provide the patient with can lead to
confusion given the virtually identical pronunciation. As correctly
pointed out by
the applicants, the trade marks are so similar that if
a doctor had heard from a colleague (telephonically perhaps) that
he/she
should prescribe URIZONE and he/she comes across FURIZOME,
he/she might wonder if his/her colleague did not perhaps mention the
drug FURIZOME and then simply prescribe the incorrect drug.
[56]
Most significantly, both pharmaceuticals are intended to treat the
same condition. The applicant
pointed out in the founding affidavit
that, regarding doctors and pharmacists, one should bear in mind the
handwriting of doctors
on prescription scripts. Situations are likely
to arise where a doctor may prescribe the applicants’ URIZONE
trade mark,
and a pharmacist may be confused into believing that the
doctor in fact prescribed the FURIZOME product or the other way
round.
Accordingly, in addition to the above, considering the
condition that these products are meant to treat, that both are
available
in a 1 x 3g sachet, the possibility of confusion is
unavoidable even when prescribed by doctors and dispensed by a
pharmacist.
[57]
I do not intend to deal with the scenarios (discussed above)
postulated by the respondent in
the answering affidavit and in the
heads of argument
ad seriatim
. However, I have to emphasise
that in years gone by, the law insofar as prescription drugs was
concerned was always that because
the products are prescribed by
medical doctors and dispensing pharmacists, a higher standard of care
is expected. Therefore, the
marks needed to be even more closely
align together before infringement could be found than was ordinarily
the case. However, by
enacting
s 22F
of the
Medicines and Related
Substances Act 101 of 1965
, the legislature jettisoned this approach
from the discourse.
[58]
The legislature has acknowledged the emergence of a significant
transformative trend in healthcare
among the public over the past two
decades. Members of the public are far more aware of the types of
treatment or different pharmaceuticals
available for the treatment of
specific conditions, the pros and cons of those treatment as well as
the clinical successes associated
with those products. Patients have
generally started to take greater responsibility for their own
healthcare, rather than relying
solely upon their doctors and
pharmacists to decide. The patient has emerged as one of the three
tiers on which pharmaceuticals
are promoted and marketed. The patient
can exercise this right,
inter alia,
by asking for the
prescribed medicine by name. To this end,
s 22F
creates a tripartite
relationship or a “triad” of relevant consumers,
consisting of the “
practitioner, pharmacist and patient
”
in which pharmaceuticals are marketed.
[59]
The existence of the triad was confirmed by the SCA in
Adcock
Ingram v Cipla Medpro,
(“
the ZETOMAX judgment
”),
where the court found that because of the advent of generic
medicine and the provisions of
s 22F
of
Medicines and Related
Substances Act 101 of 1965
, the patient, as such the ordinary member
of the public, plays a role in deciding upon his or her medication,
no longer remaining
a passive participant in the purchasing process.
The ZETOMAX judgment was decided in terms of
s 10(14)
of the
Trade
Marks Act. The
court noted that the question of a likelihood of
deception or confusion in relation to chronic prescription
medications must be
answered with reference not to the specialised
market of prescription medication only, but with reference to the
patient as well.
The court stated:
‘
The patient is the
ultimate consumer whose wishes may not be disregarded and who has the
right to participate in any decision concerning
his health and
treatment. It may well be that there is little likelihood of the
medical practitioner or pharmacist being deceived
or confused, but
the enquiry does not end there’.
[30]
[60]
Notwithstanding the fact that one is dealing with prescription
medicine, the reality is that
patients are involved in the process of
deciding which medicines they will use, and that creates the risk of
confusion. This situation
in turn creates a responsibility upon
pharmaceutical companies to make sure that they adopt trade marks
that are not confusingly
similar. A patient, and perhaps also a
professional, who knows only the one word and has an imperfect
recollection of it is likely
to be mistaken. As correctly stated by
the SCA in the ZETOMAX matter, one must make allowance for imperfect
recollection and the
effect of careless pronunciation rather than
comparing the two words letter by letter or syllable by syllable.
Thus, upon examining
the two marks as a whole and recognising their
similarities, the general impression is that they are remarkably
alike to the point
of causing confusion.
[61]
Ostensibly the respondent argues that because Schedule 4 medicines
are involved one should ignore
the role patients play in deciding on
the medicines to be prescribed and dispensed. Furthermore, the
argument by Mr Puckrin that
various safeguards exist that regulate
the supply, prescription, dispensing and sale of schedule 4
prescription medications to
protect the relevant consumers
(particularly patients) against a likelihood of confusion or
deception blissfully ignores the role
of the public, or patient, in
making their own medical choices and in deciding upon which product
they wish to be treated with.
There are certainly scenarios where
patients do play a role in deciding on the medicine for their health
and in that process, there
exists a great possibility of consumer
deception or confusion.
[62]
It is incontrovertible that in many cases patient ask doctors to
prescribe the medicine that
they are familiar with, have used before,
or heard about. It is reasonable to conclude that this will be the
case. When a patient
request for a specific medicine by its brand
name for a particular condition diagnosed by the doctor, it will
likely be a medicine
that they are familiar with, or have heard
about, or read of. If the name of the medication aimed at the same
ailments are confusingly
similar, it obviously poses a risk of these
patients becoming confused. In this case, there exists a significant
risk of deception
or confusion to patients arising from the two
strikingly similar trade marks URIZONE and FURIZOME.
[63]
Distinctive and distinguishable trade mark play a crucial role in the
competitive landscape of
pharmaceutical products. What I also find
concerning is the fact that the respondent selected this particular
name, despite having
another name, completely different in every
respect, that was approved by SAHPRA. The only inference to be drawn
is that the respondent
wanted to take advantage of the reputation and
goodwill of the applicants’ URIZONE, and this cannot be
countenanced. Accordingly,
this court finds that the two trade marks
URIZONE and FURIZOME are visually, aurally and conceptually similar
and that there exists
a likelihood of confusion or deception among
consumers.
Order
[64]
Given all these considerations, the following order is granted:
64.1
The respondent is interdicted and restrained in terms of
s 34(1)(a)
of the
Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993
from infringing the third
applicant’s trade mark registration number 1995/00309 URIZONE
in class 5 by using in relation to
the pharmaceutical product, the
trade name FURIZOME or any other trade mark so nearly resembling the
third applicant’s URIZONE
trade mark so as to be likely to
deceive or cause confusion.
64.2
The respondent is interdicted and restrained from passing-off its
pharmaceutical products as those of the
applicants or associated with
the pharmaceutical products of the applicants by using in any manner
or form the trademark FURIZOME
or any confusingly similar trademark
or name.
64.3
The respondent is interdicted and restrained from unlawfully
competing with the applicants by using in any
manner or form the
trademark FURIZOME or any confusingly similar trademark.
64.4
The respondent is ordered to pay the applicants’ costs,
including the costs of two counsels were so
employed.
LEKHULENI JD
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
APPEARANCES
For
the Applicant: Adv R Michau SC
Instructed
by: Spoor & Fisher
For
the Respondent: Adv C E Puckrin SC
Instructed
by: Kisch IP
[1]
In terms of
s 46
of
Patents Act 57 of 1978
, the duration of a patent
is 20 years from the date of the patent application subject to the
patentee or agent paying the renewal
fees.
[2]
See s 2A of the Medicines and Related Substance Act 101 of 1965.
[3]
It provides: ‘Medicines which contain a substance appearing in
Schedule 2, Schedule 3, Schedule 4, Schedule 5 or Schedule
6 may be
advertised only for the information of medical practitioners,
dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists and other persons
authorised to
prescribe or in a publication which is normally or only made
available to persons referred to therein.’
[4]
[2012] ZASCA 39.
[5]
See s 22A(5)(a) – (e) of the Medicines Act.
[6]
Section 22 of the Medicines Act; General Regulation 45(2) of the
Regulations to the Medicines Act; Regulation 5.2 of the SAHPRA
Advertising Guidelines.
[7]
Truworths
Ltd v Primark Holdings
2019
(1) SA 179
(SCA) at paras 6-7, 11, 16, 17 and 57; See also
Mcdonald's
Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd and Another;
Mcdonald's Corporation v Dax Prop CC and Another;
Mcdonald's
Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd And Dax Prop
CC
1997
(1) SA 1 (A).
[8]
Bata
Ltd v Face Fashions CC and Another Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC and
Another (206/98) [2000] ZASCA
192
(29 September 2000) at para 9
;
see
also
Sabel
BV v Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport
[1998]
RPC 199.
[9]
See
Ramsay
Son & Parker (Pty) Ltd v Media 24 Limited and New Media
Publishing (Pty) Ltd
,
2008 BIP 149 (C) para 12.
[10]
National
Brands Ltd v Blue Lion Manufacturing (Pty) Lt
d
2001 (3) SA 563
(SCA) para 10.
[11]
2001 (3) SA 941
(SCA) para 10; See also
Bata
Ltd v Face Fashions
CC
2001 (1) SA 844 (SCA).
[12]
Smithkline
Beecham Consumer Brands (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Beecham South
Africa (Pty) Ltd v Unilever plc
[1995] ZASCA 26
;
1995
(2) SA 903
(A) at 912H.
[13]
Plascon-
Evans Paints (Pty) Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
1984
(3) SA 623 (A).
[14]
Bata v
Face Fashions CC and Another
2001
(1) SA 844
(SCA) para 9;
Cowbell
AG v ICS Holdings Ltd
2001
(3) SA 941
(SCA) para 10.
[15]
Casadobe
Props 60 (Pty) Ltd v Fratelli Martini Secondo Luigi SpA
(759/2023)
[2025] ZASCA
14
(25 February 2025) at para 12.
[16]
Century
City Apartments Property Services CC and Another v Century City
Property Owners’ Association
2010
(3) SA 1
(SCA) para 13.
[17]
Compass
Publishing BV v Compass Logistics Ltd
[2004] EWHC 520
;
[2004]
RPC 41
para 24.
[18]
At para 13.
[19]
See sections 8, 18A, 18B, 18C, 19 and 22A of the Medicines Act.
[20]
See
s 15
of the
Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965
.
[21]
See paras 1.4.4 and 1.4.5 and 1.1.5 of the SAHPRA Guidelines to
scheduling of substances and Medicines of May 2022.
[22]
See para 5.2 of the SAHPRA’s Guidelines for advertisement of
Medicines and Health products.
[23]
Section 22F of the Medicines Act provides: ‘Generic
Substitution: Subject to subsection (2), (3) and (4), a pharmacist
or a person licensed in terms of section 22C (1)(a) shall- (a)
inform all members of the public who visit the pharmacy or any
other
place where dispensing takes place, as the case may be, with a
prescription of dispensing, of the benefits of the substitution
for
a branded medicine by an interchangeable multi source medicine, and
shall, in the case of a substitution, take reasonable
steps to
inform the person who prescribed the medicine of such substitution;
and (b) dispense an interchangeable multi source
medicine instead of
the medicine prescribed by a medical practitioner, dentist, nurse or
other person registered under the Health
Professions Act, 1974,
unless expressly forbidden by the patient to do so.’
[24]
Webster
and Page
,
South
African Law of Trade Marks
4th
Ed (1997), par 12.7, p 12-13;
Kraft
Foods, Inc v All
Jov
Foods (Ptv) Ltd
1999 BIP 122 (T).
[25]
Truworths
Ltd v Primark Holdings
2019
(1) SA 179
(SCA) at para 6.
[26]
McDonald’s
Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd and Another;
MacDonald’s Corporation v Dax Prop
CC and Another
1997 (1) SA 1
(A) at 20
B-E.
[27]
Puma AG
Rudolf Dassier Sport v Global Warming (Pty) Ltd
2010 (2) SA 600
(SCA) at
para 11.
[28]
Ramsden P
Guide
to intellectual Property Law
(2011)
1
st
Ed at 162.
[29]
Adidas
AG and Another v Pepkor Retail Limited
2013
BIP 203 (SCA).
[30]
At para 30.
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